The Problem of Evil (XXVII)

[ApeNotKillApe]

Instances of God doing evil from the SAB

Jeremiah 18:11 Now therefore go to, speak to the men of Judah, and to the inhabitants of Jerusalem, saying, Thus saith the LORD; Behold, I frame evil against you, and devise a device against you: return ye now every one from his evil way, and make your ways and your doings good

Jeremiah 19:3 And say, Hear ye the word of the LORD, O kings of Judah, and inhabitants of Jerusalem; Thus saith the LORD of hosts, the God of Israel; Behold, I will bring evil upon this place, the which whosoever heareth, his ears shall tingle.

Judges 9:23-24 Then God sent an evil spirit between Abimelech and the men of Shechem; and the men of Shechem dealt treacherously with Abimelech:
That the cruelty done to the threescore and ten sons of Jerubbaal might come, and their blood be laid upon Abimelech their brother, which slew them; and upon the men of Shechem, which aided him in the killing of his brethren.

Samuel 16:14-15 But the Spirit of the LORD departed from Saul, and an evil spirit from the LORD troubled him. And Saul's servants said unto him, Behold now,an evil spirit from God troubleth thee.

2 Chronicles 18:19-22 And the LORD said, Who shall entice Ahab king of Israel, that he may go up and fall at Ramothgilead? And one spake saying after this manner, and another saying after that manner. Then there came out a spirit, and stood before the LORD, and said, I will entice him. And the LORD said unto him, Wherewith? And he said, I will go out, and be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And the Lord said, Thou shalt entice him, and thou shalt also prevail: go out, and do even so. Now therefore, behold, the LORD hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of these thy prophets, and the LORD hath spoken evil against thee.

I should add, I don't expect any theists to address these quotes that I've so graciously provided.

[robvalue]

Honestly the problem of Evil isn't a good argument against the Abrahamic God.  I mean the guy sounds like a total prick.  He's the kind that would smite puppies because he thought it was fun.  He sacrificed his son (which was also himself) by means of crucifixion.  He's obviously a torture fetishist.

You're right, it's not a good argument against the character as portrayed in the books. It's only good against the interpretation some Christians/Muslims carry around with them, which bears little resemblance to the text.

Some carry around the (partly) evil version quite happily instead, and the argument fails against people willing to worship a being like that.

[Gemini]

The logical incompatibility of the claims "a tri-omni God exists" and "gratuitous suffering exist" is not terribly controversial....To salvage the doctrine of a tri-omni God, theists by and large take the skeptical position and argue that we don't know that God isn't morally justified in permitting such instances of suffering.

You can cry foul all you want. The skeptical objection still contains a positive claim that cannot be proven. That claim is this: there is a possible world without evil.

Secondly, there is no doctrine to salvage. Skeptics' definitions of "tri-omni" are not part of Christian doctrine. Skeptics strain the definition of omnipotent well beyond any reasonable bounds by saying that an all-powerful god could do the impossible. In so doing they are objecting to a god not associated with Christianity...

A simple form of the logical argument from evil would go:

1. If gratuitous suffering exists, then a tri-omni God does not exist.
2. Gratuitous suffering exists.
3. Therefore, a tri-omni God does not exist.

I question whether you have any interesting objections to the first premise. I would be surprised if you did, because I'm not aware that it's at all controversial.

Perhaps you have an idiosyncratic doctrine of God which is different than the historically orthodox all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good (tri-omni) God believed in by the overwhelming majority of Christians and Christian philosophers. Maybe you're with William of Ockham, or an antinomian, or some such. If so, that's not an interesting objection to the first premise, because participants in the argument aren't talking about your version of theism.

It sounds, however, as though you've misconstrued what we mean by a tri-omni God. Your objection is to the second premise. As far as "proving" that a possible world with less gratuitous suffering than this one exists, you do actually need to show a logical contradiction with the proposition. Nice try, but you still can't shift that burden of proof.

And if you notice, I'm willing to set aside objections to the logical coherence of omnipotence. Because the logical problem of evil still succeeds, even if you grant logical constraints on God's power. A God who can't do logical impossible things is still plenty powerful enough to eliminate gratuitous suffering.

[Mister Agenda]

Omnipotence isn't even required for a better world. For humans, the world is much better now than it was 200 years ago when 90% of the world's population lived in extreme poverty (per the UN definition). It was down to 37% in 1990, it's barely over 10% today. Despite headlines, going by percentages, fewer people are dying in war, tolerance is increasing, people are living healthier lives and are better fed. Renewable energy is even catching on.

