'Is & Ought' in David Hume

[Pyrrho]

I have decided to start this thread so that I can refer to it in other threads, giving one place for this topic, so that when it comes up, I don't need to post this over and over again and derail some other threads.  Of course, we can discuss this topic in this thread, and as far as I am concerned, if the thread is over 30 days old, it is okay with me to revive it.  However, you may wish to check with those who run this site for how they feel about reviving it.

Now to the topic at hand:


There is an issue of how one goes from statements of fact ("is" statements) to statements of value ("ought" statements), or whether there is any way to derive one from the other.  I am going to present the standard interpretation of what David Hume had to say on this, and then explain why I believe that that is wrong, both in the sense of being a mistaken interpretation of what Hume meant, and also that the idea of the standard interpretation is also wrong and ought not be believed.  The standard interpretation of what David Hume had to say about this is as follows, which I quote in order to avoid accusations of misrepresentation:

The is–ought problem, as articulated by Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume (1711–76), states that many writers make claims about what ought to be on the basis of statements about what is. Hume found that there seems to be a significant difference between descriptive statements (about what is) and prescriptive or normativestatements (about what ought to be), and that it is not obvious how one can coherently move from descriptive statements to prescriptive ones. The is–ought problem is also known as Hume's law and Hume's guillotine.

A similar though distinct view is defended by G. E. Moore's open-question argument, intended to refute any identification of moral properties with natural properties. This so-called naturalistic fallacy stands in contrast to the views of ethical naturalists.
...

Hume calls for caution against such inferences in the absence of any explanation of how the ought-statements follow from the is-statements. But how exactly can an "ought" be derived from an "is"? The question, prompted by Hume's small paragraph, has become one of the central questions of ethical theory, and Hume is usually assigned the position that such a derivation is impossible.[2] This complete severing of "is" from "ought" has been given the graphic designation of Hume's Guillotine.[3]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is–ought_problem


So, according to the standard interpretation, it is impossible to legitimately derive morals from statements of fact.  In other words, that one cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is.'

It will be useful to take a look at the paragraph in which the issue is raised, to see the exact words of Hume:

I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, [470]that this small attention wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason.

http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/342#Hume_0213_1007


The occurs in The Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part I, Section 1, last paragraph.

The first thing to observe is the fact that Hume did not actually state that it is impossible to derive morals ('ought statements') from matters of fact ('is statements').  His exact words are, with added emphasis:

For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.

That something seems inconceivable is very different from something being inconceivable.  If Hume had wanted to say that it was inconceivable, he could have done so.  But in fact, he did not.

Also, this is a tacked-on paragraph ("I cannot forbear adding...") at the end of a section, not presented as anything essential to his thinking.

It is also worth mentioning that the idea that an 'ought' statement cannot be derived from an 'is' statement is something for which an argument should be presented, and not something that should just be accepted without reason.  The fact that Hume presents no reason to accept that idea fits better with the idea that he never meant such a thing, than with the idea that he did.  It is also rather interesting that many who interpret Hume in accordance with the standard interpretation often accept it as being true, without any argument.

Sometimes, though, people mean something other than what they say, as, for example, it would have been unwise to publicly proclaim atheism in Hume's day, and so one might naturally expect someone to avoid explicitly saying such a thing, even if it were true.  But, in fact, Hume explicitly stated that morals could be derived from matters of fact.  Ironically, in the paragraph immediately prior to the famous one quoted above.  Here it is, with the relevant part with added emphasis:

Nor does this reasoning only prove, that morality consists not in any relations, that are the objects of science; but if examin’d, will prove with equal certainty, that it consists not in any matter of fact, which can be discover’d by the understanding. This is the second part of our argument; and if it can be made evident, we may conclude, that morality is not an object of reason. But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflexion into your [469]own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but ’tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar’d to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind: And this discovery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences; tho’, like that too, it has little or no influence on practice. Nothing can be more real, or concern us more, than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and behaviour.

