[Serious] Thomism: Then & Now

[Angrboda]

Personally, I think Hylomorphism is a crock; it's a band-aid that covers the gaps in our knowledge of efficient processes. But I admit that I'm pretty ignorant about it.

[vulcanlogician]

Well... we kind of hit a dead end with the 5 ways. Granted, I've not done due diligence on the matter. I watched a couple of YouTube vids and read Bel's article. I also read Spirit-Salamander's post, but didn't really dive into an argument when Neo challenged one of the claims. It's not like I spent 10 hours of study on the subject, and it may demand just that.

I do keep falling into a contemporary way of understanding motion. But I've spent some time trying to understand Aristotle's concept of motion. There's a real possibility (in my mind) that Aristotle's concept of motion just sucks. Or --put more charitably-- maybe it's like his teleological cause: it accurately describes nature but is superfluous. And when we begin to examine Aquinas with concepts that are not superfluous (ie. modern understanding of motion/change/growth) there isn't anything supporting the first way.

Again, I haven't really done due diligence. It's possible I'm selling Aquinas short here. But, so far, nothing has jumped out and nabbed me as being good support for the 5 ways.

It probably helps to have a god-concept one thinks is plausible to begin with. (Like the ontological argument). I wouldn't be opposed to trying Spinoza's god-concept (or something radical like that). Spinoza thought God (aka reality, aka substance) was fundamentally self-caused and unfolds according to its nature in a deterministic fashion. IDK if we can reconcile that vision of God with Aquinas, but it's the closest thing to a god-concept I have or can even possibly entertain. Spinoza is a big PSR guy (except the causa sui thing) so we have that going for us.

But this also raises the issue in circularity of reasoning. If we already need a god-concept to begin with (as part of our premises, as it were) we can expect that concept to be reflected in our conclusions.

[Angrboda]

But this also raises the issue in circularity of reasoning. If we already need a god-concept to begin with (as part of our premises, as it were) we can expect that concept to be reflected in our conclusions.

I've had some thoughts, but been too lazy to write them up. So I'll just provide a quick and dirty intro.

Daniel Dennett suggests that the function of philosophical arguments is that they are "intuition pumps" -- they prime us for having certain intuitions which are in agreement with what the author wants us to conclude. So an argument against abortion may try to prime or trigger intuitions about the unfairness and immorality of murder with respect to the fetus. Those intuitions may or may not be appropriate to the subject and conclusion. It may not make logical sense to think of abortion as murder, but once our intuition that it is murder has been generated, that typically ends the thinking process. It's a little like propaganda in that respect. The purpose is to cause an intuitive response to a proposition rather than a rational one, where a rational one might be at odds with the intuition.

This comes into play in the five ways in that the Thomistic concepts and causal framework may be being used by Aquinas to prime or generate intuitions that are not likely to be generated by more modern concepts. Whether this is true, rational, good or bad, is an open question. If the Thomistic concepts are not rationally derived, it seems plausible that the intuitions primed by them are not rational either. Then they might be. I'd say there are a lot of open questions. And it's also worth remembering that an intuition (conclusion) may be correct, even if the means (argument) of provoking that intuition is irrational or invalid.

[vulcanlogician]

Personally, I think Hylomorphism is a crock; it's a band-aid that covers the gaps in our knowledge of efficient processes.  But I admit that I'm pretty ignorant about it.

Sounds like mereological nihilism to me

The thing is, if mereological nihilism is NOT true (and we must admit that many people aren't convinced of mereological nihilism) then some form of hylomorphism seems plausible. There is a such thing as "chair-ness." And in the case of people, we can say that the way the molecules and energy in emjay's body are arranged produces an intelligible "emjay-ness." And were we to use Star Trek transporter technology to reconfigure different atoms in the same shape we would find the same "emjay-ness" to be intelligible in the new configuration of matter/energy.

I emphasized the word "intelligible" to denote that hylomorphism doesn't ask us to accept a concrete fact of "emjay-ness itself" as an eternal form (as Plato would). To hylomorphists, "emjay-ness" is not some airy-fairy thing that floats around emjay's body. All hylomorphism asks us to accept is that "emjay-ness" (like "chair-ness") is an intelligible concept.

The author of The Ethics of Killing, MacMahan, says that hylomorphism is a "polite form of materialism." And I like this take on it. Because, from one way of looking at it, it's materialism through and through; it just adds this metaphysical component of "this thing is intelligibly THIS."

Since you expressed sympathies with mereological nihilism, of course you are prone to reject this. And I'm there with you... 95% or something. But I also see where hylomorphists are coming from. I'm not ready to 100% reject chair-ness yet.

[Angrboda]

That's not my problem with it. I believe form is mediated by efficient causes. If so, form isn't a real property, it's an emergent effect of efficient causes.

[vulcanlogician]

That's not my problem with it.  I believe form is mediated by efficient causes.  If so, form isn't a real property, it's an emergent effect of efficient causes.

I don't think a hylomorphist rejects what you've said here. A hylomorphic soul, form (or what have you) can be an emergent phenomenon and still have an intelligible "that-ness" about it. But the specifics of hylomorphism concerning emergence due to efficient causes is waaaaaay out of my wheelhouse. The issue may be a source of contention among hylomorphists even.

[vulcanlogician]

@Belacqua might know a thing or two about hylomorphism to shed some light on some of this.

[Belacqua]

@Belacqua might know a thing or two about hylomorphism to shed some light on some of this.

I guess I'm not yet understanding the objections to hylomorphism. It just says that every material object has both form (morph) and matter (hyle). It doesn't specify how the matter comes to take on the form, which can happen in different ways.

The classic example is the clay and the jar. Clay (hyle) can take many forms, and in a given case it may be a jar (morph). But obviously this requires an easily understandable Efficient Cause -- the potter. 

Maybe I'm missing an argument against this...?

[vulcanlogician]

The argument is that there is only the matter there, and "form" is some kind of dispensable addition to what is actually there.

[Belacqua]

The argument is that there is only the matter there, and "form" is some kind of dispensable addition to what is actually there.

I don't see how you can have matter without form.

If it's clay, the form may be "lump" or "glob" but it's still a form. 

Is there an example of some matter which has no form? Remember that "form" doesn't need to be a solid shape. Hydrogen and oxygen (matter) combine to form water, which is malleable, but also requires a form (the way it's put together). 

There's nothing magic about form. It's just the way the matter goes together.