(June 30, 2017 at 8:45 am)Jörmungandr Wrote: "Is God's nature good because it is God's, or is God's nature good because it is morally good (i.e. it conforms to an independent standard of good)?"  You see, playing the ontology card has gained you nothing.  Just as the Euthyphro dilemma applies to Divine Command Theory, it also applies to the argument that morality is derived from God's nature.  Either God's nature is arbitrarily good simply because it is God's, which results in an arbitrary set of morals which by definition is not moral.  Or God's nature is good in that it conforms to a standard of goodness that is independent of God, making God's nature superfluous to the question of morals.  You have accomplished nothing by your detour into ontology except to confuse the issue.  God is still an unsatisfactory source of morality, and you're left empty handed, claiming the existence of objective morals that you can't explain.

(July 2, 2017 at 2:07 am)Little Henry Wrote:

(July 2, 2017 at 12:21 am)Jörmungandr Wrote: Well it's a good thing that I didn't give the Euthyphro dilemma then isn't it?

Gods nature is not arbitrarily good. It is necessary.

I never said God's nature is arbitrarily good.  What I did say was that the standard of goodness which God's nature meets must come from himself, or it must come from somewhere else.  Those are the two horns of the dilemma, and they are inescapable.  Saying that God's nature is "necessary" adds nothing to the question.  It is a non-answer.  Either the standard of goodness comes from God himself, in which case it's arbitrary, or it comes from somewhere else, obviating God.  It's irrelevant whether it "necessarily" comes from God or not.  Contingency and necessity have nothing to do with it.

(July 2, 2017 at 2:07 am)Little Henry Wrote:

(July 2, 2017 at 12:21 am)Jörmungandr Wrote: Wrong.  You've failed to actually read the dilemma I've given you, and substituted your own false version.

Again, your version is based on an incorrect assumption that his nature of goodness is arbitrary.

I did no such thing.  I posed a dilemma with two horns.  Either God's nature is good because the standard of goodness comes from himself, or because the standard of goodness comes from somewhere else.  There is no third option.  Claiming I assumed something I didn't assume is just more waffling on your part.  You can't refute the dilemma, so you're just throwing out arbitrary answers.

(July 2, 2017 at 2:07 am)Little Henry Wrote:

(July 2, 2017 at 12:21 am)Jörmungandr Wrote: Hurr durr!  This is not a valid response to the dilemma I've posed.  Try actually reading what I wrote instead of what you imagine I might write.

Again, your version is based on an incorrect assumption that his nature of goodness is arbitrary.

This is false.  I did no such thing.

You can assert all day his nature is necessarily good .You have not established it necessity. And you have yet to argue why it should be accepted as good. Aside you proclaiming  that it's good . So on and  on the baseless proclamations go.

Agreed Jorm or as Michael Martin puts it

Quote:In any case, appealing to God's character only postpones the problem since the dilemma can be reformulated in terms of His character. Is God's character the way it is because it is good or is God's character good simply because it is God's character? Is there an independent standard of good or does God's character set the standard? If God's character is the way it is because it is good, then there is an independent standard of goodness by which to evaluate God's character. For example, suppose God condemns rape because of His just and merciful character. His character is just and merciful because mercy and justice are good. Since God is necessarily good, God is just and merciful. According to this independent standard of goodness, being merciful and just is precisely what a good character involves. In this case, even if God did not exist, one could say that a merciful and just character is good. Human beings could use this standard to evaluate peoples' character and actions based on this character. They could do this whether or not God exists.
Suppose God's character is good simply because it is God's character. Then if God's character were cruel and unjust, these attributes would be good. In such a case God might well condone rape since this would be in keeping with His character. But could not one reply that God could not be cruel and unjust since by necessity God must be good? It is true that by necessity God must be good. But unless we have some independent standard of goodness then whatever attributes God has would by definition be good: God's character would define what good is. It would seem that if God could not be cruel and unjust, then God's character must necessarily exemplify some independent standard of goodness. Using this standard one could say that cruelty and injustice are not good whether God exists or not.
This attempt to avoid the dilemma by basing objective morality on God's necessary character has another problem. It assumes that there would not be an objective morality without God. However, this seems to beg the question against an objective atheistic ethics. After all, why would the nonexistence of God adversely affect the goodness of mercy, compassion, and justice? Yet, this is precisely what would happen if being part of God's character created the goodness of mercy, compassion and justice. This point can perhaps be made in another way. One could affirm the objective immorality of rape and deny the existence of God with perfect consistency. There is no contradiction in claiming "Rape is objectively evil and God does not exist."[14]

And even if you argued for some source argument this will fail because

Quote:If goodness is not something that a god exhibits, but something of which the god is the source, the statement "god is good" becomes a meaningless tautology. Consider the property "tastes like an apple". Many things that aren't apples exhibit this quality, but what does it mean to say that an apple tastes like an apple? Nothing; it simply cannot be any other way. Similarly, defining god as the source of the property "goodness", then applying that property back to god, is equivalent to saying "god is consistent with his own nature", which tells us nothing

I this debate I am a bit of a simpleton.

I do not know of a god.

I have developed a morality through my upbringing, education and interaction with other social beings of my species.

I have been wrong.

I have been right.

I understand and empathise with others and do not have a diagnosis of a brain condition that inhibits this.

I am a social creature, that seems to be evidenced by simian evolution and is evidenced in other species too.

I understand what the amagdyla does to a limited extent in human responses

I have an incomplete understanding of how the human mind works, others know more, but nobody has the problem solved.

