Methodological Naturalism

[RoadRunner79]

Methodological Naturalism
This thread is about the usefulness of methodological naturalism in science as a philosophy.  I don’t think that it has any usefulness apart from smuggling in a philosophical naturalism into science; dictating the results of what scientist can find in my opinion is a bad thing.  Methodical Naturalism as I am talking about here can be defined as limiting the conclusions of science to only natural causes.  

Science is the study of the universe to give us the best explanation for why things are the way they are and how they work, and what caused them.  I agree, that (especially in the natural  sciences), that it is concerned with the study of the natural world where testable and repeatable patterns are found, to determine how the universe works and to predict under certain circumstances what will occur.   These hard sciences would be things like physics, chemistry, and biology.  I can understand under this definition, how a methodological naturalism might apply as you are looking for specific things in nature.  Very early science referred to pretty much the systematic study of anything.  Theology could be considered a science.  However, I find that there is a definition in the middle of these two extremes that is also used today.   That is the use of scientific tools, to make in inference to the best explanation for a cause from an effect.   You will find this in the historical and forensic sciences such as evolution.   It’s part of the reason that defining science (or the demarcation of science) is a difficult philosophical issue, and why repeatability is not really a part of the definition of science any longer.  

This last definition is what I am talking about when talking about science.  That scientist use the tools available to them, in the study of the natural world, to come to the best explanation for a cause.  Science that is using inductive logic, rather than deductive.   There was a time in the discussion of the demarcation of science, where inductive logic was not science at all, but this is not generally the case now.  

There are some objections to the removal of methodological naturalism from science.  Some argue, that if non-natural forces are allowed to be considered as a cause, then they can simply be invoked for any abnormality or un-explained result in an experiment.   That we cannot have science, if non-regular, non-repeating forces are allowed.  That it will lead to “of the gaps” type arguments where what is unknown, is simply replaced by a non-naturalistic explanation.   I disagree, with any inductive argument, you still need to support your premises and logic to reach your conclusion.  An “of the gaps” type argument isn’t any better with an assumption of naturalism, any more than it is; if there if there the non-natural is also allowed.  You need to support your conclusion either way.  You need to provide facts, that lead to your conclusion.  It is argued, that we cannot do science, if we can simply assume that some supernatural force meddled with the results, but if one is promoting this, it leads to the same questions, if you are claiming that a natural force interfered with your results… why do you think that?  Or if you think that a person messed with your results.
Another argument is that once you conclude the supernatural, then you are no longer doing science.   I can see a point here, but I don’t find this compelling either.  This would make the definition of science about the conclusion, and not the method and study.   If you are doing science up until the point of the conclusion, and one group believes that the cause is natural forces and laws, and another gives good reason that natural forces are not responsible, then I don’t think that it’s right to say that one group was doing science all along, while the other was not.   This would also beg the question if a study doesn’t not come to a conclusion and the answer lies outside of their grasp, are they “doing science”   If I’m troubleshooting a machine, and I’m called in for what is believed to be an electrical/control problem; if I use my skills and abilities to eliminate an electrical/controls cause, that doesn’t mean that I wasn’t doing electrical work.  It is because of the use of electrical methods and testing, that I can infer a mechanical problem.  At this point, then perhaps I call someone else to take over, or if capable, then I look at the mechanical problem.  The electrical work stops in either case, but that is because the best explanation was not an electrical problem.  It doesn’t invalidate the electrical work, that I did, to come to that conclusion. 
So, I think that methodological naturalism hamstrings science, dictating what can be the conclusion, rather than reasoning from the evidence and work, to the best explanation.   I don’t agree with “of the gaps” arguments of any kind, or that a certain answer must be pre-determined.   I don’t think that the use of the term methodological naturalism is a benefit to the field of science, or that certain conclusions of any type should be a priori to any study.

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I wrote this fairly quickly, but I think that it is enough to get a conversation started.   Do you think that methodological naturalism is a benefit to science?   If so why?

[The Grand Nudger]

What do you think the utility of some other position would be, and how would something other than methodological naturalism apply to the sciences?  What instruments do we possess that could certify or quantify a non-natural x?

I agree that methodological naturalism is limiting, this is an intentional state of affairs. That limitation safeguards against at least some unintentional (or even inevitable) errency.

