Why materialists are predominantly materialists

[bennyboy]

First of all, I don't "believe in" idealism.  I'm agnostic about the nature of reality, but I consider a kind of experiential idealism a better default position than a material monism.  This is because there's a 100% chance that all knowledge is known only by a subjective agent, and an unknown chance that all subjective agency is dependent on a material substrate.  100% > not sure, any day of the week.

More word games.  Your odds don't make any sense.  Both "all knowledge is known only by a subjective agent" and "subjective agency is dependent on a material substrate" may both be true at the same time.

Yes, they may.

 And  "all knowledge is known only by a subjective agent" doesn't lead to Idealism.

No, it doesn't, at least not necessarily.

However, I'd say a few things about that:
1) Since there's no way to know where experiences come from, or if they come from anything, the default position should start with experience-- not something else.
2) Whatever might be "out there," for sure we experience it only as ideas. The human existence is for sure idealistic. And in a sense, it doesn't really matter if we're in a physical monist reality, or a substance dualism, or the Mind of God or the Matrix: it is our constant dance with experiences and ideas that define us, and in which we live and breathe and write forum posts.
3) The material world view is subsumed by idealism. All math, all physical science, is anyway represented as ideas by us. However, many things, but especially qualia, are not well represented by math and the physical sciences.
4) The duality of photons, in which a single entity cannot be expressed unambiguously in space and time, is perfectly workable as an idea-- but not as a material "thing."

I declare as agnostic-- very simply, I don't know for sure what lies behind my experiences. However, idealism has a broader scope than materialism, and until proof is furnished that the scope must be limited, there's no advantage in being a materialist, and there's a very real disadvantage-- that one's view of what "material" means may limit avenues of inquiry, in science and otherwise, thereby serving as an obstacle to the improvement of our understanding of reality.

[The Grand Nudger]

1)  Since there's no way to know where experiences come from, or if they come from anything, the default position should start with experience-- not something else.

If there's no way to know...stop right there,  Stop attempting to leverage a way of knowing, there's no application for reason or evidence here, after that. We're done, you've scuttled us. There's no sense in talking about default positions or the burden of assumptions, the pregnancy of axioms, the percentages of certainty, rational this that or the others, how a photon works or whether or not a table is really there and made of stuff after all...none of it. It's all uninformative...if we cannot know.

We get that you'll be an idealist until proven wrong, and we also get that it doesn't matter how many times any single component of your idealism -is- proven wrong or shown, as a whole, to be fundamentally vacuous. That's why it's so persistent.


Just a minor correction...you're not an agnostic...you're an ignostic. It's not that you don't know, you do not think that it can -be- known. Subtle but important. It also assumes a burden, if such things interest you, as a positive position. It does not receive the general immunity people perceive as a boon of an agnostic position. I don't expect you to provide anything, just food for thought.

[Arkilogue]

If there is anything true/consistent/reliable about reality at all, we are surely compose of it and by it, immersed in it and propelled through it and there is no where it is not.

To think you are incapable of knowing/perceiving/exploring it is to grossly underestimate your position.

"Ye are gods"
If you believe you can't....you can't...or at least you certainly won't.

[bennyboy]

1)  Since there's no way to know where experiences come from, or if they come from anything, the default position should start with experience-- not something else.

If there's no way to know...stop right there,  Stop attempting to leverage a way of knowing, there's no application for reason or evidence here, after that.  We're done, you've scuttled us.  There's no sense in talking about default positions or the burden of assumptions, the pregnancy of axioms, the percentages of certainty, rational this that or the others, how a photon works or whether or not a table is really there and made of stuff after all...none of it.  It's all uninformative...if we cannot know.  

We get that you'll be an idealist until proven wrong, and we also get that it doesn't matter how many times any single component of your idealism -is- proven wrong or shown, as a whole, to be fundamentally vacuous.  That's why it's so persistent.  

I'm not an idealist. I'm purely agnostic. I'm arguing that materialism requires at least one extra assumption, and that the benefits of holding a material world view are insufficient to merit the extra assumption. If you need a monism, start at the source for a default position: experience itself as reality. After that, walk very carefully in determining what additional assumptions you need to make, and the degree to which they are really necessary.

Just a minor correction...you're not an agnostic...you're an ignostic.  It's not that you don't know, you do not think that it can -be- known.  Subtle but important.  It also assumes a burden, if such things interest you, as a positive position.  It does not receive the general immunity people perceive as a boon of an agnostic position.  I don't expect you to provide anything, just food for thought.

