Theistic morality

[chasm]

I mean, how can you even go off "pain is bad"? Buddhists and Scientologists thinking suffering and pain are good.

Unless you're a sadist or a masochist pain is not something you can generally value, so therefore it isn't something you generally should. "ought" implies "can"

That's my point, though. Some people like pain and believe it's a good thing, while others don't. And that was my point about morals: what society thinks is socially acceptable. Most people don't think pain is a good thing, therefore pain isn't very socially acceptable.

"Pain is bad" comes from someone's own personal opinion on morals, which was exactly my point.

[The Omnissiunt One]

I mean, how can you even go off "pain is bad"? Buddhists and Scientologists thinking suffering and pain are good.

Unless you're a sadist or a masochist pain is not something you can generally value, so therefore it isn't something you generally should. "ought" implies "can"

That's my point, though. Some people like pain and believe it's a good thing, while others don't. And that was my point about morals: what society thinks is socially acceptable. Most people don't think pain is a good thing, therefore pain isn't very socially acceptable.

"Pain is bad" comes from someone's own personal opinion on morals, which was exactly my point.

That's why I don't subscribe to classical utilitarianism (pain vs. pleasure), but preference utilitarianism, which would allow for people who like pain.

[chasm]

That's why I don't subscribe to classical utilitarianism (pain vs. pleasure), but preference utilitarianism, which would allow for people who like pain.

That doesn't help the case for what you're arguing.

[Scented Nectar]

Pain is subjective. I think that if something feels good, it should not be called a pain by that person. For instance, some people enjoy the feeling of strenuous exercise even though they say things like 'no pain, no gain'. Other people find the same thing to be a physical discomfort and not pleasurable at all. To the latter, it would be a pain.

People who like pain is an oxymoron.

[The Omnissiunt One]

That doesn't help the case for what you're arguing.

I've already explained my case elsewhere.

[rjh4 is back]

It would depend on the significance of the interests involved to each person. A hundred people receiving a pin prick wouldn't outweigh one being burnt alive, as pain cannot be taken into account cumulatively, as it is confined within each individual's consciousness. Strength of interest being equal, though, it would depend on the numbers in each group, yes. Of course, it isn't an exact science, but it can be approximated, and rough moral decisions can be made.

So how would preference utilitarianism as you view it handle the following hypothetical?

Person A: An individual
Group B: A group consisting of 10,000 people other than individual A

Time Period 1: 3 years (From time 0 to 3 years)
Time Period 2: 3 years (From 3 years to 6 years from time 0)
Time Period 3: 3 years (From 6 years to 9 years from time 0)
Time Period 4: 25 years (From 9 years to 34 years from time 0)

Assume all involved, A and B, do not have a preference for imprisonment, starvation, or death.

X: Something that happens to A at some time prior to time 0.
Not X: X not happening to A at some time prior to time 0.

Here are the facts for X and Not X:

X:

TP1: As a direct result of things that happened to A because of X, A is imprisoned (hindering the interests of A). The interests of B are fulfilled.

TP2: As a direct result of things that happened during the imprisonment of A, A is no longer imprisoned and is placed in a powerful position (fulfilling the interests of A). The interests of B are fulfilled.

TP3: A famine occurs in the land. As a direct result of the powerful position in which A is placed, A is able to provide food for A and B during the famine (fulfilling the interests of A and B).

TP4: The famine ends. The interests of A and B are fulfilled.


Not X:

TP1: The interests of A and B are fulfilled.

TP2: The interests of A and B are fulfilled.

TP3: A famine occurs in the land. As a result of the famine A and B starve to death.

TP4: The famine ends. A and B are dead.

How would you evaluate X and Not X overall (in terms of “good” and “bad”)?

[Edwardo Piet]

That's my point, though. Some people like pain and believe it's a good thing

But if they like it then it's in their interests. Hence my point that the only thing people can value are things that they are interested in, their values. And so since that's all they can value, that's all they should value (if it is to be said that they should value anything).

[The Omnissiunt One]

Clearly x is overwhelmingly preferable in the long-term, so x is good and not x is bad. Death means, for self-conscious beings, that both their plans for the future are thwarted, and any potential future interests they might have had go unfulfilled. That was easier to decide than I thought it would be, when I saw a hypothetical scenario coming up.

[rjh4 is back]

Clearly x is overwhelmingly preferable in the long-term, so x is good and not x is bad. Death means, for self-conscious beings, that both their plans for the future are thwarted, and any potential future interests they might have had go unfulfilled. That was easier to decide than I thought it would be, when I saw a hypothetical scenario coming up.

I thought that is what you would say. However, this seems to reveal some flaws in at least your application of preference utilitarianism. I would like to address two general flaws as I see it.

