[Serious] The Good

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

Moderator Notice
Let’s all keep in mind that this is a “serious” thread. No insults, please.

Ah so that’s what serious means in the thread title.

Among other things, yes.

Boru

[brewer]

I am surprised that no one has mentioned Isaiah 45:7 yet. In it, G-d says that He creates evil.

The Jewish understanding of evil is a little bit different. And there are different types of evil. And sometimes people do evil for good reasons. When they go too far with their evil, then they are just plain evil-- example, Hitler. And when they do just the right amount of evil, then they are saviors-- example, Cyrus who is actually referred to as a moshiach in the OT.

Most acts of man are both good and evil. There is a little bit of evil in pretty much everything that is 'good', and there is a little bit of good in everything that is 'bad'. In the earthly realm, things aren't entirely good or entirely bad. There is a correct measure for everything. The correct measure is not necessarily a constant.

Every person has a capacity for evil that is equal to their capacity for good. They have a capacity for good that is equal to their capacity for evil. So Hitler could have been one of the greatest people in world history, had he chosen the better part of his nature. We have the yetzer hara (dark side) and the yetzer hatov (our better nature). There is a story of some students of a great Rabbi saying that their Rabbi had no yetzer hara. Another Rabbi objected, saying that they were insulting their Rabbi. To say that someone has no yetzer hara is to say that they are a zero, a doormat. Our dark side motivates us to do great things. Our better nature moderates the ambition of the dark side.

Not every person. Read the DSM5. Some have very little capacity for good (at least what others would consider good).

An example: https://psychcentral.com/blog/difference...sociopath/

[The Grand Nudger]

Notions like that are more invocation of theological preference for balance than statements of clinical or proportional fact.

[Yonadav]

Notions like that are more invocation of theological preference for balance than statements of clinical or proportional fact.

I presented a theological perspective as a theological perspective. I said that it was a theological perspective, right near the beginning of my post. This is a discussion; not an argument.

[The Grand Nudger]

-was for wyzas, yon.

[brewer]

-was for wyzas, yon.

Not argument, disagreement, with an over reaching theological perspective.

[Yonadav]

-was for wyzas, yon.

Not argument, disagreement, with an over reaching theological perspective.

Meh. I certainly wouldn't argue that sociopaths aren't hard to explain from that perspective. Theological perspectives are not explanatory sedatives.

[Belacqua]

There are no objective final causes.

This seems strange to me. 

If you find an acorn on the ground, you know its final cause: to grow into an oak tree. That's objective.

It might fail to grow, or it might grow a little bit into a stunted oak tree. But it won't grow into an elephant or a dwarf star. That's all the Aristotelian four causes structure says. 

With humans it's more complicated. A human baby has a number of potentials, not all of which it can fulfill fully. The baby's teleology is to grow into a healthy human adult, that part is clear. But whether it should develop, say, musical potential, or choose to neglect that in favor of something else, makes the human case more complex than the acorn's. 

Ultimately the question of the Good, approached from this angle, is whether we can take this truth about human nature and work out what would be good for humans in every case. And again, nothing specific, probably, like "taking Flintstones vitamins" but more general, like health and opportunity.

[arewethereyet]

There are no objective final causes.

This seems strange to me. 

If you find an acorn on the ground, you know its final cause: to grow into an oak tree. That's objective.

It might fail to grow, or it might grow a little bit into a stunted oak tree. But it won't grow into an elephant or a dwarf star. That's all the Aristotelian four causes structure says. 

With humans it's more complicated. A human baby has a number of potentials, not all of which it can fulfill fully. The baby's teleology is to grow into a healthy human adult, that part is clear. But whether it should develop, say, musical potential, or choose to neglect that in favor of something else, makes the human case more complex than the acorn's. 

Ultimately the question of the Good, approached from this angle, is whether we can take this truth about human nature and work out what would be good for humans in every case. And again, nothing specific, probably, like "taking Flintstones vitamins" but more general, like health and opportunity.

It might get eaten by a squirrel and never become a tree at all.

[Belacqua]

It all depends on the point of view really, antibiotics might be good for us, but its bacterial mass murder.

So good for humans, avoid doing harm to your own species. It's easier said than done.

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And by harm I mean violence.

This is a good point. 

When we say "good," I suspect we're always saying "good for something or someone." 

Good for humans might well be bad for bacteria. Although I think lately we're finding out that things are a bit more interwoven than we thought. Bad for bee colonies turns out to be bad for humans, too.

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It might get eaten by a squirrel and never become a tree at all.

That's obvious. 

This would prevent the acorn from reaching its full potential.