So here we have Hume explicitly stating that moral judgements are matters of fact.  It would be a very strange thing if Hume meant to say, in the very next paragraph, that moral judgements are so disconnected from matters of fact, that one could not derive a moral statement from matters of fact.


Furthermore, Book III of the Treatise is about morals, and this occurs in the introductory portion of it, right before he spends the rest of the book deriving morals from statements of fact.  (Book I of the Treatise is "Of the Understanding", about epistemology, and Book II is "Of the Passions".)  Additionally, in Hume's later book, an Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals, he also derives 'ought' statements from 'is' statements.  It would be very strange, indeed, if Hume meant to say that such things were impossible, when he spent so much time doing it himself.

Additionally, the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals is a retelling of his ethical theory, and there is no retelling of the famous paragraph in which Hume allegedly made the claim that one cannot go from an 'is' to an 'ought.'  That should tell everyone how unimportant that paragraph was to Hume's philosophy.  In other words, he never meant the standard interpretation.

Of course, I do not expect people who are invested in the standard interpretation to change their minds.  But the simple fact is, he never said what they claim he claimed, and the things he did claim are inconsistent with the standard interpretation.


What he meant was that when examining ethical theories, it is important to carefully look at the first stage where 'ought' statements appear, to see exactly how they are purportedly derived.  In doing so, one will expose the "vulgar" theories, or, in other words, the bad theories that do not work.


Anyone who imagines that one cannot go from an is to an ought, should give us reason to believe their claim.  Just claiming it without any argument is simply begging the question.


As for the claim itself, if there really were no connection between what is and what ought to be, what ought to be would not be anything at all.

[Mudhammam]

I have no difficulty in translating descriptive statements into prescriptive ones, for example, such as:

Every human being desires a modicum of happiness (including but not limited to pleasure, health, friendship, etc.). When there are opportunities to fulfill such desires, human beings tend towards them. Therefore, every human being acts to fulfill his or her conception of happiness.

This means, essentially, if you want to possess a state of happiness (and everyone does), then you ought to pursue that which stands to actualize what it is you want.

Clearly, our conceptions about what brings about maximum happiness, and the actions that one can take to fulfill this want, form much of the debate. I believe one can be wrong about what it is they think maximum happiness is and entails, but establishing the truth or falsity of a given conception of maximum happiness in a universal sense is much harder to do since in reality we are dealing with particular persons in particular situations. That said, I believe it can be done, and even if one denies this, the affirmation or denial still requires a context of an absolute objective---that either some notion of the good life as an end applies equally to all or conversely that it only applies to each individual relative to their own goals. (I.e. you cannot deny absolutes without doing so absolutely, and if your denial is only true relative to yourself, there's no reason anyone else must agree).

[Whateverist]

Well, we go from matters of fact concerning our internal states in regard to states of affairs in the world at large, to what for us are as much "ought" as we will ever experience. Hume compares morality to other sensations whose nature is determined by the way we are configured, not by any intrinsic aspect of the world.

So, when one says they have no difficulty going from an "is" to an "ought", that just means they accept their internal states as valid for determining their response. When confronted by what seems monstrously callous behavior by others, all we can do is exclaim "have we so little in common?!" Sometimes the answer is yes.

While we may have no difficulty in going from an "is" to an "ought" for ourselves, there is no common currency for issuing oughts to others. The facts of my internal states only move myself and those who feel as I do. I cannot compel another to feel as I do and so I cannot issue an ought. I can of course band with those who feel as I do to coerce those whose behavior we find monstrous to desist. We are justified by the facts of our internal states to do so. Just as they are justified by their own lights to do as they will so long as they can. That is where justice as a social convention kicks in.

[Mudhammam]

While we may have no difficulty in going from an "is" to an "ought" for ourselves, there is no common currency for issuing oughts to others. The facts of my internal states only move myself and those who feel as I do. I cannot compel another to feel as I do and so I cannot issue an ought. I can of course band with those who feel as I do to coerce those whose behavior we find monstrous to desist. We are justified by the facts of our internal states to do so. Just as they are justified by their own lights to do as they will so long as they can. That is where justice as a social convention kicks in.

