why do we enjoy poetry From the perspective of neuroscience?

[Alan V]

Thoreauvian, you are enumerating the points of your world view.  Saying "X is good, so must be evolution" is not a particularly convincing argument for why the Universe has the capacity, under any material formation or process, of sustaining subjective experience.  Why, for example, couldn't things learn, interact, say stuff, make babies, and so on purely mechanically without ever really having qualia?

And more importantly, how am I to establish that isn't the case?

Alternately, how am I to determine that any of the things I take as real aren't just idealistic representations?  How do I know space is real, or anything of the objects in it or their properties?  By experiencing them as such, maybe?  That leads to a nasty circle-- if 100% of everything you base a theory of mind on is dependent on a world view you developed with that mind, you're going to have a problem establishing a foundation.  The Matrix might be feeding you mutually coherent data that represents no actual reality, or perhaps the Mind of God makes pure ideas seem like physical reality, or maybe Ulthar the Magnificent is poking your (Xarathrian, not human) brain with a hard-tipped boodledyboo in a jar somewhere because you've been dead for 10 Xarathrian days and the Ritual of Rezooberification is set to commence.

There are a variety of evolutionary strategies. Are you denying that consciousness is one of them?

We determine that the things we take to be real are real to whatever extent by taking a pragmatic, trial-and-error approach. That approach has given us science and logic, since they work. My construct of a mind in a body is based on observations, and my assertions regarding them are the simplest explanations in my opinion. They also have the benefit of avoiding the qualia problem of consciousness studies.

I am not a philosopher, and I don't think a philosopher's ideal of absolute knowledge is relevant to what is most probably correct. If you really think we are brains in vats, you have the burden of proof.

[Belacqua]

Thoreauvian, you are enumerating the points of your world view.  Saying "X is good, so must be evolution" is not a particularly convincing argument for why the Universe has the capacity, under any material formation or process, of sustaining subjective experience.  Why, for example, couldn't things learn, interact, say stuff, make babies, and so on purely mechanically without ever really having qualia?

And more importantly, how am I to establish that isn't the case?

Alternately, how am I to determine that any of the things I take as real aren't just idealistic representations?  How do I know space is real, or anything of the objects in it or their properties?  By experiencing them as such, maybe?  That leads to a nasty circle-- if 100% of everything you base a theory of mind on is dependent on a world view you developed with that mind, you're going to have a problem establishing a foundation.  The Matrix might be feeding you mutually coherent data that represents no actual reality, or perhaps the Mind of God makes pure ideas seem like physical reality, or maybe Ulthar the Magnificent is poking your (Xarathrian, not human) brain with a hard-tipped boodledyboo in a jar somewhere because you've been dead for 10 Xarathrian days and the Ritual of Rezooberification is set to commence.

There are a variety of evolutionary strategies.  Are you denying that consciousness is one of them?

We determine that the things we take to be real are real to whatever extent by taking a pragmatic, trial-and-error approach.  That approach has given us science and logic, since they work.  My construct of a mind in a body is based on observations, and my assertions regarding them are the simplest explanations in my opinion.  They also have the benefit of avoiding the qualia problem of consciousness studies.

I am not a philosopher, and I don't think a philosopher's ideal of absolute knowledge is relevant to what is most probably correct.  If you really think we are brains in vats, you have the burden of proof.

I'm afraid that bringing up evolution here doesn't address the problem. 

We can all be sure that whatever the process of internal experience is, it came about through evolution. Because everything about us came about through evolution. But that isn't what we're talking about. 

The "hard problem" of consciousness is: how do electrochemical events in the brain present themselves to the subject as experiences? Yes, the process came about through evolution, but evolution doesn't answer the question. That would be as if you asked: "how does the body make testosterone?" and I answered, "because of evolution." It's true, but it doesn't answer the question. (Beware of the genetic fallacy.)

[bennyboy]

There are a variety of evolutionary strategies.  Are you denying that consciousness is one of them?

We determine that the things we take to be real are real to whatever extent by taking a pragmatic, trial-and-error approach.  That approach has given us science and logic, since they work.  My construct of a mind in a body is based on observations, and my assertions regarding them are the simplest explanations in my opinion.  They also have the benefit of avoiding the qualia problem of consciousness studies.

I am not a philosopher, and I don't think a philosopher's ideal of absolute knowledge is relevant to what is most probably correct.  If you really think we are brains in vats, you have the burden of proof.

