Logical Absolutes

[LadyForCamus]

I don’t get what the big mystery is for theists (and some atheists, apparently) regarding the logical absolutes. They’re just descriptions of what appear to be immutable facts of reality. Theists go on and on about how they have “no grounding,” and therefore must be “transcendent.” They’re grounded by reality itself. They’re merely labels we use to talk about the world in its current state, just like numbers are symbols that represent quantities of things that exist. If there was a reality that was different from ours (if that’s possible) it would have a different set of logical laws depending on how it operated. I saw a debate with Matt Sick and Matt D. Where Slick pulled Matt D. into a two hour back and forth about this, and Dillahunty basically conceded that he didn’t know “where the laws of logic come from.” And then of course, Slick was like, “Ha! See? Your world view has no explanation for this hard, seemingly unsolvable problem, but mine does!”  But they don’t come from anywhere. They just are. And then we talk about them. I guess I don’t get what the big whoop is. Thoughts?

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

I think that's pretty accurate. If the laws of logic 'come from' anywhere, they come from us. They're a framework we invented to talk about reality in a coherent fashion. A so-so analogy might be gravity - the law of universal gravitation is a human construct to describe an observed phenomenon.

Dillahunty seems to have dropped the ball on this one.

Boru

[no one]

If Halle Berry absolutely wanted to jump my bones, logically, I would welcome her request

[LadyForCamus]

I think that's pretty accurate. If the laws of logic 'come from' anywhere, they come from use. They're a framework we invented to talk about reality in a coherent fashion. A so-so analogy might be gravity - the law of universal gravitation is a human construct to describe an observed phenomenon.

Dillahunty seems to have dropped the ball on this one.

Boru

That’s what I thought as well. It was a few years back, so I’m not sure if his position has evolved since then. It’s a loaded question in the first place to ask “where the laws of logic come from.” It’s akin to when creationists ask “if there’s no god, then who created everything?”

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

My personal fave is still, ‘If we evolved from apes, why are there still apes?’

Boru

[Angrboda]

With regard to Dillahunty and Slick, theism does provide an explanation for the origin or source of these things that naturalism currently lacks. Unfortunately, their explanation is not a very good one, as it leaves them open to charges of vacuity. If the laws of logic and morality are whatever God thinks they are, then they are both arbitrary and subjective. Theists try to circumvent this problem by suggesting that God possesses a nature that "just is" the correct one, but as I showed Chloroform recently, this doesn't eliminate the charge of arbitrariness and vacuity. The Euthyphro dilemma is in full force whether it's God's commands or his nature.

As to things like the laws of logic being reflections of empirical facts or merely descriptive, I'd have to disagree. The idea that 2 + 2 = 4 seems true in a way that is more than just a convention of language. The problem of abstracts is a tough one, and one that I see no easy answer for.

[brewer]

The laws of logic come from the human mind. The god conception comes from the human mind. Both can serve a purpose depending on the particular humans need.

However, I think one tends to be more fear based.

Edit: Come to think of it, other minds use logic also (not labeled as laws). But I've never heard of them having a god. Hmmm........

[Rev. Rye]

With regard to Dillahunty and Slick, theism does provide an explanation for the origin or source of these things that naturalism currently lacks. Unfortunately, their explanation is not a very good one, as it leaves them open to charges of vacuity. If the laws of logic and morality are whatever God thinks they are, then they are both arbitrary and subjective. Theists try to circumvent this problem by suggesting that God possesses a nature that "just is" the correct one, but as I showed Chloroform recently, this doesn't eliminate the charge of arbitrariness and vacuity. The Euthyphro dilemma is in full force whether it's God's commands or his nature.

As to things like the laws of logic being reflections of empirical facts or merely descriptive, I'd have to disagree. The idea that 2 + 2 = 4 seems true in a way that is more than just a convention of language. The problem of abstracts is a tough one, and one that I see no easy answer for.

And if what God says logic and reason are contradicts the known facts (e.g. the manufactuversy over creation and evolution) and we’re supposed to believe what He says over what we see with our own eyes, well, that basically amounts to gaslighting.

And now that I think about it, I start to think: no wonder they fell for the blatant lies of Bush Jr and Trump, hook line and sinker. Their worldview primed them for that shit. If they’re willing to believe God can mislead people about how the world works, then if somebody who claims to work with Him lies blatantly, then there’s no reason to not take his word over the overwhelming evidence that he’s wrong.