(I think) I disagree. The question "Is it right to kick babies?" while connected, is different from the question, "Should society punish baby-abusers?" I refuse to accept that the first question, rephrased in the statement, "One ought not to kick babies," boils down to simply, "I have an opinion about how babies ought to be treated that may be completely contrary to yours, and moreover, both are equally valid with respect to each individual's internal states." In fact we can compel others to agree with us, at least in action, and that's why we often use the threat of force when reason fails to persuade.

[Pyrrho]

The first thing I want to say is that you are going on to another topic, which is, what is the basis for morality?  I would rather have that discussion in another thread, and keep this one about the question of whether moral principles can be derived from matters of fact, and what Hume had to say about that.

However, I do not want to leave the following without comment, so....

I have no difficulty in translating descriptive statements into prescriptive ones, for example,  such as:

Every human being desires a modicum of happiness (including but not limited to pleasure, health, friendship, etc.). When there are opportunities to fulfill such desires, human beings tend towards them. Therefore, every human being acts to fulfill his or her conception of happiness.

This means, essentially, if you want to possess a state of happiness (and everyone does), then you ought to pursue that which stands to actualize what it is you want.

Your hypothetical is a practical matter, rather than a matter of morality.  To borrow an expression from Kant, you have a hypothetical imperative, not something that applies categorically to everyone.  Whenever you have an 'if-then' kind of statement, a hypothetical statement, it only applies to those for whom the antecedent is relevant.  To illustrate how this sort of statement is not providing moral guidance, consider the following example:

If you want to molest little children, then you ought to say things like, "hey little girl, want some candy?" to lure them in.

This is all about means to ends, and does not provide an end; the end is presupposed (in the antecedent, the part connected to the 'if' in the sentence).  And it is something to be ignored by anyone who does not have any interest in the antecedent.  Notice, this is not something that is about morality, but about achieving a particular goal.

With morality, one has statements like:

One ought not kill people for pleasure.

Notice, it is not a hypothetical, and is not merely giving practical advice on how to achieve a particular goal one might have.

According to Hume, such things are based upon certain types of feelings that people have, and that are nearly universal in that nearly everyone feels that way.   With my particular example, you will likely find very few people who seriously feel like it is okay for people to kill other people for pleasure.  There is more to it than that (it is not merely a matter of near-universal agreement; it is only some types of feelings that are relevant to morality), but I don't want this thread to deal with that issue; here, though is a start for someone interested in this matter.  See also this.

Clearly, our conceptions about what brings about maximum happiness, and the actions that one can take to fulfill this want, form much of the debate. I believe one can be wrong about what it is they think maximum happiness is and entails, but establishing the truth or falsity of a given conception of maximum happiness in a universal sense is much harder to do since in reality we are dealing with particular persons in particular situations. That said, I believe it can be done, and even if one denies this, the affirmation or denial still requires a context of an absolute objective---that either some notion of the good life as an end applies equally to all or conversely that it only applies to each individual relative to their own goals. (I.e. you cannot deny absolutes without doing so absolutely, and if your denial is only true relative to yourself, there's no reason anyone else must agree).

That sounds a bit like John Stuart Mill's position for the basis of morality.  If you want to argue about that, we can do so in another thread.

[Whateverist]

While we may have no difficulty in going from an "is" to an "ought" for ourselves, there is no common currency for issuing oughts to others.  The facts of my internal states only move myself and those who feel as I do.  I cannot compel another to feel as I do and so I cannot issue an ought.  I can of course band with those who feel as I do to coerce those whose behavior we find monstrous to desist.  We are justified by the facts of our internal states to do so.  Just as they are justified by their own lights to do as they will so long as they can.  That is where justice as a social convention kicks in.

