What would be the harm?

[bennyboy]

Yes, we ought to care about this and that, and any rational being could be made to understand why in reference to objective values...but that won't actually mean that they will.  A moral failure..in the objectivists schema, is a rational failure.

Why ought we? On what basis do you say we ought to do anything? 14 pages in, and you haven't answered this.

My answer is that there's nothing objectively wrong with any material state. However, feelings provide a context. People feel bad about the idea of having their daughters raped and murdered, so they negotiate a rule: "In our society, it will be considered wrong to rape and murder." If they didn't give a shit, they wouldn't have the feelings, and wouldn't bother to arrive at the rule. It's not the existence of rape which causes the rule to be made-- it's the feelings of subjective agents about the rape.

Your turn.

[The Grand Nudger]

Yes, we ought to care about this and that, and any rational being could be made to understand why in reference to objective values...but that won't actually mean that they will.  A moral failure..in the objectivists schema, is a rational failure.

Why ought we?  On what basis do you say we ought to do anything?  14 pages in, and you haven't answered this.

I focus more on the ought not's than the oughts, myself, but if you're actually drawing a blank as to why you should care about this, by this point in your life...and after so many conversations and explanations preceding, I doubt that any explantion of mine this time will reach you in any way that it failed to reach you before. Not that I believe this is anything more than another attempt to waste any effort spent on you and pivot to some other thing.

I don't have the patience for more than one line of your ridiculous shit at a time..so save yourself the trouble.

My answer is that there's nothing objectively wrong with any material state.  However, feelings provide a context.  People feel bad about the idea of having their daughters raped and murdered, so they negotiate a rule: "In our society, it will be considered wrong to rape and murder."  If they didn't give a shit, they wouldn't have the feelings, and wouldn't bother to arrive at the rule.  It's not the existence of rape which causes the rule to be made-- it's the feelings of subjective agents about the rape.

There you go again. 

An objectivist can simply explain to you that rape is wrong because it is harmful.  They can then lay out in explicit detail all of the harm they are referring to. This is what would make it objectively wrong as moral theorists discuss it, which is all that it has to do. If you don't care whether or not you cause harm then you don't care whether or not you cause harm...rape remains harmful regardless.  You should care, regardless. Your question above has been answered in a single sentence..but because you're irrational (and potentially fucked up in the head to an unreachable degree, lol) then no explanation would be expected to reach you...in this example, ofc. We make the rule because we recognize that it is wrong. That you can't...again...in the example...is a you problem, not moral realisms problem.

Which is just a restatement of what you quoted, at any rate.

The final refuge of "why should I care" for the otherwise unreachable...is that somebody will hit you over the head with a brick. Base and simple self interest, if nothing else.

---

-and just to piss all over you before you get the chance to waste another post...

No, that won't make a moral proposition any less objective, as has already been explained to you multiple times and at length, in this thread... and so many others.

[bennyboy]

Killing animals and putting them on a bun is clearly harmful to them by your definition. Would you say that you are therefore objectively morally wrong to do so?

Stepping on ants is clearly harmful to them. Do you cower at home in a vacuum-sealed room to prevent harming ants?

Or is it possible that since you don't have particularly strong emotions about the well-being of ants, that you go walking willy-nilly all over the place despite the objectively immoral harm that you might be inflicting? Is it possible that because your monkey brain likes eating meat, you will suppress any feelings of sympathy you might have toward the suffering of other living things so that you might increase your own enjoyment?

[The Grand Nudger]

Killing animals and putting them on a bun is clearly harmful to them by your definition.  Would you say that you are therefore objectively morally wrong to do so?

It is harmful, yeah.  That's what makes it morally relevant.  I take it this is something that you also observe?   Or is it merely something that we've imagined?

Stepping on ants is clearly harmful to them.  Do you cower at home in a vacuum-sealed room to prevent harming ants?

If I don't have a binding issue with killing cattle...what chance does an ant have to garner my sympathies?  

