Friendly Atheism

[John 6IX Breezy]

I don't think I've called them hypocrites but thanks for putting words in my mouth. I'm not talking "rational to them" but rational to an outside observer/third person perspective. My perspective would be that they are avoiding a rational look at the beliefs as a way to avoid cognitive dissonance in favor of emotional reasons/security.

I assumed you meant rational to them, not a third-party observer, because you were responding to my post on live hypothesis which is all about what's rational to the individual.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

If we base it on what's rational to the individual, then we have to qualify every imaginable psychotic behavior as rational.

There seems to be an obvious connection between, 'It is rational to believe Jesus died for our sins because it is rational to people who hold that view' and, 'It is rational to believe that it's OK to torture children because this behaviour is rational to child torturers.'

Boru

[brewer]

I don't think I've called them hypocrites but thanks for putting words in my mouth. I'm not talking "rational to them" but rational to an outside observer/third person perspective. My perspective would be that they are avoiding a rational look at the beliefs as a way to avoid cognitive dissonance in favor of emotional reasons/security.

I assumed you meant rational to them, not a third-party observer, because you were responding to my post on live hypothesis which is all about what's rational to the individual.

Rationalizations can be made for any behavior/belief. It does not make the behavior/belief rational. 

And Boru makes an excellent point.

[John 6IX Breezy]

Rationalizations can be made for any behavior/belief. It does not make the behavior/belief rational. 

And Boru makes an excellent point.

I think its fair to distinguish between first-person and third-person rationality, but both are still observer-dependant. We can agree that psychotic behavior is rational for the one with the psychotic disorder. But what are the criteria for classifying something as rational from a third-person perspective? Many psychotic behaviors are categorized as such based on statistical analysis; they are abnormal because they are infrequent, deviating from the average, not necessarily because they are inherently abnormal or irrational (Barlow & Durand, 2015).

Even third-person observers are bound to differ on their classification. For you, someone being afraid of butterflies may appear irrational; it poses no threat. But from my perspective, it is reasonable given its underlying infrastructure; we understand why phobias happen. In other words, phobias are rational not because of the butterfly, but because of how the person's brain is processing it. It makes sense why they are responding that way.

If you're going to classify beliefs and behaviors as objectively rational/irrational, you need to give an objective way to measure and classify it.

Reference: Barlow, D. H., & Durand, V. M. (2015). Abnormal psychology: An integrative approach (7th ed.). Stanford: Cengage Learning.

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There seems to be an obvious connection between, 'It is rational to believe Jesus died for our sins because it is rational to people who hold that view' and, 'It is rational to believe that it's OK to torture children because this behaviour is rational to child torturers.'

Hmm I don't know if I agree. Something is missing. For example, would you say its rational to believe vaccines work on account of scientists believing that it works? It seems to me that something needs to be added to the equation, so that believing scientists is rational, believing child torturers is not, and believing Christians falls somewhere between the two. There's a hidden variable there you're not taking into account, and I'm not sure what it is.

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EDIT: I just did a quick search through the DSM 5. There is no indication that rational/irrational are ever used as diagnostic criteria.

[Belacqua]

If we base it on what's rational to the individual, then we have to qualify every imaginable psychotic behavior as rational.

Maybe so, depending on our precise definition of "rational." 

If rational means something like "internally consistent based on the premises given," then a rational thought process might end up with something very wrong. 

Given the premises that were almost universally accepted in medieval Europe, for example, Christian believers were entirely rational. To us, they were wrong, because we have different premises. 

But it may be that people are psychotic because their thinking isn't in fact rational. The results don't follow from their premises. I know a very sad woman who finds her kitchen messy in the morning, and based on this true fact, concludes that the Prime Minister broke into her house over night. This is psychotic and not rational.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

Rationalizations can be made for any behavior/belief. It does not make the behavior/belief rational. 

And Boru makes an excellent point.

I think its fair to distinguish between first-person and third-person rationality, but both are still observer-dependant. We can agree that psychotic behavior is rational for the one with the psychotic disorder. But what are the criteria for classifying something as rational from a third-person perspective? Many psychotic behaviors are categorized as such based on statistical analysis; they are abnormal because they are infrequent, deviating from the average, not necessarily because they are inherently abnormal or irrational (Barlow & Durand, 2015).

Even third-person observers are bound to differ on their classification. For you, someone being afraid of butterflies may appear irrational; it poses no threat. But from my perspective, it is reasonable given its underlying infrastructure; we understand why phobias happen. In other words, phobias are rational not because of the butterfly, but because of how the person's brain is processing it. It makes sense why they are responding that way.

If you're going to classify beliefs and behaviors as objectively rational/irrational, you need to give an objective way to measure and classify it.

Reference: Barlow, D. H., & Durand, V. M. (2015). Abnormal psychology: An integrative approach (7th ed.). Stanford: Cengage Learning.

---

There seems to be an obvious connection between, 'It is rational to believe Jesus died for our sins because it is rational to people who hold that view' and, 'It is rational to believe that it's OK to torture children because this behaviour is rational to child torturers.'

Hmm I don't know if I agree. Something is missing. For example, would you say its rational to believe vaccines work on account of scientists believing that it works? It seems to me that something needs to be added to the equation, so that believing scientists is rational, believing child torturers is not, and believing Christians falls somewhere between the two. There's a hidden variable there you're not taking into account, and I'm not sure what it is.

