The Watchmaker: my fav argument

[John 6IX Breezy]

As a result, most times the simpler explanation will be more probable simply because of its lack of complexity.

I agree with your overall argument and use of probability, but I don't know if I agree with this particular sentence. As an example, the original heliocentric model assumed that orbits were perfect circles rather than ellipses. This oversimplification was arguably as "improbable" as the overcomplication of Ptolomy's epicycles.

I would also like to forward the perspective that complexity can be interpreted as increasing the resolution of our models, allowing for a clearer image.

[Angrboda]

As a result, most times the simpler explanation will be more probable simply because of its lack of complexity.

I agree with your overall argument and use of probability, but I don't know if I agree with this particular sentence. As an example, the original heliocentric model assumed that orbits were perfect circles rather than ellipses. This oversimplification was arguably as "improbable" as the overcomplication of Ptolomy's epicycles.

I would also like to forward the perspective that complexity can be interpreted as increasing the resolution of our models, allowing for a clearer image.

Yes, like I said, it's more a heuristic than a rule. With the heliocentric model in particular, they were dealing with unknowns such as what held the planets in place (I believe God was the answer). Though I think you miss the point that it be necessary that the simpler theory account for all the facts, which the heliocentric model with perfect circles didn't do because it wasn't in accord with all the facts but only with some of them. It's a question that I'd have to consider at length as to whether that made the circle model more or less probable, as you're dealing with the principle of insufficient reason again in which circles are just as probable as ellipses or moreso. It's also worth noting that accounting for the orbits of planets without appealing to God would have resulted in a complex or even hopeless explanation at the time. Again, I'd have to mull the matter for some time, as there's a lot going on with the example of the heliocentric model.

As an addendum, it also bears pointing out that an explanation may appear simple because of one cause or another when it is not simple. The God explanation hides an enormous amount of assumptions behind the simple expression that God did it. So many in fact that people struggle to this day to reconcile them with the facts. I, myself, am convinced they cannot be reconciled, but that depends on the particulars being attributed to God. Needless to say, if it's such an open question as to whether God fits the facts or not, he must be anything but simple.

[John 6IX Breezy]

Though I think you miss the point that it be necessary that the simpler theory account for all the facts, which the heliocentric model with perfect circles didn't do because it wasn't in accord with all the facts but only with some of them.

I think this is an important point, because accounting for all the facts is an ever moving target. The simpler heliocentric model may have accounted for all the facts known at a given point in time, but not a later one.

[polymath257]

It would be more accurate to say that in science we go for the simplest (without any elements not required) explanation that accounts for all the observations. Saying God did it is functionally equivalent to saying 'magic did it' and doesn't actually explain anything.

I don't know how true that is of science. Yes, ideally you want a particular model to be as economic as possible. But you never choose between models based on simplicity. (At least that hasn't been the case in the cognitive sciences; our theories seem to get more complex over time.) Theories are tools for scientists, so perhaps in that sense they might opt for the lightest hammer. But simplicity isn't a replacement for experimentation. And I'd be interested to see an example where simplicity actually did what you say it does.

Edit: And if I may add: Given that you have no access to reality, except by your theories, you have no contrast by which to measure simplicity. In other words, you are unjustifiably deciding that a given level of simplicity is correct. But the more complex theory could be the simplest, and the one you've chosen an oversimplification. Simplicity is an unjustified preference, that reflects the limits of our brains, rather than the nature of reality.

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But it isn't an explanation at all. Since it fits with any possible scenario, evidence cannot change the probability of it being correct. Which means it isn't dependent on evidence. Which means it is untestable nonsense.

You have to be more clear on what you want to argue. Either design has no observable differences with naturalism (meaning they both explain and predict the same thing). Or they do in fact have many differences (design doesn't explain anything, etc). So start substantiating your premises: Don't arbitrarily dictate what design does or doesn't do without showing it. It's clear that you're arguing against an idea of design that isn't one I presented.

Generally speaking, having a lot of parameters to adjust just means you are curve fitting and probably not getting the real picture. The goal is to have the necessary amount of *predictive* complexity but no more. otherwise your sample space is too large to be able to make any actual conclusion.

But yes, you want the model to be as simple as possible *but still make valid predictions that can be verified*.

As for design, either design has no observational differences with naturalism *in which case naturalism is preferred because of simplicity* OR they have observational differences and the observation should be done to determine which is the better explanation.

If design is to be a reasonable explanation at all, it *has* to give observational differences with naturalism. If that is being claimed, then those differences should be presented and the relevant observations made. As far as I can see, no actual differences have been proposed. That makes design a dis-favored position.

[John 6IX Breezy]

If design is to be a reasonable explanation at all, it *has* to give observational differences with naturalism.

