Free Will

[bennyboy]

It is no more a part of compatibilism than it is of the idea that free will and determinism are incompatible.  In all of the discussions of free will, there is something that is described as having free will, or not having free will, depending on the position taken.

If one takes the position that there is no self, no will, then there is nothing being discussed that can be said to be free, nor that can be said to be not free.

If you are not, then it would be incorrect to say that you are free, and equally incorrect to say that you are not free.  If there is no you, then neither "you are free" nor "you are not free" would be about anything.

I think what you are saying is right. However, I would rephrase it: I would say that free will is as real as the self is. I wouldn't say there's a wrong perspective, either. In the sense of QM particles dancing in space, I don't think the rather arbitrary divisions in particle density in one space and another really mean much, though we call them "mom" or whatever. Certainly, from the perspective of the very small, all of what it means to be human seems meaningless.

But when we start talking about how great Mom is, and what a nag Aunt Ethel is, and how I dream of being a famous heavy metal rap star some day, then doing all that but denying free will is like believing in the Pantheon but removing Dionysus because you think he's just not believable.

This is an idea that's not popular here, but I think that reality is context-dependent. My desk REALLY is solid, occupying a volume, in the context of my experience of using it. It is also REALLY 99.999999% empty space, in the context of modern ideas about physics. I'd say that in the context of a physical view of the human organism, including brain function, then free will doesn't make much sense-- at best, it's the name for the function of particular brain parts. However, in the context of living a human life, free will is at least as real as beauty, love, and everything else that defines us.

So I don't think reality is unambiguous, and our multiple views either right or wrong. I think reality is ambiguous, and that it is our perspective that defines the context by which reality becomes apparent.

[Pyrrho]

Whether materialism is correct or not makes no difference.  If substance dualism is correct, you still have a hand that you did not choose to have (unless you happen to have no hands, but then we can just change the example; the point will still be the same), and it is still connected to your mind such that you are unlikely to want to stick your hand in a fire, due to the nature of your hand and the nature of the connection between your hand and your mind.  The only difference is the idea about what the mind is, that it is immaterial rather than some processes in a brain.  But that makes absolutely no difference for the pain of sticking your hand in the fire, the consequences to your hand for sticking it in a fire, etc.  You still did not choose to have the hand, and the connection of the hand to your mind, and that you have a hand with a connection to your mind is why you don't want to stick it in a fire.  In other words, either way, what you will can be traced to something that you did not choose.

Well, I'm not so sure I agree that materialism makes absolutely no difference. First, of course there are personal character traits that are preselected independent of will, and secondly, yes, these characteristics apply pressures of varying degrees on any given individual choice one makes. Most of us, after all, aren't going to have the strength of will to pull a  Scaevola. My criteria for free will, if it is to mean anything, is that a person has the genuine ability to choose alternative possibilities. In a materialistic universe, which seems to allow for nothing beyond determination or randomness, and most scientists think it is only the former that is relevant to any discussion about decision-making, I cannot conceive how it could be that free will exists. If the will is immaterial, however, then I think it opens up the possibility that even given two scenarios in which the exact same circumstances are present, whatever the sufficient causes may be, a particular action on the part of the will needn't necessarily follow. It could be the case that from a desire to preserve their so-called freedom of the will a person disregards the physical discomfort that ensues when flame meets flesh and they choose not to react. We can always look for further causes in such an act and say that these antecedents are responsible for the person's willingness to endure the pain, but it still doesn't establish that the choice was necessary. If it wasn't necessary, then it was determined by the will alone. And as I said, if the will is but a material composition of causes/effects or impulses that spontaneously generate from indeterminate states, this makes all the difference for what freedom means.

Like Irrational says, I think you still have the same problems.  With a material world, it is theoretically possible that the current beliefs about how things work are wrong.  And I do not see any relevant options that are added by the mind being immaterial.

You state:

"My criteria for free will, if it is to mean anything, is that a person has the genuine ability to choose alternative possibilities."

I don't know what you mean.  Clearly, a person cannot simultaneously do two mutually exclusive actions (e.g., go to the store while at the same time staying away from the store).  What the person will do is either go to the store at a given time or not.  How will you test your idea that one "has the genuine ability to choose alternative possibilities"?  What would be different in the world that we can observe if that claim is true, versus an otherwise identical world in which that claim is false?

