what are we supposed to say again when christians ask us where we get our morality?

[Wyrd of Gawd]

Lot didn't appeal to God; Abraham did.

[MindForgedManacle]

Many theists are far too willing to just accept moral realism and many atheists far too willing to abandon it, neither generally having very good reasons for doing so.

Our experiences and beliefs are a product of viewing reality through the lenses of experience and human cognition. Objective morality is an untenable abstract ideal necessary to maintain because it gives us a goal to strive towards.

Our morality doesn't have to come from an outside source to reach toward a goal, any less than Honor needs to be objective for people to behave honorably.

They're fables we tell ourselves, because we realize they improve the human condition for everyone.

What feels morally right or wrong objectively isn't actually objective. It's historical consensus.

That's why slavery seems objectively morally wrong now, but wasn't in the past. It's why treating women as property seems objectively wrong now, but wasn't universally considered as such in the past. Because an objective source does not exist. In the Bible you see Lot appeal to a moral standard outside of God to convince God to spare the innocent of Sodom.

That standard is Don Quixote's untraceable star. Doesn't matter if it doesn't exist; it matters that we tell ourselves it does.

I was going to do my usual point by point deconstruction here, but I'm too tirec and lazy right now (why the hell am I still awake past 1am?), so I'll just do a general rebuttal.

You gave a pretty rote and flawed run through of support of moral relativism there. Part of the problem here is the way you're wording things. As I've said on the forums many times, the phrase "objective morality" is a bit of a misnomer, and demonstrably leads many astray. This is because the word "objective" usually refers to that which is mind-independent. But morality as, by definition, about what entities with minds should and shouldn't do. So it makes no sense to talk about morality being objective in that sense. However, what neither you nor many others realize is that this is a stupid (and fallacious) point to criticize moral realism over. Guess what? Logic (and hence mathematics) and science are necessarily NOT mind-independent either. This is especially problematic with logic (and maths), because - in essence - to say that since X isn't mind-independent, and thus is subjective, and thus is just a "consensus" and changes throughout history, is to render logic itself just such a thing. But wait a second, you're using logic to try and establish that very point. After all, logics are just man-made systems of deriving conclusions from accepted styles and inference rules, and there zre TONS of differing and incompatible logics out there. And if that's the case you're making (which it is, i.e that being mind-dependent somehow renders it inert and not true), then your claim is self-refuting. Further, your (and those making similar claims) are making a fallacious objection. Specifically, you're begging the question against moral realism by claiming it needs to appeal to a type of supporting evidence that wouldn't support it in the first place.

Moral frameworks are similar to logical, mathematical and scientific frameworks. They take on axioms, inference rules and data, and try to derive conclusions from them. To me, that shows that moral realism is clearly defensible, unless you want to be consistent with what you're saying about moral realism and conclude that, therefore, logic, mathematics and science are merely historical consensus and subjective? That sounds rather post-modernist, I must say.


The only people who say that moral realism (i.e what you're calling "objective morality") comes from "an outside source" are people who hold to something (or something like) Divine-command theory, and those are theists. Amongst philosophers, ~72% are atheists and approximately 60% are moral realists. Hence, most philosophers who are moral realists are also atheists. So it is not the case that those most well-versed on this issue are theists, and hence do NOT believe moral realism comes from some external source. So it's just demonstrably false to think that is what is thought about it.

Now, you bring up slavery and such, but I don't quite see the point. I'm going to have to pull out one of William Lane Craig's responses to this, because he's actually right. You're confusing moral ontology (what is actually right and wrong, and to what degree) with moral epistemology (i.e how we come to know what is moral). Moral progress (and regress for that matter) are completely compatible with moral realism being true. We aren't omniscient, much less omnibenevolent or omnipotent.

However, if you really just think its consensus, then I wonder how you couch your moral proclamations? Is thievery (when one's life isn't on the line) wrong, or is that just your opinion?

[GrandizerII]

The point is that morality is based on standards that differ with individual, culture, and time.

The rules of mathematics and logic are thought up by rational beings like us, but they are at least based on nature and empirical observations. They do not differ with individual opinions, cultural beliefs, or zeitgeist of the time.

Also, when William Lane Craig argues about a distinction between moral ontology and moral epistemology, I find this to be a big red herring because the nature of morality is dependent on what you believe about it anyway. So there may be a distinction in meaning, but in the case of morality, is not a good counter argument to keep using whenever someone brings up moral issues that were once condoned in the past (such as slavery).

[MindForgedManacle]

The point is that morality is based on standards that differ with individual, culture, and time.

The rules of mathematics and logic are thought up by rational beings like us, but they are at least based on nature and empirical observations. They do not differ with individual opinions, cultural beliefs, or zeitgeist of the time.

I wonder what systems of logic and inference rules you've been looking at, because those have most definitely changed over time. Logic isn't one thing, it's a multiplicity of axiomatic systems. There are commonalities amongst various logics but the views and applications of these have changed throughout the ages, and then one can say the same of morality. Logics tend to (but not always) accept the law of non-contradiction, and moral systems to accept that murder is wrong.