1) Given that you say x is good and not x is bad, one can then fill in x with something and conclude that that x is good. For example, say x is that A murdered his neighbor, one can follow your line of reasoning to conclude that not all murder is bad because at least in an instance like this, it is good. (Murdering one's neighbor is certainly something that would land A in prison.) Likewise x could have been that A beat his slave such that he died on the spot leading to the conclusion that at least in some instances, beating one's slave such that he died on the spot can be good. But what I really had in mind in the hypothetical (which really wasn't all that hypothetical) was the Biblical account of Joseph in Genesis chapters 37-45 or so. In this case, x was A's (Joseph's) brothers selling him into slavery. I did make up the time periods and the number of people. As a result of Joseph being sold into slavery, he was the slave of Potiphar whose wife wanted Joseph. When Joseph refused, Potiphar's wife lied about Joseph which landed him in prison. Well, you get the idea and can read the account for yourself. Anyway, following your application of preference utilitarianism to this situation, we could reasonably conclude that selling someone into slavery is sometimes good and from this we can conclude that slavery is sometimes good. From this we can reasonably conclude that preference utilitarianism at least sometimes allows slavery and coupling this with your position that "anything that allows slavery is bad" we can conclude that preference utilitarianism is bad. What do you think, Omni?

2) The second flaw is that it seems to me that for your application of preference utilitarianism to draw proper conclusions or to make valid moral judgements using preference utilitarianism, you really need more information than you will ever have. Let me explain. I am guessing that if I had stopped my hypothetical after TP1, then you would have concluded that x is bad (assuming imprisonment for A was not justified). It is only after you learn "the rest of the story", as Paul Harvey would say, that you then realize that x ended better than not x. We as humans can never fully know the ramifications of our actions to properly conclude that an action is good or bad using this type of analysis. We can only know for sure after all is said and done. (You know...hindsight is 20/20.) Let me know what you think of this, too, Omni?

One last observation for you, Omni. If all is said and done and we find that on the whole over the course of time that more people are fulfilled than are hindered then even based on your own moral system, you may have to conclude that God is good in spite of the fact that you now think some of the Biblical teachings are bad.

[The Omnissiunt One]

From this we can reasonably conclude that preference utilitarianism at least sometimes allows slavery and coupling this with your position that "anything that allows slavery is bad" we can conclude that preference utilitarianism is bad. What do you think, Omni?

This is certainly more challenging. Of course, in the case where A murders his neighbour, a preference utilitarian would have to factor in the violation of a self-conscious being's interests, which would be a seriously bad action. Similarly, the beating of one's slave to death violates many of the slave's interests. In this case, though, I think preference utilitarianism would still think x to be good overall, perhaps.

However, this doesn't present a particular problem, because in reality, preference utilitarianism advocates the formation of general moral principles to follow in one's life, rather than judging as each situation arises (except in very unusual circumstances, where a diversion from the usual rules is likely to be better). On the whole, in probably 95% of cases, murder and slave-beating would not have such beneficial circumstances. Therefore, as a general rule, these should be avoided.

2) The second flaw is that it seems to me that for your application of preference utilitarianism to draw proper conclusions or to make valid moral judgements using preference utilitarianism, you really need more information than you will ever have. Let me explain. I am guessing that if I had stopped my hypothetical after TP1, then you would have concluded that x is bad (assuming imprisonment for A was not justified). It is only after you learn "the rest of the story", as Paul Harvey would say, that you then realize that x ended better than not x. We as humans can never fully know the ramifications of our actions to properly conclude that an action is good or bad using this type of analysis. We can only know for sure after all is said and done. (You know...hindsight is 20/20.) Let me know what you think of this, too, Omni?

My reply to this would be (and it's not easy... the difficulty of predicting consequences is a serious criticism of utilitarianism in general) that we have learnt from experience what sort of actions lead to what sort of consequences. In most moral dilemmas in life, the scenarios aren't as outlandish and as far from our experience as this one is. We know that mugging an old lady will probably have worse ramifications for her, those close to her, and even the mugger in the long term, than not mugging her.

Besides, I would argue that we all have to make utilitarian decisions at some point. Interests inevitably conflict in life, and we have to choose whose should be violated. Governments have to do it, as do those running hospitals, because there are limited resources to meet everyone's needs and desires. Anyone who says that they never use utilitarian reasoning is, I suspect, being disingenuous. If they're not, they're being impractical and, I'd say, unethical.

One last observation for you, Omni. If all is said and done and we find that on the whole over the course of time that more people are fulfilled than are hindered then even based on your own moral system, you may have to conclude that God is good in spite of the fact that you now think some of the Biblical teachings are bad.

I doubt that we will ever get to to find such a thing out. However, I'm not sure that conclusion would be warranted anyway, given that God could've (presumably) made a world in which there was no suffering. In a world made by a truly good, all-powerful god, utilitarianism would be redundant.