Proving What We Already "Know"

[The Grand Nudger]

People are inconsistent, we have many faults. You've drawn an inference about the nonexistence of a thing by it's violation, for example. It would make as much sense to say that women don't exist because they're violated. Is this notion one of the things that you hold to be so true and so apparently true that you'd have to doubt your entire worldview if it were not?

I don't think morality is a special case, personally. I think any morality that required a person to hold to objective untruth would be a poor morality - but ofc I would think that as a realist, eh? Similarly, I don't think that a persons willingness to do an immoral thing (or societies failure to be aligned with our moral goals aat a given point in time) suggests that there can be no moral truth. I can know it's not a good idea to have that second piece of cake and still do it, too. My eating that second piece of cake doesn't change anything about it, or whether or not I should. Society may strongly insist that I do eat that piece of cake, maybe it's my birthday, or maybe it's rude to refuse, etc etc etc.

Perhaps that's a hangup that leads to the question of how we prove what we know? You're looking for a special case. There's a possibility that morality is not, in fact, a special case. You mention that x can be violated, and so, a defeater for that argument on it's own grounds could only be to show that this x is not violated...morality's special case there being some hoped for ability to prevent us from doing bad things, because (or when, or if) we notice that they're bad. We can (at least potentially) prove our moral statements in the same way we can prove our names or that the sun rises in the east - but having done so won't grant some further ability or desired state of affairs, and so, seeing that this desired state of affairs fails to materialize is not a demonstration that the moral assertions cannot be true or have not been proven true. If I say "x is bad because of a b and c" and you take a look..and, objectively, a b and c are all present - in what way has this moral statement failed to accurately report the relevant facts of an object? If someone then did x, would a b and c suddenly not be there?

That rights don't exist or that morality is subjective because rapists rape, because they can't do things no one claims they can do, and no one expects them to do... is...to put it bluntly, nonsense. Morality may in fact be subjective..but that certainly isn't a cogent approach to proving that truth, if you already know it, and your entire worldview depends on it. What you're angling for when considering objective morality (or rights) is something akin to a natural law, where we only have the right not to be raped if we cannot, in fact, be raped. Where morality is only objective if no other outcome can prevail. That's not what rights or objective morality are, but if that's what you go out looking for you won't find much of it and I suppose that could easily lead to statements such as these in your posts. I usually tell people, when it becomes clear that they're looking for some greater or grander x than objective moral statements are or even can be - to think smaller. More mundane.

It's true that objective moral statements can't do many things x, that they fail to force many outcomes x - but all that matters with respect to their objectivity as opposed to their subjectivity, is that they accurately report a set of relevant facts about a thing which do not depend on a given observer.

[bennyboy]

People are inconsistent, we have many faults.  You've drawn an inference about the nonexistence of a thing by it's violation, for example.  It would make as much sense to say that women don't exist because they're violated.  Is this notion one of the things that you hold to be so true and so apparently true that you'd have to doubt your entire worldview if it were not?  

I don't think morality is a special case, personally.  I think any morality that required a person to hold to objective untruth would be a poor morality - but ofc I would think that as a realist, eh?  Similarly, I don't think that a persons willingness to do an immoral thing (or societies failure to be aligned with our moral goals aat a given point in time) suggests that there can be no moral truth.  I can know it's not a good idea to have that second piece of cake and still do it, too.  My eating that second piece of cake doesn't change anything about it, or whether or not I should.  Society may strongly insist that I do eat that piece of cake, maybe it's my birthday, or maybe it's rude to refuse, etc etc etc.  

Perhaps that's a hangup that leads to the question of how we prove what we know?  You're looking for a special case.    There's a possibility that morality is not, in fact, a special case.  You mention that x can be violated, and so, a defeater for that argument on it's own grounds could only be to show that this x is not violated...morality's special case there being some hoped for ability to prevent us from doing bad things, because (or when, or if) we notice that they're bad.  We can (at least potentially) prove our moral statements in the same way we can prove our names or that the sun rises in the east - but having done so won't grant some further ability or desired state of affairs, and so, seeing that this desired state of affairs fails to materialize is not a demonstration that the moral assertions cannot be true or have not been proven true.  If I say "x is bad because of a b and c" and you take a look..and, objectively, a b and c are all present - in what way has this moral statement failed to accurately report the relevant facts of an object?  If someone then did x, would a b and c suddenly not be there?  