Also, when William Lane Craig argues about a distinction between moral ontology and moral epistemology, I find this to be a big red herring because the nature of morality is dependent on what you believe about it anyway. So there may be a distinction in meaning, but in the case of morality, is not a good counter argument to keep using whenever someone brings up moral issues that were once condoned in the past (such as slavery).

How is the nature of morality "dependent on hat you believe about it"? Under moral realism, that's false by definition. And yes, it is a good counter argument because you're confusing what people once thought about what they did with the actual fact of the matter about what they did.

[GrandizerII]

I wonder what systems of logic and inference rules you've been looking at, because those have most definitely changed over time. Logic isn't one thing, it's a multiplicity of axiomatic systems. There are commonalities amongst various logics but the views and applications of these have changed throughout the ages, and then one can say the same of morality. Logics tend to (but not always) accept the law of non-contradiction, and moral systems to accept that murder is wrong.

Yes, those changes are called corrections based on things newly discovered in nature. Not because of changes in individual, cultural, or historical beliefs.

Moral rules are not based in nature but in human opinion.

You say that stealing is wrong, but what observation in nature leads you to assert this as objectively wrong?

Murder is always wrong because murder, by definition, is wrong. You probably mean to say "killing" instead of "murder". In that case, no, moral systems do not always accept killing to be wrong.

How is the nature of morality "dependent on hat you believe about it"? Under moral realism, that's false by definition. And yes, it is a good counter argument because you're confusing what people once thought about what they did with the actual fact of the matter about what they did.

You're assuming there is this "actual fact" that provides an objective basis for why slavery is wrong.

Under moral subjectivism, the distinction between moral ontology and epistemology is a red herring. Also, Occam's razor does not support extra unnecessary features/entities, so moral subjectivism would be more reasonable.

[MindForgedManacle]

Yes, those changes are called corrections based on things newly discovered in nature. Not because of changes in individual, cultural, or historical beliefs.

What? These things were the result of cultural and historical changes. And what logical system one should employ will be selected based on your own opinion about what you're applying it to. Further, moral realists could easily claim they're corrections too and not simply opinion, but I'll get to that below.

Moral rules are not based in nature but in human opinion.

So are the rules of logic and maths. What's your point?

You say that stealing is wrong, but what observation in nature leads you to assert this as objectively wrong?

I didn't say it was in wrong in all circumstances. Here, you're equivocating between "objective" and "absolute".
As a consequentialist, theft is wrong on my view if it decreases well-being, which it most often does.

Murder is always wrong because murder, by definition, is wrong. You probably mean to say "killing" instead of "murder".

No, murder is an unlawful killing, and I meant murder. Murder is not by definition wrong, just unlawful. But smoking weed is illegal too, doesn't mean it's wrong morally.

In that case, no, moral systems do not always accept killing to be wrong.

Many deontological moral frameworks do actually treat killing as immoral in all situations, just do a search for responses to Immanuel Kant's ethical framework.

You're assuming there is this "actual fact" that provides an objective basis for why slavery is wrong.

Well yes, as a consequentialist and a moral realist I DO have such an actual fact: Slavery causes a massive decrease in peoples' well-being. And given that goes against my moral axioms and is based on a demonstrable fact about the world (harm to the slaves), it is "objective".

Under moral subjectivism, the distinction between moral ontology and epistemology is a red herring.

Okay? It would be silly to say that is true for moral realism just because it is for a subjectivist.

Also, Occam's razor does not support extra unnecessary features/entities, so moral subjectivism would be more reasonable.

Er, no. First demonstrate that moral realism is an "extra, unnecessary feature". Just assuming that it is, is kind of silly.

[GrandizerII]

No, murder is an unlawful killing, and I meant murder. Murder is not by definition wrong, just unlawful. But smoking weed is illegal too, doesn't mean it's wrong morally.

Ok, I am used to thinking of murder as killing that's considered unjustified, but let's go with the "legally wrong" definition.

In such a case, no, murder would not be objectively wrong in the moral sense. Plus, laws on what constitutes murder may differ with each state or nation, so even if a moral system supports the belief that murder, as defined by a certain state or nation, is immoral, it may not agree with the notion that murder, as legally defined by another state or nation, is immoral.

If the law of a nation considers abortion to be murder, but another nation does not, which definition should the moral system of concern follow? Either way, it cannot agree with both notions of murder being wrong.

I didn't say it was in wrong in all circumstances. Here, you're equivocating between "objective" and "absolute". As a consequentialist, theft is wrong on my view if it decreases well-being, which it most often does.

You are using a standard/ideal by which to measure the wrongness of stealing/theft. You are not relying on an observation of nature to determine that theft (in general) is wrong. Correct me if I'm wrong, but by what you're saying, you are basing the wrongness of theft on how you personally assess the well-being of each person involved in the theft and how you personally do the comparisons. If so, then how is this not subjective?

What? These things were the result of cultural and historical changes. And what logical system one should employ will be selected based on your own opinion about what you're applying it to. Further, moral realists could easily claim they're corrections too and not simply opinion, but I'll get to that below.

