The christer solution to some dilemma always seems to be to bicker about something else.

(October 17, 2017 at 11:28 am)Khemikal Wrote: If, before you've created some thing x, you recognize that it will have it's own inherent goodness..it's existence is dependent on you...not it's goodness.  If someone else created it, it would still be good. [1]

If no one created it, it would still be good. [2]

Conversely, if, before you've created some thing x, you recognize that it would not have it;s own inherent goodness, than your creative act would not make the thing good.  Option 1. [3]

You gave existence to the thing, not goodness. [4]

If goodness is created, that's the second option, not the first..not both, and not a third. [5]

It may never become a thing, but that has no bearing on whether or not it is or would be a good thing.  A non-profit that feeds people is a good thing regardless of whether or not I form, fund, and operate it.  It's because it is a good thing that I decide to do all of that in the first place.  My intellect recognizes the good...neither it, nor my will creates it.  Option 1 [6]

You;re wheedling back and forth between the two options present, not presenting a third. I understand why, despite an affinity to affirm one over the other, you don't wish to accept the consequences - but oh well. [7] This is why it's a dilemma.  It's not a dilemma at all for a person who's willing to accept those consequences of either position.  If, for example, a person goes with option one, and accepts that there is some independent standard of goodness - no problem.  A person who goes with option two, for their part, can accept the attendant arbitrary.

A person who believes, however, that there is no standard of goodness independent of their god, that their god is the author of morality cannot accept the first...and are often compelled to rail against the meaningful arbitrarity of the second.  For reasons™ that hilariously swirl the drain of accepting some inherent goodness that they've already rejected. [8]

1) If someone else created it, both its existence and its goodness is dependent on that someone fulfilling the conditions for its existence. No existence => no goodness.

2) I am curious... "what", exactly, is being-good in regard to a non-existing thing?

3) Unless, of course, existing is itself inherently good. I think it is.

4) If you give existence to a thing, then you have fulfilled all of the conditions necessary for that thing to be-the-thing-it-is. Your giving-it-existence AS the thing-it-is is the very thing which gives the thing its goodness. I'm not sure how you are separating the concepts in any real way besides words.

5) If goodness is created arbitrarily, then it is the second option. If the goodness of created things participates in goodness itself (i.e. it is neither arbitrary nor subsistent) then its a third option.

6) A non-existent non-profit that feeds people is not a good thing, it is not-a-thing-at-all. Someone has to create it if its inherent goodness is ever going to-be. IF someone creates it, it will necessarily be good. Which is to say, on the condition that it is made to exist, it will unconditionally be good. If you are saying that the "form" of inherently good things are being-good somewhere somehow... where and how do you propose that is?

7) Affirming one over and against the other is the same as proposing an incomplete account as a full one. Both are partially true under different aspects, which means there MUST be a third option: participated goodness aka concurrent goodness - God creates things as having their own goodness by participation. Things are good because God creates them as participating in goodness itself (therefore, it isn't arbitrarily willed goodness, but rather goodness corresponding to goodness itself), and through participation in goodness itself, things have their own inherent goodness (therefore, it isn't radical independence of goodness, but rather, a true inherent goodness existentially dependent on it's essential source).

8)

(October 17, 2017 at 12:24 pm)Ignorant Wrote: 1) If someone else created it, both its existence and its goodness is dependent on that someone fulfilling the conditions for its existence. No existence => no goodness.

Fine, fine..Igno, I see no reason to bicker.  Goodness is created.  Option 2.  

Quote:2) I am curious... "what", exactly, is being-good in regard to a non-existing thing?

Depends on who you ask, I suppose.  

Quote:3) Unless, of course, existing is itself inherently good. I think it is.

Conflation into meaningless, meanwhile the dilemma remains unresolved.  

Quote:4) If you give existence to a thing, then you have fulfilled all of the conditions necessary for that thing to be-the-thing-it-is. Your giving-it-existence AS the thing-it-is is the very thing which gives the thing its goodness. I'm not sure how you are separating the concepts in any real way besides words.

Delicious irony.  

Quote:5) If goodness is created arbitrarily, then it is the second option. If the goodness of created things participates in goodness itself (i.e. it is neither arbitrary nor subsistent) then its a third option.

If there -is- a "goodness itself", it's a version of option 1.  

