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Free Will
#21
RE: Free Will
(October 12, 2015 at 7:40 pm)Nestor Wrote:
(October 12, 2015 at 3:12 pm)Pyrrho Wrote: Or in other words, due to the structure of your body.  You did not choose to have a hand in the first place, or nerves, or a brain, etc.  That is all due to things prior to your existence. Whether that is due to "determinism" or random chance or whatever, clearly, you did not choose it.  Everyone of sense knows that, so why is it that people pretend it is not the case?*  

_________________________________________________________________
*As is often the case, the answer to the question resides in the question itself.  It is not everyone, but everyone "of sense" that was specified, and it is those who are lacking in sense who fail to realize such obvious facts.
I suppose one reason people may doubt that is the case is that they're not materialists, and how one defines being or self - whether or not mind emerges as something distinct from a given sum of physical parts, or is itself a physical process, or if there is something above and beyond the objects of sense that is inextricable from reality or the experience thereof - probably has implications for their view of the will i.e. what it consists of and how it is exercised.

Whether materialism is correct or not makes no difference.  If substance dualism is correct, you still have a hand that you did not choose to have (unless you happen to have no hands, but then we can just change the example; the point will still be the same), and it is still connected to your mind such that you are unlikely to want to stick your hand in a fire, due to the nature of your hand and the nature of the connection between your hand and your mind.  The only difference is the idea about what the mind is, that it is immaterial rather than some processes in a brain.  But that makes absolutely no difference for the pain of sticking your hand in the fire, the consequences to your hand for sticking it in a fire, etc.  You still did not choose to have the hand, and the connection of the hand to your mind, and that you have a hand with a connection to your mind is why you don't want to stick it in a fire.  In other words, either way, what you will can be traced to something that you did not choose.

If idealism is correct, the same idea still applies, the only difference being that the description of what your hand really is changes.  Again, sticking the 'immaterial' hand into an 'immaterial' fire still hurts the same, etc.

And no matter which of these, or any other metaphysical claptrap one wishes to propose, we are still left with the fact that one did not choose to come into existence, as one did not exist before one existed, and so one was not choosing anything at that time.  And after one begins to exist, it is too late for one to choose how one initially comes into existence.  One still starts with qualities that one did not choose, and one chooses things due to the qualities one has.  (If one did not, then one would not be choosing at all, but some other force would be acting aside from one, or random events would be taking place, or some other thing that is not one choosing.)  Indeed, this idea extends further, in that a being that has always existed could not have chosen its beginning nature either, as it had no beginning and consequently nothing could have chosen its beginning.  But that extension is of no practical importance for humans, unless one is going to pretend that a human has existed eternally.  But even with such a pretense, it would make no difference for the claim I am making about your hand and why it is that you probably do not will to stick your hand in a fire.

"A wise man ... proportions his belief to the evidence."
— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section X, Part I.
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#22
RE: Free Will
(October 12, 2015 at 10:31 pm)Rhythm Wrote: It's unlikely that such a belief actually -has- implications for free will, or is even remotely related.  Not that this will stop people from referencing their beliefs when considering the issue, of course.  If there were fairies working an ethereal treadmill inside of our heads, that might be a problem fro materialism....but that wouldn't tell us whether or not we had any free will.

Yes.  Many times, people confuse materialism with determinism, as if materialism required determinism (it does not, as is obvious from modern physics regarding the behavior of some subatomic particles; ask Alex K about this in his "ask a particle physicist" thread), and as if substance dualism or idealism required that determinism is false (which is also wrong; normally, one regards one's desire to raise one's arm as a cause of it raising, whether the arm is material or not).  Determinism is a separate idea from the question about what substance or substances the universe is made of, and it is good if people do not muddle together separate ideas.

Fairies working an ethereal treadmill inside our heads, as you say, does not tell us that determinism is false, or that we have any kind of freedom that we would not have as purely material beings.

I am reminded of the words of Oscar Wilde:

"Ah! that is clearly a metaphysical speculation, and like most metaphysical speculations has very little reference at all to the actual facts of real life, as we know them."  

- Gwendolen, The Importance of Being Earnest, Oscar Wilde.