It seems to me that there is no test, no way of distinguishing between having that "genuine ability" and not having it.  Not only not an actual test, but no theoretical test either.  So it seems to me to be mere empty words, devoid of any real meaning.

(The distinction between an actual test and a theoretical test can be clarified with an example.  Right now, we cannot test the idea that on a planet in Alpha Centauri, there is a teapot on its north pole.  [I trust you notice the nod to Russell.]  We cannot presently go there to test that idea, so we have no real test that we can make.  But a theoretical test is easy enough to imagine, where we build a spaceship that takes us there and we go look.)


As for the example of Gaius Mucius Scaevola, if the story is true and not mere myth, the extraordinary circumstances may be said to be important in causing the action.  He evidently thought he was going to die anyway, and very possibly in an unpleasant way.  His apparent options at that point are to either die bravely, or die cowardly.  Since he is very interested in helping his side win (or he would not be there at all), being brave furthers that goal, as it is more likely to strike fear into the enemy, or at least make the enemy consider that the fighting is going to be extremely difficult if they proceed, given how brave the one example is.  So the story has some degree of plausibility to it.

[Pyrrho]

How is a purely immaterial will any better? You still have the same problems.

Maybe. I don't have any clear conception of how a will might operate that isn't subject to the same problems that the constraints of physical laws impose; perhaps, however, self-determination need not be random. Can a will act on accord of its own self-willingness in which its exertion is neither necessary as a result of immediate antecedent causes nor involuntary impulses? It's a possibility that I'd like to maintain, at least as a matter for further consideration. The best I can currently entertain at this point, the most intelligible notion of something that strikes me as genuine freedom, is that perhaps human intuition includes foreknowledge of a range of possibilities in which one actually is completely free to pursue whichever course it ultimately decides upon - either because a particular path appears the most reasonable, or feels the most satisfying, or promises to serve as a worthy test of fortitude, or has the potential to forge an identity (an act of protest, say), or even because it considers irrationality a right to be exercised.

The thing is, what seems most reasonable or desirable is going to depend on the observed and believed characteristics of the situation, combined with the individual's desires and reasoning abilities.  That all involves pre-existing conditions that are not a matter of the individual choosing.

One never starts from nothing and then chooses; there is always the situation and whatever characteristics the actor has.  And those initial characteristics of the actor are not chosen by the actor, nor does the actor choose the universe in which the actor acts.

I don't know really. Why does one of these sometimes agree with my will, at other times not? Am I responsible for that judgment? Is it something of a symbiotic relationship with my genes, environment, past choices, etc.? Or does it ultimately transcend all of that, and coincide instead with a natural affinity to reason, sometimes present in the conscious intellect, sometimes absent; sometimes embraced, other times ignored? Maybe it boils down to the ends: self-preservation, on one level, of the body, on another, the inner "self", on yet another, the will. Or perhaps its all about pleasure; or freedom. Even these seem like choices to be considered to some extent.

In normal speech, we tend to say that someone acts freely if he does as he wills, and is not forced by something external to him at that moment.  (This is the idea presented in the opening post.)  But there is no reason to suppose that what he wills can magically escape the normal way the universe works.  My hand example is meant to draw this out, even if you do find someone acting as one normally would not, due to his abnormal circumstances.  But even that exception to what one normally does fits with the idea that one acts due to what one is and the circumstances one is in.  His demonstration of his bravery serves a purpose (even if they had just killed him anyway, as noted in my previous post).  His action would make no sense if the general idea of sticking one's hand in a fire was not normally highly undesirable and normally not what someone would do.  Its extreme nature was, in fact, essential to the point, essential to his purposes at that time.


It might also be worth pointing out that the practical implications of this are such that no further freedom is necessary (even if we had a coherent idea of what that "further freedom" was).  When we have identified someone as being willing to kill other people under unacceptable circumstances (because the person is caught doing this), then we lock them up for the protection of the remainder of society.  How the person became dangerous is irrelevant to this.  Though it may be relevant to how to stop other such actions in the future, but only if it follows some rules or laws of nature or some pattern.  If it is purely random or otherwise unpredictable, there would be nothing to be done about it.  But we know that people's actions are not completely unpredictable, and that the more we know about the person, and the situation of the person, the better we can predict what the person will do.  That we know from observation of people's behavior, not from some a priori consideration.

