Occams Hatchet and Is Materialism "Special"

[robvalue]

I don't know. What does material mean? If it means "that which literally exists", then by definition everything that exists is material.

Seriously. Does it mean anything else? People who want to argue against it often seem to draw some arbitrary line at things we can currently test (or can ever test) that exist, and call that material. Then they say these "other things" that do exist, aren't material. Trying to shoe horn in magic and shit.

Of course, as well as the literally existent we have abstract concepts and rules. And experiental realities. And whatever else. I'm quite happy to say these things "exist", in their own way. But it's usually a different usage of the word than literally existing. Rules tend to "apply", for example. Abstract concepts exist conceptually. Existence is extremely hard to define anyway, so I tend to only use it in relative terms. Abstract concept A and B exist as much as each other. Material object C and D exist as much as each other. A and C do not necessarily exist in the same way.

Are we just saying abstract concepts are non-material? Rules are non-material? If so, sure. They're (not necessarily) the same thing. I put the qualifier in there in case we've fucked up and are, actually, looking at the same thing somehow.

(This pragmatic model covers solipsism and other collapses.)

[LadyForCamus]

Sorry, a little late to this party. What makes such an assumption unreasonable?

Nothing's wrong with making assumptions. I make some in order to feel it's worthwhile living and getting out of bed in the morning.

The problem is that assumptions ingrained in the world view, if they are also treated as objects of observation or conclusions of inquiry, lead to a nasty circle-- a kind of implicit begging of the question, if you will.

But...does any evidence exist which points to a non-material explanation for mind? Do we have any competing theories outside of non-scientific philosophical concepts and hypotheses? I mean...poking at the materialist explanation of mind to the point where you have actually retreated back into a full-blown solipsism hole is not actually fostering a functional positive argument for any of the possible alternatives. It's just like a "God of the gaps" argument.

Is it unreasonable to operate under the assumption that the hypothesis of solipsism is probably NOT an accurate model of reality? That the world I experience actually, physically exists? If that is not an unreasonable assumption to make, then I don't see why it would be unreasonable to also assume that other people experience this physical world via a similar mechanism, even if we haven't found a way to perfectly describe it yet.

[Whateverist]

When I put the probes of a voltmeter across a certain part of an electrical circuit, the readout displays a number which represents an electrical quantity.  We know it does so accurately because we've designed it to provide an accurate representation of the electrical quantity.  When it's voltage, we say that we have measured the voltage across the probes.  With current, current.  We only have correlates for the things we measure.  The large hadron collider is a massive correlate provider.  If there were a single cluster of neurons that have been found to be solely responsible for the experience of red.  Say we've mapped out experience and what happens in the brain when you experience red.  Is it a valid objection to the practice of measurement to say that I haven't measured the presence or absence of the experience red in this hypothetical brain?  This seems consistent with practice in other areas.  When I measure 5 volts in a circuit, I say that the circuit is presenting 5 volts.  I don't say that the voltmeter is measuring a correlate of a circuit presenting 5 volts.  Measurement assumes ontology.  To take the knife in the thigh example, our experience is only a correlate of the event.  Some people don't experience the pain as being undesirable.  Others don't experience the pain at all.  All you have is a representation that something is occurring.  But if correlates aren't admitted into evidence as witness to the existence of a thing, then your experience isn't witness to its own existence.  After all, your experience is just a correlate of reality.  That you have 'an idea' that you have an idea is no more valid than that the voltmeter is measuring 5 volts.  I think every one of us has experienced the phenomena of being half awake and thinking something, and that thought turned out to be nonsensical once we are fully awake.  How do you know that your notion of an idea isn't just another half awake illusion?  Are we going to doubt reality on the basis of the point that we know nothing in and of itself, all we know are representations of reality, correlates?  All we have are correlates; once you dispense with them, you've dispensed with the notion that anything is real.  Including experience.  Skepticism cuts both ways.

It certainly does.  There are no safe assumptions which are guaranteed not to distort the reality we assume is out there.  But I assume there is something real and objective which my (like every other) organism has evolved the capacity to screen for aspects salient for my survival.  The manner of the screening may well influence the representation I have of what is out there.  But why question that?  What assumptions is a person making who would attempt to distance himself from those representations and consider them dispassionately?  What sure footing do they suppose is available for such a project?  Me thinks madness lies in that direction.

