Appeal to authority

[Neo-Scholastic]

It's the fallacy that something must be true, because an authority figure or expert sais so. I've been hearing this fallacy quite a lot and don't remember it being used to prove points which I personally believe to be true. Could it be, that the people trying to convince others of this point of view have a difficult time themselves believing their own claims?

"Biblical scholars say..."

The overwhelming number of scientists believe in global warming...

[polymath257]

Here you're setting an axiom, which is a philosophical or metaphysical claim. You are taking as given the idea that knowledge is only gained by testable and -- I assume -- empirical input. And that to be reliable it must be verifiable -- again, I assume by empirical testing. 

You are aware, I'm sure, that the axiom you've given -- that all reliable knowledge must be obtained through empirical verifiable methods -- is not something that can be confirmed by empirical and verifiable methods. So it's a claim that needs to be argued in a philosophical way. 

Experts or authorities on theology or philosophy can be very helpful in analyzing the axiom you use here. Metaphysics in general is -- by definition -- not something that physics can test. Hence the name "metaphysics." Yet we all have positions on metaphysical ideas. E.g., your position that science is the best source of knowledge. 

Good authorities on theology, metaphysics, or other branches of philosophy make careful arguments concerning issues which can't be tested in the way you want knowledge to be tested. There are claims about theology and metaphysics which are foolish, and claims which are very hard to disprove. The authorities, as in any field, help us to understand these. 

Sometimes people begin with the same axiom as you and then just assume that anything a metaphysician argues must be stupid. This has led to some very bad philosophizing from non-authorities in the field. If they begin with the assumption that all theology is stupid, they assume they can knock it down easily. But its isn't always this easy.

Philosophy is best when it considers all possibilities and worst when it thinks it has the truth.

Most of metaphysics, as traditionally done, starts with faulty assumptions about how things 'must be' and proceeds to derive rather useless conclusions.

So, here's the question: what can justify a belief? At the very least, there is a requirement that when two differing views are offered, there is some way to resolve the disagreement.

In math, the axioms are accepted and any disputed proof or example ultimately has to derive from those axioms. A dispute can be resolved by seeing if any proposed proof can be reduced to those axioms

In the science, a disagreement is resolved by finding some observational test where the two views predict different results and then going and doing the test. At least one of the viewpoints will be shown to be incorrect (assuming correct experimental design, etc).

What is the dispute resolution procedure for philosophy or theology? How do two differing theological views get mediated? By which gives the best argument? According to whom?

And, in the case of theology, where the idea is to get information about a deity (as opposed to information about what people have *thought* about deities), what possible way of resolving disputes is there? So, if a Christian and a Moslem disagree about the nature of God, what procedure is there to resolve the dispute?

I think we agree that there is none. And that means there isn't any actual justification for the beliefs of theologians as regards to deities, which means there is no knowledge about such.

---

I'd point out that mathematical knowledge isn't based on empirical studies. It is based on having a set of axioms that everyone agrees to use. But, that is also why mathematics *alone* says nothing about the real world. To say anything about the real world requires observation.

[Belacqua]

Most of metaphysics, as traditionally done, starts with faulty assumptions about how things 'must be' and proceeds to derive rather useless conclusions.

Well, this is true of some metaphysicians, and not true of others. Aristotle's metaphysics starts with the observations that things change. I don't think that's a faulty assumption. 

The most important moves away from Aristotelian metaphysics were brought about by Galileo and Newton, who are also not guilty of the charge you make. So I'd want to be careful with saying "most of metaphysics." Maybe it's true that most of anything is worthless (Sturgeon's Law) but that doesn't mean the whole field should be dismissed. 

Important metaphysicians have generally based their thinking on the best science of the time (Kant, Nietzsche) and important physicists have acknowledged their debt to philosophy (Einstein's comments on Schopenhauer, Heisenberg's book Physics and Philosophy, et.al.) 

So, here's the question: what can justify a belief? At the very least, there is a requirement that when two differing views are offered, there is some way to resolve the disagreement. 

Yes, this is an important question. 

"Some way to resolve the disagreement" may be tricky, however. I wouldn't want to say that only those questions are important which may be resolved by limited fragile human beings. Philosophy proceeds by dialectic -- people arguing with each other -- and many of its questions may never be resolvable. This doesn't mean they are worthless. 

In the science, a disagreement is resolved by finding some observational test where the two views predict different results and then going and doing the test. At least one of the viewpoints will be shown to be incorrect (assuming correct experimental design, etc).