[Mudhammam]

"My criteria for free will, if it is to mean anything, is that a person has the genuine ability to choose alternative possibilities."

I don't know what you mean.  Clearly, a person cannot simultaneously do two mutually exclusive actions (e.g., go to the store while at the same time staying away from the store).  What the person will do is either go to the store at a given time or not.  How will you test your idea that one "has the genuine ability to choose alternative possibilities"?  What would be different in the world that we can observe if that claim is true, versus an otherwise identical world in which that claim is false?

It seems to me that there is no test, no way of distinguishing between having that "genuine ability" and not having it.  Not only not an actual test, but no theoretical test either.  So it seems to me to be mere empty words, devoid of any real meaning.

The distinction lies in the cause which is ultimately responsible for a given act: we are lead either through a chain of events that in principle can be traversed to the starting conditions of the universe, or to an individual will that renders judgment (in its decision to act) by means of pure intellection, perhaps not independent, but supervenient upon the sum of physical events that are present as a result of predetermined circumstances. To me, it seems like the difference between treating a murderer or a rapist as a moral agent wholly culpable for their crimes rather than merely the victims of bad luck. The idea that one genuinely possesses the ability to choose between alternative possibilities is simply that one can always do otherwise, in principle, than whatever it is they ultimately decide, in contradistinction to the reality where actions are shackled to the antecedent determinants that no one can truly be held accountable for. As these contraries are metaphysical, I'm inclined to think that the suggestion of a possible test is a category mistake; what changes rather is our perspective of the human condition; for example, our approach to moral questions and what a rational response to bad actors should be.

[Pyrrho]

Bold emphasis is added:

"My criteria for free will, if it is to mean anything, is that a person has the genuine ability to choose alternative possibilities."

I don't know what you mean.  Clearly, a person cannot simultaneously do two mutually exclusive actions (e.g., go to the store while at the same time staying away from the store).  What the person will do is either go to the store at a given time or not.  How will you test your idea that one "has the genuine ability to choose alternative possibilities"?  What would be different in the world that we can observe if that claim is true, versus an otherwise identical world in which that claim is false?

It seems to me that there is no test, no way of distinguishing between having that "genuine ability" and not having it.  Not only not an actual test, but no theoretical test either.  So it seems to me to be mere empty words, devoid of any real meaning.

The distinction lies in the cause which is ultimately responsible for a given act: we are lead either through a chain of events that in principle can be traversed to the starting conditions of the universe, or to an individual will that renders judgment (in its decision to act) by means of pure intellection, perhaps not independent, but supervenient upon the sum of physical events that are present as a result of predetermined circumstances. To me, it seems like the difference between treating a murderer or a rapist as a moral agent wholly culpable for their crimes rather than merely the victims of bad luck. The idea that one genuinely possesses the ability to choose between alternative possibilities is simply that one can always do otherwise, in principle, than whatever it is they ultimately decide, in contradistinction to the reality where actions are shackled to the antecedent determinants that no one can truly be held accountable for. As these contraries are metaphysical, I'm inclined to think that the suggestion of a possible test is a category mistake; what changes rather is our perspective of the human condition; for example, our approach to moral questions and what a rational response to bad actors should be.

So are you saying that it is merely a difference in attitude?



For the rest, you use words like "cause" that are normally associated with ordinary events, that can be examined scientifically.  Like whether or not smoking causes cancer.

Additionally, this claim;

"As these contraries are metaphysical, I'm inclined to think that the suggestion of a possible test is a category mistake..."

seems to suggest that metaphysics isn't really about anything.  It seems to me that a "difference" that makes no difference is no difference at all.

Separating some subject off from scrutiny seems very much like what many religionists try to do with their religion.  And saying that there is a magic kind of cause of things seems suspiciously similar to claiming "god did it."