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/844/844-h/844-h.htm

"A wise man ... proportions his belief to the evidence."
— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section X, Part I.
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#23
RE: Free Will
(October 12, 2015 at 11:32 pm)MTL Wrote: This discussion calls to mind a good passage from the novel "The Sea Wolf" by Jack London:


Quote:he had engaged Maud in animated discussion.  Temptation was the topic they
had hit upon, and from the few words I heard I made out that he was
contending that temptation was temptation only when a man was seduced by
it and fell.

"For look you," he was saying, "as I see it, a man does things because of
desire.  He has many desires.  He may desire to escape pain, or to enjoy
pleasure.  But whatever he does, he does because he desires to do it."

"But suppose he desires to do two opposite things, neither of which will
permit him to do the other?" Maud interrupted.

"The very thing I was coming to," he said.

"And between these two desires is just where the soul of the man is
manifest," she went on.  "If it is a good soul, it will desire and do the
good action, and the contrary if it is a bad soul.  It is the soul that
decides."

"Bosh and nonsense!" he exclaimed impatiently.  "It is the desire that
decides.  Here is a man who wants to, say, get drunk.  Also, he doesn't
want to get drunk.  What does he do?  How does he do it?  He is a puppet.
He is the creature of his desires, and of the two desires he obeys the
strongest one, that is all.  His soul hasn't anything to do with it.  How
can he be tempted to get drunk and refuse to get drunk?  If the desire to
remain sober prevails, it is because it is the strongest desire.
Temptation plays no part, unless--" he paused while grasping the new
thought which had come into his mind--"unless he is tempted to remain
sober.

"Ha! ha!" he laughed.  "What do you think of that, Mr. Van Weyden?"

"That both of you are hair-splitting," I said.  "The man's soul is his
desires.  Or, if you will, the sum of his desires is his soul.  Therein
you are both wrong.  You lay the stress upon the desire apart from the
soul, Miss Brewster lays the stress on the soul apart from the desire,
and in point of fact soul and desire are the same thing.

"However," I continued, "Miss Brewster is right in contending that
temptation is temptation whether the man yield or overcome.  Fire is
fanned by the wind until it leaps up fiercely.  So is desire like fire.
It is fanned, as by a wind, by sight of the thing desired, or by a new
and luring description or comprehension of the thing desired.  There lies
the temptation.  It is the wind that fans the desire until it leaps up to
mastery.  That's temptation.  It may not fan sufficiently to make the
desire overmastering, but in so far as it fans at all, that far is it
temptation.  And, as you say, it may tempt for good as well as for evil."

(Bold is mine)

I would not put it quite that way.  I think desire is a part of what one is, a part of one's "soul" [to use the terminology in your quote], a part of one's mind.  Your desires are not separate from you, they are a part of you.  But they are only a part of you, not all of you.  Your mind or "soul" is more than just your desires.  Your mind also includes your beliefs and ideas and feelings and ways of processing thoughts and feelings.  

For the purposes of this thread, it makes no difference whether the mind is material, spiritual, or something else.

"A wise man ... proportions his belief to the evidence."
— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section X, Part I.
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#24
RE: Free Will
It actually makes only a minor difference as to whether or not determinism holds either.  If hard determinism holds, we don't have it, but if determinism (hard or soft) doesn't hold...we can't confidently proclaim the opposite.  Even if it were all random, if it was -possible- to know a future state in that random universe, if a future state had a set truth value as a matter of fact divorced from any previous circumstance or condition.....we still don't have it (fatalism, ofc).  

Fatalism -must be- true if determinism is true, but fatalism -can be- true even if determinism is false. In either case, there's no free will, but the universes that could be described with either term might be night and day different from each other. The breadth of the field -against- free will is very, very wide. The path through that field, leading to an actualized free will, is narrow. A universe which contains free will would be an excruciatingly specific universe, it would be a universe in which a future state was -actually unknowable-. If our will were free, we could not know an outcome until after the fact. Any prior knowledge of a future state's truth value is a clear and inarguable indication of a limit on the "freedom" of will. Our ability to predict human behavior and decision-making, even to coerce it overtly, covertly, systematically, and repeatedly... shows us that while our will may be actualized (whatever it may be made of), it's freedom is not. If free will exists, it's demonstrably ineffective, and that's as generous as I can be, personally, regarding the conjecture.
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#25
RE: Free Will
(October 12, 2015 at 5:40 pm)Pyrrho Wrote: This accords well with the ordinary definition of "free" quoted in the opening post.  It requires no metaphysical nonsense.