You speak pretty confidently. Okay, let's walk through this. First of all, given any system-- a computer, a highly-complex organism on a planet near Alpha Centauri, or a human brain-- how do you establish whether it is conscious or not? You know. . . using trial-and-error, observations, and so on?

How do you differentiate, scientifically, between a "real" subjective agent and a philosophical zombie-- a machine which simulates all the behaviors of a real subjective agent, but which has no more actual subjective experience than a rock? And actually, this is a non-trivial issue, unless you want perhaps within this lifetime to accept constitutional recognition to a billion Google-bots which smile at your dumb jokes and know what you want for breakfast before you do.

Second, given that 100% of your "objective" observations are necessarily made through the agency of mind, on what basis do you establish that the reality about which you are so confident consists of anything more than mind? Why do you choose a materialist monism rather than an idealistic one?

So far as I can tell, there is no scientific theory which explains why any system is conscious rather than not. The evolutionary narrative "Well, it's here, so must be evolution" is a cop-out. First you have to demonstrate that it is in fact here. So. . . how do you demonstrate that there is such a thing as consciousness at all, in order that it may sensibly be studied? Because if you cannot demonstrate consciousness to be a real thing, then you might as well say "Evolution. . . so unicorns were inevitable!"\

As for probability-- how do you attach probability to a philosophical position? From whence comes your sample? Compared to what other philosophical positions would you weigh such a position?

[Alan V]

The "hard problem" of consciousness is: how do electrochemical events in the brain present themselves to the subject as experiences? Yes, the process came about through evolution, but evolution doesn't answer the question.

My answer to the hard problem of consciousness was not "because of evolution," but rather, to paraphrase, because self-organization organizes selves. There is simply nothing in an indifferent or hostile environment to program biological organisms to choose survival over death, so if they are to survive at all they must evolve self-motivations, pleasures, pains, and so on -- at least at a certain level of complexity. In other words, such things can only come from inside the organisms themselves.

[Belacqua]

The "hard problem" of consciousness is: how do electrochemical events in the brain present themselves to the subject as experiences? Yes, the process came about through evolution, but evolution doesn't answer the question.

My answer to the hard problem of consciousness was not "because of evolution," but rather, to paraphrase, because self-organization organizes selves.  There is simply nothing in an indifferent or hostile environment to program biological organisms to choose survival over death, so if they are to survive at all they must evolve self-motivations, pleasures, pains, and so on -- at least at a certain level of complexity.  In other words, such things can only come from inside the organisms themselves.

Right, that all seems very likely. Is someone here suggesting that something comes from outside the organism?

The question is how -- the mechanism by which -- electrochemical brain events present themselves to the subject as experiences. There is currently no explanation for this.

[Alan V]

You speak pretty confidently.  Okay, let's walk through this.  First of all, given any system-- a computer, a highly-complex organism on a planet near Alpha Centauri, or a human brain-- how do you establish whether it is conscious or not?  You know. . . using trial-and-error, observations, and so on?

How do you differentiate, scientifically, between a "real" subjective agent and a philosophical zombie-- a machine which simulates all the behaviors of a real subjective agent, but which has no more actual subjective experience than a rock?  And actually, this is a non-trivial issue, unless you want perhaps within this lifetime to accept constitutional recognition to a billion Google-bots which smile at your dumb jokes and know what you want for breakfast before you do.

Second, given that 100% of your "objective" observations are necessarily made through the agency of mind, on what basis do you establish that the reality about which you are so confident consists of anything more than mind?  Why do you choose a materialist monism rather than an idealistic one?

So far as I can tell, there is no scientific theory which explains why any system is conscious rather than not.  The evolutionary narrative "Well, it's here, so must be evolution" is a cop-out.  First you have to demonstrate that it is in fact here.  So. . . how do you demonstrate that there is such a thing as consciousness at all, in order that it may sensibly be studied?  Because if you cannot demonstrate consciousness to be a real thing, then you might as well say "Evolution. . . so unicorns were inevitable!"\

As for probability-- how do you attach probability to a philosophical position?  From whence comes your sample?  Compared to what other philosophical positions would you weigh such a position?

I think you mistake a pragmatic approach for confidence.

You don't have to establish whether a computer or a brain are conscious to deal with them. In fact, if a machine is programmed to behave like a human conversationally, you can deal with it like you were talking to a human.