You can call it ignostic if you want. But I think it's pretty safe to say that someone who thinks certain things CAN'T be known will also claim not to know them-- i.e. also be agnostic. But wait. . . if you think I'm an ignostic, why did you just call me an idealist?

[The Grand Nudger]

I'm not an idealist.  I'm purely agnostic.  

It's not a dirty word.  You know you're an idealist and I know that you're an idealist.  We've had that discussion plenty.  You can safely be an idealist in my presence, lol.  

I'm arguing that materialism requires at least one extra assumption, and that the benefits of holding a material world view are insufficient to merit the extra assumption.  If you need a monism, start at the source for a default position: experience itself as reality.  After that, walk very carefully in determining what additional assumptions you need to make, and the degree to which they are really necessary.

I'm not sure what it's supposed to be insufficient for or as, but hey, knock yourself out.   

You can call it ignostic if you want.  But I think it's pretty safe to say that someone who thinks certain things CAN'T be known will also claim not to know them-- i.e. also be agnostic.  But wait. . . if you think I'm an ignostic, why did you just call me an idealist?

It's not about what I want, it's how -you- frame your position.  If something cant be known it's more accurate to call yourself ignostic about it.  If it's just something you don't know, then fine..agnosticism.  I find your ignostic idealism just as perplexing as you seemed to have picked up on. If we can't know, we can;t know. There's no sense in referring to the ways that we know things, about what makes fewer assumptions., or their logical necessities. Nor, frankly, is there any reason to point to what is evident, another term for our experiences and the root of evidence. There's no reason at all, in fact, that can pierce what cannot be known. That's sort of what it means when something -can't be known, rather than when something simply isn't.

We can't know, you've said so, full stop.

[bennyboy]

It's not a dirty word.  You know you're an idealist and I know that you're an idealist.  We've had that discussion plenty.  You can safely be an idealist in my presence, lol.  

If you really want to know what position I'd hold to, I'd describe it as a kind of agnostic ambiguism. I think at border conditions, you probably can't really TELL the difference between an idealistic or a material world. All you can do is perceive and try to connect the dots, or to peer through the fog. I think world views, and generalizations in general (lol) represent our attempts to see the forest despite the trees, to abuse a common saying. They don't represent the details of reality, but rather the abstractions we make about them-- and therefore do not really exist per se.

It's not about what I want, it's how -you- frame your position.  If something cant be known it's more accurate to call yourself ignostic about it.  If it's just something you don't know, then fine..agnosticism.  I find your ignostic idealism just as perplexing as you seemed to have picked up on.  If we can't know, we can;t know.  There's no sense in referring to the ways that we know things, about what makes fewer assumptions., or their logical necessities.  Nor, frankly, is there any reason to point to what is evident, another term for our experiences and the root of evidence.  There's no reason at all, in fact, that can pierce what cannot be known.  That's sort of what it means when something -can't be known, rather than when something simply isn't.  

We can't know, you've said so, full stop.

We can know things, but only in context. It's true that in the context of a dude sitting at a desk, there's a candle, a bottle of Windex, and a few other items here. It's true that these are solids and liquids in that context. It's not true that these things even exist at the subatomic level-- there's no "Windex" to be found there. The same goes for more complex things like mind and brain.

Ultimately, we cannot know the prime context, in other words the end-of-the-line framework upon which all else rests. It was once thought to be atoms, then subatomic particles, then QM particles, then. . . who knows? But as we get farther and farther down the line, I predict things will keep flipping and getting turned upside down and inside out, until we reach the obvious conclusion: there IS no end of the line, there IS no chance of establishing reality, EXCEPT IN CONTEXT.

You can call each of these levels "material" if you want, despite that each level will likely follow few of the rules of the ones above it. But if the word is going to be that malleable, materialism isn't even a position-- it's just an ontology-- what is IS, and let's call it "matter." But if this is the case, why bother? Why even have an "-ism" at all?

[The Grand Nudger]

If you really want to know what position I'd hold to, I'd describe it as a kind of agnostic ambiguism.  I think at border conditions, you probably can't really TELL the difference between an idealistic or a material world.  All you can do is perceive and try to connect the dots, or to peer through the fog.  I think world views, and generalizations in general (lol) represent our attempts to see the forest despite the trees, to abuse a common saying.  They don't represent the details of reality, but rather the abstractions we make about them-- and therefore do not really exist per se.

You do understand that, to a materialist, there is no difference between an idea and material? That the sort of ambiguity which you perceive there to be between the two, real or imagined in any specific instance, is moot point in that context?  OFC our world views are abstractions we make about reality.  Who thinks otherwise?  We judge the value and accuracy our our abstractions by how well they perform their assigned tasks.  The abstraction of materialism has been exceedingly fruitful.  It's either approaching accuracy, or we're almost unfathomably lucky.  Your call.  Ultimately it could turn out to be the latter...wouldn't be the first time.  

