(September 4, 2013 at 2:55 am)bennyboy Wrote: Given that, you are begging the question.

Prove it.

(September 4, 2013 at 2:55 am)bennyboy Wrote: That's what the Mormons keep telling me. But I don't believe them, either.

If only the Mormons presented evidence, like I have.

(September 4, 2013 at 2:55 am)bennyboy Wrote: Okay, so let's take the temperature in a room, which is heated by an element which turns on and off. This element has no means by which to achieve this turning on and off-- it relies on the thermostat, which monitors the temperature, and cuts or allows power to go to the element. You are saying the thermostat is experiencing both the room and the state of the element, since it is the "second causal chain."

You're funny!

Did you not read my explanation or did it simply go over your head? Try reading it again and see if you understand that my conclusion would be that the thermostat is not experiencing precisely because it is not a part of the second causal chain.

(September 4, 2013 at 3:02 am)genkaus Wrote: [accused of begging the question]Prove it.

Ermm. . . because that's the definition of begging the question-- starting with assumptions that lead to a conclusion identical to those assumptions.

You start with the given that brain function is subjective experience, and then go on to tell us how you inferred that brain function proves subjective experience.

(September 4, 2013 at 8:01 am)bennyboy Wrote: Ermm. . . because that's the definition of begging the question-- starting with assumptions that lead to a conclusion identical to those assumptions.

Yeah, I'm not doing that.

(September 4, 2013 at 8:01 am)bennyboy Wrote: You start with the given that brain function is subjective experience,

Nope. That's the conclusion I came to based on the evidence given by neuroscience.

(September 4, 2013 at 8:01 am)bennyboy Wrote: and then go on to tell us how you inferred that brain function proves subjective experience.

Nope. Proof of subjective experience lies in the behavior.

We have covered this before.

(September 4, 2013 at 8:33 am)genkaus Wrote: Nope. Proof of subjective experience lies in the behavior.

We have covered this before.

Nope. You've tried before, and fallen short.

It may be that subjective experience of an organism (if it exists) may result in a particular behavior, but it does not follow that all occurrences of a behavior necessarily prove subjective experience. Remember? Dogs. Tails. Cyberboys. Assumptions. Circles.

(September 4, 2013 at 10:31 am)bennyboy Wrote: Nope. You've tried before, and fallen short.

Even if I had fallen short - which I haven't - your accusation of begging the question would still be baseless.

(September 4, 2013 at 10:31 am)bennyboy Wrote: It may be that subjective experience of an organism (if it exists) may result in a particular behavior, but it does not follow that all occurrences of a behavior necessarily prove subjective experience. Remember? Dogs. Tails. Cyberboys. Assumptions. Circles.

I also remember giving the criteria for identifying the behavior that must necessarily be the result of subjective experience - thus, all occurrences of that particular behavior in that context would necessarily prove subjective experience. Remeber? Dogs. Tails. Cyberboys. No assumptions and no circles.

(September 4, 2013 at 10:39 am)genkaus Wrote: Even if I had fallen short - which I haven't - your accusation of begging the question would still be baseless.

And your insistence on conflating mind-existent words with mind-neutral or physical monist words would still be base.

Quote:

(September 4, 2013 at 10:31 am)bennyboy Wrote: It may be that subjective experience of an organism (if it exists) may result in a particular behavior, but it does not follow that all occurrences of a behavior necessarily prove subjective experience. Remember? Dogs. Tails. Cyberboys. Assumptions. Circles.

I also remember giving the criteria for identifying the behavior that must necessarily be the result of subjective experience - thus, all occurrences of that particular behavior in that context would necessarily prove subjective experience. Remeber? Dogs. Tails. Cyberboys. No assumptions and no circles.

The problem is that your criteria don't actually prove that something is actually experiencing. They just define the behaviors that you want to call experience.

(September 4, 2013 at 7:57 pm)bennyboy Wrote: The problem is that your criteria don't actually prove that something is actually experiencing. They just define the behaviors that you want to call experience.

Genkaus wants to take us back to B. F. Skinner. Then again, I'd go back to Aquinas.

(September 4, 2013 at 7:57 pm)bennyboy Wrote: And your insistence on conflating mind-existent words with mind-neutral or physical monist words would still be base.

There is no conflation - because there is no dichotomy between mind-existent words and physical monist words to begin with.