[RoadRunner79]

What do you think the utility of some other position would be, and how would something other than methodological naturalism apply to the sciences?  What instruments do we possess that could certify or quantify a non-natural x?

I agree that methodological naturalism is limiting, this is an intentional state of affairs.  That limitation safeguards against at least some unintentional (or even inevitable) errency.

As I said, I think that this applies more to the inductive sciences.   Where one is making an inference.  In that case, then you are not measuring anything directly as to the cause, but reasoning to the best explanation.  In this case, there is room for error, which is true if you are reasoning to a natural cause/force or a non-natural one.  There was times in the past, where the philosophy of the day (modernism) would not have included anything that couldn't be absolutely verified.   But this ideology isn't held as much anymore, and would eliminate sciences such as theoretical science, evolution, cosmology.   Anything that cannot be verified directly (if held consistently).

[The Grand Nudger]

I'm not sure why biology or cosmology would be excluded on basis of verification - both have productive avenues of verification open to them, but lets lay that aside. What other x's do you think should be included, and with what instruments should we measure them?

[RoadRunner79]

I'm not sure why evolution or cosmology would be excluded on basis of verification - both have productive avenues of verification open to them, but lets lay that aside.  What other x's do you think should be included, and with what instruments should we measure them?

It's more about the ideology, and eliminating something as a possibility a priori even if it is the best explanation.  Using inductive logic from the data that is measured, to come to a conclusion from that data.   You are not measuring something directly.   Would you eliminate any inference to the best explanation from the category of science if it cannot be directly measured?

[The Grand Nudger]

Well, methodological naturalism isn't about eliminating a possibility.  It's more an acceptance of the limitations of our instrumentation.  We simply don't possess a "godometer", for lack of a better term.  As soon as someone builds one, we could use it, i guess?

[RoadRunner79]

Well, methodological naturalism isn't about eliminating a possibility.  It's more an acceptance of the limitations of our instrumentation.  We simply don't possess a "godometer", for lack of a better term.  As soon as someone builds one, we could use it, i guess?

So we cannot make inferences from the data that we do have?    Are you saying that only directly measured data, and not logical induction are to be included under the category of science?  It sounds like you are going to quickly get into the problems of philosophical modernism if so.

[The Grand Nudger]

OFC we can make inferences based upon the data we have...but since all of our instruments collect natural data, then the inferences which can be produced by reference to them is limited to the same. What else are we to include, and by what instrumentation are we to collect the data with which to make inferences?

[RoadRunner79]

OFC we can make inferences based upon the data we have...but since all of our instruments collect natural data, then the inferences which can be produced by reference to them is limited to the same.  What else are we to include, and by what instrumentation are we to collect the data with which to make inferences?

I collect electrical data to infer a mechanical problem all the time.  I did so just the other day with a stuck solenoid.  I would also say that this is a current issue with science.  That it has become so specialized, and that there is too few people who collect data from different fields and subject matters that don't combine the information together.  Also, what logic leads you to conclude that data limited by the collection of natural means, is also limited to natural means as a conclusion?   In my personal example above, this does not seem to follow.  For instance, one might collect data from within the universe, to determine to come to the conclusion that it is an open system and either gaining or losing energy to something outside of the universe.

[Whateverist]

Well, methodological naturalism isn't about eliminating a possibility.  It's more an acceptance of the limitations of our instrumentation.  We simply don't possess a "godometer", for lack of a better term.  As soon as someone builds one, we could use it, i guess?

So we cannot make inferences from the data that we do have?    Are you saying that only directly measured data, and not logical induction are to be included under the category of science?  It sounds like you are going to quickly get into the problems of philosophical modernism if so.

I think the answer to my bolded is an unqualified yes.  Science is restricted to the measurable world.  The inferences you want to avoid -as do I- will also prevent you from using science to establish God's existence.  Some people do draw conclusions from science which go too far, but it isn't the science part which is to blame.  Rather it is the smuggled in premise that nothing but what science can verify should ever be believed.  That is scientism and no more real science than is creationist science.  

Gae guy's point is valid, you're never going to establish the supernatural by way of the natural; and science only does apply to the natural world.  But at least you're never going to read a real science story disproving the supernatural either.