Free Will

[The Grand Nudger]

You need to explain what, exactly, you mean by "free will."  Free will, as described in the opening post, is perfectly compatible with determinism.

By virtue of it's concession on the former, with regard to the latter, sure.  That's how free will is made to be compatible, regardless of whether or not free will is.  I, personally, don't mean anything by it, I don't know that it's actually describing something we have or do.  Generally, the notion that we are somehow, or in some measure, independent and/or intentional causal agents.   Whether a person thinks we're magic stuff that creates decisions  ex nihilo....or a person thinks that we are material creatures bound by circumstance to appraise relatively few options.  The field is wide, I get that....but personally...I think that the entire field is fairy tale and folklore.  

Additionally (though this is getting us off topic), the ability to predict something is not at all the same as causing it.  I can predict that the "sun will rise" tomorrow, but my knowledge of that future event is not in any way causing that future event.

Doesn't have anything to do with anything I said...but okay?  

(Of course, by the "sun will rise," I mean that it will seem so, due to the rotation of the earth, not that the sun will literally rise.)

I can also predict that my wife will never cheat on me.  My prediction is based on my knowledge of her character.  I do not cause her to act as she does.

I also predict that you will not willfully stick your hand into a fire and hold it there until it is completely burned off, so that you just have a stump at the end of your arm.  My prediction on that is based on knowing a bit about human nature, and, obviously, I am not causing you to refrain from doing such a thing.  Yet I am extremely confident that you will not do that.  In the ordinary sense of the word, I know you will not do that.  It is not a belief that is unsupported by evidence, or in other words, it is not a mere bit of faith.  My belief on that point is based on evidence.  It is a justified true belief.  (Go ahead, prove me wrong!  I dare you!)

There are countless other such examples, but the point is, the ability to predict something does not entail that one is in any way causing the event, nor does it rely on a specific idea of whether determinism holds or not.  Whether determinism is true or false, I make all of the above assertions with extreme confidence, and they are supported by evidence, and are not merely examples of faith.

I wasn't discussing predictions, I was discussing the availability of knowledge.  The possible or potential truth state of some future event "x".  The cause of some future event X and the availability of knowledge of future event "x" are separate propositions. There's nothing in the above that I would disagree with at a glance, but it seems like you thought we were.

Also, if it is going to be discussed, it would be good for you to explain precisely what you mean by "fatalism," as your claim that fatalism must be true if determinism is true is not correct for all common uses of the term "fatalism" (though it may be for others).

The simplest common thread between all, fatalism distilled, is this.  There is a true statement regarding the fact of a future state.  X will happen.  Fatalism must be true if determinism is true, because determinism holds that the truth value of some future event x can be derived from current state y.  X will happen, if y... so on, and so on. They're slightly different positions (one offers a "why", for example) that have this one area of overlap. People have elaborated upon this, of course, applied it to life to present something more than the statement of certainy regarding a future event. For example, "theres no point in doing anything". I don't subscribe to it myself, nor would I have to, if I were a fatalist. I see alot of those beefier, more elaborate versions of fatalism on display there in your links. Those don't interest me much, like Buddha dispensing wisdom, lol.

[Angrboda]

But what I am is a part of the circumstances, so there is no part that is not compulsory in Aristotle's sense.

By the circumstances, Aristotle means the part of the situation that is not the agent.

Speaking of introducing undefined terms, I think one of the weak points of compatibilism is this whole notion of an agent or self. To some, the agent includes the body and mind of the thing that wills. But this is making a rather arbitrary distinction. Is my hand a part of the agent? Under many conceptions, yes, but if I lose my hand am I less of a complete agent? Suppose that we in reality are just brains in vats. In that case, what I mean by my hand is just a part of a model in my brain that represents me as having a hand. So is the agent the brain? If I indeed have no hand then the model of the world I have in my mind is the circumstance to which I must comport myself. But if the model in my brain is the reality towards which I must comport myself, clearly not all of the brain is the agent; some of the brain is the circumstance which we are compelled to comport ourselves with. So part of the brain doesn't qualify as agent but rather is circumstance. But which part of brain is the agent then? You seem to have drawn an arbitrary line between some part of body and brain and declared that things to one side are circumstance, and things to the other side of the line are agent. Depending on where and how I draw this line, different sets of acts will be viewed as voluntary and compulsory. If the notion of free will depends on the arbitrary drawing of a line in the sand, it's not a rational conception and is just a case of defining something into existence.