---

EDIT: I just did a quick search through the DSM 5. There is no indication that rational/irrational are ever used as diagnostic criteria.

No, I would not say it is rational to believe vaccines work because scientists believe they work.  I would say that it is rational to believe that vaccines work because vaccines work.  But you have the proposition exactly backwards.  Would you believe someone is rational because they believe vaccines DON'T work?

Irrationality (as far as regards the topic at hand) seems to mean either believing a proposition to be true when there is no good reason for supposing it is, or believing a proposition to be false in the face of overwhelming evidence that it is true. 

Let's take the virgin birth of Jesus as an example from religion.  Parthenogenesis never occurs naturally in mammals - it isn't physically possible.  However, it can be induced in mammals with some very complex procedures, such as gene splicing and fiddling about with stem cells.  It is therefore non-rational to believe that Jesus was the result of a virgin birth (a much more likely explanation is that Mary told a fib or two).  It doesn't matter how may people believe that it happened, or how sincerely this belief is.  Since it flies in the face of the observed facts, it is not a rational belief.

Boru

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

If we base it on what's rational to the individual, then we have to qualify every imaginable psychotic behavior as rational.

Maybe so, depending on our precise definition of "rational." 

If rational means something like "internally consistent based on the premises given," then a rational thought process might end up with something very wrong. 

Given the premises that were almost universally accepted in medieval Europe, for example, Christian believers were entirely rational. To us, they were wrong, because we have different premises. 

But it may be that people are psychotic because their thinking isn't in fact rational. The results don't follow from their premises. I know a very sad woman who finds her kitchen messy in the morning, and based on this true fact, concludes that the Prime Minister broke into her house over night. This is psychotic and not rational.

As I said earlier, 'rational' and 'right' don't always coincide.  One can be rational and still be monumentally wrong.

Again, I am simply addressing the claim that because a notion is rational to one person that it fits any accepted meaning of the term 'rational'.

Boru

[John 6IX Breezy]

No, I would not say it is rational to believe vaccines work because scientists believe they work.  I would say that it is rational to believe that vaccines work because vaccines work.  But you have the proposition exactly backwards.  Would you believe someone is rational because they believe vaccines DON'T work?

Irrationality (as far as regards the topic at hand) seems to mean either believing a proposition to be true when there is no good reason for supposing it is, or believing a proposition to be false in the face of overwhelming evidence that it is true. 

Let's take the virgin birth of Jesus as an example from religion.  Parthenogenesis never occurs naturally in mammals - it isn't physically possible.  However, it can be induced in mammals with some very complex procedures, such as gene splicing and fiddling about with stem cells.  It is therefore non-rational to believe that Jesus was the result of a virgin birth (a much more likely explanation is that Mary told a fib or two).  It doesn't matter how may people believe that it happened, or how sincerely this belief is.  Since it flies in the face of the observed facts, it is not a rational belief.

Boru

I think most people believe vaccines work, or don't work, on authority. The average person has neither the time, interest, or ability to read published research on vaccines, and simply trust that scientists have it figuired out. I'm scientifically trained, and I still struggle to understand research published in other fields. I think most people build and defend their positions using news articles that interpret and report the original research, giving it a narrative. Vaccine debates tend to also be partisan precisely because news outlets are partisan. But from what I've seen, anti-vaxers have their reasons, such as a distrust of authority (particularly governments, or fraud in the scientific community), that makes their position rational.

I think your virgin birth example is interesting. You seem to imply that it's possible, just not natural, it requires intervention. Isn't that what Christians say? The story isn't that the virgin birth happened naturally, but that God intervened. The virgin birth is rational if God exists; it isn't inherently irrational.

[brewer]

Rationalizations can be made for any behavior/belief. It does not make the behavior/belief rational. 

And Boru makes an excellent point.

I think its fair to distinguish between first-person and third-person rationality, but both are still observer-dependant. We can agree that psychotic behavior is rational for the one with the psychotic disorder. But what are the criteria for classifying something as rational from a third-person perspective? Many psychotic behaviors are categorized as such based on statistical analysis; they are abnormal because they are infrequent, deviating from the average, not necessarily because they are inherently abnormal or irrational (Barlow & Durand, 2015).

Even third-person observers are bound to differ on their classification. For you, someone being afraid of butterflies may appear irrational; it poses no threat. But from my perspective, it is reasonable given its underlying infrastructure; we understand why phobias happen. In other words, phobias are rational not because of the butterfly, but because of how the person's brain is processing it. It makes sense why they are responding that way.

If you're going to classify beliefs and behaviors as objectively rational/irrational, you need to give an objective way to measure and classify it.

Reference: Barlow, D. H., & Durand, V. M. (2015). Abnormal psychology: An integrative approach (7th ed.). Stanford: Cengage Learning.

Why do you keep trying to change the goal post away from rational religious belief? We are not talking about what is considered medically irrational/delusional. Unless you want to discuss why some of the christian beliefs could fit the medical criteria. 

Phobias by definition are irrational fears. Just because we think (have a hypothesis for) the neuropsychology of the brain for phobias does not make phobias rational. You have no idea of what you're talking about.

[GrandizerII]

I don't like all these semantic arguments about what "rational" means. I understand that rationalism tends to mean something specific in philosophy, but I thought we were talking about whether theism is based on sound reasoning or not. Maybe then the better question would be: is theism in any form based on sound arguments (and without involving unwarranted leaps to the conclusion)? But I suspect even this will trigger debates about what "sound" means ...