I am also not convinced that a metaphysical position has the practical importance that you claim.  No matter what the ultimate cause, it is still a good idea to lock up serial killers.  And, as a practical matter, insofar as rehabilitation is practically possible, that, too, seems like a good idea.  And for that, one would want to use science to see what works and what does not.  And it likewise seems to be a good idea to prevent people from becoming serial killers, insofar as that is practically possible.  And, again, one would want to use science for that to see what works and what does not.  Metaphysics seems entirely irrelevant to all of this.

[Mudhammam]

Yeah, we would still try to rehabilitate people and keep those who pose an imminent threat away from society, but it would make no sense to moralize, to say to the convicted murderer or rapist: "You had the genuine possibility of doing otherwise but you choose not to," which, if such in fact is not the case, seems repugnant to my conception of human dignity. That's what separates us from beasts: we can reason against the passions; we can demarcate right and wrong and choose to do the former in spite of whatever proclivities draw us towards the latter. We function with a deeply imbedded sense of latitude to make decisions independent of any prior circumstances that have led up to that point. It seems to me that's what the philosophic virtues are largely about: living in accordance to a set of principles regardless of the situations that we find ourselves in. To commit to such ideals seems to me to be a choice that I am freely able to make at any given moment.

I'm also just not so sure that I'm persuaded of the idea that science, which deals exclusively with the physical world, is capable of answering such questions as whether or not the physical world is all that exists (and much of experience, if we include imagination and intellection, hardly seems remotely physical), and if it is not, then we might have to arrive at certain (that's an intentional double entendre) conclusions through other means - which is what we are always doing in exercising pure reason, anyway, and possibly free will, if it can survive.

[GrandizerII]

Yeah, we would still try to rehabilitate people and keep those who pose an imminent threat away from society, but it would make no sense to moralize, to say to the convicted murderer or rapist: "You had the genuine possibility of doing otherwise but you choose not to," which, if such in fact is not the case, seems repugnant to my conception of human dignity.

Which is why I would personally not even consider making such statements to such people. It's not true, and it's not even productive to say. But dangerous people are dangerous, and as someone who wants his loved ones to be as safe from harm as they can be, and knowing most people in this world feel the same way, it would certainly be very productive to do whatever it takes to keep predators away from our loved ones and ourselves, regardless of free will or not.

[Angrboda]

Additionally, this claim;

"As these contraries are metaphysical, I'm inclined to think that the suggestion of a possible test is a category mistake..."

seems to suggest that metaphysics isn't really about anything.  It seems to me that a "difference" that makes no difference is no difference at all. ... I am also not convinced that a metaphysical position has the practical importance that you claim.  No matter what the ultimate cause, it is still a good idea to lock up serial killers . . . . Metaphysics seems entirely irrelevant to all of this.

I've made the argument before, but to my mind, punishment serves one of 5 possible goals: (I just added one)

1. Insuring the safety of innocents by isolating offenders from the community and depriving them of the opportunity to re-offend;
2. Deterrence;
3. Rehabilitation;
4. Compensation - the redistributing of the fruits of the offender's resources to compensate society;
5. Retribution - making someone "pay" for what they have done because they are morally deserving of punishment.

As noted, deterrence is generally not regarded as effective. And retribution is probably, from a moral and practical standpoint, one of the least compelling justifications for punishment. I'm not going to elaborate further where this suggests we head with criminal punishment except to point out two key points.

In Michel Foucault's landmark study of the history of punishment, Discipline and Punish, he points out how, with the reforms in punishment that have occurred in Europe since the 16th century, the focus of punishment has shifted away from punishing the individual for an act to one in which we largely punish and attempt to correct the person as someone who has a mind capable of committing such acts. Thus we allow insanity as a defense, because the person's inclination to commit crime is not amenable to the treatment, punishment. We adjust the punishment dependent on the goal of fixing the criminality of the mind, not on addressing the severity of the crime; three strikes and you're out is aimed at minds that can't be fixed, not crimes that have been committed. Child molesters can be given chemical or surgical castration in exchange for reduction of sentence and leniency. Prisoners are monitored for progress and paroled earlier if they "show signs of good character" — it's not the crime that determines punishment anymore, it's the predisposition to offend which is the focus of punishment. Retribution, perhaps, is a return to focus on the crime rather than on fixing the criminal mind, but I'd be hesitant to take that step without serious consideration as to whether doing so serves any legitimate purpose.

