The Category Error of Scientism

[Neo-Scholastic]

It is easy to make the mistake of placing mental properties and physical processes in the same category of being. You will find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, referring to the natural world only quantitatively. When you use qualitative terms to describe physical reality you must do so with a certain understanding: that these terms serve as convenient linguistic conventions.

Most advocates of atheistic approaches to both morality and philosophy of mind make the same category error: they project mental properties onto physical processes or, alternatively, describe physical processes in terms of mental properties. Both ontological and methodological naturalism exclude qualitative assessments of physical reality. These assessments include the mental properties of meaning, qualitative value, and teleology.

Without access to qualitative terms naturalism has nothing to say about morality or mind. Both subjects concern qualitative concepts. Discussing moral questions requires making comparative value judgments. Discussions about mental properties refer to the significance and purpose of things.

You can see the truth of the above by a couple simple examples:

Consider the difference between these two descriptions: 1) “Old growth trees are important to forest eco-systems” vs. 2) “Old growth trees are essential for the survival of forest eco-systems”. Statement 1 makes the category error by attributing a mental property, desire, to forest eco-systems, similar to saying that economic security is important to me.

Now consider the difference between another two statements: 1) “The thermostat wants to reach 72 degrees” vs.2) “The bi-metal strip in a thermostat expands or contracts in response to ambient air-temperature.” Statement 1 attributes intentionality, to the thermostat.

Or yet another: 1) “One function of the liver is to purify the blood” vs. “The liver filters blood.” Physical objects do not have purposes; they just are and do what they do.

And finally: 1) “The smoke indicates a fire” vs. 2) “Smoke rises out of fire.” In statement 1, use of the term ‘indicates’ designates a sign-significance relationship. But in physical terms, one physical thing cannot be ‘about’ another.

So, since the subject of science is limited to the natural world, the scientific method, by virtue of its self-imposed limitation, cannot inquire into the cause or experiential character of mental properties. Nor can scientific findings, like evolutionary processes, be used to support any moral philosophy.

[Jacob(smooth)]

. Nor can scientific findings, like evolutionary processes, be used to support any moral philosophy.

The ONLY sentence there which approaches accuracy or relevance.

The rest... Dude, do you even science?

[Fidel_Castronaut]

"The fossil record is the claim, not the evidence."

[Neo-Scholastic]

That signature plays on the thread titled "The Bible is the Claim not the Evidence." In does not reflect my position on evolutionary theory. Nor does your comment have anything to do with the subject of this thread.

[Fidel_Castronaut]

Cool.

[Belac Enrobso]

Koral

[Angrboda]

Cool! More proof that you don't know your ass from a hole in the ground!

[Belac Enrobso]

^ and I'm a jerk...

[mralstoner]

... the scientific method, by virtue of its self-imposed limitation, cannot inquire into the cause or experiential character of mental properties. Nor can scientific findings, like evolutionary processes, be used to support any moral philosophy.

Much of what you said is correct, but not the above statement. Science can and does study subjective wellbeing (i.e. feelings) both by observation and by survey. Over time, science will increasingly be able to say what, generally speaking, are the conditions for happiness for an average human being. And those scientific findings definitely will be used in support of moral philosophy. But that said, no amount of scientific information, or moral philosophy derived thereof, can make such a philosophy desirable for you - especially if you're not an average individual.

[bennyboy]

Chad, I'd even go a step further. People use intentional language about objects, like organs. But in a purely physical monist view, i.e. a physical determinism, I think intentional language about PEOPLE is flawed, in that it ascribes a quasi-magical intentionality to a physical system. Basically, people willfully act on a mythology about others they interact with: "My Mom is the best Mom ever. She's so kind and nurturing." They rarely look at it as: "The animal labeled 'Mom' responds to its offspring due to the interaction of hormones and brain structures."