What is the dispute resolution procedure for philosophy or theology? How do two differing theological views get mediated? By which gives the best argument? According to whom?

One way to address the question of how we have confidence in metaphysical positions would be to look at your own metaphysical beliefs and asking why you hold them so firmly. 

Based on what you've said, I think I can make a basic summary of your metaphysical position. Please correct me if I'm wrong:

1) Empirical observation tells us about the real world. 

2) Beliefs (things we hold to be true) about the real world are given increased confidence if they are intersubjectively repeatable. 

3) The real world is knowable at least in part through empirical observation intersubjectively repeated, except for math, which is largely not based on empirical observation, yet is in some way true and important for understanding the real world (in combination with observation). 

I'm certainly not saying these are bad metaphysical principles -- only that in themselves they are not provable through empirical observation. It leaves open some questions which I don't know about your metaphysical beliefs:

4) Is there anything about the real world which is not, even in principle, observable by humans? That is, is there any other subject, like math, which may be said to be true but is not empirically-based? 

5) The things which are outside science's purview: are they important to think about? Must we give up on them forever? Since Newton, science has progressed by accepting that certain things will be accepted without explanation. For example, Newton told us how gravity behaves, but gave no theory for what it is, and we still lack anything along those lines. Does this mean that such questions are forever unanswerable by humans? 

So, again, if I have these wrong please correct me. They are metaphysical issues on which I think you are very firm in your convictions. So you see that in principle it is possible to hold very firmly to a set of metaphysics without being stupid about it.

[Peebothuhlu]

At work.

Hey Belaqua!

Just a quick post/reply about your "Point 5'."

Newton was not formulating his works aout 'Something outside' of anything.

Another analogy might be an ancient Greek scholar giving a dissertation about the winds and predictive, developmental theorys pertaining to hurricanes.

I would say that science deals with "What is."

If you or others are suggesting there's a "What else." then working out just how that 'Else' interacts with 'Is' must be the next amount of work to be put in.

Cheers!

[polymath257]

Most of metaphysics, as traditionally done, starts with faulty assumptions about how things 'must be' and proceeds to derive rather useless conclusions.

Well, this is true of some metaphysicians, and not true of others. Aristotle's metaphysics starts with the observations that things change. I don't think that's a faulty assumption. 

The most important moves away from Aristotelian metaphysics were brought about by Galileo and Newton, who are also not guilty of the charge you make. So I'd want to be careful with saying "most of metaphysics." Maybe it's true that most of anything is worthless (Sturgeon's Law) but that doesn't mean the whole field should be dismissed. 

Important metaphysicians have generally based their thinking on the best science of the time (Kant, Nietzsche) and important physicists have acknowledged their debt to philosophy (Einstein's comments on Schopenhauer, Heisenberg's book Physics and Philosophy, et.al.) 

So, here's the question: what can justify a belief? At the very least, there is a requirement that when two differing views are offered, there is some way to resolve the disagreement. 

Yes, this is an important question. 

"Some way to resolve the disagreement" may be tricky, however. I wouldn't want to say that only those questions are important which may be resolved by limited fragile human beings. Philosophy proceeds by dialectic -- people arguing with each other -- and many of its questions may never be resolvable. This doesn't mean they are worthless. 

In the science, a disagreement is resolved by finding some observational test where the two views predict different results and then going and doing the test. At least one of the viewpoints will be shown to be incorrect (assuming correct experimental design, etc).

What is the dispute resolution procedure for philosophy or theology? How do two differing theological views get mediated? By which gives the best argument? According to whom?

One way to address the question of how we have confidence in metaphysical positions would be to look at your own metaphysical beliefs and asking why you hold them so firmly. 

Based on what you've said, I think I can make a basic summary of your metaphysical position. Please correct me if I'm wrong:

1) Empirical observation tells us about the real world. 

2) Beliefs (things we hold to be true) about the real world are given increased confidence if they are intersubjectively repeatable. 

3) The real world is knowable at least in part through empirical observation intersubjectively repeated, except for math, which is largely not based on empirical observation, yet is in some way true and important for understanding the real world (in combination with observation). 

I'm certainly not saying these are bad metaphysical principles -- only that in themselves they are not provable through empirical observation. It leaves open some questions which I don't know about your metaphysical beliefs:

4) Is there anything about the real world which is not, even in principle, observable by humans? That is, is there any other subject, like math, which may be said to be true but is not empirically-based? 

5) The things which are outside science's purview: are they important to think about? Must we give up on them forever? Since Newton, science has progressed by accepting that certain things will be accepted without explanation. For example, Newton told us how gravity behaves, but gave no theory for what it is, and we still lack anything along those lines. Does this mean that such questions are forever unanswerable by humans? 

