Proving What We Already "Know"

[The Grand Nudger]

Another argument to consequence - but not on facts. You are certainly responsible for a great deal of death. As you live and breath, I can say that with confidence.

A gods eye view? Hardly. We have a hominids eye view. We probably miss alot. You've reasserted the idea that danger is insensible outside of qualia, but danger remains a fact of circumstance outside of arguments of convenience and regardless of whether or not the thing in danger is conscious of that fact - even when the thing thing in danger is conscious. Does danger mean something? Honestly, what's the point in beating around the bush? If you think no, there's no need for some doomed argument to that effect - it's just what you think, right or wrong...and what you think is that nothing means anything.

What is word?

It's like pulling fucking teeth to get from where you started..to where we are. Stop.

[bennyboy]

A gods eye view?  Hardly.  We have a hominids eye view.  We probably miss alot.

Relative to, say, a worm, yes.  And even more to a car.

Does danger mean something?

Yes.  I define "danger" as "threat of a bad change of state."  But in a Universe without qualia, why would ANY change of state be "bad?"  Or for a machine without qualia?

 Honestly, what's the point in beating around the bush?  If you think no, there's no need for some doomed argument to that effect - it's just what you think, right or wrong...and what you think is that nothing means anything.

What I think is that truth is defined by a context.  The truth of the idea of "danger" is in the context of sentient experience.  Outside that context, there really is no meaning in the word "danger."

Let me define sentience though, not to mean full self-awareness or anything like that-- only the ability to have subject experience, i.e. sensation, and some kind of motivational system to approach / avoid.

It's like pulling fucking teeth to get from where you started..to where we are. Stop.

We can stop whenever you want. Just stop responding, and I'll have nothing more to talk about.

[The Grand Nudger]

I think I've figured out what you mean by a gods eye view - though I think you were simply expressing the idea that we have some better version of x. What do you think accounts for that difference, between car-worm-us?

There are any number of reasons that a thing could be bad in the absence of qualia. To be blunt, there are more reasons that a thing could be bad -absent- any reference to qualia than to those references. Do you think it would be more or less bad to beat a man in a coma, on the notion that they wouldn't experience it?

Things with minimal sentience and things with no detectable sentience whatsoever, even by your definition, are still routinely in danger. Living and nonliving things. Our rivers are in danger - our forests are in danger, etc etc etc.

I'd say you're zero for three doubling down on these...and I doubt that positions of convenience accurately express whatever it is you're trying to communicate. I'd certainly agree that there are dangers to sentient things that are not dangerous to non sentient things. An added set of items of moral import. I also think that there are items of moral import that only apply to sentient things. I'd also say that not all danger is of a moral import - sentient subject or not. Dogs put things in danger, routinely, probably not a moral issue. Earthquakes bring down buildings..also not a moral issue.

Truth in context appears to be an empty phrase. If the context of a truth is the set of relevant facts, than that's just plain old bog standard truth - for example. Realism, relativism, and subjectivism are all cognitive theories of morality. This means, simply, that they are truth apt.

[bennyboy]

I think I've figured out what you mean by a gods eye view - though I think you were simply expressing the idea that we have some better version of x. What do you think accounts for that difference, between car-worm-us?

There are any number of reasons that a thing could be bad in the absence of qualia.   To be blunt, there are more reasons that a thing could be bad -absent- any reference to qualia than to those references.  Do you think it would be more or less bad to beat a man in a coma, on the notion that they wouldn't experience it?  

At that moment in time, that person is a collection of organic materials and not much more. I'd argue the badness comes from the observer (or in this case the imaginer of the hypothetical example).

Things with minimal sentience and things with no detectable sentience whatsoever, even by your definition, are still routinely in danger.  Living and nonliving things.  Our rivers are in danger - our forests are in danger, etc etc etc.

I don't think rivers are in danger. They are changing in composition, for sure. The fish are in danger, because presumably they'd prefer not to suffer pervasive cancer and die-- their motivations to live, breed and by implication evolve may be thwarted. In the context of assessment by humans, THEN rivers can be said to be in danger-- but that's a property of our view of goodness as sentient creatures with preferences about things, not of the river itself.

But take some inorganic liquid flow anywhere else in the universe-- could IT be said to be in danger? Or is it just stuff that may or may not ever be noticed by anything?

Truth in context appears to be an empty phrase.  If the context of a truth is the set of relevant facts, than that's just plain old bog standard truth - for example.  Realism, relativism, and subjectivism are all cognitive theories of morality.  This means, simply, that they are truth apt.

The term "truth in context" is just my way of referring to scope. I'm perfectly happy substituting "context" for "set of relevant facts," because that's what it means. But I think my term sounds catchier and is less verbose.

Either way, the problem is the same. If you draw conclusions base on one set of relevant facts, and you intend to assert that the same conclusion applies to a broader set of facts (or completely different ones), then you either have to justify that generalization, or accept it as axiomatic.

