Euthyphro dilemma

[Ignorant]

Fine, fine..Igno, I see no reason to bicker.  Goodness is created.  Option 2. [1]

"I am curious... "what", exactly, is being-good in regard to a non-existing thing?"

Depends on who you ask, I suppose. [2]


If there -is- a "goodness itself", it's a version of option 1. [3]

If goodness isn't arbitrarily defined, if there is a goodness itself, then the creation of some thing does not..in any meaningful sense, impart it with goodness or create goodness.  It creates a thing that is good.  We're simply describing a creative act in conformity to that standard.  Option 1. [4]

Anything that conforms to that standard would be a good thing.  It needn't proceed from your god to be so, and your god is itself only a good thing if it conforms to that standard. [5] 

If your god was otherwise it would not be good, [6] and creating things that participate in his him-ness would not be good. 

If instead, you insist that it must proceed from your god and that the creative act of your god (or anyone, really) creates "goodness"...then goodness has been arbitrarily defined as whatever proceeds form your god and is in conformity with it's nature.  Option 2. [7]

The problem with theological nominalist ethics in christianity has always been it's allegiance to modified forms of voluntarism, and it's adherents dissatisfaction with the same. [8]

Starting with #8) I AM NEITHER NOMINALIST NOR VOLUNTARIST. What makes you think that I am either?

1) Lol, yes, created goodness is created. Nice work. It's only option 2 if created goodness is arbitrary and unrelated to goodness itself. I repeat my position: created goodness is directly related to uncreated goodness itself.

2) Ya, I'm sure it is, but I am asking you. I was hoping to get the answer which directly depends on the way you understand reality.

3) Well it isn't, really. Both options regard  the source of the created things' goodness (i.e. is it in the thing or is it in the creator?). The third option is that the source of goodness is concurrently in both the creator and the created thing in different manners: in the creator subsistently, and in the created through participation. This third option is the classical, pre-voluntarist/nominalist account of creator-created relation. The creator is essentially good through his own essence, the created is essentially good through its participation in the creator's nature. 

4) Suppose that x is good. I ask, how is x being-good? You say, what-x-is is [the-cause-of-x's-goodness], and nothing else whatsoever. I ask, how is x being-what-x-is at all? You say (presuming the creative premises in the dilemma) that god causes x-being-what-x-is. I ask:

If god causes (x-being-{what-x-is}), and {what-x-is} is [the-cause-of-x's-goodness] can we say, then, that god causes (x-being-[the-cause-of-x's-goodness])?

If we can, then both god and x are causing x's goodness in two different but no less meaningful ways (i.e. concurrently). Both are sources of x's goodness, with god being the more/most fundamental source. As the most fundamental source, he IS the standard of goodness.

5) Which is like saying god is only god if he conforms to himself. It isn't false, but it isn't really saying anything at all.

6) If my god were otherwise, he would be neither good nor god. Lol.

7) I have never said that goodness "must" proceed from my god, only that things which DO participate in god's essence actually communicate/exhibit god's goodness in ways particular to what-they-are. I have only said that this particular goodness comes from BOTH the thing itself and from goodness itself (i.e. god) according to different manners. I have only said that this particular goodness is not arbitrary, but rather, directly related to the nature of the goodness (i.e. god) in which it participates.

That is not arbitrary definition. If (describing things as "good" because it directly relates to "goodness" in some way) is arbitrarily defining goodness, then I don't know what arbitrary means.

[SteveII]

1. Neither. It defines good. All moral theories need an explanatory ultimate. This is a particularly good one since it is eternal and unchanging. 

That's option 2, not option "neither".  If tyhe definition of goodness is whatever a gods eternal and unchanging nature happened to be, then the definition of goodness is arbitrary.

Yes, the way you worded it was nearly the same as option 2. But it is far from the equivalent of the second horn. As I said to Jorm, you need God's nature to be arbitrary not in the sense that if could have been different, but that it still can be different. 

2. Nope. The first horn is clearly talking about a goodness as contingent property. It needs to be arbitrary otherwise the horn has no undesirable conclusion. I am talking about a nature that governs God. God cannot do or command anything in violation of his nature. 

Then whatever constrains god and gods nature as a good nature is the standard and definition of goodness.  Option 1.  

Horn 1: "is something good because God wills it" and the third option: "God cannot will anything that isn't good" are not the same thing. 

[The Grand Nudger]

Starting with #8) I AM NEITHER NOMINALIST NOR VOLUNTARIST. What makes you think that I am either?

It's probably your waffling insistence on nominalist and voluntarist apologetics in an attempt to evade the dilemma, even as you insist you're from neither camp....huh?