So, again, if I have these wrong please correct me. They are metaphysical issues on which I think you are very firm in your convictions. So you see that in principle it is possible to hold very firmly to a set of metaphysics without being stupid about it.

You are close in many ways. Part of the issue is the definition of the term 'real world'. In part, I *define* it by what can be verified through the scientific method.

I don't consider math, in and of itself, to give knowledge about the real world. It does, however, provide a *language* with which to analyze the information we get. When it comes to the 'real world', I hesitate to say math is 'true'.

As for topics outside of the purview of science (other than math):


Morality is another realm where, potentially, there could be knowledge, but I don't know of any dispute resolution techniques for morality. So, while there is a potential there, I see it as mostly opinion at this point and not knowledge.

Similar comments can be had about aesthetics. I might believe there *could* be a dispute resolution procedure for such, but I know that at this point we don't have one.

I'd point out that Einstein described gravity as a curvature of spacetime, which is a dynamical entity in his viewpoint. So, in that sense, we *do* have a description of what gravity is. But, I will also say that any *fundamental* description of the real world (or anything else for that matter) *has* to be 'just so': anything other than that would be a deeper description.

Philosophy, for the most part, is good for discussions among friends and with alcohol. It doesn't give knowledge (no justification), but can help us orient or minds to new possibilities. Like I said, it is best when looking at possibilities and alternatives and worst when it thinks it has truth. At best, it helps us to formulate our *opinions* (unjustified beliefs) and gives us things to investigate.

[bennyboy]

It's one thing to depend on experts for ideas. The fallacy is in claiming something is true because an expert said it.

---

"According to einstein the closer to the speed of light an object is the slower time will pass for it, to an outside observer" -> not a fallacy.

"Eistein believed in god, therefore god exists" -> appeal to authority.

Correct.

We can verify the first claim and have. Not a fallacy.

We can't on the second, therefore a fallacy.

With all due respect, the appeal to authority has nothing to do with the verifiability or correctness of an assertion.  It doesn't matter if Einstein was right or wrong.  What matters is that you can't say, "Einstein said X, and he was the best scientist, so it's probably true."

[Belacqua]

At work.

In transports of delight.

[quote pid='1884854' dateline='1550189908']

Newton was not formulating his works aout 'Something outside' of anything.

Right -- I hope my spatial metaphor wasn't misleading. He certainly didn't go to work thinking his goal was to find something outside of the real world, or outside of science. 

It's just that his work ended up re-drawing the boundaries as to what science addresses, and what it considers to be a success.

Another analogy might be an ancient Greek scholar giving a dissertation about the winds and predictive, developmental theorys pertaining to hurricanes.

This is an excellent analogy, because it points up the differences between Aristotelian metaphysics and what came later. 

Weather happens through more or less materialist/mechanical causes. Masses of air push each other, and the movement of air has force enough to send the leaves flying when it bumps into them. It was axiomatic for pre-Newtonian science that for something to impart motion to something else, it required physical contact. The leaves needed a push from the wind. Although alchemists posited no-contact influence called "action at a distance," Galileo and other serious scientists rejected the idea. Spooky no-contact influence was too counterintuitive. 

Newton's success was to quantify the behavior of gravity in the complete absence of understanding how it did what it did. The Aristotelians would have considered this a failure, since it left out the part they wanted to explain -- why the affected object has motion imparted to it in the absence of contact. This is still unexplained. (But see my response to polymath, below.)

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In part, I *define* it [the real world] by what can be verified through the scientific method.

[/quote]

Good. This is a bold and clear metaphysical statement. It seems problematic to me, but certainly it's sufficient for getting through the day, and getting your car to start. 

I'd point out that Einstein described gravity as a curvature of spacetime, which is a dynamical entity in his viewpoint. So, in that sense, we *do* have a description of what gravity is. But, I will also say that any *fundamental* description of the real world (or anything else for that matter) *has* to be 'just so': anything other than that would be a deeper description.

Now I am no expert on this, so I hope you'll fill me in if I'm missing something big. 

But it seems to me that the concept of curved space is a way to explain better the behavior and trajectories of objects under the influence of gravity. It shows why a moon being pulled by gravity won't necessarily proceed in a line that is straight from the observer's point of view.

However, it still doesn't explain why the moon is attracted by the body with greater mass in the first place. And this is the question, to me. 

Curved space explains the curved trajectory of the moon, but not why the moon is pulled in the first place. Why doesn't it stand still, or move away from the object with greater mass? Is there some way in which the concept of curved space explains this?

