Kalam

[Belacqua]

 where in the Kalam does it argue that the event that started the sequence might have stopped, or could stop once the sequence has been initiated? 

As far as I know, Kalam only claims that 1) the universe has a beginning, and 2) the beginning was caused. 

Beyond that I don't think it makes any claims as for whether the cause needs to continue or not. They'd need additional arguments for that. 

If William Lane Craig and those guys have proposed those additional arguments, I've never heard of them. (I'm not a big fan of Craig.)

Again, though, this is sufficient to separate it from Aquinas, who makes no arguments for temporal beginnings. 

How does anyone know that the chain would continue if the cause of the Big Bang disappeared, especially considering we don’t even know what the cause of the Big Bang is?

There may be all kinds of arguments as to why the cause of the temporal beginning would have to hang around. I have never heard of one.

But such an argument would have to be in addition to the Kalam argument, which only makes the two claims. Given merely those two claims, it is entirely compatible with a Deist clock-making God. 

Whereas in Thomas' argument, the ongoing necessity of the creator is fundamental to his claims. 

Time is a dimension of even an eternal universe, no?

I think so! Aristotle thought there was no point at which time began. It's just always been running along. Aquinas thought that this was all that could be proved through logic (Natural Theology) and if we believe in a beginning point then we only believe it through unproven revelation.

[LinuxGal]

Thomas Aquinas' Five Ways to Prove the Existence of God

The First Way: Motion.

The Second Way: Efficient Cause.

The Third Way: Possibility and Necessity.

The Fourth Way: Gradation.

The Fifth Way: Design

I answer that:

1. An unmoved mover violates the law of reciprocal action.

2. Radioactive decay is uncaused.

3. Conservation laws point to mass-energy being necessary rather than contingent.

4. The best item of a set may not be objectively good.

5. Evolution presents a simulacrum of design.

[Neo-Scholastic]

But the simultaneous existence of things, under Thomism, is not causation but simply coexistence.

The way I see it, under Thomism, a cause is based on an essential relationship. If the relationship is accidental then it would be, as you say, simply coexistence. Early in this thread @Belacqua accurately described this critical essential/accidental distinction in Scholatic nomenclature.

Your interpretation of Thomism is different that ours. I do not think the dispute rises to the level that justifies accusations of ignorance.

[Belacqua]

But the simultaneous existence of things, under Thomism, is not causation but simply coexistence.

The way I see it, under Thomism, a cause is based on an essential relationship. If the relationship is accidental then it would be, as you say, simply coexistence. Early in this thread @Belacqua accurately described this critical essential/accidental distinction in Scholatic nomenclature.

Your interpretation of Thomism is different that ours. I do not think the dispute rises to the level that justifies accusations of ignorance. 

I think I'm going to give up on the word "cause," because it is too misleading to modern ears. 

From now on, I'll translate "the αἰτία of X" as "that which must exist in order for X to exist." Or, because that's too long, I'll say twmeiofXte. As a sort of abbreviation. 

So if twmeiofXte must exist in order for X to exist, then it is clearly not mere coexistence. The existence of X depends on twmeiofXte.

One more example before I give up: 

Hydrogen must exist in order for our sun to exist. Therefore hydrogen in essentially prior to our sun. If all the hydrogen in the universe disappeared, the sun would also disappear. Conversely, our sun could disappear without all the rest of the hydrogen in the universe disappearing. Therefore the sun is essentially posterior to hydrogen. 

Hydrogen is twmeiofXte where X is the sun.

I am not optimistic that this explanation will suffice.

Also I realize that it's kind of odd for me to post this to you, since you are the only one here who already gets it.

[Angrboda]

But the simultaneous existence of things, under Thomism, is not causation but simply coexistence.

The way I see it, under Thomism, a cause is based on an essential relationship. If the relationship is accidental then it would be, as you say, simply coexistence. Early in this thread @Belacqua accurately described this critical essential/accidental distinction in Scholatic nomenclature.

Your interpretation of Thomism is different that ours. I do not think the dispute rises to the level that justifies accusations of ignorance.

I believe that is because you do not understand the dispute. I do not think we are operating from different interpretations at all. But indulge me, and describe an example of such an essential relationship so we can analyze the issue rationally instead of continuing to shout from our respective hilltops. I think that you are going to find that no such essential relationships exist. But I'm willing to entertain an attempt on your part to show otherwise. I've made this point twice in this thread and all I got in return was a deafening silence. We can make no progress as long as you and Bel are content to conclude that we simply do not understand Thomism as well as you do and that once properly understood then all the ducks fall in a row. That's arrogant assumption, not reasoned discussion.

[LadyForCamus]

But the simultaneous existence of things, under Thomism, is not causation but simply coexistence.

The way I see it, under Thomism, a cause is based on an essential relationship. If the relationship is accidental then it would be, as you say, simply coexistence. Early in this thread @Belacqua accurately described this critical essential/accidental distinction in Scholatic nomenclature.

Your interpretation of Thomism is different that ours. I do not think the dispute rises to the level that justifies accusations of ignorance.

Help me out here. What would be an example of an accidental relationship (or mere coexistence, if you prefer), as opposed to Bel’s example of hydrogen and its relationship to the sun?