As far as I know, "philosophical zombies" are unknown in the real world. Again, you have the burden of proof before I would deal with anyone as if they were such creatures. As William James might say, what is the cash-value of such an idea? How is it practical at all?

As for choosing material monism over idealism, that's a matter of probability. The simplest explanation is the most probable.

I know I have consciousness, and assume since others are like me that they do too. I don't have to prove it at all, since I typically avoid engaging philosophers with their thought experiments in pursuit of something I don't believe in -- their hypothesized absolute knowledge.

As I said above, I attach probabilities to philosophical positions based on their complexity. I consider theism much less probable than atheism, for instance, since theism posits a whole other, spiritual level to reality which as far as I can see is unwarranted. Similarly I dismiss alternative "brains in vats" scenarios and idealism as promoting unwarranted complexities.

[Belacqua]

You speak pretty confidently.  Okay, let's walk through this.  First of all, given any system-- a computer, a highly-complex organism on a planet near Alpha Centauri, or a human brain-- how do you establish whether it is conscious or not?  You know. . . using trial-and-error, observations, and so on? 

How do you differentiate, scientifically, between a "real" subjective agent and a philosophical zombie-- a machine which simulates all the behaviors of a real subjective agent, but which has no more actual subjective experience than a rock?  And actually, this is a non-trivial issue, unless you want perhaps within this lifetime to accept constitutional recognition to a billion Google-bots which smile at your dumb jokes and know what you want for breakfast before you do.

Second, given that 100% of your "objective" observations are necessarily made through the agency of mind, on what basis do you establish that the reality about which you are so confident consists of anything more than mind?  Why do you choose a materialist monism rather than an idealistic one?

So far as I can tell, there is no scientific theory which explains why any system is conscious rather than not.  The evolutionary narrative "Well, it's here, so must be evolution" is a cop-out.  First you have to demonstrate that it is in fact here.  So. . . how do you demonstrate that there is such a thing as consciousness at all, in order that it may sensibly be studied?  Because if you cannot demonstrate consciousness to be a real thing, then you might as well say "Evolution. . . so unicorns were inevitable!"\

As for probability-- how do you attach probability to a philosophical position?  From whence comes your sample?  Compared to what other philosophical positions would you weigh such a position?

I think you mistake a pragmatic approach for confidence.

You don't have to establish whether a computer or a brain are conscious to deal with them.  In fact, if a machine is programmed to behave like a human conversationally, you can deal with it like you were talking to a human.

As far as I know, "philosophical zombies" are unknown in the real world.  Again, you have the burden of proof before I would deal with anyone as if they were such creatures.  As William James might say, what is the cash-value of such an idea?  How is it practical at all?

As for choosing material monism over idealism, that's a matter of probability.  The simplest explanation is the most probable.

I know I have consciousness, and assume since others are like me that they do too.  I don't have to prove it at all, since I typically avoid engaging philosophers with their thought experiments in pursuit of something I don't believe in -- their hypothesized absolute knowledge.

As I said above, I attach probabilities to philosophical positions based on their complexity.  I consider theism much less probable than atheism, for instance, since theism posits a whole other, spiritual level to reality which as far as I can see is unwarranted.  Similarly I dismiss alternative "brains in vats" scenarios and idealism as promoting unwarranted complexities.

Again, the point you are addressing is tangential.

Yes, we can pragmatically and confidently assume that all other humans are not p-zombies. No problem.

What is it in their experience that makes them different from zombies or computers?

OK, I look out my window from where I'm sitting. Mostly I see green. 

As you know, there is no green out there. There is only light, vibrating at ~ 560–520 nm. There is no green in my eyeball, there is only that light hitting the retina. There is no green between my retina and my brain, only nerve impulses. There is no green in my brain -- it's in the skull, there's no light in there. Why do I experience green? 

The difference between a p-zombie or a computer is this experience. How does this experience come about?

[Alan V]

My answer to the hard problem of consciousness was not "because of evolution," but rather, to paraphrase, because self-organization organizes selves.  There is simply nothing in an indifferent or hostile environment to program biological organisms to choose survival over death, so if they are to survive at all they must evolve self-motivations, pleasures, pains, and so on -- at least at a certain level of complexity.  In other words, such things can only come from inside the organisms themselves.

Right, that all seems very likely. Is someone here suggesting that something comes from outside the organism?

The question is how -- the mechanism by which -- electrochemical brain events present themselves to the subject as experiences. There is currently no explanation for this.

And yet I still think I just offered a probable explanation.  Go figure.