But the metaphysical nonsense is the interesting part of free will!  We want to know whether we really are determined in our choices, like a puppet on a string, and whether we are truly free, with no strings dictating our actions.

Aristotle Wrote:   But with regard to the things that are done from fear of greater evils or for some noble object (e.g. if a tyrant were to order one to do something base, having one's parents and children in his power, and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to death), it may be debated whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary. Something of the sort happens also with regard to the throwing of goods overboard in a storm; for in the abstract no one throws goods away voluntarily, but on condition of its securing the safety of himself and his crew any sensible man does so. Such actions, then, are mixed, but are more like voluntary actions; for they are worthy of choice at the time when they are done, and the end of an action is relative to the occasion. Both the terms, then, 'voluntary' and 'involuntary', must be used with reference to the moment of action. Now the man acts voluntarily; for the principle that moves the instrumental parts of the body in such actions is in him, and the things of which the moving principle is in a man himself are in his power to do or not to do. Such actions, therefore, are voluntary, but in the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one would choose any such act in itself.

http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicoma...3.iii.html

Aristotle gives the example of throwing goods overboard to save one's ship if one gets caught in a storm.  In that case, there are strong incentives to ditch the cargo.  One does not truly have an opportunity to preserve the cargo.  But what of in lesser circumstances?  Let's suppose the ship is at sea in calm weather.  The captain can choose to continue sailing to his destination port, where he can sell his cargo, or turn around and return home, where there is no market for his goods.  If he were to return home, he would face the same loss as the captain in a storm in that the value of the cargo would be lost.  He does not have the opportunity to preserve the value of the cargo and return home.  Is his choice not then also in a mixed state, being partially voluntary and involuntary?  Do the opportunities open to him not determine what it is that he wills, if he is of sound mind and body, and aware of his choices?  Let's take the hypothetical another step further and suppose the ship is moored at harbor in the home port, having just been filled with cargo.  The captain may choose to sail or not.  If he chooses not to sail, he loses the value of the cargo just the same as in the previous case.  He isn't free to take the opportunity to remain in port if he values the profit from the sale of his cargo.  His choice is once again both voluntary and involuntary in a sense.  Now let's suppose, instead, that I am a ship captain, yet have no billet of goods.  I can choose to load up with cargo for sale in a foreign port, or choose not to do so.  Again, the same cost to me is that I will not benefit from the sale of the cargo.  If I value the profit from the sale of cargo, I do not have a free opportunity to remain in port with my ship empty.  And so it goes, each decision we make prior to the sale of goods in that foreign port determines whether we will ultimately profit from the sale of our cargo.  At no point in the chain of events is our will not a mixture of voluntary and involuntary parts.  We do not voluntarily choose the conditions under which we will profit, nor determine which opportunities are closed to us.  It is in this sense that we worry whether or not our actions are in any sense truly voluntary.  And the answer to that question is of great interest to us.

I think, if I have some liberty here, we could speak of free choices in which we have the opportunity to preserve what is of value to us through multiple courses of action. But as in the dialog MTL pasted, there will always be one opportunity that has less cost than the others. Being of sound mind and body, and apprised of the cost of the different choices, we have no opportunity to choose that but which to our mind is the most profitable. Thus, none of our choices are voluntary. They are all involuntary in that the opportunities which present themselves will fully determine which choice we make.
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#26
RE: Free Will
(October 13, 2015 at 12:59 pm)Rhythm Wrote: It actually makes only a minor difference as to whether or not determinism holds either.  If hard determinism holds, we don't have it, but if determinism (hard or soft) doesn't hold...we can't confidently proclaim the opposite.  Even if it were all random, if it was -possible- to know a future state in that random universe, if a future state had a set truth value as a matter of fact divorced from any previous circumstance or condition.....we still don't have it (fatalism, ofc).  

