Contra Metaphysical Idealism

[bennyboy]

If reality were reducible to thought, then we dreamed up 13.78 billion years of the universe that existed before we did.

For your contention to be true, ancient Homo sapiens would have to have dreamt up a universe that acts like the universe modern man has dreamed up.

Your concepts are self contradicting, essentially incoherent.

I see. There's still a disconnect between what I've said, what I mean, and what you think I'm saying and meaning.

When I say the universe is reducible only to concepts, I don't mean that the universe is created by the mental activity of people. I mean that the essential nature of the universe is that it is built on the interrelationship between concepts or ideas which exist independent of a human observer. So even given all of evolution, and an understanding of brain function, and the relationship between brain structure, its chemistry, and a person's subjective experience-- the fundamental "stuff" underlying all this has no tangible reality, and can only be described mathematically or metaphorically.

[Angrboda]

I don't see what keeps your idealism from sliding headlong into solipsism. You assert that you can't know anything but the ideas in your mind. Where do you get the notion that anything is more than an idea in your mind and only your mind? There's no reason to stop at idealism, other than that, at some level, even you realize how absurd it is to dismiss the existence of an independent, shared reality.

[MindForgedManacle]

Why not? In a reality composed entirely of ideas, concepts, and experiences, why wouldn't they?

Because those things in the world move beyond merely things of which I am consciously aware of, which on the idealist view is all that exists. And it makes nonsensical the belief that anything happens that affects a person in a surprising way. Think about it: on an idealist view, why does touching a hot stove hurt, and consistently so, and only when the person in question has a properly functioning nervous system? Under an idealist worldview, there should be no such consistency since the only reason reality is as it is, is because of the way minds think of it.

Why qualify "experience" with "physical"? It sounds like you're trying to piggyback one philosophical context onto another one.

Because the "experience" has certain features that are effectively inexplicable under a non-physicalist metaphysics.

Let me clarify-- I'm not trying to replace physicalist objectivity and the concistency of our shared physical knowledge with a pseudo-solipsistic idealism. I'm saying that physicalism may be seen as a child node of idealism, but not vice versa: i.e. that it's possible to resolve all we can experience, including physics, down to concepts, but not vice versa. All the things we know about the universe, including brain function and its relationship to thought, can be ideas. However, the idea that consciousness, which is intrinsically subjective, is a child node to a physical monism, which is intrinsically objective, is absurd.

Well, there are several problems that come to light there. Firstly, then what you are really supporting is not metaphysical idealism per se, but something like an indirect metaphysical realism in which there is, unless I'm mistaken, an objective world apart from observation or minds, but which cannot actually be "seen" by minds as it is in itself, which is the position I hold.

Secondly, it's not even clear how that [subjectivity of consciousness] makes it absurd if viewed as nested within physicalism, unless you hold that the inverse is also absurd.

Ironicially, it is largely science which leads me to idealism. Science serves very much to undermine our normal view of what things ARE. For example, the idea that a table is 99.999999% empty space, and that even that .00000001% which is "stuff" is slippery, ambiguous, possibly-random stuff that can only be represented statistically, makes much more sense in a universe of ideas. This is because ideas can be both abstract and concrete, both well-defined and ill-defined. Physical "stuff" isn't supposed to be all those things, at least not in a definition where an objective reality is supposed to really have meaning.

I think that's actually a fallacy of reification and a subtle argument from ignorance. You basically said something to the effect of: "Science shows that aspects of the world we experience is weird and random; under idealism it would make sense if the world was weird and random. Therefore science supports idealism."

Further, you are actually attacking a straw man. Sure, 19th century materialism, which is not the same as physicalism, has been hammered by science. However, the basics still remain: reality at it's most fundamental and durable level is composed of matter/energy/fields and their interactions, and spacetime which is definitely not an idealist-friendly position.

Let me put it this way: where can something be both a wave and a particle? Where can a cat be both alive and dead at the same time until Schrodinger opens its box? I'd contend a mental reality would accomodate that kind of paradox and ambiguity much better than a physical one.

Strictly speaking, things AREN'T a wave and a particle. Particles are perturbations in quantum fields. All that Schrödinger's equation does is describe particles as a wave-function.

And I just have to say, anyone that takes Schrödinger's Cat, which was just a thought experiment, literally doesn't understand it.