[polymath257]

With regard to Dillahunty and Slick, theism does provide an explanation for the origin or source of these things that naturalism currently lacks.  Unfortunately, their explanation is not a very good one, as it leaves them open to charges of vacuity.  If the laws of logic and morality are whatever God thinks they are, then they are both arbitrary and subjective.  Theists try to circumvent this problem by suggesting that God possesses a nature that "just is" the correct one, but as I showed Chloroform recently, this doesn't eliminate the charge of arbitrariness and vacuity.  The Euthyphro dilemma is in full force whether it's God's commands or his nature.

As to things like the laws of logic being reflections of empirical facts or merely descriptive, I'd have to disagree.  The idea that 2 + 2 = 4 seems true in a way that is more than just a convention of language.  The problem of abstracts is a tough one, and one that I see no easy answer for.

First, there are several different 'logics'. Aristotle produced the first list of 'laws of logic', but he was rather vague about specifics and it took later thinkers to straighten out some of his mess.

Boole gave a formal that, essentially, encompassed propositional logic, but his system didn't include phrases like 'there exists' and 'for every', which are usually seen as logical connectives.

That leads to quantifier logic. But that doesn't include aspects of equality or mathematics.

Because of the attempts to provide a logical foundation to mathematics that spanned the turn of the last century, a number of different approaches to logic were investigated. For example, intuitionist logic denies the classical 'law of excluded middle', especially as it applies to infinite systems. Other systems explicitly allow certain types of contradiction, but still manage to avoid triviality.

I would claim that the statement 2+2=4 seems obvious cause the number of definitions and assumptions required to prove it are minimal. I would bet that it is far less obvious that 29*31=899 or that a number is divisible by three if and only if the sum of its decimal digits is divisible by three.

In fact, the assumptions required to prove 2+2=4 are few enough that they would NOT be enough to show that 3 and 4 are different numbers. In essence, simply having a notion of 'next' and definitions of 2,4, and + are enough.

[Angrboda]

With regard to Dillahunty and Slick, theism does provide an explanation for the origin or source of these things that naturalism currently lacks.  Unfortunately, their explanation is not a very good one, as it leaves them open to charges of vacuity.  If the laws of logic and morality are whatever God thinks they are, then they are both arbitrary and subjective.  Theists try to circumvent this problem by suggesting that God possesses a nature that "just is" the correct one, but as I showed Chloroform recently, this doesn't eliminate the charge of arbitrariness and vacuity.  The Euthyphro dilemma is in full force whether it's God's commands or his nature.

As to things like the laws of logic being reflections of empirical facts or merely descriptive, I'd have to disagree.  The idea that 2 + 2 = 4 seems true in a way that is more than just a convention of language.  The problem of abstracts is a tough one, and one that I see no easy answer for.

First, there are several different 'logics'. Aristotle produced the first list of 'laws of logic', but he was rather vague about specifics and it took later thinkers to straighten out some of his mess.

Boole gave a formal that, essentially, encompassed propositional logic, but his system didn't include phrases like 'there exists' and 'for every', which are usually seen as logical connectives.

That leads to quantifier logic. But that doesn't include aspects of equality or mathematics.

Because of the attempts to provide a logical foundation to mathematics that spanned the turn of the last century, a number of different approaches to logic were investigated. For example, intuitionist logic denies the classical 'law of excluded middle', especially as it applies to infinite systems. Other systems explicitly allow certain types of contradiction, but still manage to avoid triviality.

I would claim that the statement 2+2=4 seems obvious cause the number of definitions and assumptions required to prove it are minimal. I would bet that it is far less obvious that 29*31=899 or that a number is divisible by three if and only if the sum of its decimal digits is divisible by three.

In fact, the assumptions required to prove 2+2=4 are few enough that they would NOT be enough to show that 3 and 4 are different numbers. In essence, simply having a notion of 'next' and definitions of 2,4, and + are enough.

It wasn't the triviality of proving 2 + 2 = 4, but rather that as abstracts, the numbers seem to reflect metaphysical truths, that there's something underlying them that's ontic in a way that linguistic conventions aren't.