In a conversation with Peter Atkins and John Lennox Here

Its pretty stupid that the video is called 'Lennox DESTROYS atheist', there isn't much destroying going on, Atkins's response was completely cut out. Regardless:

Atkins said the universe could be a mathematical structure, and thus it could form from nothing. Lennox disagrees and states that mathematics doesn't 'cause' anything. I was wondering what everyone's thoughts on this is.

While I don't think mathematics acts 'causally', but it does tell us what will happen, regardless of our opinion. When you have a ball, it will follow f =ma when you throw it every time. And we can apply this to the origin of the universe. We know from quantum mechanics and gravity, that fluctuations can occur, even when you have absolute nothing, no universe, no space, no time, the laws still apply. And you will eventually get a universe. If this is nothing is up for debate, it probably isn't since we still have laws. This doesn't point to a mind behind it at all, in fact the opposite. If we have mathematical constructs that tell us how the universe got here, that is all we need, god therefore becomes completely superfluous.

Lennox also likes to argue for god due to the order in nature. Sure, we don't know why nature is so orderly, there are a few guesses, that still gives no reason to propose a god. That's just an argument from ignorance, which Lennox is fond of. He said the similar things with abiogenesis. Is gods mind ordered? Why is god so ordered then? So you've really answered nothing.

Lennox is right and Atkins is just out of his depth here. I'm not familiar with any position on the ontology of mathematics that treats mathematics as possessing causal capabilities. If I had to argue against mathematics being causal I'd offer up the following argument I just thought of:

Quote:1) An object is a causal agent iff it can be affected.

2) If an object can be causally affected, then that object is mutable.

3) Mathematics are immutable.

4) Therefore mathematics are not a causal agent.

He's right that mathematics can't cause anything to happen, but he's talking out of his ass saying that the universe points to an intelligent designer.

I agree. I tend to see Lennox as a poor apologist. :p

I don't know whether mathematics can or cannot cause "things" (and note that in this case, causality and things are all mathematical objects). I'm not a fan of the mathematical universe hypothesis, but it seems to depend on a variant of the debate between Platonism and nominalism; is mathematics in any sense "real" or not. Most initial reactions to this question immediately assert "no," but I think the reasoning involved incorporates some question begging. I don't know what it would mean for the universe to be a mathematical structure, but our judgements about that cannot come from an assumption grounded in views that the universe is not a mathematical structure, ie. some form of realism. This is a form of question begging which I think is exemplified by Descartes in his cogito ergo sum argument: his conclusion rests on a premise which seems drawn from a realist assumption about the universe, namely that if there is an effect, then there must be a something which is its cause. For Descartes, the existence of a doubt implies the existence of a "something" which is responsible for this effect. That's a form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, that effects must have causes, and it's drawn from an inductive observation of the universe under an assumption of realism. Similarly, when we say that mathematics doesn't cause anything, and therefore the universe can't be mathematical, then I think we're drawing that conclusion from a prior assumption of realism — but that is the very assumption which is at issue, so you can't draw your conclusion from there!

I don't think mathematics is "real" and so I don't think mathematics can have causality, but that belief is subject to many doubts, the likes of which are hard to resolve. The same doubts occur in arguments about the Platonic reality of math and logic, and also curiously, arguments about cosmological origins. The answer to the question of whether mathematics has causality seems to lie on the road ahead of us, not something that we've already figured out.

(May 26, 2014 at 4:42 pm)rasetsu Wrote: I don't know whether mathematics can or cannot cause "things" (and note that in this case, causality and things are all mathematical objects). I'm not a fan of the mathematical universe hypothesis, but it seems to depend on a variant of the debate between Platonism and nominalism; is mathematics in any sense "real" or not. Most initial reactions to this question immediately assert "no," but I think the reasoning involved incorporates some question begging. I don't know what it would mean for the universe to be a mathematical structure, but our judgements about that cannot come from an assumption grounded in views that the universe is not a mathematical structure, ie. some form of realism. This is a form of question begging which I think is exemplified by Descartes in his cogito ergo sum argument: his conclusion rests on a premise which seems drawn from a realist assumption about the universe, namely that if there is an effect, then there must be a something which is its cause. For Descartes, the existence of a doubt implies the existence of a "something" which is responsible for this effect. That's a form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, that effects must have causes, and it's drawn from an inductive observation of the universe under an assumption of realism. Similarly, when we say that mathematics doesn't cause anything, and therefore the universe can't be mathematical, then I think we're drawing that conclusion from a prior assumption of realism — but that is the very assumption which is at issue, so you can't draw your conclusion from there!

I don't think mathematics is "real" and so I don't think mathematics can have causality, but that belief is subject to many doubts, the likes of which are hard to resolve. The same doubts occur in arguments about the Platonic reality of math and logic, and also curiously, arguments about cosmological origins. The answer to the question of whether mathematics has causality seems to lie on the road ahead of us, not something that we've already figured out.

Wait a minute - there's a debate? Are there really any Platonists out there?

To the OP: No. Mathematics doesn't do anything. It is a way to model and describe, it is a tool invented by humans.

(May 26, 2014 at 4:42 pm)rasetsu Wrote: I don't know whether mathematics can or cannot cause "things" (and note that in this case, causality and things are all mathematical objects). I'm not a fan of the mathematical universe hypothesis, but it seems to depend on a variant of the debate between Platonism and nominalism; is mathematics in any sense "real" or not. Most initial reactions to this question immediately assert "no," but I think the reasoning involved incorporates some question begging. I don't know what it would mean for the universe to be a mathematical structure, but our judgements about that cannot come from an assumption grounded in views that the universe is not a mathematical structure, ie. some form of realism. This is a form of question begging which I think is exemplified by Descartes in his cogito ergo sum argument: his conclusion rests on a premise which seems drawn from a realist assumption about the universe, namely that if there is an effect, then there must be a something which is its cause. For Descartes, the existence of a doubt implies the existence of a "something" which is responsible for this effect. That's a form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, that effects must have causes, and it's drawn from an inductive observation of the universe under an assumption of realism. Similarly, when we say that mathematics doesn't cause anything, and therefore the universe can't be mathematical, then I think we're drawing that conclusion from a prior assumption of realism — but that is the very assumption which is at issue, so you can't draw your conclusion from there!

I don't think mathematics is "real" and so I don't think mathematics can have causality, but that belief is subject to many doubts, the likes of which are hard to resolve. The same doubts occur in arguments about the Platonic reality of math and logic, and also curiously, arguments about cosmological origins. The answer to the question of whether mathematics has causality seems to lie on the road ahead of us, not something that we've already figured out.

I'm not quite sure that's the case Apo. Here's what I take to be what Descartes was saying and assuming:

1) There is no possible world in which there can be a process without an entity.
2) There exists a process we call "thinking".
3) Therefore there is some entity, such that it is thinking, whatever that entity happens to actually be.
4) We call this entity "I".
5) Therefore I exist.

I think I'd agree with 1), as it seems incontrovertible. After all, does it make any sense to say there is rolling happening without a thing which rolls?
2) is just an incorrigible belief, so it seems fairly uncontroversial, and 3) just follows from 1) and 2). While 4) and 5) are really just about how we use language.

I'm not sure this is really the PSR, so much as it is an attempt at reductio-ing the idea of processes existing without entities. I can't say I definitely hold to it, but it has some appeal to me.

(May 26, 2014 at 8:43 pm)Chas Wrote: Wait a minute - there's a debate? Are there really any Platonists out there?

On the topic of the nature of mathematics, yes. As a more general philosophical position in the way Plato conceived it to be, definitely not. That's why the position she was talking about is called "mathematical Platonism".