I would also suggest that consciousness is really just awareness filtered through a self-concept.  It is not a being at all, but a process of the body's brain.  So there is no actual subject aside from the body, as I said before.  That means the electrochemical events are necessarily experiences of brains in bodies, and are merely interpreted for content.

---

Yes, we can pragmatically and confidently assume that all other humans are not p-zombies. No problem.

What is it in their experience that makes them different from zombies or computers?

OK, I look out my window from where I'm sitting. Mostly I see green. 

As you know, there is no green out there. There is only light, vibrating at ~ 560–520 nm. There is no green in my eyeball, there is only that light hitting the retina. There is no green between my retina and my brain, only nerve impulses. There is no green in my brain -- it's in the skull, there's no light in there. Why do I experience green? 

The difference between a p-zombie or a computer is this experience. How does this experience come about?

You are correct. I really do not see the problem as a problem.

What you are really asking is why we are selves. But that is a given.

[Belacqua]

And yet I still think I just offered a probable explanation.  Go figure.

I would also suggest that consciousness is really just awareness filtered through a self-concept.  It is not a being at all, but a process of the body's brain.  So there is no actual subject aside from the body, as I said before.  That means the electrochemical events are necessarily experiences of brains in bodies, and are merely interpreted for content.

"...that is a given."

In Chomsky's speech, that I linked to earlier, he gives examples of this kind of response. In many cases today, science doesn't tell us how something happens. Science can only tell us "it just happens." 

This is the case with experience. Nothing you offer here advances us beyond that.

[bennyboy]

And yet I still think I just offered a probable explanation.  Go figure.

I would also suggest that consciousness is really just awareness filtered through a self-concept.  It is not a being at all, but a process of the body's brain.  So there is no actual subject aside from the body, as I said before.  That means the electrochemical events are necessarily experiences of brains in bodies, and are merely interpreted for content.

You seem not to be engaging with the philosophical questions that are being posed. You should take it for granted that we all know enough about the brain and evolution to understand your position.

What you aren't addressing are the important questions:
1) If science is about observation, what observations do you make to establish whether a given system does/doesn't have a subjective experience of reality?
2) Why is there any such thing as subjective experience in a material monist reality, in which all process are mechanistic?

You have said that awareness brings survival benefits. If by awareness, you mean the ability to process and interact with the environment, so as to maintain viability long enough to reproduce, fine-- but an advanced machine could do that. If by awareness, you mean the subjective knowledge of what things are like, then that is not really clear at all.

---

As far as I know, "philosophical zombies" are unknown in the real world.  Again, you have the burden of proof before I would deal with anyone as if they were such creatures.  As William James might say, what is the cash-value of such an idea?  How is it practical at all?

As far as you know, there is nothing BUT philosophical zombies. I'm not against taking a pragmatic approach to philosophy. If I felt that nobody else was really conscious, I could rape and pillage and generally have a great time of things. But I have the sense that people are conscious, and I act accordingly, and this defines my life.

The problem comes when you use that pragmatic assumption and attempt, as you are, to use it as the basis for proof or study of mind, because this is instantly and obviously self-referential: "Well, since I already know that all people are conscious, and that consciousness is in the brain, then when I study the brain, I'm studying the nature of consciousness." Yessssss, but. . . that circle is fine in and of itself, but not when you're attempting to access a level of truth one step beyond it-- like what is it about the Universe which is capable of sustaining consciousness at all, under any form? What, exactly, about the brain allows for consciousness-- is it certain chemistry, as you've asserted? Or is it certain kinds of self-referential information? Or do all energetic interchanges in the Universe represent some fundamental spark of awareness, as subtle to our senses as a single electron might be?

As for choosing material monism over idealism, that's a matter of probability.  The simplest explanation is the most probable.

I know I have consciousness, and assume since others are like me that they do too.  I don't have to prove it at all, since I typically avoid engaging philosophers with their thought experiments in pursuit of something I don't believe in -- their hypothesized absolute knowledge.

As I said above, I attach probabilities to philosophical positions based on their complexity.  I consider theism much less probable than atheism, for instance, since theism posits a whole other, spiritual level to reality which as far as I can see is unwarranted.  Similarly I dismiss alternative "brains in vats" scenarios and idealism as promoting unwarranted complexities.

Since everything from your perspective is experiential, then the simplest position is that reality is experiential. You have accepted quite a complex collection of philosophical assumptions in arriving at your "simplest explanation."