This guy is helpful, given he's an actual physicist. Watch please:

"Regarding Quantum Mechanics and Materialism"

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[video=youtube]http://youtube.com/watch?v=7WusCyD_eTc[/video

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However, I'm going to pose a dilemma for you Benny by combining what Rasetsu said with what I said in the OP:

You either have to be a solipsist or a theist if you're an idealist. To reiterate, idealism says that only things which are thought of exist. This entails that under an idealist metaphysic, there exists "omni-cogniscience", that is, everything is thought of. Thoughts are a mental substance. Hence, idealism necessarily entails the existence of a mental substance that is omni-cognizant. This basically is God, which atheists clearly don't believe in and can provide good reasons to doubt the existence of. The only way to avoid this seems to be solipsism, and say that there is only a single mental substance that is not omni-cognizant.

Are you an idealistic-theist or a solipsist?

[bennyboy]

I don't see what keeps your idealism from sliding headlong into solipsism. You assert that you can't know anything but the ideas in your mind. Where do you get the notion that anything is more than an idea in your mind and only your mind? There's no reason to stop at idealism, other than that, at some level, even you realize how absurd it is to dismiss the existence of an independent, shared reality.

Good point. When do you get off the philosophical train as it passes through solipsism, through experientialism and idealism, through spiritualism, and through physical monism?

Let's start with what I accept as self-evident. My experiences exist. Therefore, the first position I must consider is that of solipsism. However, if the universe is a projection only of myself, then I'm an ego in conflict, since many of my experiences cause me suffering. I'm not aware of any desire to inflict suffering on myself, so I believe that at least some experiences originate from outside myself.

Now onto a communal idealism. If I accept that other agents exist, and that they experience somewhat as I do, and we all agree that certain experiences of form and function are consistent, we come to the idea that these experiences represent a truth external to the human minds which conceive them. So if all is mind, there is a supermind, or a vast multiplicity of minds, which support the existence of the universe as we experience it.

Now onto physical monism. Since some shared experiences are considered external to the human minds which conceive them, then those must originate from an objective source, and must be self-dependent. Having already accepted the minds of others, via their behaviors and their incompatibility (in some cases) with the conscious wishes of my ego, as being existent, I can now treat them as also objective to myself-- properties of the bodies and brains I can perceive.

Now, however, we've closed the circle-- we've used experience to create a model of an objective reality, and used that model to infer the "real" nature of consciousness. But we have a couple of problems:
1) the existence of other minds was an assumption all along-- it was never (and could never) be established with any strong logical line
2) we've now done a loop and a half-- the physical inquiries we've made, founded on the assumption of a monistc physical universe, have lead to the falsification of the foundations of experience-- whatever reality is, we now know FOR SURE that we aren't experiencing it as such. And since our little train ride started with direct experience as the foundation upon which all those other assumptions and inferences are based, we're hooped.

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Why not? In a reality composed entirely of ideas, concepts, and experiences, why wouldn't they?

Because those things in the world move beyond merely things of which I am consciously aware of, which on the idealist view is all that exists.

This is not my interpretation of idealism. This is what I would call solipsism.

And it makes nonsensical the belief that anything happens that affects a person in a surprising way. Think about it: on an idealist view, why does touching a hot stove hurt, and consistently so, and only when the person in question has a properly functioning nervous system? Under an idealist worldview, there should be no such consistency since the only reason reality is as it is, is because of the way minds think of it.

In a non-solipsistic idealism, just because all is mind doesn't mean that I have access to, and control over, it all. That would be like saying if everything is physical, why can't I reach out and move the sun?

Why qualify "experience" with "physical"? It sounds like you're trying to piggyback one philosophical context onto another one.

Because the "experience" has certain features that are effectively inexplicable under a non-physicalist metaphysics.

I disagree. The nature of ideas is that there is no necessary limitation on their nature or content.

Well, there are several problems that come to light there. Firstly, then what you are really supporting is not metaphysical idealism per se, but something like an indirect metaphysical realism in which there is, unless I'm mistaken, an objective world apart from observation or minds, but which cannot actually be "seen" by minds as it is in itself, which is the position I hold.

This is why I declare as agnostic, and not as a metaphysical idealist. That being said, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with a universe composed of ideas, in which most of those are obscure to us due to limitations of perspective.

Secondly, it's not even clear how that [subjectivity of consciousness] makes it absurd if viewed as nested within physicalism, unless you hold that the inverse is also absurd.

I think it's pretty clear. Ideas, by our experience, can be BOTH abstract or concrete, BOTH consistent or elusive in nature. Therefore, a collection of experiences which are concrete and consistent fit perfectly fine into a mind-only universe.