That rights don't exist or that morality is subjective because rapists rape, because they can't do things no one claims they can do, and no one expects them to do... is...to put it bluntly, nonsense.  Morality may in fact be subjective..but that certainly isn't a cogent approach to proving that truth, if you already know it, and your entire worldview depends on it.  What you're angling for when considering objective morality (or rights) is something akin to a natural law, where we only have the right not to be raped if we cannot, in fact, be raped.  Where morality is only objective if no other outcome can prevail.  That's not what rights or objective morality are, but if that's what you go out looking for you won't find much of it and I suppose that could easily lead to statements such as these in your posts.  I usually tell people, when it becomes clear that they're looking for some greater or grander x than objective moral statements are or even can be - to think smaller.  More mundane.

It's true that objective moral statements can't do many things x, that they fail to force many outcomes x - but all that matters with respect to their objectivity as opposed to their subjectivity, is that they accurately report a set of relevant facts about a thing which do not depend on a given observer.

If a moral world view matched the actual world, there would be no need for moral consideration, or even the term "morality."

Consider it this way, perhaps-- a moral world view is one which models a non-generalizable context where what is true in our world is untrue in that one.  It says, "Yes, in this world, someone can be raped due to:
-the tendency of males of the species to do it
-the availability of individuals to whom it can be done
-circumstances in which it can be done"

"However, we can create a world in which:
-males can be genetically, hormonally or physically altered to limit tendency
-females can be so heavily protected (say, by surgically installed crotch lasers) that they cannot viably be raped
-males and females will be entirely segregated.
-the penalties for violation are so harsh that nobody will violate."

So, in the context of that virtual world, it is not true that rape is a thing.  Having established this solidly in our minds, we attempt to prove that this truth can be generalized to our actual world.  The problem is that it can't be, and the consequences are disasterous.

[The Grand Nudger]

If a moral world view matched the actual world, there would be no need for moral consideration, or even the term "morality."

Sure there would.  That there's such a thing as a scientific worldview is only because there's scientific consideration, and an idea of what the term refers to.  Ultimately that worldview may be wrong, but not for either of those reasons.

Likewise, there are many..many... ways that it could be that no moral world view matched the actual world - but this isn't one of them.

Consider it this way, perhaps-- a moral world view is one which models a non-generalizable context where what is true in our world is untrue in that one.  It says, "Yes, in this world, someone can be raped due to:
-the tendency of males of the species to do it
-the availability of individuals to whom it can be done
-circumstances in which it can be done"

I'll stop you at "can be".   It does not matter whether or not a person can be x-d in any world to moral realism or moral facts.  It's conceivably the case that in a world where x is or isn't bad, it still may or may not happen.   

"However, we can create a world in which:
-males can be genetically, hormonally or physically altered to limit tendency
-females can be so heavily protected (say, by surgically installed crotch lasers) that they cannot viably be raped
-males and females will be entirely segregated.
-the penalties for violation are so harsh that nobody will violate."

So, in the context of that virtual world, it is not true that rape is a thing.  Having established this solidly in our minds, we attempt to prove that this truth can be generalized to our actual world.  The problem is that it can't be, and the consequences are disasterous.

In a world where x was bad and we arranged our society so that it couldn't happen, it would still be a thing and still be bad.  It just wouldn't be a present concern.  Like damaging the wheels of ox carts while the owners are asleep.  Shitty thing to do, isn't happening...and precisely because people took concrete and factual steps to prevent it.  In a wporld where x was bad and we didn't do any of that...x...would stil...be bad.

I'll suggest again that you're saddling the idea you wish to object to, and replace with this empty truth in context phrase, with things that have absolutely nothing to do with what you're objecting to. It's a fundamental misunderstanding that you have and express in every post when you say "if things were that way..then they would be this way " well, no..and the things you're coming up with aren't just irrelevant to the idea you're objecting too..they're fucking bananapants. I can see why, if this is your field of play, you wonder how we might prove what we already know. I don't think that you ever could prove what you claim to know - but it looks like a you problem more than a we problem.

