The Moral Argument for God

[Vincent]

I do not support or endorse genocide. I find it terrible and disgusting. 

Great. Always and everywhere? So, would you agree that genocide is an example of something that is objective wrong regardless of circumstances? If so, can we then agree that at least one OMV does exist?

Nope. You're still not getting it. I believe it's wrong always and everywhere. I believe it should never happen again. I am going to assume that you think the same way, right? As does most of civilized society. In fact, everyone on the planet Earth could unanimously agree that genocide is wrong. 

And it would still be subjective. 

Why? Because that would be a conclusion reached on the basis of our feelings and personal opinion. We empathize with other human beings, we think killing an entire group of people would be unjust and unfair (because we wouldn't want that happening to us), and thus we agree it to be wrong. It is not a conclusion reached through objective thought without interference from human opinion. Human opinion is what allowed us to reach that agreement in the first place. Thus by definition, it cannot be objective.  

Stalin and Mao did act out of desire for power, but the means to their ends was served by their belief that human life has no value.

Not sure if you're joking or actually that ignorant. You are suggesting that there is a correlation between someone being atheist and someone not putting value on human life. 

This is ridiculous. 

I am an atheist, and I place so much value on human life that I wouldn't kill someone even if they murdered my family. It's against my moral code. Every atheist I have ever met and interacted with places a significant amount of value on human life. Are there some atheists out there who don't? Yes. But then again, one look at history tells us that there are plenty of religious people who don't as well. Look at the Inquisition. Look at Al Qaeda. Look at Isis. Look at Hitler, who was a Roman Catholic. You cannot make blanket statements like "Atheists don't put value on human life" before first examining everyone else. If someone is a dick, then they are a dick. Their religious views don't determine that. Get the hell out of here. 

No, it was wrong. Always and everywhere. They called it moral. They thought they were acting morally. But they were wrong.

Why? What, objectively and factually, did they do wrong? They didn't break the laws of the universe. The world itself does not have an opinion one way or another. There is no law of nature that says "thou shall not commit genocide" as there is the law that 2+2=4. Morals do not exist in the physical universe, neither does a concept of what is right and what is wrong. But if you want to be realistic and look at the situation with self-professed subjective morality, then yes, they were wrong. According to the moral standards of modern civilized society, they were very wrong. It's just a matter of you accepting that those standards are subjective. 

Had you grown up in Nazi Germany and joined their posse, you would have thought it moral, too. 

But you were born here, in a different time in a different country, where you received an education that taught you it was wrong. 

There is no universal equation for morality. Morality is in the hands of the beholder. They called it moral, so it was moral. TO THEM, it was moral. TO YOU, it is not. THAT is subjectivity. What is objective does not vary from  person to person based on one's opinion. That is not the nature of objectivity. If someone could have two things and add two more and it would make five, simply because they believed it so, and if someone else could have two things and add two more and it would make three, simply because they believed it so, then that is not objective. And that is exactly how morals work. But taking two things and adding two more has always and will always be four, for everyone. There is no disagreement on that anywhere in human history. There are no wars fought or debates run over 2+2=4. Because that is objective. It is fact. The morality of genocide is not fact because it is only through opinion and feeling that we declare it wrong. 

To the Catholic priests who rape young boys, raping boys was an act of morality. So for them, in that place, at that time, it became moral. Because humans make what is moral moral themselves. I am not talking about what I feel about the situation. I am not talking about what other countries felt about it. I am referring only to the Catholic priests. They raped innocent boys, and they called it moral, so it was moral.

I might rewrite that to fit it in a bit more, but yes, this is technically true. If a Catholic priest reasoned with himself that raping boys was moral, then that makes it moral for him. For him. This is what you're not getting. What is moral for one person is not moral for everyone. It doesn't mean you have to believe it's moral. And if the rest of society disagrees, then he can be tried. but it doesn't change that for him, raping the child was moral. Because morality is not fact. It is opinion. 

And because some people have decided that all of this is moral, it really doesn't matter that the minority would suffer

Which is why people fought against the Nazis and they lost. Which is why eventually someone would have overthrown them. Because too many would not tolerate their view of morality. 