Or is it possible that since you don't have particularly strong emotions about the well-being of ants, that you go walking willy-nilly all over the place despite the objectively immoral harm that you might be inflicting?  Is it possible that because your monkey brain likes eating meat, you will suppress any feelings of sympathy you might have toward the suffering of other living things so that you might increase your own enjoyment?

It's always possible that we find ourselves implicated or wallowing in some thing that should give us pause , sure. I will absolutely do harm for the sheer enjoyment of it, among many other reasons and even for non reasons. What of it?

It's always possible..if there's any "there" there...to moral propositions.  If not, then LOLNO, and your questions regarding our shared observations are rendered absurd.  If it's just about my feelers and I don't give two feelers... then there's nothing morally relevant about killing cattle or ants or anything else. Does this statement match your moral intuitions or an objective description of morality based in harm? Can you understand why...if there's any "there" there to either of these questions you find pertinent, your notions regarding the basis of all moral schemas must be in error?

This argument.,..which we've seen before, is the "you eat meat so that makes morality all about feelers" gambit. I do eat meat..but that doesn't mean that my morality is based on my feelers. Assuming the absolute worst, it means that I knowingly do things I consider to be bad...which..ofc, we already knew was something that human beings do.

(eating meat is probably one of the least questionable things I've ever done..in the list of questionable things I've done, lol)

[bennyboy]

If I don't have a binding issue with killing cattle...what chance does an ant have to garner my sympathies?  

I dunno. You're the one claiming that there are objective mores floating around in the ether. My position is that since you don't have strong feelings about the animals' welfare, and since those around you don't elicit worry or fear of castigation about the issue, that you are unlikely to consider the welfare of the animals in your dietary decisions. But that's because I don't believe there are things which are just right because they're right-- I believe morality is a process of feeling and subsequent negotiation with others.

How about a lion? If it shreds an animal for lunch, is it acting immorally? Since you are claiming that causing harm is intrinsically moral, and not dependent on the whims of a subjective agent, does it really matter what kind of agent commits the harm? Or are you going to argue capacity, with the caveat that we don't get to consider brain function and determinism in considering capacity among humans?

[quote]
This argument.,..which we've seen before, is the "you eat meat so that makes morality all about feelers" gambit.  I do eat meat..but that doesn't mean that my morality is based on my feelers.  Assuming the absolute worst, it means that I knowingly do things I consider to be bad...which..ofc, we already knew was something that human beings do.

So you claim there are objective mores, give the example of the causing of physical harm being immoral, and then embrace the causing of physical harm, and with a certain degree of irreverence to boot. If instead, "Meh, they're just fucking cows" it was "Meh, they're just fucking homos" (or niggers, or bitches, or Republicans), would you accept the rejoinder "Meh. . . you might be right, but I take pleasure in it and anyway we know that people are imperfect."

Seems like about one step away from Friday-hookers-Sunday-confessional.

[The Grand Nudger]

If I don't have a binding issue with killing cattle...what chance does an ant have to garner my sympathies?  

I dunno.  You're the one claiming that there are objective mores floating around in the ether.  My position is that since you don't have strong feelings about the animals' welfare, and since those around you don't elicit worry or fear of castigation about the issue, that you are unlikely to consider the welfare of the animals in your dietary decisions.

Then you'd simply be wrong on each count...regarding articles that don't impeach moral objectivity in the first place.  That's a Benny problem..just as any of my dietary inequities would be a Gae problem.  Human beings are capable of moral failure, and..clearly, human beings are capable of rational failure...though, to a realist...the two statements are redundant as we've previously discussed.  It might be helpful for you to remember that deeming something to be wrong for the wrong reasons is just as much an example of a moral and/or rational failure as some other thing may be.

 But that's because I don't believe there are things which are just right because they're right--

Neither does a realist. Even a non natural realist considers things to be wrong because they present themselves as tokens of some type, that they signify a form.

I believe morality is a process of feeling and subsequent negotiation with others.

So does a realist.  A realist, however, in light of relevant facts of the matter, recognizes that this is not all there is to the subject.

How about a lion?  If it shreds an animal for lunch, is it acting immorally?

