(April 7, 2013 at 7:40 pm)Rhythm Wrote: Logical? LOL, whew boy. While the specifics of any ontological arguments validity would be a case by case basis - the soundess of every ontological argument for god falls on the very same axe.
(you butchered platingas argument, but it doesn't matter that you did)

What makes it interesting to me too, is that when we try to plug in different things for a necessary being (like a magical elephant or the universe), it doesn't work. We know they cannot be ontologically possibly necessary.

It in fact, only works, for what properties would be necessary in all worlds.

For example, a magical elephant. Instead of being an elephant, it would be possible it be a monkey ontologically. Hence cannot be the necessary being.

However, if it must be one, simple existence, ultimate in it's attributes (although I still lean to the idea it would not be worthy of worship because it didn't earn it's attributes) that form simple existence, then there is no problem.

If we define it to have colours, then it's problematic, because why can't it have 1 colour over another.

If we give it shape, then why can't it have a certain shape in one possible world as opposed to another.

Not only does it seem that ontologically, a necessary being is possible, but that ontologically, we get to know the properties of that being.

If it didn't need to be ultimate in life, then why can't it have a certain amount of life over the other. Suppose we say 1000 is it's qualitive mass of power. Why can't it be 1001. etc.. ontologically, it would be possible.

But the necessary being by definition, must be something that it cannot be otherwise in other worlds. Therefore if it's the possible ultimate eternal being, we get to know some properties of it.

This is what makes the proof even weirder. Somehow tied into language, is the very properties of what this necessary being can possibly be, while everything else seems impossible to be the necessary being.

The reason that you've gone off the rails (in the same way that any argument like this goes off the rails) is that your idea of an "ultimate or necessary" whatever is an illogical premise. The reason that ontological arguments are generally "meh" at what they hope to achieve (take platingas as a case in point) is that they only show that if one starts with an illogical premise and forms a valid argument it is rational to accept the conclusion. That's the entirety of what an ontological argument for a god can do. Clearly, I'm not as impressed by this as you.

You won't actually be able to explain why the ultimate ultimate, the necessary of necessaries can't be a monkey or an elephant, or the color red (or non-existent). It's tied to what you already feel to be ultimate or necessary. Hanuman and Ganesh, and the Ming line that connects you to the cosmic egg all disapprove.

I use to shrug it off, because I said, why can't it then be "this and that" is the necessary being. But when you understand, why something HAS to be, in all possible worlds, then you will see it can't be something in time or has properties that aren't necessary. The reason why it can't be something in time, is because it can always have been in a different time, in a different possible universe. In the case of the necessary being, it is what has to be possibly necessarily so, in all possible worlds.

The reason why it can't be finite, is that it can always be less or more in that existence. Therefore it neccessarily must be something that cannot be increased or decreased. It has to be something that is eternal. It has to be something that doesn't have unneccessary qualities like colours or shape, that can always be different in one possible world over another.

What's weird about it really is that it narrows down the concept to one.

Then you shrugged it off for the right reasons. It doesn't have to be anything at all (my favorite is the ontological argument for the existence of no god- the author adds that for something to have maximal greatness it must achieve everything while being non-existent). There are some things that precede the argument, establishing what constitutes a necessary, or "maximal" entity - we can add whatever we like in there.

It hasn't been narrowed down by the argument, it;s been narrowed down by your notions of how to meet the criteria. Can't state it any more plainly.

I think the logic being used establishes that God either necessarily exists in every possible world or necessarily does not exist in any possible world.

(April 9, 2013 at 9:57 am)Mister Agenda Wrote: I think the logic being used establishes that God either necessarily exists in every possible world or necessarily does not exist in any possible world.

True, that is one aspect. Notice saying 'God' exist in one possible world, would imply that he exists in all possible worlds.

For example, I say I either have 10 red marbles or 10 blue marbles. Which one is it?

The person sees a red marble on the floor, and then says "you have 10 red marbles" then based on what you said.

Therefore if 'God' was possible in one possible world, then he necessarily is possible in all worlds.

On the flip side, if there was a possible world where God was not possible, then God doesn't exist, per this proof.

It's really weird, this proof.

Out of my depth here, but I'll shoot off my mouth anyway:

Isn't one no-god possible world, a world where the universe (or meta-universe if you like) has always existed in some zero energy-state quantum structure, that occasionally produces universes? Oddly, that does appear to be the world we are living in.

(April 9, 2013 at 11:21 am)JesusHChrist Wrote: Out of my depth here, but I'll shoot off my mouth anyway:

Isn't one no-god possible world, a world where the universe (or meta-universe if you like) has always existed in some zero energy-state quantum structure, that occasionally produces universes? Oddly, that does appear to be the world we are living in.

If there is a world where it's possible for God to not exist, it would mean God definitely doesn't exist in any possible worlds or is not possible.

I would say what strengthens the argument, is that we are more justified in believing in worlds where a Necessary Being is possible, then believing in worlds that he isn't.

The reason is because of contingency. It can be possibly that existence is contingent upon the Creator(including himself) necessarily. So we can't say it's definitely possible that a possible existence could exist without this being.

But then this becomes an issue "for all we know", right? Not really.

If we can we definitely know a possible world where this necessary being would exist, then it necessarily follows we know he exists if we know this argument to be true (a huge IF).

The reverse is true, but who claims to know for sure a possible world exists that can possibly be not contingent.

It perhaps is ontologically not possible.

You're imagining islands again.
(on top of not being able to function without first assuming god - you can call it a necessary being if you like....but I'm still not drinking the koolaid. Premise, necessary beings - conclusion, necessary beings. meh. That's what Apo's S5 comment was about pages back.)

MysticNight

The god imagined is not possible.

It breaks every physical law and has to be placed "outside of time and space" for the concept to work.