A physical monism, on the other hand, is defined by objective properties: things being locatable in time and space, for example. Neither concepts nor elementary particles can be positioned in this way. In order to make physical monism work, you have to stretch it so far that it is really just another name for idealism.

I think that's actually a fallacy of reification and a subtle argument from ignorance. You basically said something to the effect of: "Science shows that aspects of the world we experience is weird and random; under idealism it would make sense if the world was weird and random. Therefore science supports idealism."

Given ignorance, it's time to pull out the razor. I know for sure that experiences exist as experiences, because this truth is self-evident: I do, in fact have them. I cannot know for sure that objects exist as objects, because I interface with them only through experience.

Therefore, the BOP is on physicalism to demonstrate that something we can't see, properly imagine or define, exists as an actual thing and not just a property of mathematical or conceptual truths interacting through time.

Further, you are actually attacking a straw man. Sure, 19th century materialism, which is not the same as physicalism, has been hammered by science. However, the basics still remain: reality at it's most fundamental and durable level is composed of matter/energy/fields and their interactions, and spacetime which is definitely not an idealist-friendly position.

1. There's nothing about any of those things which is counter-idealist. All those things are interfaced through our experiences and our ideas about our experiences. Whether those experiences come from the Matrix, a BIJ, the Mind of God or a completely objective physical monist reality is not knowable to us.
2. We think of all those things as real objects. But you can't directly interact with any of those objects. At best, you are experiencing emergent properties, and equating those properties with the "real" objects you think underly them. That's idealism at work.

However, I'm going to pose a dilemma for you Benny by combining what Rasetsu said with what I said in the OP:

That's not really the OP, you thread hijacking diva!

You either have to be a solipsist or a theist if you're an idealist.

No, you don't, unless you want to say a really big mind or collections of minds must be called God.

To reiterate, idealism says that only things which are thought of exist. This entails that under an idealist metaphysic, there exists "omni-cogniscience", that is, everything is thought of. Thoughts are a mental substance. Hence, idealism necessarily entails the existence of a mental substance that is omni-cognizant. This basically is God, which atheists clearly don't believe in and can provide good reasons to doubt the existence of. The only way to avoid this seems to be solipsism, and say that there is only a single mental substance that is not omni-cognizant.

God is a single, organized mind that acts as an agent in arranging and interfering with other minds (or sub-minds). Arguing that any rules which relate ideas and experiences consistently should be called God is not that different than saying that all the rules of gravity and other forces, of fields, etc. should be called God. If you are looking for something to attach the name "God" to, those are fair enough candidates. But necessary? No, I don't think so.

Are you an idealistic-theist or a solipsist?

Are you a potato, or a potatist?

[Chas]

If reality were reducible to thought, then we dreamed up 13.78 billion years of the universe that existed before we did.

For your contention to be true, ancient Homo sapiens would have to have dreamt up a universe that acts like the universe modern man has dreamed up.

Your concepts are self contradicting, essentially incoherent.

I see. There's still a disconnect between what I've said, what I mean, and what you think I'm saying and meaning.

When I say the universe is reducible only to concepts, I don't mean that the universe is created by the mental activity of people. I mean that the essential nature of the universe is that it is built on the interrelationship between concepts or ideas which exist independent of a human observer. So even given all of evolution, and an understanding of brain function, and the relationship between brain structure, its chemistry, and a person's subjective experience-- the fundamental "stuff" underlying all this has no tangible reality, and can only be described mathematically or metaphorically.

And that is something entirely without evidence or possible mechanism. Where do these 'concepts or ideas' reside? All you seem to be doing is restating Platonism.

[bennyboy]

And that is something entirely without evidence or possible mechanism. Where do these 'concepts or ideas' reside? All you seem to be doing is restating Platonism.

Platonism posits an EXTRA layer of reality. I certainly don't intend to indicate that. I suppose you could say idealism means we're living in Plato's third world exclusively.

Where do elemental concepts or ideas reside? Where does the universe reside? Where does God reside? When you are stating a brute fact about the underlying substance of things, there's always the lurking appeal to infinite regression or to paradox. "Given system X, what underlies it? System Y or nothing. If system Y, what underlies it? If nothing, then what is the magical mechanism by which is it self-existent?"

[Chas]

And that is something entirely without evidence or possible mechanism. Where do these 'concepts or ideas' reside? All you seem to be doing is restating Platonism.

Platonism posits an EXTRA layer of reality. I certainly don't intend to indicate that. I suppose you could say idealism means we're living in Plato's third world exclusively.