I don't think so, no.  We don't generally consider them capable of rational failure.  They are not like us in that relevant way.  If they had a mind capable of apprehending moral value...and that mind was capable of a moral assessment in light of that moral information...then we might hold them morally accountable.  Since they don't, they can't..and we wont.  I'm super friendly to the notion of sliding the bar closer to us than others may think..and it;s noted that many animals express a sort of proto moral impulse often described as a sense of empathy. This is generally thought to be the precursor of our own much more elaborate rational systems of morality - and it still informs us, deeply, with regards to it..though not always accurately.

Since you are claiming that causing harm is intrinsically moral, and not dependent on the whims of a subjective agent, does it really matter what kind of agent commits the harm?

Sure..why wouldn't it?  If were discussing moral objectivity, the ability to understand a moral proposition is relevant to any prospective moral agents desert.  If we're not..then, obviously, it doesn't matter at all.

Or are you going to argue capacity, with the caveat that we don't get to consider brain function and determinism in considering capacity among humans?

Don't we consider that, though, in determining any particular human beings moral capacity?  Why wouldn't we?  It does seem to be the case that there are human beings who either lack moral agency, or possess an underdeveloped moral agency.  Then, there is the fact that all human beings who do possess a well developed moral agency can still be compromised with respect to the same by a great many factors of both environment and biology.  

So you claim there are objective mores, give the example of the causing of physical harm being immoral, and then embrace the causing of physical harm, and with a certain degree of irreverence to boot.  If instead, "Meh, they're just fucking cows" it was "Meh, they're just fucking homos" (or niggers, or bitches, or Republicans), would you accept the rejoinder "Meh. . . you might be right, but I take pleasure in it and anyway we know that people are imperfect."

I actually do understand that some people take pleasure in their immorality, however that may express itself.  Whats the problem?  

Seems like about one step away from Friday-hookers-Sunday-confessional.

That probably has something to do with the fact that you're not listening. Or...I suppose you really could be as dumb as you're making yourself out to be, too? At some point...it gets hard to tell the difference between the two.

So, just to recap...that there are meaningfully objective moral propositions does not guarantee that any specific proposition is among them, or..that if said proposition is among them, it will compel all human beings to act equally - or even at all. We're capable of indifference, we're capable of moral ignorance, we're capable of moral failure.....and we're capable ( even hard wired to enjoy some amount) of base cruelty. In each of these cases, it is the moral agency of human beings that is shown to be suspect...not the meaningful objectivity of a moral proposition, or some fundamental human inability to form an objective moral proposition. Regardless of whether some moral proposition adequately communicates what is wrong and why, there will be people whose behavior and/or attitude does not conform to it.

That's why we reserve the right to hit people over the head with bricks, as previously noted. Sometimes, people just can't be reasoned with. Familiar? Ditto with animals. They generally don't wander into our mouths, control their populations, or stay off our property on account of sitting them down and having a rational chat about the various realities of our respective situations. Some of us are more like them than others, in that regard.

This is extremely relevant to consequentialist ethics, specifically in light of the fact that a consequentialist ethic is an invocation of instrumental goods. The contention is that doing (or not doing) some x will be good-for the good...but that doesn't mean that the thing x being done -is- good, in and of itself. There is both some amount of harm we allow for the good, and some amount of harm we are willing to do for the good. The success of either qualifier in principle depends on the rationality of the case being made....though,m hilarious, actually achieving the good may not. We can do that completely by accident. Just as we can fail by accident, or even out of necessity. That's one of the most troubling realizations of the human condition..at least in my book. That the instances in which we must succeed by necessity are vastly outweighed by those in which we must countenance some moral failure or another by the same. It may be that this won;t always be the case, that we are constrained at present by factors beyond any of our ability to adequately mediate. This could explain why our notions of moral desert are not immediately or directly equivalent to the status of our moral propositions. A ton of moral theory swirls around those questions. How, why, and when a person can do a bad thing that carries no weight of consequence...or when two identical consequences are not an issue of an identical moral failure. The long and short of this is that we appear to exist in a state of near perpetual moral and practical compromise...and, just to toss you a bone that makes your comments about religion vastly less infantile than you originally conceived them as...perhaps this is exactly what religion tries to express with concepts like sin and miasma and fate? They're not wrong in thinking that we exist in this state...and that they have some insight is hardly surprising..they written by human beings, after all. They're wrong in asserting that our desire to resolve it can instantiate an agent or force capable of doing so....and wrong in that even f it could, just as in the case with human beings, that would necessitate that this force or agent was remotely interested in doing so.

