A sidenote on moral absolutes

[genkaus]

Not necessarily true, utilitarianism was created as an attempt to minimise suffering in peoples and Bentham writes TPOMAL in response to suffering, not to production of pleasure alone. Furthermore, it is attributed an equal value in the main aim of the act utilitarian theory, with the greatest good being the maximisation of pleasure and the minimisation of pain. It is not my supposition that these things are antithetical, it is the assertion of utilitarianism itself, as proposed first by Epicurus and later by the modern philosophers (such as Bentham and Mill). No, causing the greatest amount of suffering in the present would be the right choice, whereas in reality their actions would still be those which produce the greatest pleasure, even if not for the current generation.

That is exactly my point. Since the utilitarian theory is based on that assertion, that makes it conditional and not absolute. To the best of our knowledge, that assertion applies only to common human psychology. A simple example would be S&M community where pleasure and pain are not antithetical. Its not hard to imagine other communities or species to which the principle doesn't apply either. Ergo, we can conclude that even though it may seem absolutist, since it is based on a premise that is not always true (and can be shown to be so), it is very much contextual.

[liam]

A simple example would be S&M community where pleasure and pain are not antithetical. Its not hard to imagine other communities or species to which the principle doesn't apply either.

I see your point, however, I wonder whether the assertion does not allow for such things, for example, the masochistic example may not argue that pain and suffering are still bad but rather that they produce in the individual greater pleasure, even if by way of pain, than they do pain itself.

This left me wondering whether that was a hole in the actual theory itself or in my own appraisal of it. What I was, more specifically wondering, was whether or not this was an issue of whether or not it is not absolute or whether or not it is not appropriate for all situations. I shall explain below:

Ergo, we can conclude that even though it may seem absolutist, since it is based on a premise that is not always true (and can be shown to be so), it is very much contextual.

This seems to me to be a confusing issue, just because it is not universally true does this mean that I was wrong or that there is a fundamental issue in the absolute itself? For example, the S&M community may have been an iceberg issue for my evaluation or rather an issue that was overlooked by the utilitarians in supposing that the two 'sovereign masters' were binary opposites.

[genkaus]

I see your point, however, I wonder whether the assertion does not allow for such things, for example, the masochistic example may not argue that pain and suffering are still bad but rather that they produce in the individual greater pleasure, even if by way of pain, than they do pain itself.

This left me wondering whether that was a hole in the actual theory itself or in my own appraisal of it. What I was, more specifically wondering, was whether or not this was an issue of whether or not it is not absolute or whether or not it is not appropriate for all situations. I shall explain below:

This seems to me to be a confusing issue, just because it is not universally true does this mean that I was wrong or that there is a fundamental issue in the absolute itself? For example, the S&M community may have been an iceberg issue for my evaluation or rather an issue that was overlooked by the utilitarians in supposing that the two 'sovereign masters' were binary opposites.

My position is that that absolutism lies not in the theory itself, but in its practitioner. Compare moral theories to scientific theories (science in the 16th century id, it makes it any easier). On one hand we have the guide to understanding and judging the physical reality, on the other, human actions.

Suppose I was an idiot incapable of understanding the basics behind the Newton's law of gravitation, but nevertheless, capable of understanding the formula. Without the understanding of its premises, but understanding that it is applicable in many of the scenarios, I'd tend to apply it absolutely. And if I were ot discover the black holes, where the law completely fails, I'd come to the conclusion that those bodies were behaving unscientifically (or there were other bodies or beings at play). But without the proper understanding of the premises of the law itself, I would not be able to doubt its validity or understand the context where it is applicable and where it is not. But if I do understand them, I would get that it is a convenient approximation which is not applicable in certain cases.

The same, I'd say, applies to moral theories. If the practitioner simply follows the letter of the theory without understanding its philosophical underpinnings, he's more like to apply it dogmatically and in an absolutist manner. But if they do understand it, they are better qualified to apply it contextually and, frankly, rationally. However, it is a lot more difficult in case of morality than science because hardly any moral theories have clear-cut and explicit philosophical base and most of them are simply a mish-mash of religious, social and cultural baggage. As far as morality is concerned, we are still blood-letting and exorcising demons.

[liam]

I see what you're saying but I don't feel you've entirely addressed what I said, nonetheless it would be beneficial to reflect on what you have said.

A lack of understanding in certain people is an inevitability that cannot be controlled, this is true of every theory and this would suggest to me the kind of understanding proposed in Searle's 'Chinese room'. I don't disagree that an individual can be an absolutist in the theory but rather I'd argue that it always attempts to assimilate them into the idea that such and such an action is always good, this seems to be the case for all theories and this is all I wished to state. I agree that there is very little upon which to base morality but nonetheless we should still try and find the safest ground possible. I'd argue that while these social and cultural influences can't be ignored, they can be removed by rational reflection and a doubt about one's own society and/or culture, even if not fully.

[genkaus]

I see what you're saying but I don't feel you've entirely addressed what I said, nonetheless it would be beneficial to reflect on what you have said.

A lack of understanding in certain people is an inevitability that cannot be controlled, this is true of every theory and this would suggest to me the kind of understanding proposed in Searle's 'Chinese room'. I don't disagree that an individual can be an absolutist in the theory but rather I'd argue that it always attempts to assimilate them into the idea that such and such an action is always good, this seems to be the case for all theories and this is all I wished to state. I agree that there is very little upon which to base morality but nonetheless we should still try and find the safest ground possible. I'd argue that while these social and cultural influences can't be ignored, they can be removed by rational reflection and a doubt about one's own society and/or culture, even if not fully.

I'm assuming the "it" here refers to the moral theory. I guess that's the only point of disagreement left between us. While you see the idea that such and such action is always good as inherent in the theory, I see it as a result of human need for certainty and easy answers - even if that human happens to be the philosopher propounding that theory.

[liam]

I'm assuming the "it" here refers to the moral theory. I guess that's the only point of disagreement left between us. While you see the idea that such and such action is always good as inherent in the theory, I see it as a result of human need for certainty and easy answers - even if that human happens to be the philosopher propounding that theory.

Indeed it does, apologies for the ambiguity in terms. Very well, there seems little to be discussed left here, unless you've anything else to say?