Quote:6) A non-existent non-profit that feeds people is not a good thing, it is not-a-thing-at-all. Someone has to create it if its inherent goodness is ever going to-be. IF someone creates it, it will necessarily be good. Which is to say, on the condition that it is made to exist, it will unconditionally be good. If you are saying that the "form" of inherently good things are being-good somewhere somehow... where and how do you propose that is?

Bickering about existence won't resolve a dilemma of goodness.

Quote:7) Affirming one over and against the other is the same as proposing an incomplete account as a full one. Both are partially true under different aspects, which means there MUST be a third option: participated goodness aka concurrent goodness - God creates things as having their own goodness by participation. Things are good because God creates them as participating in goodness itself (therefore, it isn't arbitrarily willed goodness, but rather goodness corresponding to goodness itself), and through participation in goodness itself, things have their own inherent goodness (therefore, it isn't radical independence of goodness, but rather, a true inherent goodness existentially dependent on it's essential source).

If goodness isn't arbitrarily defined, if there is a goodness itself, then the creation of some thing does not..in any meaningful sense, impart it with goodness or create goodness. It creates a thing that is good.  We're simply describing a creative act in conformity to that standard.  Option 1.

Anything that conforms to that standard would be a good thing. It needn't proceed from your god to be so, and your god is itself only a good thing if it conforms to that standard. If your god was otherwise it would not be good, and creating things that participate in his him-ness would not be good. I guess it;s just a lucky coincidence that god is good (except when he isn't, lol).

If instead, you insist that it must proceed from your god and that the creative act of your god (or anyone, really) creates "goodness"...then goodness has been arbitrarily defined as whatever proceeds form your god and is in conformity with it's nature. Option 2.

The problem with theological nominalist ethics in christianity has always been it's allegiance to modified forms of voluntarism, and it's adherents dissatisfaction with the same.

(October 17, 2017 at 12:12 pm)Neo-Scholastic Wrote: The supposed dilemma is predicated on the idea that God's existence is different from His essence, which is not the case.

Existence being separate from essence is one of the most basic fundamentals of philosophy. No wonder you suck at it.

The first horn "is something good because the gods will it" or
The second horn "do the gods will it because it is good?” but now
The third option (that has no unwanted conclusion): it is not God's will that defines the good but his unchanging nature that governs his will and his commands to us.

With a third option, there is no dilemma. The defeater of the dilemma is to point out that God's goodness is a necessary property (which is a third option). Goodness is not a property that God could have lacked. As the greatest conceivable being, there is no possible world where God is not good.

Science loves philosophy. Religion whores it for profit.

(October 17, 2017 at 12:53 pm)SteveII Wrote: The first horn "is something good because the gods will it" or
The second horn "do the gods will it because it is good?” but now
The third option (that has no unwanted conclusion): it is not God's will that defines the good but his unchanging nature that governs his will and his commands to us.

Is his nature good, or do you call it good because it's his nature?  

Quote:With a third option, there is no dilemma. The defeater of the dilemma is to point out that God's goodness is a necessary property (which is a third option). Goodness is not a property that God could have lacked. As the greatest conceivable being, there is no possible world where God is not good.

Pointing out goodness as a property possessed by a god is an affirmation of the first proposition, not a third option.

As for the elaboration, the articles of your faith compell you to claim that if god were not good it would not be god..but that's not a logical conclusion. Meanwhile, in this actual world, the "good god" exhorts his followers to rape and genocide. Does that establish that he's not good, or not god? Or are you pretty sure that those exhortations were good?

Your call.

(October 17, 2017 at 12:12 pm)Neo-Scholastic Wrote:

(October 17, 2017 at 9:10 am)MysticKnight Wrote: You define a human as a rational animal, or you can define a rational animal as a human. There is no real dilemma.

The supposed dilemma is predicated on the idea that God's existence is different from His essence, which is not the case. God's existence and essence are identical. God is only a title for that which has multiple attributes including Goodness-Itself (the 4th Way of Aquinas, gradients of Perfection).

This doesn't evade the dilemma. Even if it made sense, which it doesn't.

(October 17, 2017 at 12:53 pm)SteveII Wrote: The first horn "is something good because the gods will it" or
The second horn "do the gods will it because it is good?” but now
The third option (that has no unwanted conclusion): it is not God's will that defines the good but his unchanging nature that governs his will and his commands to us.

You misrepresent the first and second options when you pretend they're only about specifically God's will... so your third option can present itself as "No the answer is it's God's something else."