For assertions to moral facts, however, it's much simpler - even if it leaves people far lesssatisfied than they imagined they might be. All one needs to do to prove some moral fact is to show that the thing in question accurately has those attributes one assigns to it as the explanation for what makes it bad. That, for example..when you x someone, it actually hurts..and that's not just your opinion as an observer, because of some fact about yourself. That's it, that's all. You can see how, for example, the assertion "homosexuality is bad" fails that test where our favorite "rape is bad" succeeds.

[bennyboy]

If a moral world view matched the actual world, there would be no need for moral consideration, or even the term "morality."

Sure there would.  That there's such a thing as a scientific worldview is only because there's scientific consideration, and an idea of what the term refers to.  Ultimately that worldview may be wrong, but not for either of those reasons.

Likewise, there are many..many... ways that it could be that no moral world view matched the actual world - but this isn't one of them.

Let me be clear, here. I'm speaking specifically of a moral world view, not of all world views. A moral view is predicated on what SHOULD BE, in contrast with what IS. This is different from say a scientific world view, which attempts to model reality as it is (whether it's complete or not).

I'll stop you at "can be".   It does not matter whether or not a person can be x-d in any world to moral realism or moral facts.  It's conceivably the case that in a world where x is or isn't bad, it still may or may not happen.   

I don't think there's any bad, ever, represented in material reality, or can be. Badness is deviation from a model of rightness. As people, we have strong feelings about certain things-- deaths of infants, disease, personal rights of various types.

Consider this-- a cow probably has a different model of rightness than you do. I believe a cow, if it could imagine at all, would imagine a world in which nobody mistreats or kills cows, for food or otherwise. So why do people mistreat or kill cows? Because their moral world view doesn't include non-humans unless they're pets.

Different moral models, different moral assessments.

For assertions to moral facts, however, it's much simpler - even if it leaves people far lesssatisfied than they imagined they might be.  All one needs to do to prove some moral fact is to show that the thing in question accurately has those attributes one assigns to it as the explanation for what makes it bad.  That, for example..when you x someone, it actually hurts..and that's not just your opinion as an observer, because of some fact about yourself.  That's it, that's all.  You can see how, for example, the assertion "homosexuality is bad" fails that test where our favorite "rape is bad" succeeds.

You haven't yet proven that things hurting is bad. Is this to be taken as an axiom? What if someone (say, a person in a coma) cannot actually FEEL pain? What if it's a cow, or a cockroach?

As for homosexuality-- again, what are the standards of goodness or badness? I can imagine scenarios where homosexuality might reasonably be considered bad-- for example, if a regent has only one son, but wants to heal fractures with another kingdom by marriage. That son being homosexual could cost the kingdom financial hardship, or even lead to war. Presumably, almost any model of rightness is likely to view financial hardship or war as bad (though I know of a few where even those are considered good).

Homosexuality (or anything else) isn't intrinisically good, bad, or neutral. Different times, different moral models, different assessments.

[The Grand Nudger]

Let me be clear, here.  I'm speaking specifically of a moral world view, not of all world views.  A moral view is predicated on what SHOULD BE, in contrast with what IS.  This is different from say a scientific world view, which attempts to model reality as it is (whether it's complete or not).

I fail to see how that rescues the gross inaccuracy of the demands I responded to.  Why should there be no need for moral consideration, if any moral worldview matched with reality?  Why should there be no term morality, if any moral system matched with reality?  Here again you're pleading a special case....positively insisting on a special case - but a moral view does not have to be a special case.  Sure, different types of views are different for many reasons, but there's no reason that any type of view about anything being accurate or matching with reality would mean that there would be no need for consideration of that subject or for terms to accurately communicate it to others.

Bananapants.

I don't think there's any bad, ever, represented in material reality, or can be.  Badness is deviation from a model of rightness.  As people, we have strong feelings about certain things-- deaths of infants, disease, personal rights of various types.

I get that you think that.  You thinking that is a fact of a subject (you), but not a fact of the object(moral systems).  There are numerous ways that bad can be represented in material reality.  You disagree with them.