So, slavery was moral in the South, but immoral in the North simultaneously? If you lived in Maryland, slavery was okay, but taking a single step over the state line into Pennsylvania would suddenly make it immoral (and not merely illegal)? If it was illegal, WHY? Because the people of Pennsylvania were simply of a different opinion?

This is an example of what happens when people treat moral values subjectively rather than objectively.

Yes, to the Northern people it was immoral. To the southern it was moral. If you were a northerner who stepped over the line, it doesn't automatically make you think slavery is moral, because you still have your own thoughts and beliefs, but you will have entered an environment that considered it moral. It became illegal because humans started thinking it was immoral and sought to destroy the institution. Changing times, changing opinions. Thus there was a war, and slavery was eradicated. Now, if the morality of slavery was an objective fact, then there would not have been a war fought, and slavery wouldn't have been institutionalized in the first place. Because we would have been unable to institutionalize it. Because it would have been factually wrong. Because we were able to do so, and because we fought a war over it, only proves that it is a subjective value. 

Suppose you were in the fort with them. Would YOU try to stop these guys from raping this girl? Would you feel bad for her being gang-raped? Or would you get in line to have a go yourself? Because in THAT situation, it would not be immoral to rape her?

If I were in the fort, I'd have been raped already, because I'm biologically female. But that's beside the point.

Would I try to stop them? No, I'd get the shit beat out of me. I might feel bad. But then remember, in an apocalypse, I've probably already seen gruesome shit, and raping might not be as high on the list as watching a zombie eat my friend's flesh. It may or may not be immoral to me, as it would be the same for you. I might be so traumatized by other experiences that I just might not give a shit. And even if I did think it immoral, it would still be moral for those boys. Because morality is in the hands of the beholder. 

You were doing well right up until the last few sentences

I like how you didn't respond to anything in those last two paragraphs and then asserted the last few sentences were wrong without trying to defend that assertion. Good job. 

I still don't think you're understanding the difference between something that is objective and something that is subjective. Let me paint you a picture of a world with objective morality. So you have things like murder, rape, and thievery which are objectively, factually incorrect by universal standards. This means that human beings are physically incapable of murdering other human beings. There is something in our brains that prevents us from doing it. The thought of killing or raping or stealing does not even cross our minds. Ever. In all of human history. We cannot bring ourselves to do these things.  

That is what objective morality looks like. As you can see, that image does not add up to the kind of moral standards we have in our society. The closest thing we have is agreements between large numbers of people about what morals we should live by, and teaching our offspring to live by those same standards. That's not objective. That's agreed-upon subjectivity. And it's not a bad thing. 

It seems to me that a part of you understands that morals are relative. But because of this sensation of discomfort in you, this realization that anyone can do something and label it "moral", you deny it. Well, while I'd love to live in a society that has objective morality, it just isn't the case in this reality. You have to understand that the concept of moral truth exists nowhere in nature or the universe apart from within the human mind (or within the minds of intelligent aliens). We made it up. Just like government and laws. Many years ago, early humans realized that they would needed to establish certain standards of behavior that would be most beneficial to their survival. From this desire arose morals - principles of how to act influenced by empathy, emotion, personal need and opinion. There is nothing objective about morals. We can treat them as though they are absolute or objective by having punishments for people who commit undesirable actions, but the fact will remain that they are still subjective. 

Think about humanity thousands of years from now. Suppose somewhere along the line future humans decide that war is an immoral institution, and thus seek to eradicate and illegalize it. They look back on 21st century people who believed war was just, and they say "what an unethical an barbaric lot." Are you then being an immoral person, by allowing war to happen and honoring the soldiers that fight? No. Of course not. Because you have justifications of it in your head, reasons that you think it's lawful and moral. 

But then again, so did the Nazis. So did slave owners. 

I'm not trying to say that war is more or less terrible than genocide or slavery (although future humans might have an opinion about that).  I'm trying to get it through to you that morality is dependent on time, on culture, and on context. One day humanity might scorn itself for ever thinking it moral to eat animals. We might all turn vegan. But you still think it's moral. And so it is for you. Because morality is subjective. 