(September 4, 2013 at 7:57 pm)bennyboy Wrote: The problem is that your criteria don't actually prove that something is actually experiencing. They just define the behaviors that you want to call experience.

Actually, I've been pretty clear on this and yet, you consistently insist on building the same strawman. My criteria identifies certain behaviors as necessary consequences of experience. I have not ever equated behavior with experience. I do not define behavior as experience. I do not call any behavior experience. Is that clear enough for you? If you don't have a valid objection, move on - stop repeating the same strawman.

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(September 4, 2013 at 9:03 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: Genkaus wants to take us back to B. F. Skinner. Then again, I'd go back to Aquinas.

Who the fuck is that?

(September 5, 2013 at 12:10 am)genkaus Wrote:

(September 4, 2013 at 7:57 pm)bennyboy Wrote: The problem is that your criteria don't actually prove that something is actually experiencing. They just define the behaviors that you want to call experience.

Actually, I've been pretty clear on this and yet, you consistently insist on building the same strawman. My criteria identifies certain behaviors as necessary consequences of experience. I have not ever equated behavior with experience. I do not define behavior as experience. I do not call any behavior experience. Is that clear enough for you? If you don't have a valid objection, move on - stop repeating the same strawman.

Fine. I will refine my statement. The problem is that your criteria don't prove that something is actually experiencing. They only outline the particular behaviors which you are willing to assume indicate actual experience.

Quote:

(September 4, 2013 at 9:03 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: Genkaus wants to take us back to B. F. Skinner. Then again, I'd go back to Aquinas.

Who the fuck is that?

Evidence that you went to college before about 1960, or skipped first-year psych class to chase skirts. Unless you are talking about Aquinas, in which case it's evidence that you went to college before 1250, or skipped first-year philosophy to chase skirts. In either case, pictures or it never happened!

Joking aside, though, Skinner was of the opinion that psychoanalysis was bullshit, and that people should be treated like black boxes: data in, behavior out. And the mechanisms for altering behavior (i.e. learning) were operant: an organism would be rewarded or punished for a behavior, and the number of trials, degree of punishment or reward, etc. could be analyzed to arrive at an effective system of training regardless of the underlying mechanism of the brain and/or the subjective mind. This completely disregards philosophical issues with mind, and gets right down to the science of making things (or people) do want you want them to. It's also very much the starting point for artificial neural networks, which are programmed to use an evolutionary system (random output combined with "punishment" or "reward") to guide a machine to do things it was not directly programmed to do.

In other words, Skinner is the start of a chain of ideas that will eventually arrive at the creation of the Cyberboy 2000.

(September 5, 2013 at 12:49 am)bennyboy Wrote: Fine. I will refine my statement. The problem is that your criteria don't prove that something is actually experiencing. They only outline the particular behaviors which you are willing to assume indicate actual experience.

Except I'm not "willing to assume" anything - my knowledge here is based on the criteria you set out.

I know that I experience (a position held by you as well, with regards to yourself).
I know that some of my specific behavior is necessarily the result of my experience.
Therefore, I know that such behavior indicates actual experience.

No assumption necessary.

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(September 5, 2013 at 12:49 am)bennyboy Wrote: Joking aside, though, Skinner was of the opinion that psychoanalysis was bullshit, and that people should be treated like black boxes: data in, behavior out. And the mechanisms for altering behavior (i.e. learning) were operant: an organism would be rewarded or punished for a behavior, and the number of trials, degree of punishment or reward, etc. could be analyzed to arrive at an effective system of training regardless of the underlying mechanism of the brain and/or the subjective mind. This completely disregards philosophical issues with mind, and gets right down to the science of making things (or people) do want you want them to. It's also very much the starting point for artificial neural networks, which are programmed to use an evolutionary system (random output combined with "punishment" or "reward") to guide a machine to do things it was not directly programmed to do.

That doesn't sound like my position at all.

(September 5, 2013 at 12:49 am)bennyboy Wrote: In other words, Skinner is the start of a chain of ideas that will eventually arrive at the creation of the Cyberboy 2000.

Yeah, I don't think so. Skinner's basic premise - of using reward/punishment model - would work only if the entity is capable of subjective experience. I can kick my car when it sputters or I can take it to a car wash when it works fine - neither will affect its future 'behavior'.