We can know things, but only in context.  It's true that in the context of a dude sitting at a desk, there's a candle, a bottle of Windex, and a few other items here.  It's true that these are solids and liquids in that context.  It's not true that these things even exist at the subatomic level-- there's no "Windex" to be found there.  The same goes for more complex things like mind and brain.

I'm not sure why you think things disappear at a subatomic level.  Why does windex suddenly become not-windex in your estimation?  Windex is simply the name for a collection of matter.  It's there, and it's windex, if you scale up or down in your resolution (otherwise...what are you looking at, again?).  

Ultimately, we cannot know the prime context, in other words the end-of-the-line framework upon which all else rests.

A bold claim.  You're going to need much, much more to support it than "we were wrong before".  

It was once thought to be atoms, then subatomic particles, then QM particles, then. . . who knows?  But as we get farther and farther down the line, I predict things will keep flipping and getting turned upside down and inside out, until we reach the obvious conclusion: there IS no end of the line, there IS no chance of establishing reality, EXCEPT IN CONTEXT.

What do you think that would imply or establish if it were the case, particularly in context.  Atoms, material.  Subatomic particles, material.  QM particles....material.  It's simply the nature of reductivist methods to continually seek out that which underlies the presently considered resolution, the thing you call context for whatever reason.  We may keep finding underlying this and that's, we may not.  Those we've found thusfar are incorporated into the materialist model, as the materialist model was used to discover them.  

You can call each of these levels "material" if you want, despite that each level will likely follow few of the rules of the ones above it.  But if the word is going to be that malleable, materialism isn't even a position-- it's just an ontology-- what is IS, and let's call it "matter."  But if this is the case, why bother?  Why even have an "-ism" at all?

Very small things like flies can make use of van der wal's force.  They can walk on the ceiling.  Elephants can't.  Why would you expect "the rules" for all collections of matter at every resolution to be the same...it isn't even the same in your top level macro experience.  I'm not sure what this is taken to indicate.  

The word -is- and has always been that malleable - cheifly because is describes a general phenomena. When asking ourselves the question "what is all this stuff made out of" it's useful to frame it in general terms. We're looking to describe alot of stuff, alot of different..even wildly disparate stuff, right?  We would expect some stuff to be different from some other stuff - hell..that;s sort of bound up in our very notion of this stuff and that stuff. But you're going to need to make up your mind.  Is materialism stuck with billiards balls or is it too malleable?  Would you prefer that it -didn't- accept and modify itself in the light of new discoveries over the centuries in which it's been productively employed to pierce that fog you were talking about up top? Can you see why such an approach wouldn't appeal to a materialist?

[Neo-Scholastic]

EVEN IF I had ideas about reality, and they were 100% bang-on correct. . . how would I know this to be the case?  How would I know there were not some additional layer, inscrutable to me, supporting all of that?

You cannot, which is probably why you are not a true atheist.  Agnostic, maybe.

Riiiighht...No True Atheist

[Crossless2.0]

You cannot, which is probably why you are not a true atheist.  Agnostic, maybe.

Riiiighht...No True Atheist

We have 'em too, Chad.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Of course it does.  Ideas as a something is opposed to ideas as nothing.  That's taking a position.  Only by contrasting the world of ideas with the world of things do you come up with the notion of "what ideas are."  Relationships among objects is a category of idea but it doesn't explain what an idea is.  Our experience is completely noninformative about the nature of ideas.  The only non-position position about their reality is pure agnosticism.  They could be material.  They could be a substance in and of themselves.  They could be illusions.  By describing them as a substance in and of themselves, you're taking a metaphysical view about them as sure as materialism is.  What's worse, you're defining them as the negation of the material.  That's borrowing the concept of the material in defining the idea.  It's an example of the use of the stolen concept.

It is from sensory experience that people explain things in terms of matter and its operations. From that stance, the materialist reinterprets the original sense data and experience - either trying to force mental properties into a materialist paradigm (making it a kind of substance) or dismissing mental properties as illusions because they don't conform our notions about how matter works. But if our knowledge of matter and how it works originally come from sensory experience then denying the reality of sensory experience undermines the reason that knowledge about matter exists in the first place. To me that sounds self-defeating.

This is not to say that no one can know anything about ideas. Ideas are that with which we are most intimately familiar. For that reason, I believe they should be treated on their own terms and not forced to fit in some Procrustes bed fabricated by materialist assumptions.