'Is & Ought' in David Hume

[Pyrrho]

[Mudhammam]

I have no difficulty in translating descriptive statements into prescriptive ones, for example, such as:

Every human being desires a modicum of happiness (including but not limited to pleasure, health, friendship, etc.). When there are opportunities to fulfill such desires, human beings tend towards them. Therefore, every human being acts to fulfill his or her conception of happiness.

This means, essentially, if you want to possess a state of happiness (and everyone does), then you ought to pursue that which stands to actualize what it is you want.

Clearly, our conceptions about what brings about maximum happiness, and the actions that one can take to fulfill this want, form much of the debate. I believe one can be wrong about what it is they think maximum happiness is and entails, but establishing the truth or falsity of a given conception of maximum happiness in a universal sense is much harder to do since in reality we are dealing with particular persons in particular situations. That said, I believe it can be done, and even if one denies this, the affirmation or denial still requires a context of an absolute objective---that either some notion of the good life as an end applies equally to all or conversely that it only applies to each individual relative to their own goals. (I.e. you cannot deny absolutes without doing so absolutely, and if your denial is only true relative to yourself, there's no reason anyone else must agree).

[Whateverist]

Well, we go from matters of fact concerning our internal states in regard to states of affairs in the world at large, to what for us are as much "ought" as we will ever experience. Hume compares morality to other sensations whose nature is determined by the way we are configured, not by any intrinsic aspect of the world.

So, when one says they have no difficulty going from an "is" to an "ought", that just means they accept their internal states as valid for determining their response. When confronted by what seems monstrously callous behavior by others, all we can do is exclaim "have we so little in common?!" Sometimes the answer is yes.

While we may have no difficulty in going from an "is" to an "ought" for ourselves, there is no common currency for issuing oughts to others. The facts of my internal states only move myself and those who feel as I do. I cannot compel another to feel as I do and so I cannot issue an ought. I can of course band with those who feel as I do to coerce those whose behavior we find monstrous to desist. We are justified by the facts of our internal states to do so. Just as they are justified by their own lights to do as they will so long as they can. That is where justice as a social convention kicks in.

[Mudhammam]

While we may have no difficulty in going from an "is" to an "ought" for ourselves, there is no common currency for issuing oughts to others. The facts of my internal states only move myself and those who feel as I do. I cannot compel another to feel as I do and so I cannot issue an ought. I can of course band with those who feel as I do to coerce those whose behavior we find monstrous to desist. We are justified by the facts of our internal states to do so. Just as they are justified by their own lights to do as they will so long as they can. That is where justice as a social convention kicks in.

(I think) I disagree. The question "Is it right to kick babies?" while connected, is different from the question, "Should society punish baby-abusers?" I refuse to accept that the first question, rephrased in the statement, "One ought not to kick babies," boils down to simply, "I have an opinion about how babies ought to be treated that may be completely contrary to yours, and moreover, both are equally valid with respect to each individual's internal states." In fact we can compel others to agree with us, at least in action, and that's why we often use the threat of force when reason fails to persuade.

[Pyrrho]

[Whateverist]

While we may have no difficulty in going from an "is" to an "ought" for ourselves, there is no common currency for issuing oughts to others.  The facts of my internal states only move myself and those who feel as I do.  I cannot compel another to feel as I do and so I cannot issue an ought.  I can of course band with those who feel as I do to coerce those whose behavior we find monstrous to desist.  We are justified by the facts of our internal states to do so.  Just as they are justified by their own lights to do as they will so long as they can.  That is where justice as a social convention kicks in.

(I think) I disagree. The question "Is it right to kick babies?" while connected, is different from the question, "Should society punish baby-abusers?" I refuse to accept that the first question, rephrased in the statement, "One ought not to kick babies," boils down to simply, "I have an opinion about how babies ought to be treated that may be completely contrary to yours, and moreover, both are equally valid with respect to each individual's internal states." In fact we can compel others to agree with us, at least in action, and that's why we often use the threat of force when reason fails to persuade.

But doesn't your "one ought not to kick babies" amount to a disposition one would want to instill in their kids? What good is it to say that to an adult who has just kicked a baby? Apparently their parents failed.

I think you're trying to define morality too strictly in cognitive terms. We can articulate what we feel is moral and in the vast majority of cases we'd find agreement. Does that mean morality is an empirical matter to be determined through polling?

[Mudhammam]

The first thing I want to say is that you are going on to another topic, which is, what is the basis for morality?  I would rather have that discussion in another thread, and keep this one about the question of whether moral principles can be derived from matters of fact, and what Hume had to say about that.

(bold mine)
I guess I'm not entirely sure how it is that you conceive of those distinctions as entirely separate... Isn't the question as to whether a well-reasoned survey of the facts can suffice in conferring moral duties or principles another side of the same coin, as to where precisely lies the basis for moral duties or principles, viz. in establishing their ontological ground?

Your hypothetical is a practical matter, rather than a matter of morality.  To borrow an expression from Kant, you have a hypothetical imperative, not something that applies categorically to everyone.  Whenever you have an 'if-then' kind of statement, a hypothetical statement, it only applies to those for whom the antecedent is relevant.  To illustrate how this sort of statement is not providing moral guidance, consider the following example:

If you want to molest little children, then you ought to say things like, "hey little girl, want some candy?" to lure them in.

This is all about means to ends, and does not provide an end; the end is presupposed (in the antecedent, the part connected to the 'if' in the sentence).  And it is something to be ignored by anyone who does not have any interest in the antecedent.  Notice, this is not something that is about morality, but about achieving a particular goal.

I agree that conditionals only apply to those of whom the antecedent is relevant, but I suspect that there are broad enough conceptions of happiness or well-being that do necessarily apply to all with a capacity to think and feel. That was the point of my preceding syllogism, that every human being, on account of sentience and rationality, have some interest in their own well-being, even if their opinion of what that translates into as a practical matter is so utterly wrong that their notion of happiness and how to best achieve it results in outcomes that are highly destructive and/or counter-productive to greater states of happiness. I don't see how morality could be about anything other than achieving a particular goal, i.e. happiness, though on account of the human condition this is a goal that every person shares (with varying opinions as to the correct definition or expectation of what this should be like in actuality).

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But doesn't your "one ought not to kick babies" amount to a disposition one would want to instill in their kids?  What good is it to say that to an adult who has just kicked a baby?  Apparently their parents failed.

I think you're trying to define morality too strictly in cognitive terms.  We can articulate what we feel is moral and in the vast majority of cases we'd find agreement.  Does that mean morality is an empirical matter to be determined through polling?

Sure, I do think morality is an empirical matter, and in terms of judging whether a person has lived a virtuous life, that it is to be determined by examining those who appear to live the most productive and satisfying lives, and not simply according to their own view of themselves, but also through polling those effected by their actions or inaction.

[Whateverist]

But then, would you overturn your own conscience based on the polling?

[Mudhammam]

But then, would you overturn your own conscience based on the polling?

I sure hope my conscience would be overturned if polling indicated that the well-being of any individual was diminished because of direct and unnecessary action or inaction that was related to myself. If not, I suppose I'd have to acknowledge that I fall far short of the ideal I espouse, and in fact, I can say that's most definitely the case. I'm *not* speaking of polling in terms of might decides right, but only that the majority of beings in a given "internal state" allot us sufficient data to determine if the antecedents/consequences are to be recommended as morally correct or rejected as to the contrary.

[Pyrrho]

I am a little surprised that no one has argued in favor of the mainstream interpretation of Hume on the Is/Ought distinction.