Kalam

[arewethereyet]

Fair enough. Perhaps have have not paid close enough attention. And you are right that talking passed one another is not productive. I will read thru your posts more carefully amd give you a proper response based on sincere reflection.

bold mine
This is the most poorly written post I recall you making.  Even when I don't agree with you, which is most of the time, you tend to be somewhat coherent.

WTH - are you drunk?

[Belacqua]

I haven't been interested in debate much these days with theists, but if I ever did want to argue with a Thomist, I'd challenge them instead on something else related to their theology, namely how they could reconcile a triune God of distinct Persons with the absolutely simple/indivisible First Cause, in addition to other Christian beliefs held by Thomists borne out of revelation instead of logic. I think this is where the many weaknesses of their worldview lie.

Yes, this is an important point, I think.

Any Christian who's being careful in his thinking will make a clear distinction between Natural Theology -- that which (they say) can be proved by logical extrapolation from the facts of the world, and Revealed Theology -- that which they just have to accept as given, with no possible logical proof. 

First Cause arguments only get you to the God of the Philosophers, which is, as you say, absolutely simple. How this absolutely simple impassible non-physical thing could undergo kenosis and incarnate as a single individual is not something that can be explained. Which of course is one reason that Jews, non-Christian Neoplatonists, and others, don't accept it. 

I suspect that any discussion with a Thomist about Revealed Theology would be limited to what exactly they mean by things like "kenosis," but if they're careful they won't mix up what's provable (allegedly) with what's not.

[Jehanne]

I haven't been interested in debate much these days with theists, but if I ever did want to argue with a Thomist, I'd challenge them instead on something else related to their theology, namely how they could reconcile a triune God of distinct Persons with the absolutely simple/indivisible First Cause, in addition to other Christian beliefs held by Thomists borne out of revelation instead of logic. I think this is where the many weaknesses of their worldview lie.

Yes, this is an important point, I think.

Any Christian who's being careful in his thinking will make a clear distinction between Natural Theology -- that which (they say) can be proved by logical extrapolation from the facts of the world, and Revealed Theology -- that which they just have to accept as given, with no possible logical proof. 

First Cause arguments only get you to the God of the Philosophers, which is, as you say, absolutely simple. How this absolutely simple impassible non-physical thing could undergo kenosis and incarnate as a single individual is not something that can be explained. Which of course is one reason that Jews, non-Christian Neoplatonists, and others, don't accept it. 

I suspect that any discussion with a Thomist about Revealed Theology would be limited to what exactly they mean by things like "kenosis," but if they're careful they won't mix up what's provable (allegedly) with what's not.

Alternative, naturalistic explanations (compelling ones, in my opinion) exist to the above, namely, natural and/or revealed theology.

[Neo-Scholastic]

I do not think we are operating from different interpretations at all. But indulge me, and describe an example of such an essential relationship so we can analyze the issue rationally...I think that you are going to find that no such essential relationships exist.

Fair enough, my point was more applicable to the 3W than the 2W. Be that as it may essential relationships are ones of logical priority. Before there can be any particular order of efficient causes there must also be an intelligible order. Both the order of efficient causes and the intelligible order are simultaneously in act, but the first is contingent on the later. I would go further and say the intelligible order is contingent on transcendental absolutes.

But first, lets look at exactly what Thomas is saying in the 2W:

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. <emphasis added>

There are lots of elaborate commentaries about the 2W with lots of nomenclature, but let’s not over think this and just go for the plainest meaning.

Efficient causes “in the world of sense” would today mean physical reality. And efficient causes observed in the physical world would remain in potential because no particular agent in physical reality is indepenendent of the causal order creating either 1) an infinite regress problem or 2) an uncaused effect and so supernatural action is required. All the dominoes of the system stay standing until a finger makes the first push from outside the system.

[Angrboda]

I do not think we are operating from different interpretations at all.  But indulge me, and describe an example of such an essential relationship so we can analyze the issue rationally...I think that you are going to find that no such essential relationships exist.

Fair enough, my point was more applicable to the 3W than the 2W. Be that as it may essential relationships are ones of logical priority. Before there can be any particular order of efficient causes there must also be an intelligible order. Both the order of efficient causes and the intelligible order are simultaneously in act, but the first is contingent on the later. I would go further and say the intelligible order is contingent on transcendental absolutes.

But first, lets look at exactly what Thomas is saying in the 2W:

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. <emphasis added>

There are lots of elaborate commentaries about the 2W with lots of nomenclature, but let’s not over think this and just go for the plainest meaning.

Efficient causes “in the world of sense” would today mean physical reality. And efficient causes observed in the physical world would remain in potential because no particular agent in physical reality is indepenendent of the causal order creating either 1) an infinite regress problem or 2) an uncaused effect and so supernatural action is required. All the dominoes of the system stay standing until a finger makes the first push from outside the system.

I'll have to give this greater perusal than I intend to do so tonight. But for the sake of the point that was under discussion, can you have a logical ordering in the physical domain (the domain of the existent) without a temporal ordering?

[LinuxGal]

I suspect that any discussion with a Thomist about Revealed Theology would be limited to what exactly they mean by things like "kenosis," but if they're careful they won't mix up what's provable (allegedly) with what's not.