What is an agent?

[The Grand Nudger]

The sliding variable that creates free will by it's motion on the scale?   I'd ask a similar question.  In what way is the movement of a hand (on a fire, for example) involuntary that the operation of the brain is not?   Is there actually -any- line to be drawn in the sand at all?

[Pyrrho]

By the circumstances, Aristotle means the part of the situation that is not the agent.

Speaking of introducing undefined terms, I think one of the weak points of compatibilism is this whole notion of an agent or self.  To some, the agent includes the body and mind of the thing that wills.  But this is making a rather arbitrary distinction.  Is my hand a part of the agent?  Under many conceptions, yes, but if I lose my hand am I less of a complete agent?  Suppose that we in reality are just brains in vats.  In that case, what I mean by my hand is just a part of a model in my brain that represents me as having a hand.  So is the agent the brain?  If I indeed have no hand then the model of the world I have in my mind is the circumstance to which I must comport myself.  But if the model in my brain is the reality towards which I must comport myself, clearly not all of the brain is the agent; some of the brain is the circumstance which we are compelled to comport ourselves with.  So part of the brain doesn't qualify as agent but rather is circumstance.  But which part of brain is the agent then?  You seem to have drawn an arbitrary line between some part of body and brain and declared that things to one side are circumstance, and things to the other side of the line are agent.  Depending on where and how I draw this line, different sets of acts will be viewed as voluntary and compulsory.  If the notion of free will depends on the arbitrary drawing of a line in the sand, it's not a rational conception and is just a case of defining something into existence.

What is an agent?

It is no more a part of compatibilism than it is of the idea that free will and determinism are incompatible.  In all of the discussions of free will, there is something that is described as having free will, or not having free will, depending on the position taken.

If one takes the position that there is no self, no will, then there is nothing being discussed that can be said to be free, nor that can be said to be not free.

If you are not, then it would be incorrect to say that you are free, and equally incorrect to say that you are not free.  If there is no you, then neither "you are free" nor "you are not free" would be about anything.

[The Grand Nudger]

Bingo.

[Angrboda]

What is an agent?

It is no more a part of compatibilism than it is of the idea that free will and determinism are incompatible.  In all of the discussions of free will, there is something that is described as having free will, or not having free will, depending on the position taken.

If one takes the position that there is no self, no will, then there is nothing being discussed that can be said to be free, nor that can be said to be not free.

If you are not, then it would be incorrect to say that you are free, and equally incorrect to say that you are not free.  If there is no you, then neither "you are free" nor "you are not free" would be about anything.

You haven't actually answered the question. That there is a self involved does not involve any discontinuity between agent and circumstance until you postulate that the agent is free in a sense that the circumstance is not. It is then that you need to justify the difference. So long as agent and circumstance are playing by the same rules, there is no question.

[Pyrrho]

It is no more a part of compatibilism than it is of the idea that free will and determinism are incompatible.  In all of the discussions of free will, there is something that is described as having free will, or not having free will, depending on the position taken.

If one takes the position that there is no self, no will, then there is nothing being discussed that can be said to be free, nor that can be said to be not free.

If you are not, then it would be incorrect to say that you are free, and equally incorrect to say that you are not free.  If there is no you, then neither "you are free" nor "you are not free" would be about anything.

You haven't actually answered the question.  That there is a self involved does not involve any discontinuity between agent and circumstance until you postulate that the agent is free in a sense that the circumstance is not.  It is then that you need to justify the difference.  So long as agent and circumstance are playing by the same rules, there is no question.

It isn't that the agent is necessarily free in a sense in which the circumstance is not.  It is that the meaning of saying that an agent is free is that its action is caused from within the agent, rather than from the circumstance (i.e., whatever is present that is not the agent).  And if we keep with Aristotle, the line of separation is not clean, but allows for "mixed" sorts of cases.