The second point is, that as a hard determinist, I don't believe in free will. The moral justification for using punishment as retribution for a crime is that the person is morally deserving of the punishment, and that requires moral culpability which doesn't exist in the required sense if free will doesn't exist. The other four aims of punishment — deterrence, isolation from society, compensation, and rehabilitation — all can be justified without recourse to the assumption of free will; retribution alone cannot. Now I recognize that relative to my peers, I hold an extreme view with regard to free will, yet I think many of us realize that, regardless of where on the continuum regarding the existence of free will you stand, most of us recognize that most crimes and criminal behavior is a consequence of both factors within the individual's control, as well as a large measure of factors totally outside their control, ranging from social class, education, intelligence, all the way to things like being born in a society or culture that encouraged certain values and not others, to being genetically fated to the development of temperament which leaves one at increased risk of criminal or violent behavior. As a personal matter, I try to remove free will from any justification for punishment; but even someone more moderate could well be persuaded to minimize the impact that situational factors such as being born black, being poor, and such have on the fairness and equity with which we address criminal behavior; I think, arguably, retribution results in unfairness because it treats moral culpability and the resources to act morally as evenly distributed resources, and they are not.

[Edwardo Piet]

Very tired of arguing against contra-causal and compatabilist free will... done it so many times over the years and recently too. So I'm just gonna drop this video and a quote:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_FanhvXO9Pk

[Pyrrho]

Yeah, we would still try to rehabilitate people and keep those who pose an imminent threat away from society, but it would make no sense to moralize, to say to the convicted murderer or rapist: "You had the genuine possibility of doing otherwise but you choose not to," which, if such in fact is not the case, seems repugnant to my conception of human dignity.

When I encounter an apple that is rotten, I interact with it differently than I interact with a fresh, ripe apple.  How the one got to be rotten, and how the other got to be ripe, makes no difference for this.  The same applies to people.  The difference between a good and a bad person is in what they are, not in how they got to be what they are.  I married my wife because of what she is, not because of how she came to be what she is.

That's what separates us from beasts: we can reason against the passions; we can demarcate right and wrong and choose to do the former in spite of whatever proclivities draw us towards the latter.

We can see from various nonhuman animal studies that there appears to be moral behavior, and a sense of right and wrong, in a variety of animals.  See, for example:

http://www.livescience.com/24802-animals...-book.html

https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg2...in-animals

http://www.npr.org/2014/08/15/338936897/...ave-morals

http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/041612.html

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/10...59579.html

So a sense of morality does not separate humans from other animals.

We function with a deeply imbedded sense of latitude to make decisions independent of any prior circumstances that have led up to that point. It seems to me that's what the philosophic virtues are largely about: living in accordance to a set of principles regardless of the situations that we find ourselves in. To commit to such ideals seems to me to be a choice that I am freely able to make at any given moment.

You can do what you want, within limits (e.g., you cannot fly without the aid of any devices, etc.).  That is the freedom that you have.  What would be the advantage to being able to choose what you do not want?

As for why you want what you want, that is another matter.  That will involve things that are beyond your control, as my hand example is meant to illustrate.

I'm also just not so sure that I'm persuaded of the idea that science, which deals exclusively with the physical world, is capable of answering such questions as whether or not the physical world is all that exists (and much of experience, if we include imagination and intellection, hardly seems remotely physical), and if it is not, then we might have to arrive at certain (that's an intentional double entendre) conclusions through other means - which is what we are always doing in exercising pure reason, anyway, and possibly free will, if it can survive.

Science deals with things that are testable.  It is not inherently committed to a purely physical world.  If psychics were real and had their abilities due to nonphysical things, their abilities would still be testable and demonstrable.


Going back to your idea of something being repugnant to your idea of human dignity, that is an interesting emotional aspect of you.  That is not a way to determine the truth about things in the world.  Humans are animals.  Too many people have been infected with that vile superstition known as "Christianity" which warps their view and gets them to believe that humans are somehow separate from other animals.  Modern evolutionary theory teaches us otherwise.  Which explains why so many Christians hate evolution.