I'll even go an assertion further. I'll say this: Even if a God did exist, and it decided what morals we live by, morals would STILL be subjective. Why? Because even if the morals are being chosen by a supreme being, that supreme being's opinion of what is right and wrong is subjective. Because it is an opinion. If a god were to outlaw murder on the basis of the god disliking murder, THAT is subjective. This is the fallacy of objective morality. 

Let me conclude by asking you this: what makes murder wrong?

[IATIA]

Do you think killing in self defense is wrong? How about a soldier killing in battle? Or what if a police officer shoots and kills a criminal about to stab someone?

Yes, albeit the lesser of two evils depending, of course, on the circumstances.  However, the point of this thread is subjective vs. objective morals.  The line drawn between 'murder' and 'killing' is as subjective as one can get in an attempt to rationalize the morals of taking a life.

And where would free will fit in with objective morality?

[Mr.wizard]

Do you think killing in self defense is wrong? How about a soldier killing in battle? Or what if a police officer shoots and kills a criminal about to stab someone?

Yes, albeit the lesser of two evils depending, of course, on the circumstances.  However, the point of this thread is subjective vs. objective morals.  The line drawn between 'murder' and 'killing' is as subjective as one can get in an attempt to rationalize the morals of taking a life.

And where would free will fit in with objective morality?

I agree, that is the point I was driving at. Some people find different types of killing moral and some do not, therefore killing is not  objectively immoral.

[GoHalos1993]

Instead of a "moral" argument, it should be whether there's a logical argument.

[The Grand Nudger]

In fairness, the moral argument -could be- a logical argument, it's just that the people who present it to us don't have any interest in making it so...and, frankly, they've given themselves an improbable task.  If we can't establish the existence of some thing on it's own, and we instead feel the need to refer to some other thing, the competent strategist would at least pick some other thing that wasn't as nebulous and difficult to establish as the first.  

Ala-


If god doesn't exist, then green left handed widgets wouldn't exist.
Green left handed widgets do exist (holds up a green left handed widget)
Therefore, god exists.  


....instead, we get variations of 

If god doesn't exist, then The Lost City of Atlantis wouldn't exist.
The Lost City of Atlantis does exist (...crickets....)
Therefore god exists.  

OFC that shit is going to go down in flames.  What else would anyone expect?

[brewer]

Do you think killing in self defense is wrong? How about a soldier killing in battle? Or what if a police officer shoots and kills a criminal about to stab someone?

Let's throw compassionate euthanasia into the mix also.

[Mudhammam]

I still don't see what God has to do with objective morality. This is the same canard that is sometimes floated around which amounts to something like, "Unless you concede the existence of divine reason, there can be no knowledge of objective truths." To which I say... Bullshit. That something has a quality of "goodness" which is intellectually apprehended through abstraction does not require this Idea to exist in an intelligible heaven like Plato's Forms or inside the Mind of God any more than it does for other truths, and if that is what the OP is arguing, I've yet to see that case made. It seems like both he and his opponents simply grant that if God doesn't exist, then neither do moral truths, which is at best very unfortunate for the future of secularism.

[downbeatplumb]

We get our morals from the society we live in and the empathy we have evolved as social animals.
Why people feel the need to inject impossible magic men into a very simple thing escapes me.
Oh wel,l I suppose they must justify their delusions somehow.

[brewer]

You're looking at this in the ontology thread. Attached is the moral argument. Might want to skip to the conclusion.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-arguments-god/

[athrock]

In the Ontological Argument thread which I started, Cato referred me to an article on that topic found in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and I'm going to spend some time on it tonight. 

However, I also looked up the article on the Moral Argument, and I came across a passage which seems important given some discussion we've had about the value of philosophical arguments and the burden of proof in this thread. 

Since Cato recommended the site, I hope this will reassure everyone that it is from an unbiased source.

It's a bit long, so I'll highlight some important points and include a couple of personal comments as notes embedded in the text.