Fatalism -must be- true if determinism is true, but fatalism -can be- true even if determinism is false.  In either case, there's no free will, but the universes that could be described with either term might be night and day different from each other.  The breadth of the field -against- free will is very, very wide.  The path through that field, leading to an actualized free will, is narrow. A universe which contains free will would be an excruciatingly specific universe, it would be a universe in which a future state was -actually unknowable-.  If our will were free, we could not know an outcome until after the fact.  Any prior knowledge of a future state's truth value is a clear and inarguable indication of a limit on the "freedom" of will.  Our ability to predict human behavior and decision-making, even to coerce it overtly, covertly, systematically, and repeatedly... shows us that while our will may be actualized (whatever it may be made of), it's freedom is not.  If free will exists, it's demonstrably ineffective, and that's as generous as I can be, personally, regarding the conjecture.

You need to explain what, exactly, you mean by "free will."  Free will, as described in the opening post, is perfectly compatible with determinism.


Additionally (though this is getting us off topic), the ability to predict something is not at all the same as causing it.  I can predict that the "sun will rise" tomorrow, but my knowledge of that future event is not in any way causing that future event.

(Of course, by the "sun will rise," I mean that it will seem so, due to the rotation of the earth, not that the sun will literally rise.)

I can also predict that my wife will never cheat on me.  My prediction is based on my knowledge of her character.  I do not cause her to act as she does.

I also predict that you will not willfully stick your hand into a fire and hold it there until it is completely burned off, so that you just have a stump at the end of your arm.  My prediction on that is based on knowing a bit about human nature, and, obviously, I am not causing you to refrain from doing such a thing.  Yet I am extremely confident that you will not do that.  In the ordinary sense of the word, I know you will not do that.  It is not a belief that is unsupported by evidence, or in other words, it is not a mere bit of faith.  My belief on that point is based on evidence.  It is a justified true belief.  (Go ahead, prove me wrong!  I dare you!)

There are countless other such examples, but the point is, the ability to predict something does not entail that one is in any way causing the event, nor does it rely on a specific idea of whether determinism holds or not.  Whether determinism is true or false, I make all of the above assertions with extreme confidence, and they are supported by evidence, and are not merely examples of faith.


Also, if it is going to be discussed, it would be good for you to explain precisely what you mean by "fatalism," as your claim that fatalism must be true if determinism is true is not correct for all common uses of the term "fatalism" (though it may be for others).  See:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatalism

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism/

"A wise man ... proportions his belief to the evidence."
— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section X, Part I.
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#27
RE: Free Will
It's true that being able to predict future events in no way implies that we are causing those future events, but it is a necessary condition of our will being fully determined that we should be able, in principle, predict future events from past circumstances. If our will is not determined, then this does not hold.

It occurs to me that the condition of being apprised of the opportunities available to us is an important aspect of whether we feel our choices are free or not. In some circumstances, we can determine ahead of time what the results of our action will be. Suppose that I am at the counter of an ice cream parlor. I know that if I choose a chocolate flavored ice cream cone, I will be satisfied with the experience, because I really like chocolate. But suppose they are out of chocolate that day, and I'm faced with an array of flavors that I've never tried before. It would seem that I am free to choose any of them, with an equal expectation of satisfaction. It would appear that the degree of freedom that I feel with regard to my choice is in some sense related to how well I can predict the outcome of that choice, and that in turn is a result of my being ignorant about the various opportunities from which I am choosing. Is there some threshold of ignorance beyond which, if I'm unaware of the likely outcomes, my choice stops being involuntary in the sense previously described and shades into becoming a free and voluntary choice? Is our feeling of freedom a consequence of our inability to predict outcomes? That would put an entirely different spin on the value of such freedom.
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#28
RE: Free Will
(October 13, 2015 at 1:55 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote:
(October 12, 2015 at 5:40 pm)Pyrrho Wrote: This accords well with the ordinary definition of "free" quoted in the opening post.  It requires no metaphysical nonsense.

But the metaphysical nonsense is the interesting part of free will!  We want to know whether we really are determined in our choices, like a puppet on a string, and whether we are truly free, with no strings dictating our actions.