[The Grand Nudger]

"Prove my repeated insistence wrong" - No.  "Defend this position I just came up with for you".  No.

Do your own homework.

Look, you have a position about the nature of mind, and assert it positively.  Fine. . . demonstrate that your assertion has validity to it.  So far, you haven't

Do you even know what you want?  See, just like I gave you an explanation of sound before, in regards to questions of what music is made out of, I will relay to you the manners of inference contained within the scientific method...since you're asking for validty, and simply remind you that mind being accounted for by brain is the conclusion of -every- scientific experiment regarding either and that there isn't a single dissenting observation. You don't want to be seen arguing against the means of inference in science again, I'm sure. So let;s both save ourselves that headache, eh?

You don't want mind, you want qualia..except here again I'll simply remind you that brain accounting for qualia is not only the conclusion of every scientific experiment regarding either, with no dissenting observations...but that arguing otherwise forces you to make endless special pleading, concept stealing, ad naus appeals to solipsism.  

What you want, is a full and accurate description and explanation of qualia.  Thing is, that won't help you, I don't have it...and there's actually no requirement that I do...it won;'t make any of your many statements in this thread anything other than what they were, and the absence of what you want doesn't argue against materialism.

[Neo-Scholastic]

When I put the probes of a voltmeter across a certain part of an electrical circuit, the readout displays a number which represents an electrical quantity. We know it does so accurately because we've designed it to provide an accurate representation of the electrical quantity. When it's voltage, we say that we have measured the voltage across the probes. With current, current. We only have correlates for the things we measure…. Is it a valid objection to the practice of measurement to say that I haven't measured the presence or absence of the experience red in this hypothetical brain?

This raises an interesting question. Are all aspects of reality quantifiable?

It seems to me that identifying that a thing is present, like a memory, by observation of a brain state is not the same as identifying the quality of a thing, such as what that memory is about. Applying rules about extended bodies to things that have no extension seems like a category error. It is like saying that ‘nova’ means the same thing in English (a brightening star) and Spanish (doesn’t go) just because it has the same spelling.

All we have are correlates; once you dispense with them, you've dispensed with the notion that anything is real.

If efficient cause is defined by temporal succession, then your position makes perfect sense. At the same time that Humean causality comes at great cost, i.e. it creates an infinite regress of intermediate causes. That is exactly the same objection reductionists consider a damning flaw of substance dualism.

[The Grand Nudger]

Read the post you quoted again.  It's about red.  That much was stated from the outset.  You're actually making the same objection that the post responded to.  If this area is solely responsible for the experience of red, then we can know that it's about red, as the neural correlate of red. By we, ofc, I only mean those of us who assign credibility to knowledge based upon measurement.

You even assumed that the nueral correlate was about something specific in your objection to whether or not we can identify the quality of a thing, what is was about. Memory. It is, thusly, a self defeating objection.

[bennyboy]

But...does any evidence exist which points to a non-material explanation for mind?  Do we have any competing theories outside of non-scientific philosophical concepts and hypotheses?  I mean...poking at the materialist explanation of mind to the point where you have actually retreated back into a full-blown solipsism hole is not actually fostering a functional positive argument for any of the possible alternatives.  It's just like a "God of the gaps" argument.  

Idealism is a good alternative to materialism. So is good, old fashioned, "I don't know" agnosticism. The fact is that 100% of things we experience, whatever might really be behind them, are experiences only. There are not experiences which are movies, or tables, or whatever.

Saying "We don't know, and I don't believe we can" is only a God of the gaps argument if you are making an assertion, and attempting to use the lack of knowledge as positive support for it. Saying, "I don't think that you can know what you claim to know" isn't a God of the gaps argument-- it's just skepticism.

Is it unreasonable to operate under the assumption that the hypothesis of solipsism is probably NOT an accurate model of reality?  That the world I experience actually, physically exists?  If that is not an unreasonable assumption to make, then I don't see why it would be unreasonable to also assume that other people experience this physical world via a similar mechanism, even if we haven't found a way to perfectly describe it yet.

