Metaethics Part 1: Cognitivism/Non-cognitivism

[Disagreeable]

Are you a cognitivist or a non-cognitivist and why?

I'm the former.

Why? Because I don't see how moral claims can't make sense cognitively. I find it very easy to translate them cognitively. And I find all noncognitivist objections to my translations to be weak. No matter how charitable I am I still honestly find noncognitivist objections weak.

[vulcanlogician]

Great thread.

I'm a cognitivist because, to me, ethics is a rational enterprise.

Only rational beings can make decisions based on ethical concerns. As far as metaethical nihilist or non-realist theories go, I think error theory is the strongest and most cogent. That's not to say I dislike noncognitivist theories. I like them. Why I tend to reject them is that they are explanatory theories rather normative ones.

To me, it is the ethicist's job to address the validity of normative value claims. Error theory does this... "No moral claim can be true."

But one must involve cognition to determine the truth or falsity of a claim. When understanding the truth value of the Pythagorean theorem, it is of little value to exemplify a student who solves geometry problems in order to get a pat on the head from the teacher; it may well be the case that she did. And that explains why the student was motivated to give the correct answer. But the example of a student who solves a geometry problem... her motivations or impulses... has little to do with mathematical truth.

[John 6IX Breezy]

Can you define what cognitivist means in this context?

I'm used to the word being used in a different context, and in that context I wouldn't call myself a cognitivist.

[vulcanlogician]

Can you define what cognitivist means in this context?

I'm used to the word being used in a different context, and in that context I wouldn't call myself a cognitivist.

cognitivism, In metaethics, the thesis that the function of moral sentences (e.g., sentences in which moral terms such as “right,” “wrong,” and “ought” are used) is to describe a domain of moral facts existing independently of our subjective thoughts and feelings, and that moral statements can accordingly be thought of as objectively true or false.

https://www.britannica.com/science/cognitivism

Contrast this with noncognitivists who think "Murder is wrong" is not a fact or opinion. It is a "gut reaction" .... "Murder, bleh!" or "Murder, yuck!"

I know you didn't ask me, but I hope that helps.

[John 6IX Breezy]

I know you didn't ask me, but I hope that helps.

Hmm interesting. The word seems to be used very differently—at least on the surface. A cognitivist to me is a traditional cognitive psychologist that interprets the mind in strict computational terms. (In contrast, newer theories argue that the brain in a vat metaphor is wrong, that brains evolved within bodies, bodies within environments, all of which are essential to cognition.)

Not sure if there is an interesting interdisciplinary discussion to be had here; I'll chime back in if there is.

Edit: As I'm reading further, I may by default fall under the emotivist camp.

[vulcanlogician]

Edit: As I'm reading further, I may by default fall under the emotivist camp.

Why?

[John 6IX Breezy]

Why?

I'm still trying to make the conceptual leap from psychology to metaethics (which I'm encountering for the first time). However, in moral psychology there is an aphorism that says moral intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second. In other words, most of our moral judgments are influenced or have origins in emotional responses. Strictly cognitive explanations (rational ones that ignore everything else) tend to be incomplete. Here's a more in-depth video.

[Disagreeable]

I struggle to understand noncognitivism. I get the whole "Yay!" and"Boo!" approach but to me they're just not taking moral claims as claims about morality which is, surely, what moral claims are. How are they not seeing moral claims? I don't get it. I am aware that there are some serious philosophers who take it seriously, and have strong arguments, supposedly, but I personally find it all very unconvincing indeed. And that's still putting it mildly.

I'd need a reason to reject cognitivism because it makes sense on the face of it AFAIC. And I haven't seen one reason yet.

I agree with Vulcanlogician that error theory is the most sensible form of moral anti-realism. I would also be an error theorist if I wasn't a moral realist. I mean, actually I'd probably stop by at Quasi Realism first and take error theory as a last resort. Because at least these are all cognitivist theories. I don't get noncognitivsm at all. I just don't get it. I understand what noncognitivists believe but I see the whole universe that we live in as fundamentally rational so for me to change my mind on this issue I think I'd have to change my fundamental metaphysics and epistemology!

[John 6IX Breezy]

To me, it is the ethicist's job to address the validity of normative value claims. Error theory does this... "No moral claim can be true."

I want to propose my own spin on Emotivism (let me know what you think).

Given that moral intuitions precede moral reasoning, I would argue that statements such as murder is wrong, when proposed by any intelligent organism, are not factual or objective. They do not intentionally describe something true or false about reality, rather, they describe behaviors that produce fitness payoffs.

I'm borrowing the term fitness payoffs from psychologist Donald Hoffman. He proposes that we are not tuned to perceive reality as it is, but rather an abstraction designed to increase fitness (procreation, survival, longevity, etc.). I am essentially blending both ideas (fitness payoffs and moral intuitions), such that our moral intuitions are likewise abstractions that increase fitness payoffs. They are icons in our ethical computer screen rather than transistors grounded in reality.

[Ahriman]

Cognition is objective, in a sense, as everyone has it, but each person's experience of cognition is different/subjective, therefore no objective morality, only subjective morality, so a moral claim can make sense to one person, but perhaps not to another person, so saying "I don't see how moral claims can't make sense cognitively" implies an optimism bias.