You clearly do not understand the dilemma at all.

It doesn't matter whether it's God's will, God's nature, or God's whatever. The point is: "Is goodness entirely reducible to God or is God entirely reducible to goodness?" If God is truly good then you don't need God, all you need is goodness. But if goodness only means whatever is akin to God... then this makes goodness meaningless... and God not even good.

(October 17, 2017 at 12:53 pm)SteveII Wrote: The first horn "is something good because the gods will it" or
The second horn "do the gods will it because it is good?” but now
The third option (that has no unwanted conclusion): it is not God's will that defines the good but his unchanging nature that governs his will and his commands to us.

With a third option, there is no dilemma. The defeater of the dilemma is to point out that God's goodness is a necessary property (which is a third option). Goodness is not a property that God could have lacked. As the greatest conceivable being, there is no possible world where God is not good.

Quote:[4] Some theists suppose that the Euthyphro dilemma can be avoided by basing morality on the necessary attributes of God's character rather than directly on His condemnation. It may seem that to say that God condemns rape as wrong because His character is necessarily good avoids the dilemma, but this is an illusion. For example, Greg Bahnsen argued that in the Euthyphro Plato set up a "false antithesis": "The truth of the matter is that good is not independent of God. Certain behavior is good because God approves of it, and God approves of it because it is the creaturely expression of His holiness -- in other words, it is good. To be good is to be like God, and we can only know what behavior is good if God reveals and approves of it. The important point is that good is what God approves and cannot be ascertained independent of Him. . . "(Theonomy in Christian Ethics, p. 284)

. . . . . .

In any case, appealing to God's character only postpones the problem since the dilemma can be reformulated in terms of His character. Is God's character the way it is because it is good or is God's character good simply because it is God's character? Is there an independent standard of good or does God's character set the standard? If God's character is the way it is because it is good, then there is an independent standard of goodness by which to evaluate God's character. For example, suppose God condemns rape because of His just and merciful character. His character is just and merciful because mercy and justice are good. Since God is necessarily good, God is just and merciful. According to this independent standard of goodness, being merciful and just is precisely what a good character involves. In this case, even if God did not exist, one could say that a merciful and just character is good. Human beings could use this standard to evaluate people's character and actions based on this character. They could do this whether or not God exists.

Suppose God's character is good simply because it is God's character. Then if God's character was cruel and unjust, these attributes would be good. In such a case God might well condone rape since this would be in keeping with His character. But could not one reply that God could not be cruel and unjust since by necessity God must be good? It is true that by necessity God must be good. But unless we have some independent standard of goodness then whatever attributes God has would by definition be good: God's character would define what good is. It would seem that if God could not be cruel and unjust, then God's character must necessarily exemplify some independent standard of goodness. Using this standard one could say that cruelty and injustice are not good whether God exists or not.

This attempt to avoid the dilemma by basing objective morality on God's necessary character has another problem. It assumes that there would not be an objective morality without God. However, this seems to beg the question against an objective atheistic ethics. After all, why would the nonexistence of God adversely affect the goodness of mercy, compassion, and justice? Yet, this is precisely what would happen if being part of God's character created the goodness of mercy, compassion and justice. This point can perhaps be made in another way. One could affirm the objective immorality of rape and deny the existence of God with perfect consistency. There is no contradiction in claiming "Rape is objectively evil and God does not exist."

https://infidels.org/library/modern/mich...rtin3.html

"Goodness is not a property that God could have lacked."
Whether or not God could have lacked the property says nothing about whether the standard of goodness resides with God, or outside of him. Those are the only two options, and dressing it up with fancy terms like "necessary property" do nothing to evade the dilemma.

"As the greatest conceivable being, there is no possible world where God is not good."
Again, this doesn't resolve the dilemma. The question is not, "Is God good?" but rather, "Why is God considered to be good?" Your objections about necessary properties and such do nothing to resolve that question. You're still stuck on the horns of the dilemma, you've simply introduced a red herring. Either the standard of goodness comes from God, in which case it's arbitrary, or it comes from outside him, and he is not the source of morals. There is no third place it can come from. Moreover, the ontological argument is fatally flawed, so bringing things like "the greatest conceivable being" into the equation only undermines your argument. Essentially, all you're saying is that God is good because you define him to be so; that isn't any kind of "third option."