I disagree.  What typically happens is that the people who want to talk about some metaphysical nonsense never bother to explain what the hell they mean by "free will."  They then make various pronouncements about it, and argue with other people who likewise fail to properly define their terms.  They then have pointless arguments with each other, with no real hope of any progress whatsoever, because neither really knows what the other is talking about.  Typically, such discussions degenerate into insults, as other people make statements that are "obviously false" according to some person's idea of "free will," and they in turn make statements that are "obviously false" according to other's ideas of "free will."  But since they stupidly never told the other people what, precisely, they meant, they are often not talking about the same things at all, and just imagine that the other people are stupid for not agreeing with what is "perfectly obvious" to themselves.  (There are numerous examples one can find online in various forums in which the discussion is about "free will," though I will not presently provide any links, both because those running this forum may not like links to other forums, and because I do not wish to deal with people complaining about me pointing out that they have failed to explain what they mean and are consequently wasting everyone's time in their thread.)

What seems to be the most common alternative, people define "free will" in such a way that it is obviously ridiculous nonsense, that no person of sense would ever accept as true.  (We know, for example, that people commonly do not like sticking their hands in fires, and we know this due to the fact that there is generally great pain associated with that activity.  And we also know that people did not choose to have a hand in the first place, so that the fact that people generally will to not stick their hands in fires is largely due to things that they did not choose.  Consequently, any definition of "free will" that requires that everything pertaining to the choice made be due only to the previous choices of the person is obviously not something people [or anything else] actually has.)

Sometimes, the above is somewhat obscured by the fact that something may be presented as a definition, but that something is inadequate to explain the meaning.


(October 13, 2015 at 1:55 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote:
Aristotle Wrote:   But with regard to the things that are done from fear of greater evils or for some noble object (e.g. if a tyrant were to order one to do something base, having one's parents and children in his power, and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to death), it may be debated whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary. Something of the sort happens also with regard to the throwing of goods overboard in a storm; for in the abstract no one throws goods away voluntarily, but on condition of its securing the safety of himself and his crew any sensible man does so. Such actions, then, are mixed, but are more like voluntary actions; for they are worthy of choice at the time when they are done, and the end of an action is relative to the occasion. Both the terms, then, 'voluntary' and 'involuntary', must be used with reference to the moment of action. Now the man acts voluntarily; for the principle that moves the instrumental parts of the body in such actions is in him, and the things of which the moving principle is in a man himself are in his power to do or not to do. Such actions, therefore, are voluntary, but in the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one would choose any such act in itself.

http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicoma...3.iii.html

Aristotle gives the example of throwing goods overboard to save one's ship if one gets caught in a storm.  In that case, there are strong incentives to ditch the cargo.  One does not truly have an opportunity to preserve the cargo.  But what of in lesser circumstances?  Let's suppose the ship is at sea in calm weather.  The captain can choose to continue sailing to his destination port, where he can sell his cargo, or turn around and return home, where there is no market for his goods.  If he were to return home, he would face the same loss as the captain in a storm in that the value of the cargo would be lost.  He does not have the opportunity to preserve the value of the cargo and return home.  Is his choice not then also in a mixed state, being partially voluntary and involuntary?  Do the opportunities open to him not determine what it is that he wills, if he is of sound mind and body, and aware of his choices?  Let's take the hypothetical another step further and suppose the ship is moored at harbor in the home port, having just been filled with cargo.  The captain may choose to sail or not.  If he chooses not to sail, he loses the value of the cargo just the same as in the previous case.  He isn't free to take the opportunity to remain in port if he values the profit from the sale of his cargo.  His choice is once again both voluntary and involuntary in a sense.  Now let's suppose, instead, that I am a ship captain, yet have no billet of goods.  I can choose to load up with cargo for sale in a foreign port, or choose not to do so.  Again, the same cost to me is that I will not benefit from the sale of the cargo.  If I value the profit from the sale of cargo, I do not have a free opportunity to remain in port with my ship empty.  And so it goes, each decision we make prior to the sale of goods in that foreign port determines whether we will ultimately profit from the sale of our cargo.  At no point in the chain of events is our will not a mixture of voluntary and involuntary parts.  We do not voluntarily choose the conditions under which we will profit, nor determine which opportunities are closed to us.  It is in this sense that we worry whether or not our actions are in any sense truly voluntary.  And the answer to that question is of great interest to us.

