[Serious] Thomism: Then & Now

[Belacqua]

The second video my Martin Kulp is also quite good. If you watched the first one you'll know exactly what to expect.

Here, again, he goes fast and doesn't go into detail about actualizing essence into existence. And since modern people generally don't think in these terms, people not already familiar with the arguments will probably want background. He doesn't explain, for example, why a thing's essence requires a causal force to make it exist, nor does he explain why the first link in the causal series must be a total conjunction of essence and existence. He just states that this is what the argument says. That's why I say these Five Ways aren't self-evident -- each is more like a course syllabus.

It's an excellent summary, though. I think I have a bad tendency to conflate the first three ways in my mind, so its good to be reminded.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_s-wdN5tbE

[Belacqua]

The summary in the video is so bare-bones that I think anyone would be left with questions. The argument is basically that a thing's essence and its existence are not necessarily together -- that is, we can talk about the essences of things that don't exist. For the essence to come into existence requires a cause.

This is from Feser's Aquinas:

how does a thing come into existence? That is to say, how is its essence conjoined with an act of existence so that it is made real? “It is impossible,” Aquinas says, “that the act of existing itself be caused by the form or quiddity – and by ‘caused’ I mean as by an efficient cause – for then something would be the cause of itself and produce itself in existence, which is impossible” (DEE 4). In other words, a thing’s essence, form, or quiddity cannot be what brings the thing into existence, for considered by itself an essence is merely potential, and thus cannot cause anything. For an essence to be able to cause something it would first have to be actualized by being conjoined to an act of existing, and that would entail that the thing itself (since it just is a composite of an essence with an act of existing) would already exist. Hence the essence of a thing could cause its existence only if the thing already existed, in which case the thing would in effect be bringing itself into existence, which is incoherent. “It is therefore necessary that everything whose act of existing is other than its nature have its act of existing from another” (DEE 4). But a series of things deriving their acts of existing from something else cannot go on to infinity. Hence “everything which exists through another is reduced to that which exists through itself, as to a first cause” and “there must be something which causes all things to exist, inasmuch as it is subsistent existence alone” (DEE 4). That is, there must be something whose essence and existence are identical, and this we call God.

And again, it's important that this is a per se series -- acting continually.

a thing must be caused to exist not once for all, but continuously, here and now as well as at the time it first came into being; to use the traditional theological language, it must be conserved in existence from moment to moment. But if what conserves it in existence were something which itself was a composite of essence and existence, then that conserving cause would need to be conserved as well. Insofar as the existence of a thing in whom essence and existence are distinct might involve a series of causes, then, we are once again talking about a causal series ordered per se, and thus (as Aquinas says) a causal series which necessarily depends on a first member which is not conserved by anything, but simply exists. In the nature of the case, this could only be something whose essence and existence are not distinct (and thus in need of being conjoined) but identical.

So the First Cause has to be something which doesn't exist accidentally, but essentially. That is, its essence is to exist. This would be unique, since everything else has an essence which may or may not exist.

So the Second Way claims to prove that there must be a something of which its essence is to exist, which he claims is necessary for the existence of anything else. As always, this doesn't attempt to prove that the First Cause is the God of the Bible. Only that ontologically, such a cause is necessary.

[DLJ]

The summary in the video is so bare-bones that I think anyone would be left with questions. The argument is basically that a thing's essence and its existence are not necessarily together -- that is, we can talk about the essences of things that don't exist. For the essence to come into existence requires a cause.
...

Thanks for the link to the video.

At 1:13 we get the definition of Essence as "The properties that make something what it is rather than some other thing."

Gives me flashbacks to 30 years ago when I was learning about Asset / Configuration Management.

What Aquinas misses, of course, is that the essence is not in the thing, it's in the reading/reader of the thing.

[Belacqua]

the essence is not in the thing, it's in the reading/reader of the thing.

What argument do you use to demonstrate that this is true?

[DLJ]

the essence is not in the thing, it's in the reading/reader of the thing.

What argument do you use to demonstrate that this is true?

Hmmm. Good question. I'm not sure what to call it.

Maybe...
Argument from Pattern Recognition or
Argument from 'Beauty is in the Eye of the Beholder' or
Argument from Reification Error or simply
Argument from Information Theory?