Adjustments in the fields of logic, mathematics, and science typically occur when new discoveries are made in nature (or in deduction and such).

For example, it was once believed that the earth was flat because that's what they could intuit at the time. But eventually, smart people came along, made some observations and calculations about the world they were in, and found that the earth was actually round (not flat). So a change in thinking regarding the earth's shape occurred as a result, not based on human standard, but based on what was observed in nature.

When it comes to morality, changes in thinking regarding the moral rightness of something typically occur when standards are adjusted rather not when a new discovery in nature (or a discovery of an argument based on axioms/premises established by observation of nature or any such thing) occurs.

Slavery was, generally speaking, morally acceptable back in the days because standards were different from today's standards (in most of the developed world at least). But nothing in nature screams "slavery is wrong" in the same way that nature (from what is observed) screams "2 + 2 = 4" or "squares can't also be circles".

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You also mention the many branches in the fields of logic and mathematics and such, but that's still missing the point. You can't just say they're similar to many moral systems relied on just because they also have branches and different systems.

[MindForgedManacle]

Ok, I am used to thinking of murder as killing that's considered unjustified, but let's go with the "legally wrong" definition.

Part of the reason I go with that definition is because the way you were going about it would seem to assume moral realism, which I don't think you intended. After all, you said that murder is wrong by definition, so I figured there were better ways to cash out that term.

In such a case, no, murder would not be objectively wrong in the moral sense. Plus, laws on what constitutes murder may differ with each state or nation, so even if a moral system supports the belief that murder, as defined by a certain state or nation, is immoral, it may not agree with the notion that murder, as legally defined by another state or nation, is immoral.

Again, I'm not sure what the point is here. Again, you're confusing ontology and epistemology, the implementation and belief with the actual facts of the matter.

If the law of a nation considers abortion to be murder, but another nation does not, which definition should the moral system of concern follow? Either way, it cannot agree with both notions of murder being wrong.

You're presuming that both are on equivalent factual foundations, which is patently absurd.

You are using a standard/ideal by which to measure the wrongness of stealing/theft. You are not relying on an observation of nature to determine that theft (in general) is wrong. Correct me if I'm wrong, but by what you're saying, you are basing the wrongness of theft on how you personally assess the well-being of each person involved in the theft and how you personally do the comparisons. If so, then how is this not subjective?

Are you trolling me? Of course I'm using a standard by which to measure the moral view of theft. That's how you mediate ALL "observations of nature". There is no standard-free observation or interpretation of anything for any being. But then you're again just begging the question by trying to assert a certain kind of evidence is required, when such evidence wouldn't even support the position in the first place.
And not quite. Consequentialists tend to analyze ethics in terms of the harm and/or benefits to sentient entities by their actions. Of course personal assessment is involved, but then it's involved in everything. But then to criticize that for using such would be to again make the epistemic-ontological confusion.

Adjustments in the fields of logic, mathematics, and science typically occur when new discoveries are made in nature (or in deduction and such).

For example, it was once believed that the earth was flat because that's what they could intuit at the time. But eventually, smart people came along, made some observations and calculations about the world they were in, and found that the earth was actually round (not flat). So a change in thinking regarding the earth's shape occurred as a result, not based on human standard, but based on what was observed in nature.

When did I say changes in thinking never occurred from observations of nature?

When it comes to morality, changes in thinking regarding the moral rightness of something typically occur when standards are adjusted rather not when a new discovery in nature (or a discovery of an argument based on axioms established by observation of nature or any such thing) occurs.

Slavery was, generally speaking, morally acceptable back in the days because standards were different from today's standards (in most of the developed world at least). But nothing in nature screams "slavery is wrong" in the same way that nature (from what is observed) screams "2 + 2 = 4" or "squares can't also be circles".

Again, a confusion between how we come to know what is moral and what is actually moral. A large part of the reason that slavery was condoned was because of the belief in the inherent inferiority of those whom were enslaved. That is in large part why the standards were different, because of what people believed (I suppose it's a sort of feedback loop).
Of course not. Those aren't the same sort of thing, because you're essentially just talking about contradictions with those.

You also keep mentioning the many branches in the fields of logic and mathematics and such, but that's still missing the point. You can't just say they're similar to many moral systems relied on just because they also have branches and different systems.

That's not what I'm doing. I'm saying they're similar because they have they work from axioms and inference rules to derive consistent conclusions, which is what is done in maths and logics. Not merely because there are branches and different systems, but because they have relevantly similar features in how they're developed.

[GrandizerII]

A large part of the reason that slavery was condoned was because of the belief in the inherent inferiority of those whom were enslaved.

Yeah, but this is not, in any way, due to observation of nature but due to a change in standard which is not based on natural observation. Nature says nothing about the status of beings.

Yep, nothing is standard-free, but standards in logic and mathematics and science are generally based on what can be observed naturally. The earth is round as that's what nature reveals to us. Nature says nothing about the right/wrong of slavery or theft or any other moral act/thought.

[The Grand Nudger]

"Nature" can have a say in those. We'd have to take a pragmatic approach to morality, but it can have a say.