Where do elemental concepts or ideas reside? Where does the universe reside? Where does God reside? When you are stating a brute fact about the underlying substance of things, there's always the lurking appeal to infinite regression or to paradox. "Given system X, what underlies it? System Y or nothing. If system Y, what underlies it? If nothing, then what is the magical mechanism by which is it self-existent?"

You are asking nonsensical questions.
Concepts and ideas exist in minds, not 'out there'.
Please explain 'magical mechanism'.
Please explain why there needs to be anything 'underlying' reality.

[bennyboy]

Platonism posits an EXTRA layer of reality. I certainly don't intend to indicate that. I suppose you could say idealism means we're living in Plato's third world exclusively.

Where do elemental concepts or ideas reside? Where does the universe reside? Where does God reside? When you are stating a brute fact about the underlying substance of things, there's always the lurking appeal to infinite regression or to paradox. "Given system X, what underlies it? System Y or nothing. If system Y, what underlies it? If nothing, then what is the magical mechanism by which is it self-existent?"

You are asking nonsensical questions.
Concepts and ideas exist in minds, not 'out there'.

Right. They are nonsensical questions. When the framework of reality is considered physical, then asking where that framework exists is nonsensical. Where is the universe?

The same goes for asking where ideas are in an idealistic reality. They ARE the reality. Asking where they are doesn't make sense.

Please explain 'magical mechanism'.
Please explain why there needs to be anything 'underlying' reality.

I'm not sponsoring the idea of a magical mechanism. I'm saying that all views of reality, including the physical and idealistc ones, are subject to issues of infinite regression or the problem of uncreated existence.

Well, reality is experience, or at least experiences are the only things that can be known for sure to be real. A physical monist world view posits that there are existent objects, arranged in space and time, which underly our experiences. Does there need to be such an underlying reality? No-- in fact, nobody can prove that there is one. That's the point.

[Chas]

You are asking nonsensical questions.
Concepts and ideas exist in minds, not 'out there'.

Right. They are nonsensical questions. When the framework of reality is considered physical, then asking where that framework exists is nonsensical. Where is the universe?

The same goes for asking where ideas are in an idealistic reality. They ARE the reality. Asking where they are doesn't make sense.

In that case there is no operational difference between a physical view and you so-called idealistic view. The difference, however, is that yours adds a layer of explanation that is unnecessary and explains nothing.

Please explain 'magical mechanism'.
Please explain why there needs to be anything 'underlying' reality.

I'm not sponsoring the idea of a magical mechanism. I'm saying that all views of reality, including the physical and idealistc ones, are subject to issues of infinite regression or the problem of uncreated existence.

Well, reality is experience, or at least experiences are the only things that can be known for sure to be real. A physical monist world view posits that there are existent objects, arranged in space and time, which underly our experiences. Does there need to be such an underlying reality? No-- in fact, nobody can prove that there is one. That's the point.

The evidence that the physical reality is there is that we can independently affect it and get the same results. That indicates that there is reality.

Proof? No, evidence.

[bennyboy]

In that case there is no operational difference between a physical view and you so-called idealistic view. The difference, however, is that yours adds a layer of explanation that is unnecessary and explains nothing.

You have that exactly backward. We already know ideas are real-- we don't even need evidence for that, since it's how we exist. Idealism allows for all of science to still work, while conveniently eliminating the hard problem of consciousness. Physical monism requires drawing many inferences from lifetime experiences, and arriving at a belief about an objective reality that underlies them. That's a lot more work to arrive at a philosophical position that isn't really needed in order to do science.

Let's say you found yourself in the Matrix. Let's even say you KNEW you were in the Matrix. What would you do? You'd observe, make theories, test them, talk about them with other Matrixians, and form a body of rules which described that which is consistent in the Matrix. In short, science is not dependent on the idea of the objective reality of objects or the universe in which they are placed. The converse is true-- that we like the physical model because it frames our experiences in a way that makes it easier (or even possible) to do science.

The problem is that not all things ARE made more presentable by applying the idea of physical monism to them-- things like cosmogony and qualia, for example. And that's where the assymetry favors idealism: all physical observations are well-represented as ideas. But not all experiences or ideas are well-represented as objects of a science which insists on physical monism.

The evidence that the physical reality is there is that we can independently affect it and get the same results. That indicates that there is reality.

Proof? No, evidence.

Evidence is just another word for "experiences that support my ideas." There's no such thing as non-mental evidence.