(July 3, 2016 at 8:48 pm)Anomalocaris Wrote:

(July 3, 2016 at 8:27 pm)Minimalist Wrote: How much did technology change between 1870 and 1815? 

How much has it changed between 1870 and today?

An army that failed to learn the lessons of the last war is unlikely to be able clearly assess how technological progress impacts sound military practice at all levels.   Such an army may talk big on a high level as if it's thinking was advanced.  But I think it is unlikely to succeed in a real war because its operations would grind to a halt from unresolved problems at multiple levels.

I don't know about that.  I suspect it is always fairly easy to know why you got your ass kicked. 

Then again...sometimes the fault lies within ourselves.

Lessons from the last war tells much about the problems that might be faced during the next war.  Technological progress merely provides new ways to solve those problems.  Without lessons of the last war, most armies would likely fail to recognize most problems it would face in the next war,  much less be able to think clearly about how technology would better address them.

The Maginot Line was a technological triumph of how to address the problems of the prior war.  The French built it on the assumption that another German attack would bog down into trench warfare again.

They were mistaken.  But they sure as hell were ready if they had been right.

(July 3, 2016 at 10:14 pm)Minimalist Wrote: The Maginot Line was a technological triumph of how to address the problems of the prior war.  The French built it on the assumption that another German attack would bog down into trench warfare again.

They were mistaken.  But they sure as hell were ready if they had been right.

It's a myth that Maginot line was predicated on a return to trench warfare.  

Maginot line was actually meant to free up the main body of the French army from a static defense of the entire French eastern frontier, and allow it to instead be held back as a mobile reserve.

It was not an unreasonable solution to the problem France learned that it would always face in a war with Germany, which is France is inferior to Germany in manpower, and can not count on creating creating a more powerful strategic reserve than the Germans can, so can not achieve the situation where France can achieve sufficient local superiority at the critical needed to gain a critical victory, if it had to spread its army to defend its entire frontier.   Therefore the French decided the it needed to economize on the manpower needed to hold its frontier via the use of heavy fortification.  This would force the Germans to commit most of the German army to attach the French frontier while allowing the French army to hold back the main body of its army and concentrate it as a powerful strategic reserve able to meet any German break through from a position of relative strength, and also able to deliver a attack in greater strength than what the Germans can field as their own reserve.

Where the French failed was it didn't extend the maginot line to the north sea.  So instead of being able to hold its main army back as a strategic reserve, it had to commit it far forward early on to plug the gap, thus allowing the Germans to bypass it and encircle it.  

Even this was completely serendipitous for the Germans.   All along, the German army had meant to plough head on into the French army in Belgium.  In which case something like repeat of wwi trench warfare blood bath would have resulted, and given the superiority of Anglo-French equipment, there is no real reason to suspect the Germans would have eventually won it.  

It was only the fact that the original German plan become compromised almost at the last minute when a staff officer carrying the plan crash landed in Belgium territory, that led the Germans scrambling to come up with a new, as it turned out war winning, plan at the very last minute.

So don't think that, even with all of its faults, the French army really was that hapless or hopeless as popular history paints it.   All of French army's problems were not enough to have cause it to lose the battle of France.  Only a last miute change of plans by the Germans, due to a major fuck up by the Germans, that cost the French the battle.

(July 3, 2016 at 9:34 pm)Anomalocaris Wrote: The Germans also used both German and Cossack horse mounted cavalry for anti-partisan operations in yogoslavia and on the eastern front.  Throughout WWII, much of the supply of the German army from the railhead to frontline troop was pulled by horses despite German reputation for mechanization.

It was only about 10 percent, if I'm not mistaken. At least at the start of the war. And with fuel supplies getting shorter and shorter, I doubt the number rose significantly later on.

(July 3, 2016 at 9:15 pm)Thumpalumpacus Wrote:

(July 3, 2016 at 12:37 pm)abaris Wrote: The Germans had cavalry too in WWII. But the horses no longer served as chargers. They only served as means of transportion for the soldiers to dismount when action started. But they were still called cavalry. As far as I know, even the US forces found it hard to let go of the tradition. Weren't or aren't there still units being called cavalry, although there are no longer horses but copters involved?

The last cavalry charge in American history happened in the Japanese invasion of the Phillipines.