God didn't do that. We did. The world still isn't good enough, by far, but it's inching in the right direction. The possibility of a better world than the one out of the wrapper is proven.

[wiploc]

Traditionally, the excuses mostly consist of temporarily forgetting that god is supposed to be omnipotent, or that that he is supposed to be omniscient, or that he's supposed to be omnibenevolent.  I say temporarily because the people who give up god's benevolence for the sake of argument will then turn around and worship him for his goodness. 

So I like to say that the art of defending against the problem of evil consists largely of not realizing what you have given up.  To be consistent, you have to give up omnipotence, omniscience, or omnibenevolence; but, to continue worshiping a tri-omni god, you have to not realize that you gave it up.  

But these people, people who actually give up omnipotence, omniscience, or omnibenevolence (as opposed to just making a feint in that direction and then reverting to their prior beliefs) don't have any reason to argue against the PoE.  They already know that a tri-omni god can't coexist with evil, which is why their gods aren't tri-omni.

While stated often, I don't think that the case has been made, where logically; to be omnibenevolent, other good attributes must be forsaken.

 

Evil is what an omnibenevolent god forsakes, not "other good attributes."  

The argument is normally presented as a simple and naïve false dichotomy.  One where comfort and happiness are presented as supreme, and the one making the argument seems to forget about everything else. 

 

The only thing logically incompatible with comfort is discomfort.  The only thing logically incompatible with happiness is unhappiness.  If we call comfort and happiness good, and discomfort and unhappiness evil, then--except for evil--an omnipotent god can have anything it wants in addition to comfort and happiness.  

If what it wants is discomfort and unhappiness, then it is not omnibenevolent.  
If it wants something else and can't have both that and the absence of evil, then it is not omnipotent.  

This is simple, but it's not naive or false: An omnipotent god can have anything it wants that isn't logically incompatible with other things it wants.  An omnibenevolent god doesn't want evil.  Therefore, an omnipotent and omnibenevolent god can have anything it wants.  

I agree with Steve, that it is more of an emotional problem, than a logical one. 

 

The emotional problem Steve described, if I understand it, is something like, "You are describing a god who sucks.  I wouldn't like that god even if he existed."   You can try to change the subject to that, but this subject will remain:  

If a god had the power and the knowledge and the will to prevent all evil, then there would be no evil.  Therefore, if evil exists, no such tri-omni god exists.  

Let me ask you, if I told you that there was a fix for the things you attribute to the problem of evil; would you do everything within your power, to save as many as you could from suffering?

 


I'm not omnibenevolent.  I may not even be particularly good. 

I'll tell you this, though:  If I was the god of Oklahoma, and Jehovah was the god of everywhere else, everybody would move to Oklahoma.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Perhaps you have an idiosyncratic doctrine of God which is different than the historically orthodox all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good (tri-omni) God believed in by the overwhelming majority of Christians and Christian philosophers.

You are flat out wrong. As confirmed by the Aquinas quote I gave above, I am in full agreement with the Roman Catholic Church’s definition of omnipotence, the clearly premiere Christian denomination. It is you that maintain an unorthodox definition of omnipotence and as such your formulation of the PoE has no relevance to Christianity.

It sounds…as though you've misconstrued what we mean by a tri-omni God.

And when you say ‘we’ you mean atheist skeptics who dishonestly use an unchristian version of god in their so-called refutation of the Christian god.

Your objection is to the second premise. As far as "proving" that a possible world with less gratuitous suffering than this one exists, you do actually need to show a logical contradiction with the proposition.

I need do no such thing. Traditional Christian doctrine acknowledges that evil exists, where evil is defined as the lack of the good that ought to be present (originally from Augustine and now RCC orthodoxy). Your positive claim is that some of the evil we see is gratuitous. You have not demonstrated that any, much less all, evil is gratuitous. I am not obliged to prove that all evil is necessary to refute your unsupported premise. Moreover, you have not excluded that possibility which makes your whole syllogism an argument from ignorance.

[wiploc]

So you've conceived of a possible situation where God would have morally sufficient reasons to permit suffering, despite his tri-Omni super powers. I'd like to hear what it is.

Only an infinite (or nearly so) mind can calculate all the outcomes of a storm or one earthquake--not just in the near term but from that point on through eternity. Just a few possible "good" outcomes from such an event:

An omniscient god wouldn't have a problem with that.  It would be able to eliminate evil without unforeseen side effects.  

1. Community grows stronger in time of crisis. 

An omnipotent god could achieve that strength without the crisis.  

2. Neighbors helping neighbors. Recipients lives are touched/changed by compassion. Those giving aid or compassion are themselves changed.

