Not really, a random will -is- a free will..it's just not what people might be satisfied as being particularly intentional.   A heuristic will can be both free and random, conceptually...but isn't intentional.

*pops in*

This: http://www.informationphilosopher.com/fr...ument.html

*pops out*

(July 15, 2016 at 8:00 pm)Rhythm Wrote: Not really, a random will -is- a free will..it's just not what people might be satisfied as being particularly intentional.   A heuristic will can be both free and random, conceptually...but isn't intentional.

How is it free?

(July 15, 2016 at 8:08 pm)mh.brewer Wrote: *pops in*

This: http://www.informationphilosopher.com/fr...ument.html

*pops out*

We have free will because, quantum mechanics, and, it's complex? Did you even bother to read this?

First, the brain's neuronal processes behave according to classical mechanical principles. Any role for quantum indeterminacy remains unproven.

That it's complex doesn't mean you can just wave your hands and free will emerges. Complex isn't free; only complex.

(July 15, 2016 at 7:59 pm)bennyboy Wrote:

(July 15, 2016 at 3:28 pm)Rhythm Wrote: With free will we have no yardstick, no coherent description of what it is or how it is.  No procedure for devising a test and nothing to judge the results by.

That's because free will is something one experiences, and subjective experiences, for the most part, are very hard to do science on.

When I'm standing in a candy aisle, I definitely freely choose my candy.  Whether I could have "chosen otherwise" in another re-play of the moment, or whether a computer can predict my choice before I make it, is irrelevant to the fact that I'm standing there as a thinking agent, enjoying the process of choosing my delicious snack.  But how do you determine whether another life form, or ANY collection of physical particles, is experiencing that?

This is a good point. At minimum, choice involves the belief that one has multiple options, prior to deciding. Is choice more than just this belief / experience of choice? I perceive that chocolate or vanilla are within my range of possible worlds I can actualize. That I can't choose between chocolate and motor oil ice cream because the parlor I am at doesn't stock the latter. What if this parlor doesn't carry pineapple? Do I have the choice between chocolate and pineapple anyway? Given the different levels of activity required to choose pineapple versus that of choosing chocolate, it seems a stretch to call this a choice. But in what way does relative effort matter in choice?

(July 15, 2016 at 8:45 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote:

(July 15, 2016 at 8:08 pm)mh.brewer Wrote: *pops in*

This: http://www.informationphilosopher.com/fr...ument.html

*pops out*

We have free will because, quantum mechanics, and, it's complex?   Did you even bother to read this?

First, the brain's neuronal processes behave according to classical mechanical principles.   Any role for quantum indeterminacy remains unproven.

That it's complex doesn't mean you can just wave your hands and free will emerges.  Complex isn't free; only complex.

Did you read any of my previous posts? There is free will. This is me freely waving my hands.

I'd simply suggest that a person isn't "free to choose their candy" in any way more meaningful than a computer can "freely will" to turn left or right presented with an intersection or obstruction.  Free will always ends up sounding like a triviality, when expressed in this way.   Sure, you "freely willed" your candy, so long as the terms free and will aren't all that important or specific.  It's so trivial, in this sense, that accepting that you've done so doesn't actually make -me- accept free will.

You may be waiving your hands.....but doing so does not establish that you've done it freely.  Were you waiving your hands a moment before, or is there an instigating event here, a cause, in the face of which you just suddenly feel compelled to waive your hands? I only ask because regardless of whether or not we possess this free will business I'm confident that we all experience a great deal of behavior that we cannot..even as the experiencers, describe as such.

(July 15, 2016 at 8:58 pm)Rhythm Wrote: I'd simply suggest that a person isn't "free to choose their candy" in any way more meaningful than a computer can "freely will" to turn left or right presented with an intersection or obstruction.  Free will always ends up sounding like a triviality, when expressed in this way.   Sure, you "freely willed" your candy, so long as the terms free and will aren't all that important or specific.  It's so trivial, in this sense, that accepting that you've done so doesn't actually make -me- accept free will.

I'd define freedom as the capacity at a moment to express one's nature in a decision.  However, one has only one nature at a given moment, so it's hard to imagine how one can escape the "bonds" of determinism.  It's also a strange requirement-- to prove that "X" is really free by forcing it to sometimes behave as "Y" would.

But this seems to be the standard-- that we can go AGAINST our internal influences, especially reflexes and instincts, and behave according to our ideas.  So if I'm being tortured, but I can ignore the pain and protect my world view, I'm definitely acting freely.  Or if I can put my hand in a fire, and resist pulling it out even though it hurts, surely that would have to be seen as an expression of free will, no?

(July 16, 2016 at 1:28 am)bennyboy Wrote:

(July 15, 2016 at 8:58 pm)Rhythm Wrote: I'd simply suggest that a person isn't "free to choose their candy" in any way more meaningful than a computer can "freely will" to turn left or right presented with an intersection or obstruction.  Free will always ends up sounding like a triviality, when expressed in this way.   Sure, you "freely willed" your candy, so long as the terms free and will aren't all that important or specific.  It's so trivial, in this sense, that accepting that you've done so doesn't actually make -me- accept free will.

I'd define freedom as the capacity at a moment to express one's nature in a decision.  However, one has only one nature at a given moment, so it's hard to imagine how one can escape the "bonds" of determinism.  It's also a strange requirement-- to prove that "X" is really free by forcing it to sometimes behave as "Y" would.

But this seems to be the standard-- that we can go AGAINST our internal influences, especially reflexes and instincts, and behave according to our ideas.  So if I'm being tortured, but I can ignore the pain and protect my world view, I'm definitely acting freely.  Or if I can put my hand in a fire, and resist pulling it out even though it hurts, surely that would have to be seen as an expression of free will, no?

Why do you assume that the greater the stimulus you resist, the freer your will becomes? Your resisting to pull back your hand from the fire has its own motivation behind it, and you can't escape that. You wouldn't be able to control what would make you want to burn your hand "willingly".

Free will is nothing more than a choice between one or more choices.

If free will did not exist, one would not be capable of choosing between Chinese or Mexican for dinner.

It actually is that simple.