I don't want to be a dick.

I don't need the supernatural to help me do that.

God doesn't seem to resolve anything, moral problems can be difficult. The world's writings that claim to be fro gods include things that I find very immoral. If humans are flawed by either theistic or natural reasoning, how could they understand gods or aliens or supercomputers with advanced AI?

Why does this pint of Kronenbourg taste sooo good?

Experience is weird sometimes, but a god that wanted to let me know his objective moral commands certainly could. He hasn't.

Cue up pre-supp bullshit, but this whole argument from theists is soooooo tedious.

(June 24, 2017 at 12:21 am)Little Henry Wrote: It seems when we make moral claims, ie, rape is wrong, murder is wrong, we are saying something with an intent for that statement to be fact. We are not just expressing preferences/likes/desires, but trying to say something that is fact.

Here is an example.

Lets take something that we know is subjective, say the taste of food. If i say the taste of grapes are better than the taste of olives, it is obvious to me that this statement is just expression of taste, preference. I am not trying to say something that is fact. I mean, it is not a fact that grapes indeed taste better than olives. Think about it, if you and i had argument and you said olives taste better than than grapes, then who is right or wrong? Well neither of us can be right or wrong and neither of us can be both right as that would violate the law of logic, namely the law of non contradiction.

You dont have to argue about this, i mean, you dont argue with people about what tastes better, you just know that you are expressing your preferences and tastes.

However, when we discuss morality, the conversation changes, we seem to be trying to say something that is FACT.

Lets say you and i sat at a cafe and i ordered some food that you didnt like or found disgusting, will you tell me i am wrong for eating that enjoying that food? Of course not. That would be incoherent. At most you will say, "how do you even like that that is disgusting". But you will fall short in saying that i am doing something wrong.

Now lets say after i finish my meal, i say, "for the past 6 months, i have had a little girl in my garage who i have been raping and torturing", your response will be different. You will immediately say that what i have been doing is wrong. You will say that with the intent that you are saying something that is fact.

If morality was indeed subjective, then your response would be similar to that of the food i was eating, that is, "how do you even like that that is disgusting", but you will stop short of saying that i have done something wrong.

But when we talk about morality, we use the words right and wrong with an intent for it to be FACT.

Basically you're not using the word "belief" properly.

(July 1, 2017 at 8:55 am)Thumpalumpacus Wrote:

(July 1, 2017 at 6:56 am)RoadRunner79 Wrote: Ok.... What you are describing still doesn't make it subjective ontologically.  This could be a problem with equating objective with absolute, or subjective with relative. For instance if we are talking about hair color of a particular person.  The color of the hair is objective.  It does not change even if you and I disagree on what that color is.  It is also relative, as it depends on the person, that we are talking about.

Why are you talking about hair? I'm talking about moral subjectivity. Do you really not grasp that?

If you are using different value judgements for the same act based on who the actor is, you are practicing moral relativity. This horseshit about ontology is irrelevant.

Yes, because as long as you are not committing a category error, the logic is the same.
And again, you seem to be confusing relative with subjective, which is the point; I was trying to make.

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(July 1, 2017 at 7:30 pm)Astonished Wrote:

(July 1, 2017 at 8:55 am)Thumpalumpacus Wrote: Why are you talking about hair? I'm talking about moral subjectivity. Do you really not grasp that?

If you are using different value judgements for the same act based on who the actor is, you are practicing moral relativity. This horseshit about ontology is irrelevant.

Try extrapolating it out to different nations and maybe that will help, and remove god from the equation (although Israeli schoolchildren were tested in this way and said it wasn't wrong for a god-backed army to do the same thing as a Chinese army that they did consider wrong). Is it wrong for X nation to gas the minority population that disagrees with the ruling party, but not for Y nation to do the same? If not then there's no way to justify any other party's immunity to this. Distinctions destroy the entire argument.

I find that morality more often than not, has to do with the why, rather than the what (when it comes down to it).

Little Henry Wrote:Ok, so you subscribe to objective morality?

Many of us do. But you'll find that won't stop us from picking at flawed arguments for OM. 'OM must be true or I can't call Nazis bad' is an appeal to emotion, and fallacious on at least two levels.

@Roadrunner --

No, I'm not confusing the two. And even if I were, my point would still stand, that it undermines any notion of an objective morality based on said deity.

(July 3, 2017 at 12:17 pm)Thumpalumpacus Wrote: @Roadrunner --

No, I'm not confusing the two. And even if I were, my point would still stand, that it undermines any notion of an objective morality based on said deity.

Ok.... I only seen a swap between relative and subjective... it's a mistake to equate the two. But feel free to explain.

(July 2, 2017 at 5:10 am)Little Henry Wrote: Please explain to me how if something is deemed SUBJECTIVE, it can be deemed wrong...in this case...rape.

Right and wrong are value judgements.  All value judgements depend on the point of view of the person making it, and are therefore subjective -- but this is not where it ends.  Rape is wrong in the eyes of the victim, and in the view of the average person, and according to the the laws of the country where I live.  We therefore have a social contract established to punish rapists.

Laws exist to protect us from people who do not respect our desire to be free from harm.  Is this really too hard for you to understand, Henry?

lol of course something subjective can be wrong . This fools continuing to not get that subjective does not mean arbitrary. Nor relative  nor does relative  mean subjective.  Ultimately the whole dichotomy  is less important then it's made out to be.