1. The Goals of Theistic Arguments

Before attempting to explain and assess moral arguments for the existence of God, it would be helpful to have some perspective on the goals of arguments for God's existence. (I shall generically term arguments for God's existence “theistic arguments.”) Of course views about this are diverse, but most contemporary proponents of such arguments do not see theistic arguments as attempted “proofs,” in the sense that they are supposed to provide valid arguments with premises that no reasonable person could deny. Such a standard of achievement would clearly be setting the bar for success very high, and proponents of theistic arguments rightly note that philosophical arguments for interesting conclusions in any field outside of formal logic hardly ever reach such a standard. More reasonable questions to ask about theistic arguments would seem to be the following: Are there valid arguments for the conclusion that God exists that have premises that are known or reasonably believed by some people? Are the premises of such arguments more reasonable than their denials, at least for some reasonable people? Arguments that met these standards could have value in making belief in God reasonable for some people, or even giving some people knowledge of God's existence, even if it turns out that some of the premises of the arguments can be reasonably denied by other people, and thus that the arguments fail as proofs.

It is of course possible that an argument for God's existence could provide some evidence for God's existence, in the sense that the argument increases the probability or plausibility of the claim that God exists, even if the argument does not provide enough support by itself for full-fledged belief that God exists. A proponent of the moral argument who viewed the argument in this way might in that case regard the argument as part of a cumulative case for theism, and hold that the moral argument must be supplemented by other possible arguments, such as the “fine-tuning” argument from the physical constants of the universe, or an argument from religious experience. A non-believer might even concede some version of a theistic argument has some evidential force, but claim that the overall balance of evidence does not support belief. [My note: this is the point I have made in my interaction with Evie who argues that there is simply NO evidence whatsoever.]

A major issue that cannot be settled here concerns the question of where the burden of proof lies with respect to theistic arguments. Many secular philosophers follow Antony Flew (1976) in holding that there is a “presumption of atheism.” Believing in God is like believing in the Loch Ness Monster or leprechauns, something that reasonable people do not do without sufficient evidence. If such evidence is lacking, the proper stance is atheism rather than agnosticism.

This “presumption of atheism” has been challenged in a number of ways. Alvin Plantinga (2000) has argued that reasonable belief in God does not have to be based on propositional evidence, but can be “properly basic.” On this view, reasonable belief in God can be the outcome of a basic faculty (called the sensus divinitatis by theologian John Calvin) and thus needs no support from arguments at all. In response some would argue that even if theistic belief is not grounded in propositional evidence, it still might require non-propositional evidence (such as experience), so it is not clear that Plantinga's view by itself removes the burden of proof challenge.

A second way to challenge the presumption of atheism is to question an implicit assumption made by those who defend such a presumption, which is that belief in God is epistemologically more risky than unbelief. The assumption might be defended in the following way: One might think that theists and atheists share a belief in many entities: atoms, middle-sized physical objects, animals, and stars, for example. Someone, however, who believes in leprechauns or sea monsters in addition to these commonly accepted objects thereby incurs a burden of proof. Such a person believes in “one additional thing” and thus seems to incur additional epistemological risk. One might think that belief in God is relevantly like belief in a leprechaun or sea monster, and thus that the theist also bears an additional burden of proof. Without good evidence in favor of belief in God the safe option is to refrain from belief.

However, the theist may hold that this account does not accurately represent the situation. Instead, the theist may argue that the debate between atheism and theism is not simply an argument about whether “one more thing” exists in the world. In fact, God is not to be understood as an entity in the world at all; any such entity would by definition not be God. The debate is rather a debate about the character of the universe. The theist believes that every object in the natural world exists because God creates and conserves that object; every finite thing has the character of being dependent on God. The atheist denies this and affirms that the basic entities in the natural world have the character of existing “on their own.” If this is the right way to think about the debate, then it is not obvious that atheism is safer than theism. The debate is not about the existence of one object, but the character of the universe as a whole. Both parties are making claims about the character of everything in the natural world, and both claims seem risky. This point is especially important in dealing with moral arguments for theism, since one of the questions raised by such arguments is the adequacy of a naturalistic worldview in explaining morality. Evidentialists may properly ask about the evidence for theism, but it also seems proper to ask about the evidence for atheism if the atheist is committed to a rival metaphysic such as naturalism. [My note: I have tried to make this point regarding the burden of proof, also.

Well, those are the words approved by the Editorial Board of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. What do you think of them?