Your description of inanimate objects as being "in danger" is a pretty good example. In the context of human experience, where fresh water is of fundamental importance, and where the misadventures of other animals serve as a canary in the coalmine, thinking of things like rivers as being alive and therefore in danger makes sense. But actually, it's about a step away from shamanism or talk of Mother Gaia.

Take away all the living things that might care about the river's composition, and you take away the "danger" that the river is in. "Danger" requires the "set of relevant facts" in which states of material organization can have import, i.e. sentient creatures. I'm reasonably certain that the river will be equally happy with or without sewage being dumped into it.

[The Grand Nudger]

I think I've figured out what you mean by a gods eye view - though I think you were simply expressing the idea that we have some better version of x. What do you think accounts for that difference, between car-worm-us?

There are any number of reasons that a thing could be bad in the absence of qualia.   To be blunt, there are more reasons that a thing could be bad -absent- any reference to qualia than to those references.  Do you think it would be more or less bad to beat a man in a coma, on the notion that they wouldn't experience it?  

At that moment in time, that person is a collection of organic materials and not much more.  I'd argue the badness comes from the observer (or in this case the imaginer of the hypothetical example).

Argue away, but facts of an observer are still facts - subjectivism is a cognitive position.  It makes statements that can be true or false.  Let's see how far into subjectivism you'd push this.  Let's say one of the facts of the observer (or the imaginer) is that they personally don't feel any shame, in fact, don't think it's wrong for them to do this at all.   Where does the badness come from then, or is it there at all?

I don't think rivers are in danger.  They are changing in composition, for sure.  The fish are in danger, because presumably they'd prefer not to suffer pervasive cancer and die-- their motivations to live, breed and by implication evolve may be thwarted.  In the context of assessment by humans, THEN rivers can be said to be in danger-- but that's a property of our view of goodness as sentient creatures with preferences about things, not of the river itself.

But take some inorganic liquid flow anywhere else in the universe-- could IT be said to be in danger?  Or is it just stuff that may or may not ever be noticed by anything?

The rivers, themselves, are in danger.  If whatever position you hold on some other thing requires you to argue counterfactually for rhetorical effect here, I worry for that other position.  Isn't it simpler to concede that things can be in danger without that being an issue of moral import in and of itself?  That, like your own ideas about beating a man in a coma..any moral import comes from how and by what the beating is delivered?  If a moral agent like us is altering the flow and capturing the headwaters and failing to prevent evaporation as a consequence of poorly implemented irrigation plans - then we might say that the danger a river is in is an item of moral import.  If a mountain rises up and creates a rain shadow...not so much.

The term "truth in context" is just my way of referring to scope.  I'm perfectly happy substituting "context" for "set of relevant facts," because that's what it means.  But I think my term sounds catchier and is less verbose.
[p/quote]
If you're comfortable with a set of relevant facts, then why do you consistently omit any fact other than the facts of some given subject?

Either way, the problem is the same.  If you draw conclusions base on one set of relevant facts, and you intend to assert that the same conclusion applies to a broader set of facts (or completely different ones), then you either have to justify that generalization, or accept it as axiomatic.

Your description of inanimate objects as being "in danger" is a pretty good example.  In the context of human experience, where fresh water is of fundamental importance, and where the misadventures of other animals serve as a canary in the coalmine, thinking of things like rivers as being alive and therefore in danger makes sense.  But actually, it's about a step away from shamanism or talk of Mother Gaia.

Another argument to consequence, not a successful disputation of a simple and demonstrable fact of a rivers circumstance.  I'm not too worried about being a step away from shamanism or mother gaia talk, myself.  It true, and simply true, to say that our rivers are in danger - and more broadly, that danger is a concept that applies to a very broad set of things - not all of which possess qualia, or sentience(by any description), or are alive.  If you're comfortable with a set of relevant facts as truthmaking, then why do you consistently omit and positively dismiss any fact other than the singular fact of some given subject?

Take away all the living things that might care about the river's composition, and you take away the "danger" that the river is in.  "Danger" requires the "set of relevant facts" in which states of material organization can have import, i.e. sentient creatures.  I'm reasonably certain that the river will be equally happy with or without sewage being dumped into it.

Perhaps you believe this because..despite wishing to avail yourself of the language of realism.... you can't shake a foundation of relativism and subjectivism, which you consistently mistake and miscommunicate as "scope" or "context"?  It may take a thing that cares (or..even if it doesn't, a thing that can know) to see that some thing x is bad - but, to use an easy example of the limits of this notion - you (or anyone) personally witnessing a murder, whether you would care or not, whether you would know better or not, whether it would make you happy or not...doesn't seem to change anything about that murder.  Whatever moral import there is to a murder can be independent of you caring, knowing, being happy about it...or even being.  Obviously this goes without saying for a river and whatever moral import there may be to it's destruction.  