That is not arbitrary definition. If (describing things as "good" because it directly relates to "goodness" in some way) is arbitrarily defining goodness, then I don't know what arbitrary means.

If we determined what was good by whatever god created, or was in his nature to create, or yadda yadda yadda.... then whatever a god happens to create is by definition good.  Option 2.

God could create an animal that skullfucks toddlers for fun, and that would be good.
-or he could create the oppositie of that..and -that- would be good.

This is the arbitrarity being referenced.  Do you understand?

If, instead, you're defining the good by reference to goodness... not god, gods will, gods creative act, gods nature.... this is option 1. Not a third option, but you don;t like the consequences of that either..and so you prattle endlessly about what amounts to option 2.

[SteveII]

@steve
Imagine for a moment that you're god.  It shouldn't be too difficult.  Let's say that part of your nature was being dumb as a bag of rocks.  If your nature defines goodness, then being dumb as a bag of rocks is good.

However, if you weren't as dumb as a bag of rocks, if that wasn't in your nature..if..instead, you had even the slightest shred of intelligence, and your nature defined goodness, then having a shred of intelligence is good.

This is the arbitrarity being referenced.  Do you understand?

Again, you are equivocating. You need arbitrary  to mean "contingent on God's choice" NOT "it could have been some other way". If you use the second definition, then the horn does not have the unpleasant conclusion you need it to have to be a dilemma.

[JackRussell]

Philosophical god is sooo believable.

Evidence be damned>

[The Grand Nudger]

I mean arbitrary in the sense that it could be a or the negation of a...depending on whatever gods nature or will was.  This is also the sense of arbitrarity being invoked by the dilemma.

All cleared up now?

[SteveII]

I mean arbitrary in the sense that it could be a or the negation of a...depending on whatever gods nature or will was.  This is also the sense of arbitrarity being invoked by the dilemma.

All cleared up now?

But then you use the phrase: "depending on whatever gods nature or will was". Which one of these makes all the difference in the unwanted conclusion. If nature (which would be unchanging), then unpleasant conclusion avoided. Morality (including God's actions and commands) are rooted in something unchanging = objective.

[Ignorant]

It's probably your waffling insistence on nominalist and voluntarist apologetics in an attempt to evade the dilemma, even as you insist you're from neither camp....huh? [1]

If we determined what was good by whatever god created, or was in his nature to create, or yadda yadda yadda.... then whatever a god happens to create is by definition good.  Option 2. [2]

God could create an animal that skullfucks toddlers for fun, and that would be good.
-or he could create the oppositie of that..and -that- would be good. [3]

This is the arbitrarity being referenced.  Do you understand? [4]

If, instead, you're defining the good by reference to goodness... [5] not god, gods will, gods creative act, gods nature.... this is option 1. [6] Not a third option, but you don;t like the consequences of that either..and so you prattle endlessly about what amounts to option 2. [7]

1) Lol. Can you name a different camp?

2) Who said that is how we determine what is good? I never proposed that is how to determine what is good. If I did, please point it out.

3) Only a voluntarist/nominalist would/could agree.

4) I understand that as the voluntarist position, and why you might have an interest in insisting that I am a voluntarist (only the voluntarist position feels the tension of the dilemma). 

5) Yes.

6) What if I consider "goodness" and "god" as one and the same. Which option would you throw me in with then?

7) I don't understand why you demand that I choose either "goodness" or "god". They mean the same thing to me.

[SteveII]

The first horn "is something good because the gods will it" or
The second horn "do the gods will it because it is good?” but now
The third option (that has no unwanted conclusion): it is not God's will that defines the good but his unchanging nature that governs his will and his commands to us.

With a third option, there is no dilemma. The defeater of the dilemma is to point out that God's goodness is a necessary property (which is a third option). Goodness is not a property that God could have lacked. As the greatest conceivable being, there is no possible world where God is not good.

Does the third option as you formulate it take goodness off God's list of responsibilities?  If so, goodness, rather than an extra ingredient whipped up by God in creation, becomes His goal.  So like us God can only intend and aim for goodness.  You might suppose He is better at achieving that goal, maybe He is the best even.  But at least goodness isn't something inevitable which God, like some idiot moral savant, cannot help but exude whether intended or not.

Goodness is not a goal for God. It would be an intrinsic property. Very different things.

[The Grand Nudger]

6) What if I consider "goodness" and "god" as one and the same. Which option would you throw me in with then?

7) I don't understand why you demand that I choose either "goodness" or "god". They mean the same thing to me.

If you say so, but the consequence is that whatever god did or was would be goodness.  Option 2.

If god did a, goodness
If god did the negation of a, goodness.

How delightfully arbitrary. I don't know why you think that anyone is throwing you in there but yourself.