No, it's not reasonable. I don't mean that it's UN-reasonable, either; I mean that you cannot use reason to arrive at that conclusion. The simple fact is that we are using our experiences to draw inferences about reality. But we do not really know where the experiences come from, why or how. Without being able to establish that our faculties are capable of representing truth, we cannot establish that our inferences represent truth, no matter how much we feel that they do.

[The Grand Nudger]

We do have a way of assessing whether or not our faculties represent truth.  Reason.  That's all that truth is.  We even have a way of testing those propositions we plug into our means of inference, science.  It's not that we don't possess these things, you simply don't accept their credibility in this, your special case. 

we do not really know where the experiences come from,

-the brain.

 why 

-survival

or how.

-could be any number of ways, none of which, thusfar, exceed or argue against materialism, or are inexplicable by reference to materialism. The only people producing results -of any kind- are, in fact, producing them from a necessarily materialistic framework. It could be something else entirely, and that thing may be something that exceeds the boundaries of materialism, we don't know what we don;t know, this is hardly a revelation....but until you can provide something that exceeds materialism in the first place..you're going to have a hard time justifying why you not only believe that said something exists...but is here, in this specific example of mind, present.

You see, we do know these things, that knowledge does exist, you argue against the existence of knowledge (while claiming it) and the reality of the universe (while telling us about it,what it cannot be and what -you- think it's made of)...not materialism, not materialist explanations of mind or qualia. You hold your objections to a lesser standard than you hold the thing to which you object. You exceed your own objections in the manner by which you -do- object. You will not accept any counterfactual to your initial position, regardless of the standards which it has met.

All of this only serves the purpose to plead a special case...which isn;t a fallacy if it -is- a special case..but since you;ve failed to demonstrate that it is.....a fallacy it remains. Meanwhile, you gladly steal the material concept -for- your objections in any other instance which we have ever had occasion to discuss.

Now look at that tangled mess of shit, above. Imagine, hard as it may be...that it's an accurate description of what you've been doing. Is it any wonder than no one can answer your questions to your satisfaction..and isn't the inability of anyone to answer those questions to your satisfaction your repeatedly stated reason for continuing as such?

Food for thought.

[Jesster]

I could post this image in just about any thread that bennyboy frequents

[LadyForCamus]

Idealism is a good alternative to materialism. So is good, old fashioned, "I don't know" agnosticism. The fact is that 100% of things we experience, whatever might really be behind them, are experiences only. There are not experiences which are movies, or tables, or whatever.
Saying "We don't know, and I don't believe we can" is only a God of the gaps argument if you are making an assertion, and attempting to use the lack of knowledge as positive support for it. Saying, "I don't think that you can know what you claim to know" isn't a God of the gaps argument-- it's just skepticism.

But isn't philosophical idealism as much of an asserted position as materialism by the same metrics? I'm perfectly comfortable with, "I don't know" as an answer to how the brain generates qualia. I'm also comfortable with the idea that because our existence is experiential in nature, we will probably never have "access" to absolute truths. But, it doesn't sound like you're simply saying: "I don't know/we can't know". It sounds like you're saying "we can't know, therefore materialism is eliminated as a possibility." I don't understand how you reached that conclusion, unless I am simply misunderstanding what materialism actually is. (Philosophy is not my niche, lol)

You said:

The fact is that 100% of things we experience, whatever might really be behind them, are experiences only.

How do you KNOW this "fact"? That doesn't sound like an agnostic position on the nature of reality at all.

It's it's not reasonable. I don't mean that it's UN-reasonable, either; I mean that you cannot use reason to arrive at that conclusion. The simple fact is that we are using our experiences to draw inferences about reality. But we do not really know where the experiences come from, why or how. Without being able to establish that our faculties are capable of representing truth, we cannot establish that our inferences represent truth, no matter how much we feel that they do.

You really feel that way? That we can't trust our faculties to give us at the very least a rudimentary representation of truth? That we can't even come close? I mean...why even bother with the scientific method at all at that point? Why bother trying to learn about ANYTHING if we're just blindly bumping around in a dark sea with a broken compass? How do you get out of bed every day with that mentality?! [emoji39]