Forgive the brevity of this earlier reply, I was on my phone at work. Yes, the US still has the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in its order of battle. It is currently a combined-arms division. It does feature a horse-cavalry detachment, used for demonstration and morale missions.

(July 3, 2016 at 10:38 pm)Anomalocaris Wrote: This would force the Germans to commit most of the German army to attach the French frontier while allowing the French army to hold back the main body of its army and concentrate it as a powerful strategic reserve able to meet any German break through from a position of relative strength, and also able to deliver a attack in greater strength than what the Germans can field as their own reserve.

Where the French failed was it didn't extend the maginot line to the north sea.  So instead of being able to hold its main army back as a strategic reserve, it had to commit it far forward early on to plug the gap, thus allowing the Germans to bypass it and encircle it.  

Well, they weren't encircled, but split in two. And the fact is that fortifications make travel difficult both ways -- digging in on all avenues means that you can't strike out at the enemy necessarily at the opportune place and time.

The Maginot Line was built to channelize an invasion to the flank which had easiest "allied" access -- allied in quotes because the French GHQ had in mind the idea to fight the battle on non-French soil as much as possible, and that meant Belgium, which was neutral. Had the Maginot Line been extended to the channel, the sally-ports for any offensive could well have been turned around. But with no sally-ports, a French offensive could well have fought not only the naturally-sloppy terrain, but human obstruction as well.

I think the real flaw in the plan was advancing to the Dyle line without attending to the weakness in the Ardennes. The Allies made essentially the same mistake in 1944, too.

(July 3, 2016 at 10:38 pm)Anomalocaris Wrote: So don't think that, even with all of its faults, the French army really was that hapless or hopeless as popular history paints it.   All of French army's problems were not enough to have cause it to lose the battle of France.  Only a last miute change of plans by the Germans, due to a major fuck up by the Germans, that cost the French the battle.

I think another big factor that often goes unnoticed in this sort of discussion is the morale of the French army. After seeing a score of governments in the intervening 22 years, the French fighting man, doughty though he might be, had a real reason to question how much support he might receive from the political organs of his government. That's not an appeal to the French-surrender caricature, but simply understanding that if the guy on the front lines doesn't believe the home front is behind him, he may well be less-inclined to fight it out -- a point we Americans learnt in Vietnam.

(July 3, 2016 at 10:38 pm)Anomalocaris Wrote: So don't think that, even with all of its faults, the French army really was that hapless or hopeless as popular history paints it.   All of French army's problems were not enough to have cause it to lose the battle of France.  Only a last miute change of plans by the Germans, due to a major fuck up by the Germans, that cost the French the battle.

The best army isn't of much use if it lacks in leadership. And that ultimately cost them the battle. Honorable gentlemen who didn't really understand what had changed in the last 20 years. That's even more obvious when considering that they could have ended the war before it really began. All it took was a swift strike to the east and they would have captured Germany's industrial heart. Without much resistance, since, for one, the bulk of the German army was on the eastern border and secondly, they nearly ran out of ammunition during the Polish campaign. Which mainly came from the Ruhr area, only a short distance removed from the French border.

Also, that the Germans weren't as mobile as legend has it, doesn't change the fact that they had a new generation of generals, using the mobile units to their full advantage. In close cooperation between ground and air forces. The few instances where the French reacted in a similar way, such as De Gaulle or Weygand, setting up a new and flexible line of defence, showed that the Blitzkrieg wasn't a force of nature after all. But it was too little too late.

(July 4, 2016 at 3:11 am)abaris Wrote:

(July 3, 2016 at 9:34 pm)Anomalocaris Wrote: The Germans also used both German and Cossack horse mounted cavalry for anti-partisan operations in yogoslavia and on the eastern front.  Throughout WWII, much of the supply of the German army from the railhead to frontline troop was pulled by horses despite German reputation for mechanization.

It was only about 10 percent, if I'm not mistaken. At least at the start of the war. And with fuel supplies getting shorter and shorter, I doubt the number rose significantly later on.

The Germans used millions of horses in WWII, according to what I've read.

(July 4, 2016 at 6:41 am)Gawdzilla Wrote: The Germans used millions of horses in WWII, according to what I've read.

Ten percent motorized, to be clear. The rest was on foot, horseback or waggon.