[bennyboy]

I don't think so, no.  We don't generally consider them capable of rational failure.  They are not like us in that relevant way.  If they had a mind capable of apprehending moral value...and that mind was capable of a moral assessment in light of that moral information...then we might hold them morally accountable.  Since they don't, they can't..and we wont.  I'm super friendly to the notion of sliding the bar closer to us than others may think..and it;s noted that many animals express a sort of proto moral impulse often described as a sense of empathy.  This is generally thought to be the precursor of our own much more elaborate rational systems of morality - and it still informs us, deeply, with regards to it..though not always accurately.

By what criteria do you establish capability? Is a rapist capable of not raping? What if he was abused as a child? What if he's just exceptionally sexually motivated? What if he's struggled for years against a deep-seated hatred of women?

Is rape still "objectively wrong" if not raping is just too darned hard for someone? How about murder, or genocide?

I think you and I probably have similar moral standards. However, in my opinion you cannot see the difference between cultural normalization of ideas predicated on feeling, and actual objective mores (which don't really exist except in the sense that they depend on a feeling mechanism which predates each of us individuals). Because certain mores are common enough, and you can see that they are common in your interaction with people in general, you believe that they are more than the linguistic expression of feeling.

Let me ask you this-- suppose we translated someone from a neolithic society or maybe from the bronze age, and we attempted to reconcile their views with ours. Would you be so confident saying that some things are intrinsically wrong?

[tackattack]

Don't bring up a time test, he won't like that.

[The Grand Nudger]

I don't think so, no.  We don't generally consider them capable of rational failure.  They are not like us in that relevant way.  If they had a mind capable of apprehending moral value...and that mind was capable of a moral assessment in light of that moral information...then we might hold them morally accountable.  Since they don't, they can't..and we wont.  I'm super friendly to the notion of sliding the bar closer to us than others may think..and it;s noted that many animals express a sort of proto moral impulse often described as a sense of empathy.  This is generally thought to be the precursor of our own much more elaborate rational systems of morality - and it still informs us, deeply, with regards to it..though not always accurately.

By what criteria do you establish capability?  Is a rapist capable of not raping?  What if he was abused as a child?  What if he's just exceptionally sexually motivated?  What if he's struggled for years against a deep-seated hatred of women?

There could be many reasons that a person is incapable.  They could also be capable and just not give a fuck. You've asked a half dozen versions of this question and the answer has been the same very time. Are you expecting it to suddenly change?

Is rape still "objectively wrong" if not raping is just too darned hard for someone?  How about murder, or genocide?

OFC, why would their individual inabilities change the moral appraisal of the act?  It only changes how we view their culpability for it.  In much the same way as harm still being bad, but a lion not being held morally accountable for doing harm....and just to draw that one even closer into the realm of applied justifications, the harm the lion causes and our inability to sit it down and have a little chat being the impetus to kill the lion.

I think you and I probably have similar moral standards.  However, in my opinion you cannot see the difference between cultural normalization of ideas predicated on feeling, and actual objective mores (which don't really exist except in the sense that they depend on a feeling mechanism which predates each of us individuals).  Because certain mores are common enough, and you can see that they are common in your interaction with people in general, you believe that they are more than the linguistic expression of feeling.

I'm perfectly capable of seeing the difference between cultural normalization of ideas and an objective moral schema. It's an objective moral schema I use to address those abusive effects of the cultural normalization of ideas in the first place.  An objective appraisal that lead me to concluide that there was nothing wrong with what julie and mark were doing, despite the cultural normalization of a prohibition on incest as wrong with the significant added oomph of my own disgust. Objective moral systems are neither based in common agreement nor competently argued against on account of disagreement, nor are they predicate on how we feel about a given thing. 