We don't care that we're destroying our rivers.  We don't care about the living things that may give a shit about that.  We're happy to do it, because it brings us material wealth and general wellbeing.  Not caring, and being happy about it, doesn't seem to take those rivers out of danger, and like so, it would not mean that there was no moral import to their destruction.  It's simply an example of moral (and, in the end, practical) failure. How can we prove what we already know? Just like that. I don't think it's crucial, we do have apprehensions and we do feel a certain way about things. Both can obviously go awry with rivers as our example. We see destruction and we may already feel a certain way about it, we know something about it, or about us. That it's terrible, or that it makes us feel terrible - but we still do it, ofc. A rational explication is an overlay, in that regard. Though this one is pretty much a deepity. Sometimes doing bad things makes us feel good, and sometimes doing good things makes us feel bad. Even in a relativist or subjectivist framework these would still be observations of facts about a subject in relation to their moral system. You can probably think of multiple examples from your own experience. I know I can.

[bennyboy]

Let's say one of the facts of the observer (or the imaginer) is that they personally don't feel any shame, in fact, don't think it's wrong for them to do this at all.   Where does the badness come from then, or is it there at all?

It's an imposition of others-- either a definition of the word "bad," or an attempt by others to elicit feelings by manipulation.

Take in case the abortion issue. Is abortion "bad?" It is a kind of Shrodinger's cat-- it is both bad and not-bad (or maybe even good) until the question is brought into resolution by asking a particular individual. For example, if you were a biologist watching in horror as the greedy humans you mentioned destroy our rivers and oceans, you might be tempted to go full-on 12 Monkeys and release a virus that made most of the species infertile. In that case, you might see abortion, miscarriage, murder and sterility as tremendous goods.

The rivers, themselves, are in danger.  If whatever position you hold on some other thing requires you to argue counterfactually for rhetorical effect here, I worry for that other position.  Isn't it simpler to concede that things can be in danger without that being an issue of moral import in and of itself?  That, like your own ideas about beating a man in a coma..any moral import comes from how and by what the beating is delivered?  If a moral agent like us is altering the flow and capturing the headwaters and failing to prevent evaporation as a consequence of poorly implemented irrigation plans - then we might say that the danger a river is in is an item of moral import.  If a mountain rises up and creates a rain shadow...not so much.

This is why context is important. In the context of the majority view of the human species, foulness of vital necessities is bad-- river water, air and so on. Very, VERY few would argue otherwise. But is it intrinsically bad? No-- only in that context, or that of other organisms who depend on the same resources for their health and survival.

What about an organism that found our water and atmosphere intolerable? Presumably it would recoil in horror, then get to the task of removing all the icky organic organisms, and reconstituting oceans and air to its own "good."

[The Grand Nudger]

It's an imposition of others-- either a definition of the word "bad," or an attempt by others to elicit feelings by manipulation.

Take in case the abortion issue.  Is abortion "bad?"  It is a kind of Shrodinger's cat-- it is both bad and not-bad (or maybe even good) until the question is brought into resolution by asking a particular individual.  For example, if you were a biologist watching in horror as the greedy humans you mentioned destroy our rivers and oceans, you might be tempted to go full-on 12 Monkeys and release a virus that made most of the species infertile.  In that case, you might see abortion, miscarriage, murder and sterility as tremendous goods.

That's a strong affirmation of fundamental subjectivism.  However, under subjectivism..things are not good-and-bad, like schrodingers cat, until someone is asked.  Things are not good or bad at all outside of a personal opinion.  Moral statements to the contrary are not indeterminable, they are determinable, and wrong in point in fact.  They purport to report some fact about an object, but do not.  Instead, misreporting a fact about a subject.  

Essentially, we'd need one of those decoder rings from a cracker jack box to figure out what fact, if any, they were actually reporting - and, fwiw, I agree that plenty of moral statement's are exactly like that.  Knowledge like that is even easier to prove than realist knowledge.  I think it, therefore It Is that I think that-  aaaand scene.   Personally, I don't have any trouble whatsoever seeing the bad in abortion (or murder, or miscarriage, or sterility).  

This is why context is important.  In the context of the majority view of the human species, foulness of vital necessities is bad-- river water, air and so on.  Very, VERY few would argue otherwise.  But is it intrinsically bad?  No-- only in that context, or that of other organisms who depend on the same resources for their health and survival.

So much for the terms scope and context and truth in context referring to facts.  That they refer to collections of personal opinions and utilitarian advantange is pretty explicit above.  Additionally, it's useful to reiterate that under subjectivism, purportedly moral objective statements are not "true in context" - they are false..because..... they fail to accurately report those facts they purport to report - even if they do report some other actual fact.