[Neo-Scholastic]

Fair enough. Perhaps have have not paid close enough attention. And you are right that talking passed one another is not productive. I will read thru your posts more carefully amd give you a proper response based on sincere reflection.

[Jehanne]

The way I see it, under Thomism, a cause is based on an essential relationship. If the relationship is accidental then it would be, as you say, simply coexistence. Early in this thread @Belacqua accurately described this critical essential/accidental distinction in Scholatic nomenclature.

Your interpretation of Thomism is different that ours. I do not think the dispute rises to the level that justifies accusations of ignorance.

I believe that is because you do not understand the dispute. I do not think we are operating from different interpretations at all. But indulge me, and describe an example of such an essential relationship so we can analyze the issue rationally instead of continuing to shout from our respective hilltops. I think that you are going to find that no such essential relationships exist. But I'm willing to entertain an attempt on your part to show otherwise. I've made this point twice in this thread and all I got in return was a deafening silence. We can make no progress as long as you and Bel are content to conclude that we simply do not understand Thomism as well as you do and that once properly understood then all the ducks fall in a row. That's arrogant assumption, not reasoned discussion.

Other than medievalists and their students, who cares what Thomas Aquinas thought about anything? By the way, it would take a medievalist to fully explain the mindset of those human beings who lived during the High Middle Ages. It is also impossible to fully translate the classical Latin that Thomas wrote into modern English, which is true for any translation.

[GrandizerII]

If God is the uncaused cause, as neo-Thomists and others assert, then his existence has no reason.  His existence is simply a brute fact. 

And if God's existence has no basis in reason, then there is also no reason to assert he is the solitary uncaused cause.  He may very well be one of many uncaused causes.

That's fair, but theists will make a distinction here between an arbitrary and non-arbitrary brute fact. In the case of the latter, they tend to label that as metaphysically necessary instead. When it comes to the First Cause as postulated by Thomists, it would be hard to argue for it being an arbitrary brute fact, considering its voidness of any distinctions and it being strictly absolutely simple. Whereas with a universe like the one we inhabit, it would be hard to argue for it perse being a non-arbitrary brute fact. And if we can have any trust in our intuitions whatsoever, then it would be more preferable rationally to go with a non-arbitrary brute fact (or metaphysically necessary) over an arbitrary brute fact. As such, Thomists (and theists in general) probably have the upper hand here when it comes to the matter of brute facts, unless you're willing to go for a radical atheistic worldview that may avoid the problem of arbitrary brute facts.

The First Cause concept is sort of a hard thing to counter, partly because of how intuitive it is. Nevertheless, there are some relatively strong arguments against it, such as that which invokes existential inertia (something exists at time t because it existed prior to t and there is nothing else at t to prevent its existence).

I haven't been interested in debate much these days with theists, but if I ever did want to argue with a Thomist, I'd challenge them instead on something else related to their theology, namely how they could reconcile a triune God of distinct Persons with the absolutely simple/indivisible First Cause, in addition to other Christian beliefs held by Thomists borne out of revelation instead of logic. I think this is where the many weaknesses of their worldview lie.

[emjay]

If God is the uncaused cause, as neo-Thomists and others assert, then his existence has no reason.  His existence is simply a brute fact. 

And if God's existence has no basis in reason, then there is also no reason to assert he is the solitary uncaused cause.  He may very well be one of many uncaused causes.

That's fair, but theists will make a distinction here between an arbitrary and non-arbitrary brute fact. In the case of the latter, they tend to label that as metaphysically necessary instead. When it comes to the First Cause as postulated by Thomists, it would be hard to argue for it being an arbitrary brute fact, considering its voidness of any distinctions and it being strictly absolutely simple. Whereas with a universe like the one we inhabit, it would be hard to argue for it perse being a non-arbitrary brute fact. And if we can have any trust in our intuitions whatsoever, then it would be more preferable rationally to go with a non-arbitrary brute fact (or metaphysically necessary) over an arbitrary brute fact. As such, Thomists (and theists in general) probably have the upper hand here when it comes to the matter of brute facts, unless you're willing to go for a radical atheistic worldview that may avoid the problem of arbitrary brute facts.

The First Cause concept is sort of a hard thing to counter, partly because of how intuitive it is. Nevertheless, there are some relatively strong arguments against it, such as that which invokes existential inertia (something exists at time t because it existed prior to t and there is nothing else at t to prevent its existence).

I haven't been interested in debate much these days with theists, but if I ever did want to argue with a Thomist, I'd challenge them instead on something else related to their theology, namely how they could reconcile a triune God of distinct Persons with the absolutely simple/indivisible First Cause, in addition to other Christian beliefs held by Thomists borne out of revelation instead of logic. I think this is where the many weaknesses of their worldview lie.

Interesting. I've been thinking about that a lot lately; the difference between their brute facts and our brute facts, or put another way their fundamental stuff and ours, and yours is as eloquent an answer to that question as I've ever seen, ie arbitrary vs non-arbitrary. But it still leaves the (rhetorical) question for me... is that enough...   does that excuse it from having to explain its own existence so to speak? And my answer so far being, I don't know. Ie it being logically deduced may make it less arbitrary with regard to us (ie the universe... 'creation'), but it doesn't make it any less arbitrary the other way round, regarding its own eternal existence as something-not-nothing.