To argue against a fact based assessment...you have to argue against the facts, Benny. You would have to show, for example, how some thing x didn't actually cause harm, or that to do x was to cause a greater harm than to not do x. Not that people felt different ways about x. OFC they do, we all have our very own feelers, ffs, lol. Why is this so difficult for you to comprehend?

Let me ask you this-- suppose we translated someone from a neolithic society or maybe from the bronze age, and we attempted to reconcile their views with ours.  Would you be so confident saying that some things are intrinsically wrong?

As confident as I am now, yeah.  Interestingly enough, we imagine that there's more difference between us than exists now or ever has.  We date full modernity some 50k years ago precisely because what artifacts we see suggest a global culture similar to our own.  I can't recall the name of the researcher who wrote a fairly demonstrative paper on this...but they took the case of inuit, a culture then frozen in the neolithic... who left infants out to die in the snow.  It seemed culturally monstrous to those who first observed it and remained as such in the public mind for some time until it was carefully established that in the conditions they found themselves in, with a scarcity of resources and facing an immensely harsh environment - they simply could not accept the care of the child without harming other children and tribe members.  What seemed a monstrous disregard for the life of an infant was a sober appraisal of the value of life and the need to protect it, even if it meant doing something that would be otherwise unthinkable.

Thus, the instrumental good of the bad....toward the common good. Something immediately recognizable to any westerner. Here, again, just as in the case of the fir exinguishere..we did not have a value agreement, there was a disparity of empirical and rational information leading us to a misattribution of the intent of their actions and because of all this...a mistaken assumption that we were in moral disagreement. Armed with that information and capable of a rational assessment we find that our underlying value is coherent.

Now, if we observed them doing this today, it would be monstrous, because those relevant factors explaining that instrumental good are no longer the case. Leaving children out in the snow has lost any cover it may one have once had. They could say "but we've always done it this way, it's our tradition!" and that wouldn't make a lick of difference.

Like the hunter gatherer transported into my fire room and shown the value of a fire extinguisher. Myself transported to that time or that age and supplied with the relevant knowledge, I could also understand why they do some thing I consider horrid. Now, that won;t..in the end, gaurantee that I agree with them..and they could still be wrong....and so could I in my own time with something I take to be good or bad.

These are all completely uncontroversial propositions in moral realism. It simply isn't what you think it is, you have idiosyncratic definitions for terms in established use...and unlike either myself or the neolithic hunter.... you refuse to listen to see whether or not your concerns or disparate valuation is an issue of information rather than an actual case of disparate valuation.

---

Don't bring up a time test, he won't like that.

IKR, because I might just think that no thinking adult should need something this simple explained to them so many times, huh. 

[bennyboy]

OFC, why would their individual inabilities change the moral appraisal of the act?  It only changes how we view their culpability for it.  In much the same way as harm still being bad, but a lion not being held morally accountable for doing harm....and just to draw that one even closer into the realm of applied justifications, the harm the lion causes and our inability to sit it down and have a little chat being the impetus to kill the lion.

(I'll come back and answer some of your post later. Let me say that the posts are a little too long. Can we agree to something like not more than 10 lines of quoted text, and not more than 10 of fresh ideas?)

I have one question for you: How do you distinguish between the following cases:
1) There's an objective moral truth, and not more than one person in an argument is getting it right.
2) There's no objective moral truth, and two or more people have different ideas about how to think, act or feel about something.

You are probably familiar with my approach to truth: Truth-in-context™. Take, for example, abortion. GIVEN the sanctity of all human life, then abortion is wrong-- a human zygote is still human, and killing it represents harm to it. GIVEN that the sanctity of life depends on experience, and that a zygote cannot experience, and GIVEN the sanctity of a woman's right to self-determination, then abortion is pretty much fine.

My view of morality is that people will feel about things, will decide how they want things to be, and will go through a process of social negotiation, i.e. they'll cast their moral vote-- no objective truth required. But how would you establish one or the other to be correct? I don't think there IS a right answer to be found, even hypothetically, to questions like this.