The same idea applies to your dog.  Your dog is free for any action for which the primary cause is the dog and not some other aspect of the dog's environment.  Thus, if one has a dog on a leash, and one drags the dog by the leash, the dog is not acting freely.  If the dog is not on a leash, but walks in that same direction, then that action is free.

Of course, if we have no idea where the dog ends and the other aspects of the situation begin, then we are going to have a great deal of difficulty in determining whether the cause of the action is from the dog or external to the dog.  And if there is no dog, then it will make no sense to speak of the nonexistent dog being either free or not free.


To expand on that initial idea ("It isn't that the agent is necessarily free in a sense in which the circumstance is not."), if a man ties up another man and drags him somewhere, the circumstance of the man being dragged involves another man who is dragging him, who, presumably, is free in whatever sense a man tends to be free (if, that is, a man is free in some sense).  So there is no claim of special powers in the agent, the subject of the statement, that may not be had by the circumstance.  All other people in a situation are a part of the circumstances of a particular individual.  When you are in a room with another person, that other person is a part of the situation or circumstances you are in at that time.  That individual, presumably, ordinarily has as much freedom as you do.  And there would even be no theoretical incompatibility with trees and rocks being inhabited by spirits and having as much freedom as a person.  So it is not making a man free in a sense that other things may not be.  Things in an agent's environment or circumstances or situation may have as much freedom as the agent has.  Or, theoretically, the entire environment of an agent could itself be another agent.


Again, what is being said is that the meaning of saying that an agent is free is that its action is caused from within the agent, rather than from the circumstance (i.e., whatever is present that is not the agent).  Of course, if we cannot distinguish between the agent and the circumstance, then would be nothing to say about this.


It might be worthwhile to consider that the ideas are not merely abstract, but have practical importance.  If we cannot distinguish between an agent and the circumstance, then we have nothing to charge with a crime, or to put into jail in the case of wrongdoing.  And it affects rewards as well.  If you do a job, there needs to somehow be a you in order for you to be paid for doing the job.  If we have no way of distinguishing between you and the rest of the environment, then you will not get paid for any work you may do.

So the entire thing is tied to rewards and punishments, and also with rehabilitation.

Typically, if a person has a muscle spasm and accidentally kicks someone, we do not blame the person for it (assuming, of course, that we are able to make the determination that it was a muscle spasm and not intentional).  But if the cause of the kicking of the other person is the will (whether that be a bit of brain function or immaterial soul makes no difference for this), then we typically blame the person.

Of course, as in other matters of practical importance, one may have cases where one has no idea what was the cause of some action, and we may not know whether to praise or blame someone or not.

[Mudhammam]

Whether materialism is correct or not makes no difference.  If substance dualism is correct, you still have a hand that you did not choose to have (unless you happen to have no hands, but then we can just change the example; the point will still be the same), and it is still connected to your mind such that you are unlikely to want to stick your hand in a fire, due to the nature of your hand and the nature of the connection between your hand and your mind.  The only difference is the idea about what the mind is, that it is immaterial rather than some processes in a brain.  But that makes absolutely no difference for the pain of sticking your hand in the fire, the consequences to your hand for sticking it in a fire, etc.  You still did not choose to have the hand, and the connection of the hand to your mind, and that you have a hand with a connection to your mind is why you don't want to stick it in a fire.  In other words, either way, what you will can be traced to something that you did not choose.