At best, it helps us to formulate our *opinions* (unjustified beliefs) and gives us things to investigate.

I'd say that good philosophy provides lots of justification for our opinions, even when they are not ultimately provable one way or another. In fact I think that you could write down a number of philosophical justifications for your metaphysical opinion that the real world is disclosed to us through the scientific method. Surely you don't want to say you have NO justifications for that belief.

[polymath257]

At work.

In transports of delight.

[quote pid='1884854' dateline='1550189908']

Newton was not formulating his works aout 'Something outside' of anything.

Right -- I hope my spatial metaphor wasn't misleading. He certainly didn't go to work thinking his goal was to find something outside of the real world, or outside of science. 

It's just that his work ended up re-drawing the boundaries as to what science addresses, and what it considers to be a success.

Another analogy might be an ancient Greek scholar giving a dissertation about the winds and predictive, developmental theorys pertaining to hurricanes.

This is an excellent analogy, because it points up the differences between Aristotelian metaphysics and what came later. 

Weather happens through more or less materialist/mechanical causes. Masses of air push each other, and the movement of air has force enough to send the leaves flying when it bumps into them. It was axiomatic for pre-Newtonian science that for something to impart motion to something else, it required physical contact. The leaves needed a push from the wind. Although alchemists posited no-contact influence called "action at a distance," Galileo and other serious scientists rejected the idea. Spooky no-contact influence was too counterintuitive. 

Newton's success was to quantify the behavior of gravity in the complete absence of understanding how it did what it did. The Aristotelians would have considered this a failure, since it left out the part they wanted to explain -- why the affected object has motion imparted to it in the absence of contact. This is still unexplained. (But see my response to polymath, below.)

More specifically, Aristotle claimed that *every* change required a force. So, motion required a continuing force to keep the object moving. One of the BIG splits once Galileo and Newton came on the scene is that motion itself (uniformn, that is) didn't require a force. it was *change* in motion that requires a force.

I'd point out that the more modern view has gone away from the Newtonian 'action at a distance' formulation. Now, all forces are carried by 'fields' that interact with object to affect their motion.

---

In part, I *define* it [the real world] by what can be verified through the scientific method.

Good. This is a bold and clear metaphysical statement. It seems problematic to me, but certainly it's sufficient for getting through the day, and getting your car to start. 

I'd point out that Einstein described gravity as a curvature of spacetime, which is a dynamical entity in his viewpoint. So, in that sense, we *do* have a description of what gravity is. But, I will also say that any *fundamental* description of the real world (or anything else for that matter) *has* to be 'just so': anything other than that would be a deeper description.

Now I am no expert on this, so I hope you'll fill me in if I'm missing something big. 

But it seems to me that the concept of curved space is a way to explain better the behavior and trajectories of objects under the influence of gravity. It shows why a moon being pulled by gravity won't necessarily proceed in a line that is straight from the observer's point of view.

However, it still doesn't explain why the moon is attracted by the body with greater mass in the first place. And this is the question, to me. 

Curved space explains the curved trajectory of the moon, but not why the moon is pulled in the first place. Why doesn't it stand still, or move away from the object with greater mass? Is there some way in which the concept of curved space explains this?

Well, there is another aspect of Einstein's equations. This relates the amount of matter and energy is a region to the degree of curvature of spacetime in that region. So, mass curves spacetime and the curvature of spacetime affects the motion of other things in the region: that is gravity.


The details are probably irrelevant here, but the basic equation relates, on one side, an expression concerning the curvature of spactime and on the other side an expression describing the density of mass, energy, momentum, and stress. The geometry of spacetime, in turn, provides the notion of  a geodesic, which is the type of path that things move along if there are no other forces on them (like electromagnetism).

At best, it helps us to formulate our *opinions* (unjustified beliefs) and gives us things to investigate.

I'd say that good philosophy provides lots of justification for our opinions, even when they are not ultimately provable one way or another. In fact I think that you could write down a number of philosophical justifications for your metaphysical opinion that the real world is disclosed to us through the scientific method. Surely you don't want to say you have NO justifications for that belief.

Well, if solipsism is true, then all of my sensory information is false. Which is why I *define* the real world via the scientific method applied to sense data. It means that even in the cse of solipsism I can still look for patterns in my sense data, make predictions, and test to see if those patterns continue to hold.

And, of course, because of the basic problem of induction, I cannot know that the patterns I have seen up to now will continue to hold. But they do allow me to drive my car to work.
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