Not Convinced Determinism Makes Sense of Moral Responsibility. Convince Me It Does

[pocaracas]

So... if our mind is deterministic, how can we be held accountable for what it does? Is that it?

We can, because we're dealing with two different layers of "we" in one sentence.
The low level layer is pure neuron firing...
The higher layer contains our experiences, our memories, our personality, our sensory information and decides on a behavior, based on those. Some of those decisions are made in a split second, almost automatically... others require some "cpu cycles" to gather everything. The potential punishment is one of the factors that have to go in that processing!

This is where the current scientific consensus is leading... not that it's there yet, but... it's where it's going...

Thank you for replying. I'm surprised the other responses consisted only of ignorance of the philosophical problem and the ready embrace of moral relativism. Many of the "New Atheists" obviously don't agree with postmodernism and neither do I. In fact, the only way to accuse religion of promoting evil (rather than merely going "left") is to have some objective compass of morality by which to judge religious teachings as immoral. As to your point about the potential punishment that goes into our brain processes, I'm not really sure how that's relevant. Can atheists justify moral duties--in conjunction with determinism--why a person OUGHT to do something, even if doing so results in punishment for that individual instead of reward? Daniel Dennett and Sam Harris seem to hold that determinism and moral duties can co-exist, unless I've misunderstood their views, and I'd like to understand that better.

The other responses are what they are because this subject has (recently) been done to death on this forum.
When I mentioned punishment... perhaps "consequences" should have been more apt a word. Lots of information go into making some decisions and behaviors. As to the consequences, the absence of detailed information makes one use probabilities.... what are the odds this present will please my wife? what are the odds I get caught if I rape that cute cheerleader? what are the odds people will think less of me, if I speak my mind?
If the perceived intuitive probability (stemming mostly from past experience) supports a given behavior, then it is carried out.... it seems this would be one of the last processes before actually carrying out the behavior... many considerations must come before this one: "Do I want to waste time doing this?" "Can I do it?", etc....

Now the "ought"... Looking back at history, the "ought" seems to be a product of society.
Ought we have slaves? - some time ago, it was our duty to have slaves... and the slaves' duty to be slaves... did that make it right? it seems yes. (I'd disagree, but I'm in the now)
Ought we have slaves, now? no. Do some of us wish we had slaves? definitely!
The difference being? a different perception of the value of each human individual at the level of the national code of law.



Society also has some weight in the decision making process of the brain. Some individuals will sacrifice themselves for the betterment of the social group of which they are a part... others will never do so... willingly.

[Whateverist]

Frankly, from the title of this thread, I thought you were an undercover apologist. I looked for an introduction thread but you hadn't made one. Is there anything you can think to say which might dissuade me from that perception?

[bennyboy]

Frankly, from the title of this thread, I thought you were an undercover apologist. I looked for an introduction thread but you hadn't made one. Is there anything you can think to say which might dissuade me from that perception?

The use of the word "atheists" in the 3rd person kind of gave that impression to me, too.

[Whateverist]

Yeah, that and the challenge to convince him that you can make sense of morality without some gateway moral-concept which eventually calls for good ole' God.

[Mudhammam]

Frankly, from the title of this thread, I thought you were an undercover apologist. I looked for an introduction thread but you hadn't made one. Is there anything you can think to say which might dissuade me from that perception?

Haha I'm definitely no undercover apologist. I take any association to religion to be insulting as I view the average person's religious faith terribly intellectually dishonest and often times downright stupid and worse. That said, I did grow up in a uber-evangelical setting and thus fear that I will forever have the "What if I'm wrong" questions imprinted somewhere in the back of my head. Don't get me wrong, I never entertain the idea that Christianity or whatever religion could possibly be right, but its some form of extreme skepticism always forcing me to re-examine the rationality of my own B.S. (belief system).

[MindForgedManacle]

@Apophenia Are you sure Harris isn't a compatibilist like Dennett? I was under the impression that he was.

Anyhow, @OP this question is a bit nonsensical. Firstly, it's trying to pose a problem for compaitiblist views on morality while simultaneously not recognizing that if it is actually a problem for compatibilists (I don't think it is), then it is also a probblem for libertarian concepts of free will. Take this for example: If I did not 'chose' to do otherwise than I in fact did, why didn't I? Under the libertarian concept of free will, how can I be held responsible for not choosing to choose? This is the regress problem, basically. It makes no sense to talk about choosing to choose what you choose, or choosing to think what you think.

This is among the reasons why few philosophers hold to the libertarian view, and those who do are nearly all theists. In fact, the percentages of philosophers who are some kind of theist (~14%) is approximately the same as those who adhere to libertarian free will (~14%), although I admit I can't remember what the crossover is, so take this bit as a reasonable inference.