Well, I'm not so sure I agree that materialism makes absolutely no difference. First, of course there are personal character traits that are preselected independent of will, and secondly, yes, these characteristics apply pressures of varying degrees on any given individual choice one makes. Most of us, after all, aren't going to have the strength of will to pull a Scaevola. My criteria for free will, if it is to mean anything, is that a person has the genuine ability to choose alternative possibilities. In a materialistic universe, which seems to allow for nothing beyond determination or randomness, and most scientists think it is only the former that is relevant to any discussion about decision-making, I cannot conceive how it could be that free will exists. If the will is immaterial, however, then I think it opens up the possibility that even given two scenarios in which the exact same circumstances are present, whatever the sufficient causes may be, a particular action on the part of the will needn't necessarily follow. It could be the case that from a desire to preserve their so-called freedom of the will a person disregards the physical discomfort that ensues when flame meets flesh and they choose not to react. We can always look for further causes in such an act and say that these antecedents are responsible for the person's willingness to endure the pain, but it still doesn't establish that the choice was necessary. If it wasn't necessary, then it was determined by the will alone. And as I said, if the will is but a material composition of causes/effects or impulses that spontaneously generate from indeterminate states, this makes all the difference for what freedom means.

[GrandizerII]

Whether materialism is correct or not makes no difference.  If substance dualism is correct, you still have a hand that you did not choose to have (unless you happen to have no hands, but then we can just change the example; the point will still be the same), and it is still connected to your mind such that you are unlikely to want to stick your hand in a fire, due to the nature of your hand and the nature of the connection between your hand and your mind.  The only difference is the idea about what the mind is, that it is immaterial rather than some processes in a brain.  But that makes absolutely no difference for the pain of sticking your hand in the fire, the consequences to your hand for sticking it in a fire, etc.  You still did not choose to have the hand, and the connection of the hand to your mind, and that you have a hand with a connection to your mind is why you don't want to stick it in a fire.  In other words, either way, what you will can be traced to something that you did not choose.

Well, I'm not so sure I agree that materialism makes absolutely no difference. First, of course there are personal character traits that are preselected independent of will, and secondly, yes, these characteristics apply pressures of varying degrees on any given individual choice one makes. Most of us, after all, aren't going to have the strength of will to pull a  Scaevola. My criteria for free will, if it is to mean anything, is that a person has the genuine ability to choose alternative possibilities. In a materialistic universe, which seems to allow for nothing beyond determination or randomness, and most scientists think it is only the former that is relevant to any discussion about decision-making, I cannot conceive how it could be that free will exists. If the will is immaterial, however, then I think it opens up the possibility that even given two scenarios in which the exact same circumstances are present, whatever the sufficient causes may be, a particular action on the part of the will needn't necessarily follow. It could be the case that from a desire to preserve their so-called freedom of the will a person disregards the physical discomfort that ensues when flame meets flesh and they choose not to react. We can always look for further causes in such an act and say that these antecedents are responsible for the person's willingness to endure the pain, but it still doesn't establish that the choice was necessary. If it wasn't necessary, then it was determined by the will alone. And as I said, if the will is but a material composition of causes/effects or impulses that spontaneously generate from indeterminate states, this makes all the difference for what freedom means.

How is a purely immaterial will any better? You still have the same problems.

[Mudhammam]

How is a purely immaterial will any better? You still have the same problems.

Maybe. I don't have any clear conception of how a will might operate that isn't subject to the same problems that the constraints of physical laws impose; perhaps, however, self-determination need not be random. Can a will act on accord of its own self-willingness in which its exertion is neither necessary as a result of immediate antecedent causes nor involuntary impulses? It's a possibility that I'd like to maintain, at least as a matter for further consideration. The best I can currently entertain at this point, the most intelligible notion of something that strikes me as genuine freedom, is that perhaps human intuition includes foreknowledge of a range of possibilities in which one actually is completely free to pursue whichever course it ultimately decides upon - either because a particular path appears the most reasonable, or feels the most satisfying, or promises to serve as a worthy test of fortitude, or has the potential to forge an identity (an act of protest, say), or even because it considers irrationality a right to be exercised. I don't know really. Why does one of these sometimes agree with my will, at other times not? Am I responsible for that judgment? Is it something of a symbiotic relationship with my genes, environment, past choices, etc.? Or does it ultimately transcend all of that, and coincide instead with a natural affinity to reason, sometimes present in the conscious intellect, sometimes absent; sometimes embraced, other times ignored? Maybe it boils down to the ends: self-preservation, on one level, of the body, on another, the inner "self", on yet another, the will. Or perhaps its all about pleasure; or freedom. Even these seem like choices to be considered to some extent.