Consider this-- a cow probably has a different model of rightness than you do.  I believe a cow, if it could imagine at all, would imagine a world in which nobody mistreats or kills cows, for food or otherwise.  So why do people mistreat or kill cows?  Because their moral world view doesn't include non-humans unless they're pets.

The ethiops say that their gods are flat-nosed and black, while the thracians say that theirs have red hair and blue eyes. Yet if cattle or horses or lions had hands and could draw, and could sculpt like men, then the horses would draw their gods like horses, and cattle like cattle. 

Lots of people who's worldviews do include non humans still exploit and abuse animals.  Frankly, most world views include them even if it's only obliquely in provisions against excessive cruelty.  We frequently find ourselves doing things or ignoring things we do which we think are bad.  That's a problem for emotivist and subjectivist moral theories, actually.  A huge one.  Less so for relativism as it's understood that groups and societies can cause a person to internalize shame over something that they themselves would otherwise enjoy and find to be morally neutral or possibly even good.  Not a problem at all for realism, as it's just another example of the moral failures common to humans.  Common....ostensibly, for the same reason that cattle would have their own model of righteousness and draw their gods like cattle - the same notion underlying subjectivist criticism of moral propositions.  We're compromised moral agents, and in large part due to our particular biology.

I'd suggest that this is another attempt to saddle objectivism with baggage not contained in the position.  No human or cattle moral model need be true, for moral realism to be true.  It's just the idea that at least some moral statements can be true or false with respect to the facts they purport to report, and insomuch as a statement did get those facts right, the moral statement would itself be a moral fact.  

You haven't yet proven that things hurting is bad.  Is this to be taken as an axiom?

By all means..lets discuss.  Is hurting things not contained in whatever collection of stuff we call morality?  Or does that seem to be at least part of what we're talking about when we use the terms?  Is harm completely irrelevant to morality?  

As for homosexuality-- again, what are the standards of goodness or badness?  I can imagine scenarios where homosexuality might reasonably be considered bad-- for example, if a regent has only one son, but wants to heal fractures with another kingdom by marriage.

Homosexuals can have children.  

That son being homosexual could cost the kingdom financial hardship, or even lead to war.

Heterosexual rulers don't seem to have fared any better in this regard.   

Homosexuality (or anything else) isn't intrinisically good, bad, or neutral.  Different times, different moral models, different assessments.

I'd certainly agree that homosexuality isn't intrinsically bad.  That there are relative differences between ages, and subjective differences between people, doesn't actually determine that there can be no objectively true conclusion (and...just in case the hilarity of all of this escapes you for whatever reason..the declaration that homosexuality is neither intrinsically good nor intrinsically bad is the assertion of an objective moral truth claim).  People do math different ways, and disagree on the correct answers - and yet..there is a correct answer to what the sum of one and one is.  

So, let's talk about the characteristics of realism - because you did just attempt a realist justification for why homosexuality is bad - despite stating your strong support for moral subjectivism.  If it were true...that not having children was bad, and that homosexuals couldn't have children, this would not be a subjective claim.  If it were true.... that homosexuals made the kingdom bankrupt or at risk, somehow, and the kingdom being at risk were a bad thing - this would not be a subjective claim.  These are realist claims whose truth depends on getting those facts right...and they don't...so they aren't..or..if they are, not for those reasons.

[bennyboy]

Let me be clear, here.  I'm speaking specifically of a moral world view, not of all world views.  A moral view is predicated on what SHOULD BE, in contrast with what IS.  This is different from say a scientific world view, which attempts to model reality as it is (whether it's complete or not).

I fail to see how that rescues the gross inaccuracy of the demands I responded to.  Why should there be no need for moral consideration, if any moral worldview matched with reality?  Why should there be no term morality, if any moral system matched with reality?  Here again you're pleading a special case....positively insisting on a special case - but a moral view does not have to be a special case.  Sure, different types of views are different for many reasons, but there's no reason that any type of view about anything being accurate or matching with reality would mean that there would be no need for consideration of that subject or for terms to accurately communicate it to others.

If nobody ever raped, you wouldn't sit around formulating the idea of rape and establishing social conventions for dealing with it. You wouldn't even have a word for it.