A tri-omni god could do that without any pain or suffering.  

3. Outsiders helping. Some results as #2 but they go back to another place a changed person. 

A tri-omni god could achieve that (or just achieve the benefits of that, if it preferred) without evil.

4. People's lives are refocused on things that matter. More introspection. 

Who made the rule that people can't have refocused introspection without suffering?  Not a benevolent god, that's for sure.

5. Possibly as a result of #1-4 people gain a knowledge of God.

A god could give us all the knowledge it wanted, for free.  

6. People from #5 live lives, come in contact with others, have families, possibly affecting hundreds, thousands, or even millions of future lives.

A powerful god could do that for everybody, not just millions of people.  

I'm sure you are familiar with Chaos Theory and the butterfly effect. It cannot be fathomed what effect one little change can have on the rest of eternity.

It could be fathomed by an omniscient god. 

Whatever benefits your god desires could be attained without cost, and without unknown side effects, by an omnipotent omniscient god.  If that god was also omnibenevolent, it would achieve these effects without evil.

[Gemini]

You are flat out wrong. As confirmed by the Aquinas quote I gave above, I am in full agreement with the Roman Catholic Church’s definition of omnipotence, the clearly premiere Christian denomination. It is you that maintain an unorthodox definition of omnipotence and as such your formulation of the PoE has no relevance to Christianity.

What about my definition of God as "all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good" is unorthodox? How is this a "dishonest use of an unchristian version of god?"

...Your positive claim is that some of the evil we see is gratuitous. You have not demonstrated that any, much less all, evil is gratuitous.

Mea culpa on that point. As I said earlier in the thread, my claim is that the logical argument from evil succeeds, granting some reasonable assumptions, and I should have restated that.*

Reasonable assumptions are that we are excluding from consideration:

1) Preposterous theodicies, such as Plantinga's free will defense of natural evil, or David Lewis's parodic theodicy.

2) The claim that God's actions are justified under some moral framework which is unintelligible to humans.

What I'm claiming is that if it is morally permissible to allow a two-year-old to die a painful, lingering death, it is permissible under a moral framework which is unintelligible to humans. It's a million miles away from anything we would understand as being morally justified. If God's moral nature is thus inscrutable to us, then how are we to trust him on anything?

Consider this. Perhaps theism turns out to be true after all, and when you die, you go to heaven. Where seraphim scream an endless, piercing cacophony of praises in your ear as the glory of God sears your mind with unbearable agony. I, in turn, am damned to eternal separation from God, which it turns out is being cast into space on a starship populated with other friendly infidels. We proceed to spend our immortal lives studying the universe.

This would, of course, entail that you and the Catholic Church had been mislead. So what? If God has morally sufficient reasons to allow a small child to die in agony, perhaps he has morally sufficient reasons to permit you and millions of believers to be mislead.

*Not that I'm convinced the logical argument from evil needs these assumptions to succeed. I'm just pointing out what David Lewis observed--it's no triumph to solve the problem with a preposterous or overly skeptical theodicy.

[wiploc]

@wiploc

When I use the term omnibenevolent, I mean it is a property describing the essence of God as perfect goodness or moral perfection.

Who gets to define "perfect"?  This seems like a subjective standard.  Who gets to define morality?  

I'm a utilitarian myself, so my definition of omnibenevolent is congruent with my definition of moral perfection. 

But, hey, let's say we have a god who, in his moral perfection, created man just so that he can enjoy watching us suffer.  Then he's not omni-against suffering. 

We can accommodate this god by defining suffering as good, and by defining happiness as evil.  Then this god can be both omnibenevolent and perfectly moral.  What does this do to the PoE?  Nothing.  It would still be true that evil would not exist if a tri-omni god existed. 

If we make benevolence and morality conflict (say by defining "good" as ignorance and "moral" as knowledge) then a god cannot be both omnibenevolent and perfectly moral.  Not even an omnipotent god could manage that. 

But, if "good" is happiness, and if "moral" is anything other than unhappiness, then an omnipotent god could have both.  There would be no conflict.

You are defining it more along the lines of infinite benevolence.

Omni benevolence is perfect benevolence, yes.  

Rather than a descriptive property, you are taking a step further and are claiming it creates an obligation to avoid all suffering.

No, I never do that. 

Vegetarians can eat meat all they want.  They are in no way obligated to refrain from eating meat.  But if they eat meat, they--by definition--won't be vegetarians.  

Omnibenevolent people can cause all the suffering they want.  They are under no obligation to avoid causing harm.  The  thing is, if they do choose to cause suffering, then they aren't omnibenevolent.  