Anyway, if I'm understanding it correctly from video (I admit there's a high chance that I'm not), Aquinas seems to have correctly realised that the information patterns referred to as 'properties' can be identified both/similarly from things that do not exist (i.e. imaginary / virtual / fictional things) as from things that do exist (physically).

So, credit where it's due for that.

But then there seems to be an attempt to associate ("bring together") these information patterns with the existing-things themselves rather than associating the information patterns with the reader/interpreter of the existing-things.

Seems like a non sequitur.

Ah! They you go... Argument from Non Sequitur.

[Belacqua]

What argument do you use to demonstrate that this is true?

Hmmm.  Good question.  I'm not sure what to call it.

Maybe...
Argument from Pattern Recognition or
Argument from 'Beauty is in the Eye of the Beholder' or
Argument from Reification Error or simply
Argument from Information Theory?

Anyway, if I'm understanding it correctly from video (I admit there's a high chance that I'm not), Aquinas seems to have correctly realised that the information patterns referred to as 'properties' can be identified both/similarly from things that do not exist (i.e. imaginary / virtual / fictional things) as from things that do exist (physically).

So, credit where it's due for that.  

But then there seems to be an attempt to associate ("bring together") these information patterns with the existing-things themselves rather than  associating the information patterns with the reader/interpreter of the existing-things.

Seems like a non sequitur.

Ah! They you go... Argument from Non Sequitur.

Sorry, apparently my question wasn't clear.

I'm wondering what it is that makes you say an essence isn't in the thing, but only in the reader. 

When you say "information patterns," you seem to be referring to both properties and essences. Is that what you mean? 

If something has the property of weighing two kilos, is this an information pattern? You could give information about the weight, but is the weight itself information?

An essence, I think, is the set of things that make something what it is and not another thing. So a platypus has a set of things -- characteristics, properties -- which make it a platypus and not some other thing. Are you saying that this set of things is a pattern of information? Are tails and beaks patterns of information, or they physical objects which are parts of an animal? 

I'm not clear yet on what you're saying.

[DLJ]

...
Sorry, apparently my question wasn't clear.

I'm wondering what it is that makes you say an essence isn't in the thing, but only in the reader. 

When you say "information patterns," you seem to be referring to both properties and essences. Is that what you mean? 

If something has the property of weighing two kilos, is this an information pattern? You could give information about the weight, but is the weight itself information?

An essence, I think, is the set of things that make something what it is and not another thing. So a platypus has a set of things -- characteristics, properties -- which make it a platypus and not some other thing. Are you saying that this set of things is a pattern of information? Are tails and beaks patterns of information, or they physical objects which are parts of an animal? 

I'm not clear yet on what you're saying.

Pretty much.

A platypus is a platypus. It has component parts. Some of these components (beaks and tails) are in common with other non-platypus things.

A particular combination of things get the label 'platypus' - a label given to it by an observer (an external pattern reader).

So there's the whole, the components and the labels for the whole and the components.

Neither the platypus nor the component parts of the platypus have essence. The essence (properties) are in the reading not in the thing being read.

Think of an imaginary platypus. It also has these properties... in your imagination.

In Management speak we would define a thing (an asset or a Configuration Item) using SCAR - Scope, CI level, Attributes and Relationships. Describing the properties (SCAR) doesn't give the thing anything extra. The properties (SCAR) exist as data / information / patterns of information.

What do you think about the other flavour of essence, whereby we project something akin to 'soul' or 'spirit' onto things? What's the process there, do you think? I think it relates to valuing (assetising) things (and even people).

[Belacqua]

Neither the platypus nor the component parts of the platypus have essence.  The essence (properties) are in the reading not in the thing being read.

The essence is the set of properties. The platypus really has a set of properties. Therefore it has an essence. 

Or are you thinking that an essence is some ghostly additional thing?

[DLJ]

Neither the platypus nor the component parts of the platypus have essence.  The essence (properties) are in the reading not in the thing being read.

The essence is the set of properties. The platypus really has a set of properties. Therefore it has an essence. 

Or are you thinking that an essence is some ghostly additional thing?

Nope. Not thinking that. That's why I asked that last question, to show I was making the distinction.

OK, so let's say that these properties, characteristics, attributes etc. = essence. Essence, therefore is the sum of the descriptors... information.

There's the thing (existing) and there's the information about the thing (essence).

[The Grand Nudger]

If we’re forced to think of the five ways as something other than arguments in order to remove the bar of logical coherence, we’ve probably identified the reason that no one finds them compelling.