What about an organism that found our water and atmosphere intolerable?  Presumably it would recoil in horror, then get to the task of removing all the icky organic organisms, and reconstituting oceans and air to its own "good."

Maybe it would, but I'm not convinced that the set of bad things is exhausted by the set of things creatures recoil from.  Human behavior strongly suggests otherwise.  Hate preachers caught under a massage therapist named Manuel - you probably have addictions or habits. Then there are the positive examples - where people reject clear utilitarian advantage and deny their own persuasions and opinions. What do you make of those sets?

Here, the "context" is disproving what you purport to report as an objective fact.

[bennyboy]

However, under subjectivism..things are not good-and-bad, like schrodingers cat, until someone is asked.  Things are not good or bad at all outside of a personal opinion.  Moral statements to the contrary are not indeterminable, they are determinable, and wrong in point in fact.  They purport to report some fact about an object, but do not.  Instead, misreporting a fact about a subject.  

I think we can agree on this.

So much for the terms scope and context and truth in context referring to facts.  That they refer to collections of personal opinions and utilitarian advantange is pretty explicit above.  Additionally, it's useful to reiterate that under subjectivism, purportedly moral objective statements are not "true in context" - they are false..because..... they fail to accurately report those facts they purport to report - even if they do report some other actual fact.

Well, was the fact of the world's flatness an opinion or a matter of utilitarian advantage? Or did people just "know" shit that wasn't true? In fact, they knew it so convincingly that they might either have laughed you out of the room or burned you at the stake for suggesting a spherical world.

In this kind of case, people have essentially created a kind of welfare equivalent of the Matrix, where they've isolated themselves from reality with a convincing collection of narratives and mutually-affirmed "knowledge."

Here's a question, though-- how sure should WE be that we aren't in exactly that same boat, and that what we are fully convinced represents Facts™ isn't just Flat Earth mk. II?

[The Grand Nudger]

Sure, people can get things wrong (but only cognitive things, lol..morality may not be truth apt at all..not subjective, not relative, not real). As long as you're doubting truth, though, why not doubt that the earth is round? If you think that's a fact and it would be ludicrous to object to it, then you understand people who say that there's something bad about beating a man in a coma, not as on opinion, but in fact... and it would be ludicrous to object to that.

What have you been shown with regards to a round earth that you could not be shown with regard to the moral import of beating a comatose man? I'd say that's the start of an answer to the question of how sure we should be about either thing.

[bennyboy]

Sure, people can get things wrong (but only cognitive things, lol..morality may not be truth apt at all..not subjective, not relative, not real).  As long as you're doubting truth, though, why not doubt that the earth is round?  If you think that's a fact and it would be ludicrous to object to it, then you understand people who say that there's something bad about beating a man in a coma, not as on opinion, but in fact... and it would be ludicrous to object to that.  

What have you been shown with regards to a round earth that you could not be shown with regard to the moral import of beating a comatose man?  I'd say that's the start of an answer to the question of how sure we should be about either thing.

In the context of my world view, as a living human being with a 20th/21st century life experience, the roundness of the Earth is so apparent that if it were not true, the entire world view would be in doubt.

If I were in a dream, and certain patterns emerged and were consistent across time, then I'd say that in the context of that dream, certain things were true that were not true in waking life.  For example, I've had dreams in which I could fly-- the truth of which was verified by the will to fly, the act of flight, and experiences that accorded with the truth of that ability.  Even upon waking up, I'd argue that it was true that I could fly in that particular dream.  That's a truth-in-context.

The problem is what happens when someone tries to generalize that-- "I've had many out of body experiences, vivid dreams of great portent, etc., so I am a special gift from God, and I need to surround myself with teenage girls who will help me breed an entire family-- nay, NATION-- of special gifts from God.  But don't doubt me and ask for evidence, because the Almighty is shy and gets stagefright."  Even if I accept that this guy can fly in his dreams, he's gonna have to do quite the tapdance to get me to believe anything beyond that.

___
re: morality

Morality is a special case, as it's an attempt to reconcile subjective truths (e.g. a sense of value of various states of being, like liberty or safety) with objective UN-truths.  It requires deliberately holding a world view that does NOT represent a factual one, and then getting each other to act in such a way that the "real" world conforms more with the idealistic one.

For example, human males are pretty rapey.  But we all know and love at least some women, and we imagine a nicer world in which men do not rape women.  That world isn't real-- but through our social efforts, we approach it little by little.  It's not "true" in a worldly sense that women have a right not to be raped.  It's true in the context of a shared vision.

I've seen what happens when people try, for example, to generalize that to the animal world-- middle-aged women shrieking in horror when their little dog gets its butt licked by another dog, for example.  Or parents who beat children for transgressions against moral rules that they aren't sufficiently developed really to understand. Or people who love babies calling a 12-week embryo a baby, and crying over what is basically a tadpole, but will happily eat veal.