(I think) I disagree. The question "Is it right to kick babies?" while connected, is different from the question, "Should society punish baby-abusers?" I refuse to accept that the first question, rephrased in the statement, "One ought not to kick babies," boils down to simply, "I have an opinion about how babies ought to be treated that may be completely contrary to yours, and moreover, both are equally valid with respect to each individual's internal states." In fact we can compel others to agree with us, at least in action, and that's why we often use the threat of force when reason fails to persuade.

But doesn't your "one ought not to kick babies" amount to a disposition one would want to instill in their kids? What good is it to say that to an adult who has just kicked a baby? Apparently their parents failed.

I think you're trying to define morality too strictly in cognitive terms. We can articulate what we feel is moral and in the vast majority of cases we'd find agreement. Does that mean morality is an empirical matter to be determined through polling?

[Mudhammam]

The first thing I want to say is that you are going on to another topic, which is, what is the basis for morality?  I would rather have that discussion in another thread, and keep this one about the question of whether moral principles can be derived from matters of fact, and what Hume had to say about that.

(bold mine)
I guess I'm not entirely sure how it is that you conceive of those distinctions as entirely separate... Isn't the question as to whether a well-reasoned survey of the facts can suffice in conferring moral duties or principles another side of the same coin, as to where precisely lies the basis for moral duties or principles, viz. in establishing their ontological ground?

Your hypothetical is a practical matter, rather than a matter of morality.  To borrow an expression from Kant, you have a hypothetical imperative, not something that applies categorically to everyone.  Whenever you have an 'if-then' kind of statement, a hypothetical statement, it only applies to those for whom the antecedent is relevant.  To illustrate how this sort of statement is not providing moral guidance, consider the following example:

If you want to molest little children, then you ought to say things like, "hey little girl, want some candy?" to lure them in.

This is all about means to ends, and does not provide an end; the end is presupposed (in the antecedent, the part connected to the 'if' in the sentence).  And it is something to be ignored by anyone who does not have any interest in the antecedent.  Notice, this is not something that is about morality, but about achieving a particular goal.

I agree that conditionals only apply to those of whom the antecedent is relevant, but I suspect that there are broad enough conceptions of happiness or well-being that do necessarily apply to all with a capacity to think and feel. That was the point of my preceding syllogism, that every human being, on account of sentience and rationality, have some interest in their own well-being, even if their opinion of what that translates into as a practical matter is so utterly wrong that their notion of happiness and how to best achieve it results in outcomes that are highly destructive and/or counter-productive to greater states of happiness. I don't see how morality could be about anything other than achieving a particular goal, i.e. happiness, though on account of the human condition this is a goal that every person shares (with varying opinions as to the correct definition or expectation of what this should be like in actuality).

---

But doesn't your "one ought not to kick babies" amount to a disposition one would want to instill in their kids?  What good is it to say that to an adult who has just kicked a baby?  Apparently their parents failed.

I think you're trying to define morality too strictly in cognitive terms.  We can articulate what we feel is moral and in the vast majority of cases we'd find agreement.  Does that mean morality is an empirical matter to be determined through polling?

Sure, I do think morality is an empirical matter, and in terms of judging whether a person has lived a virtuous life, that it is to be determined by examining those who appear to live the most productive and satisfying lives, and not simply according to their own view of themselves, but also through polling those effected by their actions or inaction.

[Whateverist]

But then, would you overturn your own conscience based on the polling?

[Mudhammam]

But then, would you overturn your own conscience based on the polling?

I sure hope my conscience would be overturned if polling indicated that the well-being of any individual was diminished because of direct and unnecessary action or inaction that was related to myself. If not, I suppose I'd have to acknowledge that I fall far short of the ideal I espouse, and in fact, I can say that's most definitely the case. I'm *not* speaking of polling in terms of might decides right, but only that the majority of beings in a given "internal state" allot us sufficient data to determine if the antecedents/consequences are to be recommended as morally correct or rejected as to the contrary.

[Pyrrho]

I am a little surprised that no one has argued in favor of the mainstream interpretation of Hume on the Is/Ought distinction.