I think, if I have some liberty here, we could speak of free choices in which we have the opportunity to preserve what is of value to us through multiple courses of action.  But as in the dialog MTL pasted, there will always be one opportunity that has less cost than the others.  Being of sound mind and body, and apprised of the cost of the different choices, we have no opportunity to choose that but which to our mind is the most profitable.  Thus, none of our choices are voluntary.  They are all involuntary in that the opportunities which present themselves will fully determine which choice we make.


The being "of sound mind and body," as you put it, is important to what the person does.  That is, what the person is, contributes to what the person does.  So it is not merely the circumstances in which the person exists.  If it were purely a matter of circumstances, everyone would act the same in the same circumstances, but we know that different people, being different, do different things.  Some men, when given too much change from a cashier at a store, pocket the money, as they are dishonest, but some others will point out the error and return the excess, because they are honest.  That is, the difference in the conduct is due to a difference in the persons.  The situation described is the same.

Now, it may be that they are caused to be different by preceding conditions, but whether they were caused to be different, or are different due to pure random chance or whatever, makes no difference for the fact that they are different and therefore behave differently.

As for Aristotle, his idea of "voluntary" is understood in contrast to his definition of "involuntary" and actions that are "compulsory" (that is, he does the opposite of what one would expect, and instead of defining "voluntary" and then saying that "involuntary is what is not voluntary," he reverses this and defines "involuntary" and then says that "voluntary is what is not involuntary").  Here is a bit more from Aristotle, a few paragraphs into Book III:

Quote:What sort of acts, then, should be called compulsory? We answer that without qualification actions are so when the cause is in the external circumstances and the agent contributes nothing.

http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicoma...3.iii.html

Basically, Aristotle is saying that the action is voluntary if the primary cause of the action is the agent, rather than the circumstances.  I am stating this in an overly crude way, but it is the gist of it.  (To refine it, we would need to restrict the primary cause to being in the mind of the agent, and not due to a mere twitch in the leg or other non-chosen action, and, for Aristotle, we would also need to further refine things as he does not regard actions done from ignorance as purely voluntary, etc.  But I am not presently interested in the details that interest Aristotle in his preliminary discussion leading up to his view of ethics.)  And it aligns with what I am saying it means when someone is "free."  Note that Aristotle's conception is perfectly compatible with the person being totally caused to be as he is from previous circumstances, or, in other words, this particular bit of Aristotle is compatible with determinism.

Of course, Aristotle is interested in "mixed" cases, where the cause of the action is partially the agent and partially the circumstances, but I am not overly interested in pursuing that presently.

The point is, the "free" action has its primary source in the agent.  How the agent came to be whatever the agent is, is irrelevant to whether the action is "free" or not, and thus this is not incompatible with determinism.


When I choose to keep my hand out of a fire, I do that primarily due to what I am.  It is an act of will on my part.  And so it is "free."  It makes no difference for this if my will was caused to be what it is purely due to preceding conditions, was fully causally determined, or not.  In such an instance with my hand and a fire, I act as I do because of what I am, not primarily due to the circumstances.

"A wise man ... proportions his belief to the evidence."
— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section X, Part I.
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#29
RE: Free Will
(October 13, 2015 at 3:24 pm)Pyrrho Wrote:
(October 13, 2015 at 1:55 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote: But the metaphysical nonsense is the interesting part of free will!  We want to know whether we really are determined in our choices, like a puppet on a string, and whether we are truly free, with no strings dictating our actions.


I disagree.  What typically happens is that the people who want to talk about some metaphysical nonsense never bother to explain what the hell they mean by "free will."  They then make various pronouncements about it, and argue with other people who likewise fail to properly define their terms.  They then have pointless arguments with each other, with no real hope of any progress whatsoever, because neither really knows what the other is talking about.  Typically, such discussions degenerate into insults, as other people make statements that are "obviously false" according to some person's idea of "free will," and they in turn make statements that are "obviously false" according to other's ideas of "free will."  But since they stupidly never told the other people what, precisely, they meant, they are often not talking about the same things at all, and just imagine that the other people are stupid for not agreeing with what is "perfectly obvious" to themselves.  (There are numerous examples one can find online in various forums in which the discussion is about "free will," though I will not presently provide any links, both because those running this forum may not like links to other forums, and because I do not wish to deal with people complaining about me pointing out that they have failed to explain what they mean and are consequently wasting everyone's time in their thread.)