[Mudhammam]

Thank you for replying. I'm surprised the other responses consisted only of ignorance of the philosophical problem and the ready embrace of moral relativism. Many of the "New Atheists" obviously don't agree with postmodernism and neither do I. In fact, the only way to accuse religion of promoting evil (rather than merely going "left") is to have some objective compass of morality by which to judge religious teachings as immoral. As to your point about the potential punishment that goes into our brain processes, I'm not really sure how that's relevant. Can atheists justify moral duties--in conjunction with determinism--why a person OUGHT to do something, even if doing so results in punishment for that individual instead of reward? Daniel Dennett and Sam Harris seem to hold that determinism and moral duties can co-exist, unless I've misunderstood their views, and I'd like to understand that better.

The other responses are what they are because this subject has (recently) been done to death on this forum.
When I mentioned punishment... perhaps "consequences" should have been more apt a word. Lots of information go into making some decisions and behaviors. As to the consequences, the absence of detailed information makes one use probabilities.... what are the odds this present will please my wife? what are the odds I get caught if I rape that cute cheerleader? what are the odds people will think less of me, if I speak my mind?
If the perceived intuitive probability (stemming mostly from past experience) supports a given behavior, then it is carried out.... it seems this would be one of the last processes before actually carrying out the behavior... many considerations must come before this one: "Do I want to waste time doing this?" "Can I do it?", etc....

Now the "ought"... Looking back at history, the "ought" seems to be a product of society.
Ought we have slaves? - some time ago, it was our duty to have slaves... and the slaves' duty to be slaves... did that make it right? it seems yes. (I'd disagree, but I'm in the now)
Ought we have slaves, now? no. Do some of us wish we had slaves? definitely!
The difference being? a different perception of the value of each human individual at the level of the national code of law.



Society also has some weight in the decision making process of the brain. Some individuals will sacrifice themselves for the betterment of the social group of which they are a part... others will never do so... willingly.

That makes sense but to clarify are we only morally responsible to the extent that we get caught and punished for immoral acts (both those immoral acts we committed and the moral ones we failed to do)? Or is there some transcendent truth, as rationality might be considered, something part of natural law, that we are in some way responsible to (karma, perhaps, in its truest sense) EVEN IF the present is always determined by the past?

As to your thoughts on moral duties, I think you ran into the inevitable problem with your slavery example. Of course, we both view that as morally reprehensible now, but was it *actually* morally wrong to view slavery as a duty then (or again at some point in the future with enough brainwashing) if its nothing more than societal projection?

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@Apophenia Are you sure Harris isn't a compatibilist like Dennett? I was under the impression that he was.

Anyhow, @OP this question is a bit nonsensical. Firstly, it's trying to pose a problem for compaitiblist views on morality while simultaneously not recognizing that if it is actually a problem for compatibilists (I don't think it is), then it is also a probblem for libertarian concepts of free will. Take this for example: If I did not 'chose' to do otherwise than I in fact did, why didn't I? Under the libertarian concept of free will, how can I be held responsible for not choosing to choose? This is the regress problem, basically. It makes no sense to talk about choosing to choose what you choose, or choosing to think what you think.

This is among the reasons why few philosophers hold to the libertarian view, and those who do are nearly all theists. In fact, the percentages of philosophers who are some kind of theist (~14%) is approximately the same as those who adhere to libertarian free will (~14%), although I admit I can't remember what the crossover is, so take this bit as a reasonable inference.

No doubt the concept of free will seems somewhat incoherent though I'm sure those studied in philosophy could argue otherwise. But its because I can't make sense of "choosing to choose what I choose," as you say, that I can't understand how many atheists embrace the notion of moral responsibility, or objectivity for that matter, if each human bios is ultimately pre-programmed by its own genetic history and concurring environment. By the way, I don't mean to imply that these philosophical questions are better explained by theists.

[pocaracas]

That makes sense but to clarify are we only morally responsible to the extent that we get caught and punished for immoral acts (both those immoral acts we committed and the moral ones we failed to do)? Or is there some transcendent truth, as rationality might be considered, something part of natural law, that we are in some way responsible to (karma, perhaps, in its truest sense) EVEN IF the present is always determined by the past?

I don't know.
If I had to guess, I'd say that currently most of us hold human life and well-being above most other things. Does this look like a transcendental truth, or very down to Earth?
The threat of punishment, or other consequences which may not be positive to the individual, is a way to try to have those individuals who would otherwise misbehave to keep (or, at least, to appear to keep) this view of humanity. Some still misbehave, nonetheless.

As to your thoughts on moral duties, I think you ran into the inevitable problem with your slavery example. Of course, we both view that as morally reprehensible now, but was it *actually* morally wrong to view slavery as a duty then (or again at some point in the future with enough brainwashing) if its nothing more than societal projection?

Mankind's collective knowledge is full of trial and error.
Some of that knowledge is perpetuated as unwritten behavioral rules which pass from generation to generation.
Slavery was probably ok way back then... not so ok, more recently, but tolerated... and now it's inhumane. Still, some people do it, and some people accept being slaves...
The caste system in India is, to most westerners, outdated... but it's still in effect... It seems societal moral guidelines don't reach everyone on the planet equally...

