Not Convinced Determinism Makes Sense of Moral Responsibility. Convince Me It Does

[Mudhammam]

The question was directed at anyone so thanks for taking the stab. You summarized it better than I could have. By the way, I really enjoyed the video you posted about the EAAN argument further down in the forum.

[genkaus]

Thank you for taking the time to reply. So you would consider your position under the umbrella of compatibilism?

Maybe, but I'm not certain of that. Most of the compatibilist positions I'm familiar with accept the premise of determinism/free-will debate (the observer regarded as separate from causal chain) and go from there. My position is that the classical concept of free-will has become nonsensical and should be reformulated to better reflect our current knowledge.

As to my brother's argument, I want to get away from the fine-tuning argument he imbeds in his premises and get to the issue Darwin himself seemed unsure about in one his letters often quote-mined by creationists: "Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?" So basically, if our claim is that naturalism is true, does it necessitate a skepticism about the reliability of our thought processes to the extent that it undermines our claim? (I think this phrasing might be misguided but this is essentially the argument I have encountered).

Skepticism regarding reliability of our thought processes is the mainstay of any scientific endeavor. But your brother seems to have a misguided notion regarding what it means. Skepticism doesn't automatically undermine a position, it simply asks for justification. And the claims regarding naturalism have been vindicated through both logic and evidence.

Also, how the hell do I hide this obnoxiously long quote so that you don't have to scroll through everything we already stated multiple times?

Use "[hide] [/hi de]" tags.

[Angrboda]

Also, how the hell do I hide this obnoxiously long quote so that you don't have to scroll through everything we already stated multiple times?

A small tutorial on quoting....

This code....

Code:

[quote='genkaus' pid='555722' dateline='1386227917']

"Choice" is a difficult concept to analyze without the metaphysical preconceptions. Specifically, within the classical determinism/free-will debate, the concept of "choice" is regarded as antithetical to determinism. And it is those ideas about choice that inform our view about "control".

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For example, suppose I go to a restaurant, look over the menu and consider the following factors a) the steak here is good and within budget, b) the lobster is better but expensive, c) the chicken was undercooked last time. Thus, I come to a decision and make the "choice" of ordering steak. Now, a determinist would say that since these factors were processed by my consciousness to give a logical result, there was no actual choice involved. A believer of free-will might argue that "I" had a certain leeway, that the output of these factors was not binding and therefore the element of choice was involved.
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Results in:

"Choice" is a difficult concept to analyze without the metaphysical preconceptions. Specifically, within the classical determinism/free-will debate, the concept of "choice" is regarded as antithetical to determinism. And it is those ideas about choice that inform our view about "control".

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For example, suppose I go to a restaurant, look over the menu and consider the following factors a) the steak here is good and within budget, b) the lobster is better but expensive, c) the chicken was undercooked last time. Thus, I come to a decision and make the "choice" of ordering steak. Now, a determinist would say that since these factors were processed by my consciousness to give a logical result, there was no actual choice involved. A believer of free-will might argue that "I" had a certain leeway, that the output of these factors was not binding and therefore the element of choice was involved.

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Or, selectively quote:

Code:

[quote='genkaus' pid='555722' dateline='1386227917']
Where both these positions go wrong is with the assumption that "I" am an observer apart from the actual causal chain. Even the determinist regards the processes that went into the decision making as somehow separate from the "I" - and the question both parties argue over is whether or not that observer can affect the causal chain while remaining separate from it and they give their opinion regarding choice based on it. They assume that if this a-causal observer can affect the causal chain, then he can exert control and has choice and if he can't, then both control and choice are illusions
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[i]Your first response here...[/i]

[quote='genkaus' pid='555722' dateline='1386227917']
But if we accept that the observer, the "I", is a part of the causal chain, then the previous idea regarding choice becomes meaningless. Both control and choice cannot come from something beyond but must be a part of the causal chain itself. So, in this scenario, the way we re-examined our idea about free-will (what is it supposed to be free from), we also need to re-examine the idea about choice and control.
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[i]Your second response here...[/i]

Results in:

Where both these positions go wrong is with the assumption that "I" am an observer apart from the actual causal chain. Even the determinist regards the processes that went into the decision making as somehow separate from the "I" - and the question both parties argue over is whether or not that observer can affect the causal chain while remaining separate from it and they give their opinion regarding choice based on it. They assume that if this a-causal observer can affect the causal chain, then he can exert control and has choice and if he can't, then both control and choice are illusions

Your first response here...