So, no, I won't fall for this misrepresentation.  I do not claim that that benevolent gods are obliged to do good; rather, I claim that doing good is what makes a god benevolent.  

It's a matter of definition, not of obligation.  If words have meaning, omnibenevolent gods choose always good and never evil.  

But by using this definition, you cannot stop at just natural suffering--you would have to apply it to all suffering (even man-made), otherwise preventing this suffering vs that suffering is arbitrary and therefore is not a real property. 

I'm an LPoE (logical problem of evil) kinda guy:  I never stop at just natural suffering.  

If a tri-omni god existed, there would be no suffering of any kind.  If you believe that suffering exists, then you cannot logically believe that tri-omni gods exist.   

In response to both the free will and the knowledge of God defense, you say that if God thinks these things are more valuable than preventing suffering he is not omnibenevolent.

I deny and repudiate that line of argument.  

The PoE (problem of evil) is bulletproof regardless of how you define evil.  

Let us stipulate, temporarily and for the sake of argument, that "good" means three things:  
- First and most importantly, it means knowing god.  
- Second, and second in importance, it means having free will.  
- Third, and last in importance, it means being happy.  

Posit a benevolent god of limited power:  If he had to choose between these three, he would give up happiness and free will to get knowledge of god.  If he had to choose between free will and happiness, he would prefer free will.  

This god may be omnibenevolent, but he is not omnipotent.  An omnipotent god would not have to choose between these.  An omnipotent god can do anything that does not contradict logic.  

Having happiness and free will and knowledge does not contradict logic.  So an omnipotent god could do it.  

Even an omnipotent god couldn't have pure happiness, but also unhappiness.  It couldn't have complete knowledge of god but also ignorance of god.  It could not have everybody having free will but some people not having free will.  Those would be contradictions.  Not even an omnipotent god could achieve contradictions.  

But there is no contradiction between happiness, knowledge, and free will.  An omnipotent god could effect that effortlessly.  No problem.  

The PoE is bulletproof regardless of how you define good.  If there was a god who wanted us to be happy, and who wanted us to know him, and who wanted us to have free will, then (if this god was also omniscient and omnibenevolent) we would have all three of those things.  

If we do not have all three of those things, then such a god does not exist.  

I can see you point with your definition.

The PoE is bulletproof with any definition.

I don't think argument is strong with the definition I have.

As I have demonstrated, you are wrong about this.  

Moral perfection in a universe of physical laws and free will does not entail preventing suffering if 1) there are greater goods to acheive or 2) someone makes a choice that results in suffering.

"A universe of physical laws"?  Are you saying that your god can't throw magic?  If you posit a less-than-omnipotent god, then of course it can coexist with evil, just as a less-than-omniscient or less-than-omnibenevolent god could. 

The PoE has nothing to say about such inferior gods.

[SteveII]

The Euthyphro dilemma absolutely still applies.  I've seen theists try this word game before.  Saying that "good" is intrinsic to the nature of God versus existing as a separate and independent property, is just a language gymnastic that in no way excuses him of the contradiction.

Attaching "good" to the definition of God's essence is convenient for the theist because it absolves him, and absolves God of the responsibility of defining what "good" actually means.  We are still left with the question of how such a moral determination of his character was reached in the first place.  How do we know that god's nature is "good"?  By what standards are we comparing god's essence in order to make such a judgement about his inherent morality?  Or, is God just circularly declaring that he is good because because he's God, and he is God because he is good?

So, as you can see, "God is inherently good" is just another vague, poorly defined, and essentially meaningless assertion in the end.  It doesn't get you out of Euthyphro's dilemma in the sense that you think; it only takes you safely away from it.  Without venturing to define what "good" actually means, you aren't even coming near the discussion.

It is not a word game. The dilemma states: Is the good good because God approves it, or does God approve it because it’s good? That statement means that goodness is either as a result of God's decree of the "goodness" of a good, or there some measure of goodness apart from God. The first horn clearly indicates a contingent property of God. 

The defeater of the dilemma is to point out that God's goodness is a necessary property (which is a third option). Goodness is not a property that God could have lacked. As the greatest conceivable being, there is no possible world where God is not good. 

You seem to think that somehow we have to define "good" and otherwise being "vague, poorly defined, and essentially meaningless assertion in the end." First that is to confuse moral semantics (meaning of moral terms) with moral ontology (the foundation of morality). Second, no one is being vague. We all know what "good" "evil" "right" and "wrong" is. That objection is just a misdirection and in no way defeats the argument.