[Angrboda]

Dennett and Taylor, in the article included in the Oxford Handbook of Free Will, appeal to counterfactuals ala David Lewis. To my mind, Dennett has taken several whacks at the apple without a clear kill. My copy of Harris is electronic, and not accessible at the moment. I'll see if I can find a definitive statement from Harris, but he doesn't write like a compatibilist in his "Free Will". (For another variant of compatibilism, look at Gazzaniga.)

Harris’s position on free will is straightforward enough. (See this post by Harris for more background.) The universe is deterministic, and the behaviour of every entity in the universe is determined by the fixed laws of nature. This includes everything from the motion of atoms and the planets to human behaviour. On this view, according to Harris, there is no such thing as deep responsibility, and humans are no more responsible for their actions (in a deep sense) than mountains are for having avalanches.

Hard determinism and moral responsibility

This is Free Will 101, as Paul Bloom said of another recent essay outlining a position similar to Harris’s. (It’s well worth reading both the target essay and Bloom’s response.) This take on free will sometimes goes by the name of hard determinism, and is defined by two key claims: first, that determinism is true; and second, that free will therefore does not exist....

[genkaus]

It seems that one of the strongest selling points for theism is moral responsibility and free will, oftentimes in a form of the Moral argument for God's existence. However, I think its safe to say that scientific research has thoroughly vindicated the old philosophical notion of determinism, which necessarily negates the traditional (if not incoherent) idea that man is *actually* free to choose his thoughts/behaviors. Determinism is held by the majority of atheists I've encountered and many of them also hold to some idea of moral absolutes, which in my mind entails duties or responsibilities. Can someone explain to me how determinists define free will differently than it has been traditionally understood and how humans can be held morally responsible for actions they were not actually the cause for?

First of all, I don't think that the moral responsibility and free-will constitute what is generally known as the Moral argument.

As for the main argument, I regard the determinism/free-will/moral responsibility debate as being based on bad premises. Specifically, the debate only becomes relevant with the assumption of certain supernatural phenomena.

To start with, I agree with determinism. I assume all phenomena occurring in the universe to have a cause and thus I believe in multiple causal chains all originating from a single point.

Given that, when I look at the term free-will, I ask "what is it the will is supposed to be free from?". The most common answer I find is "causation", i.e. the will is not determined by prior causes but is somehow, spontaneously generated. Given my agreement with determinism, I obviously find this concept to be ridiculous and if the that was the only point of the debate, I'd happily leave it behind and move on.

But, as it turns out, the reason why free-will is regarded as significant is because of the entrenched notion that without free-will there can be no moral responsibility. And this is what confuses me. Why would a causeless and spontaneously generated will magically give rise to moral responsibility? The only way for "you" to be held responsible for your will would be if you are the progenitor of your will. In which case, for your will to be free from determinism, the "you" must also be free from causality - meaning, the worldview where free-will leading to moral responsibility makes any sense (in fact, the only worldview where free-will can be a coherent concept) is the one where "you" are some sort of spirit existing beyond the material universe bound by causality.

Obviously, since I don't buy into that worldview, I find the traditional conception of free-will to be nonsensical - however, moral responsibility still needs to be accounted for. For this, we need to examine the cases where we consider morality to apply. Simply put, for us to call a person moral or immoral, he must have the capacity to reflect upon his thoughts, principles, actions and their consequences and thus act accordingly. Consider this a complex program where different factors are weighed in and evaluated. Irrespective of whether or not this system is deterministic in nature, without the existence of such a system, we cannot and do not assign moral responsibility.

So, within a deterministic worldview, I'd say that "you" are a complex program, initially determined by external events, but as time goes on, the having the capacity to examine and alter your own code. So, in the end, while your existence is still deterministic in nature, there are two parts to your programming - one which is alterable by yourself and one which is a given. Any action attributable to the alterable component can have a moral dimension. Given this, the idea of free-will that I find relevant to moral responsibility is freedom from any unalterable factors such as external constraints or biological conditions.

For example, if a person within the normal limits of sanity chooses to plant a bomb in a crowded ares, we'd consider him morally responsible for his actions. He had the capacity to reflect on his motivations, actions and consequences - that his programming resulted in that choice becomes irrelevant in face of the fact that it could've altered itself. If a psychopath chooses to do it - he too is held morally responsible. Lack of empathy does not negate the ability to reflect upon one's actions. However, someone insane - someone we assume has no such capacity, would not be held responsible. Similarly, someone externally constrained - such as by a gun to his head - is also not held morally responsible.

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Does not one have to hold to some form of objective morality to use examples of "evil" as one of the primary railing points against religion?

AFAIK, the primary rallying point is not "evil" but "causing suffering". Ofcourse, you could argue that this assumes causing suffering as evil and thus presumes some sort of moral code - but then, preventing suffering is a common theme in almost all moralities.