You use a lot of ifs throughout your arguments and it becomes hard to tell when you're making a claim about design, or just adding conditional layers to your hypothetical cake (no slight intended I just couldn't think of a different analogy lol). So can you clarify the quote above—do you or do you not think there are observable differences between the two?

And secondly, why is the "reasonableness" of design dependent on a contrast with naturalism? This implies that design is unreasonable if no difference exist. In which case shouldn't both perspectives be equally reasonable or unreasonable?

[polymath257]

If design is to be a reasonable explanation at all, it *has* to give observational differences with naturalism.

You use a lot of ifs throughout your arguments and it becomes hard to tell when you're making a claim about design, or just adding conditional layers to your hypothetical cake (no slight intended I just couldn't think of a different analogy lol). So can you clarify the quote above—do you or do you not think there are observable differences between the two?

And secondly, why is the "reasonableness" of design dependent on a contrast with naturalism? This implies that design is unreasonable if no difference exist. In which case shouldn't both perspectives be equally reasonable or unreasonable?

I am not making a claim about design. I am a general policy on how to approach any 'explanation'.

if there is only one predictive theory, that is the one that is accepted, at least until another comes up.

If there are two theories being discussed, the first question is whether there is an observational difference between the two. if there is, the conflict, such as it is, can be resolved by observation.

If there is no observational difference between the two, the one that makes more assumptions about non-observable entities is the one that is dis-favored.

In the case of design, we have good methods for telling whether or not certain types of things are designed by humans and somewhat poorer ways to determine design by other living things on Earth. Those methods all contrast what can be done by living things as opposed to what happens in their absence. because there are observational tests for design in those cases, design can be a reasonable explanation then.

But, to go further and claim the universe at large is designed goes *way* beyond what we can observe. In particular, it makes an assumption of entities with no observational evidence (the designer). In that case, the explanations that do not use such entities are preferred *unless* an observational difference between design and non-design can be elaborated. At this point, that has not been the case.

[Pat Mustard]

In which case, we always take the easiest.

It doesn't get much easier than "God did it." It consolidates all of nature's problems into a single locus. (Not that nature actually cares what your brain finds easy or convinient anyway.)

Problem is, goddidit assumes too much. It puts a big hulking problem right in the middle of your explanation, one that takes way more effort to explain away than is saved by inserting it, and it is also one that has never been adequately explained because it has no evidentiary basis.

It's like trying to explain Leo Messi through the power of purple monkey diswasher.

[The Architect Of Fate]

It doesn't get much easier than "God did it." It consolidates all of nature's problems into a single locus. (Not that nature actually cares what your brain finds easy or convinient anyway.)

Problem is, goddidit assumes too much.  It puts a big hulking problem right in the middle of your explanation, one that takes way more effort to explain away than is saved by inserting it, and it is also one that has never been adequately explained because it has no evidentiary basis.

It's like trying to explain Leo Messi through the power of purple monkey diswasher.

Goddidit explains everything by explaining nothing

[John 6IX Breezy]

if there is only one predictive theory, that is the one that is accepted [emphasis added], at least until another comes up. . . .
If there is no observational difference between the two, the one that makes more assumptions about non-observable entities is the one that is dis-favored [emphasis added].

Not to keep barraging your premises, but I see a lot of problems arising from this underlying Science as a Courtroom metaphor. So I would ask―accepted by who and for what purpose? Clearly, the diversity of competing theories that exists in science ought to show that nothing is ever accepted in such a manner, much less by everyone. Theories are just tools―they require our understanding not our credence.

Lastly, I would avoid evaluative terms like disfavorable, because why should anyone care what someone else doesn't find favorable? Useful theories can be inconvenient, complicated, and unfavorable.

[polymath257]

if there is only one predictive theory, that is the one that is accepted [emphasis added], at least until another comes up. . . .
If there is no observational difference between the two, the one that makes more assumptions about non-observable entities is the one that is dis-favored [emphasis added].

Not to keep barraging your premises, but I see a lot of problems arising from this underlying Science as a Courtroom metaphor. So I would ask―accepted by who and for what purpose? Clearly, the diversity of competing theories that exists in science ought to show that nothing is ever accepted in such a manner, much less by everyone. Theories are just tools―they require our understanding not our credence.

As I said, if there is only one predictive theory, it is the only candidate. You are introducing a competitive theory, which I assume is also predictive.

Lastly, I would avoid evaluative terms like disfavorable, because why should anyone care what someone else doesn't find favorable? Useful theories can be inconvenient, complicated, and unfavorable.

A theory is useful if and only if it can make testable predictions and those predictions are verified by actual observations. That is the ultimate test of any scientific theory.

If you have *two* theories that manage to make predictions that are verified by observations, the simpler one is used *because* it is simpler. Having additional assumptions that cannot be tested makes a theory less useful because it cannot  be tested.