What seems to be the most common alternative, people define "free will" in such a way that it is obviously ridiculous nonsense, that no person of sense would ever accept as true.  (We know, for example, that people commonly do not like sticking their hands in fires, and we know this due to the fact that there is generally great pain associated with that activity.  And we also know that people did not choose to have a hand in the first place, so that the fact that people generally will to not stick their hands in fires is largely due to things that they did not choose.  Consequently, any definition of "free will" that requires that everything pertaining to the choice made be due only to the previous choices of the person is obviously not something people [or anything else] actually has.)

Sometimes, the above is somewhat obscured by the fact that something may be presented as a definition, but that something is inadequate to explain the meaning.

This seems a rather laborious argument from consequences to justify the fact that you don't want to talk about any other conception of will.


(October 13, 2015 at 3:24 pm)Pyrrho Wrote: When I choose to keep my hand out of a fire, I do that primarily due to what I am.  It is an act of will on my part.  And so it is "free."  It makes no difference for this if my will was caused to be what it is purely due to preceding conditions, was fully causally determined, or not.  In such an instance with my hand and a fire, I act as I do because of what I am, not primarily due to the circumstances.

But what I am is a part of the circumstances, so there is no part that is not compulsory in Aristotle's sense.
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#30
RE: Free Will
(October 13, 2015 at 3:36 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote:
(October 13, 2015 at 3:24 pm)Pyrrho Wrote: I disagree.  What typically happens is that the people who want to talk about some metaphysical nonsense never bother to explain what the hell they mean by "free will."  They then make various pronouncements about it, and argue with other people who likewise fail to properly define their terms.  They then have pointless arguments with each other, with no real hope of any progress whatsoever, because neither really knows what the other is talking about.  Typically, such discussions degenerate into insults, as other people make statements that are "obviously false" according to some person's idea of "free will," and they in turn make statements that are "obviously false" according to other's ideas of "free will."  But since they stupidly never told the other people what, precisely, they meant, they are often not talking about the same things at all, and just imagine that the other people are stupid for not agreeing with what is "perfectly obvious" to themselves.  (There are numerous examples one can find online in various forums in which the discussion is about "free will," though I will not presently provide any links, both because those running this forum may not like links to other forums, and because I do not wish to deal with people complaining about me pointing out that they have failed to explain what they mean and are consequently wasting everyone's time in their thread.)

What seems to be the most common alternative, people define "free will" in such a way that it is obviously ridiculous nonsense, that no person of sense would ever accept as true.  (We know, for example, that people commonly do not like sticking their hands in fires, and we know this due to the fact that there is generally great pain associated with that activity.  And we also know that people did not choose to have a hand in the first place, so that the fact that people generally will to not stick their hands in fires is largely due to things that they did not choose.  Consequently, any definition of "free will" that requires that everything pertaining to the choice made be due only to the previous choices of the person is obviously not something people [or anything else] actually has.)

Sometimes, the above is somewhat obscured by the fact that something may be presented as a definition, but that something is inadequate to explain the meaning.

This seems a rather laborious argument from consequences to justify the fact that you don't want to talk about any other conception of will.


Not at all.  I am happy to discuss other ideas.  But I am not happy to discuss words that are not defined.  It is when people introduce terms that require definition, and do not define them, that is the problem.  The simple fact is, different people have different ideas of what "free will" means, and if they don't bother to say what they mean, then trying to discuss "free will" with them will be a total waste of time.  You may as well be discussing adiassadiondasdawewbar with them, without anyone bothering to say what the hell the term means.


(October 13, 2015 at 3:36 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote:
(October 13, 2015 at 3:24 pm)Pyrrho Wrote: When I choose to keep my hand out of a fire, I do that primarily due to what I am.  It is an act of will on my part.  And so it is "free."  It makes no difference for this if my will was caused to be what it is purely due to preceding conditions, was fully causally determined, or not.  In such an instance with my hand and a fire, I act as I do because of what I am, not primarily due to the circumstances.

But what I am is a part of the circumstances, so there is no part that is not compulsory in Aristotle's sense.

By the circumstances, Aristotle means the part of the situation that is not the agent.

"A wise man ... proportions his belief to the evidence."
— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section X, Part I.
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