But if we accept that the observer, the "I", is a part of the causal chain, then the previous idea regarding choice becomes meaningless. Both control and choice cannot come from something beyond but must be a part of the causal chain itself. So, in this scenario, the way we re-examined our idea about free-will (what is it supposed to be free from), we also need to re-examine the idea about choice and control.

Your second response here...

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[Mudhammam]

The fine tuning argument...
Everything in it has been quite nicely explained by apo a few months ago...
https://atheistforums.org/thread-17548-p...#pid427264

I read the full review of Don Tow's review of Martin Ree's Six Numbers. You know Don Tow doesn't quite dispute fine-tuning and actually favors "Interpretation B," that there is an intelligent Creator, right? Just thought that was interesting as you used Don Tow's review to rebut the arguments made my Martin Rees.

[xpastor]

Just a short note. Christians are always blathering about God's gift of freewill and claiming that atheistic determinism puts an end to moral responsibility. However, the fact is that it is difficult to extract any conclusion other than determinism from the theistic premise of an omnipotent, omniscient deity. Before the 19th century virtually all arguments for and against determinism were in a theological context.

The 18th century writer Sam Johnson was very troubled by the idea of determinism and argued against it with his biographer Boswell who had been brought up as a Scottish Calvinist.

Boswell: "The argument for the moral necessity of human actions is always, I observe, fortified by supposing universal prescience to be one of the attributes of the Deity." Johnson: "You are surer that you are free, than you are of prescience; you are surer that you can lift up your finger or not as you please, than you are of any conclusion from a deduction of reasoning. But let us consider a little the objection from prescience. It is certain I am either to go home tonight or not; that does not prevent my freedom." Boswell: "That it is certain you are either to go home or not, does not prevent your freedom; because the liberty of choice between the two is compatible with that certainty. But if one of these events be certain now, you have no future power of volition. If it be certain you are to go home to-night, you must go home." Johnson: "If I am well acquainted with a man, I can judge with great probability how he will act in any case, without his being restrained by my judging. God may have this probability increased to certainty." Boswell: When it is increased to certainty, freedom ceases, because that cannot be certainly foreknown, which is not certain at the time; but if it be certain at the time, it is a contradiction in terms to maintain that there can be afterwards any contingency dependent on the exercise of will or anything else." Johnson: "All theory is against the freedom of the will; all experience for it."

I sympathize with Johnson's perplexity, and his last statement wonderfully epitomizes how we all feel on the subject. However, I think he is a long way from having proved free will.

[Angrboda]

The 18th century writer Sam Johnson was very troubled by the idea of determinism and argued against it with his biographer Boswell who had been brought up as a Scottish Calvinist.

Boswell: "The argument for the moral necessity of human actions is always, I observe, fortified by supposing universal prescience to be one of the attributes of the Deity." Johnson: "You are surer that you are free, than you are of prescience; you are surer that you can lift up your finger or not as you please, than you are of any conclusion from a deduction of reasoning. But let us consider a little the objection from prescience. It is certain I am either to go home tonight or not; that does not prevent my freedom." Boswell: "That it is certain you are either to go home or not, does not prevent your freedom; because the liberty of choice between the two is compatible with that certainty. But if one of these events be certain now, you have no future power of volition. If it be certain you are to go home to-night, you must go home." Johnson: "If I am well acquainted with a man, I can judge with great probability how he will act in any case, without his being restrained by my judging. God may have this probability increased to certainty." Boswell: When it is increased to certainty, freedom ceases, because that cannot be certainly foreknown, which is not certain at the time; but if it be certain at the time, it is a contradiction in terms to maintain that there can be afterwards any contingency dependent on the exercise of will or anything else." Johnson: "All theory is against the freedom of the will; all experience for it."

I sympathize with Johnson's perplexity, and his last statement wonderfully epitomizes how we all feel on the subject. However, I think he is a long way from having proved free will.

Samuel Johnson is one of my personal heroes.

[xpastor]

Samuel Johnson is one of my personal heroes.

Glad to hear it. Long ago (1967) I wrote my MA thesis on Johnson's literary criticism, and I almost wrote a doctoral dissertation on the same subject in 1972.

I am a secular humanist now, but there are three Christians who remain heroes to me: Sam Johnson, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Martin Luther King, jr.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Free will figures prominently in most existentialist philosophy. Free will opposes physical causal closure not atheism in general.

[MindForgedManacle]

That depends on what you mean by 'free will', no? After all, compatibilism seems to offer, to me, a plausibble account of free will within a deterministic universe, so I can only assume you're referring to libertarianism (unless I misunderstand compatibilism).

[Neo-Scholastic]

No. I do mean libertarian free will. I do not consider compatablism to be truly free will.