If nothing ever died, you wouldn't have to evaluate the consequences of death, and establish principles of rights to live.

[The Grand Nudger]

What we might not do and what could not be done are not the same things. So, for example..I can imagine some act that you could commit on alien species nothing like human beings at all. It's not a real thing, that's really happening..just a thought experiment about whether or not doing x to this alien would be bad. Similarly, even if nothing ever did die, I could still evaluate the consequences of death, and establish what principles or rights to life there may be in that scenario - just as I can consider what effect nothing ever dying would have on the same..despite it also not being a present reality.

We do..btw...have words for all of these things........?

This is a particularly egregious mistake in the case of realism, though..as we may actually not know every bad thing we're up to and may not have words to describe those things - but that doesn't change whether or not they're bad in realism. How committed are you to insisting that the only possible moral view that could match reality was one with no consideration, and no words to express it...juxtaposed against the contention that the only moral view that could match reality would be one that was very well considered and communicable.

[bennyboy]

So, let's talk about the characteristics of realism - because you did just attempt a realist justification for why homosexuality is bad - despite stating your strong support for moral subjectivism.  If it were true...that not having children was bad, and that homosexuals couldn't have children, this would not be a subjective claim.  If it were true.... that homosexuals made the kingdom bankrupt or at risk, somehow, and the kingdom being at risk were a bad thing - this would not be a subjective claim.  These are realist claims whose truth depends on getting those facts right...and they don't...so they aren't..or..if they are, not for those reasons.

If a kingdom came to harm in the way I described, then you'd imagine another world in which it hadn't. That hypothetical perfect world would NOT be represented in reality.

And if that turn of events never happened, you'd never NEED to imagine that other world. The moral idea that "homosexuality is bad" would never have occurred.

[The Grand Nudger]

Right, and the harm being present in the one world, and not present in another, answers the question of whether or not it would be bad to do x. That is a realist justification in both worlds..whether it's deemed good or bad. If in one world homosexuals really couldn't have children and in the other, like in ours they could..for example. Circumstances can be factually different, don't you think..and if differences of factual circumstances matter to moral considerations..guess what that is, again? Moral realism. Whether or not the idea that homosexuality is bad occurs to a given subject is completely irrelevant to whether or not homosexuality is bad in moral realism. Additionally, whether or not the perfect world is represented in reality is completely immaterial to moral realism, as you just noted yourself..what is, and what ought to be, not the same.

We can repeat this allover again with the question of whether or not it's bad to not have children. Let's try to figure something out because this seems to be a major stumbling block to you being able to answer the question you asked in the op. Where on earth do you get your ideas about moral realism, what it would mean, and what it would entail, from?

[bennyboy]

What we might not do and what could not be done are not the same things.  So, for example..I can imagine some act that you could commit on alien species nothing like human beings at all.   It's not a real thing, that's really happening..just a thought experiment about whether or not doing x to this alien would be bad.   Similarly, even if nothing ever did die, I could still evaluate the consequences of death, and establish what principles or rights to life there may be in that scenario - just as I can consider what effect nothing ever dying would have on the same..despite it also not being a present reality.

We do..btw...have words for all of these things........?

This is a particularly egregious mistake in the case of realism, though..as we may actually not know every bad thing we're up to and may not have words to describe those things - but that doesn't change whether or not they're bad in realism.  How committed are you to insisting that the only possible moral view that could match reality was one with no consideration, and no words to express it...juxtaposed against the contention that the only moral view that could match reality would be one that was very well considered and communicable.

If nothing ever did die, the idea of death would never come up.  You don't spend any time lamenting the fact that tables only have 2 legs, or that the sun is blue, or that fizzleworts so rarely beget booble-de-boobs these days.

We'll probably have to shut down this line, because what I've already said is as concise and clear as I can make it: 

In order to have an OUGHT, you need to have an imagined world that is better in some regard than this one.  In order to have a BAD, you have to have a model of GOOD.

Without motivated sentience, you can't have good.  If nothing were living on Earth, it wouldn't be bad if bodies of water were highly acidic-- anymore than we consider Jupiter's atmosphere, whatever it is, "bad."