Was Hitler objectively bad?

[theVOID]

Certain definitions of morality are quite simply true, Desirism's definition of morality is a relational property, and relational properties do in fact exist, so in that instance morality is real and objective.

You can't use Desire Utilitarianism ("desirism") to support itself since that would be a circular argument. And so since it can't support itself it's just as subjective and personal as any other moral view. It makes sense to you is all you can ultimately say.

That is completely off base, the Definition of a concept has nothing to say on whether or not the concept is to be adopted, it only means that morality, as defined in desirism, is a factually true relational measurement. Morality as defined in Subjectivism is also a factually true representational measurement.

That is all I meant, none of that can be used as an argument for Desirism or Subjectivism or anything else, they're just trivially true. Whether or not the models based on these definitions are coherent, represent what we mean when we use moral language and match our intuitions is another matter entirely.

Desirism is not a subjective moral theory any more than the relational measurement between the sun and the earth is subjective, which it isn't. The relationship between desires and a state of affairs in which more desires are promoted is an objective measurement, there is a right and wrong answer about which desires tend to promote more and stronger desires, and these desires become morally good.

Oh, it also makes sense within its own framework, sure. Don't get me wrong. But... so what? It's ultimately just descriptive ethics: It can only be prescriptive within its own framework, outside of its own framework it can't be argued to be any more "moral" than any other moral philosophy.

There are a number of reasons to prefer Desirism to other moral theories.

1. Unlike the basis for other objective moral theories, Desires actually exist. Intrinsic values, Gods, impartial observers and social contracts don't.

2. Objective morality is more representational of our use of moral language than Subjectivism. When you say "rape is wrong" you don't intend to say "in my opinion rape is wrong".

The problem is that the question "Why should we care about morality at all?" can't be answered.

This is a conclusion of a moral theory, and under desirism we should care about morality IF and only if we want to live in a better world. A better world being a state of affairs where more and stronger desires are promoted than the current state of affairs.

All ought statements need to be qualified by an IF, this is no different.

Sure, if what is moral is defined as desires "that tend to fulfil other desires" then it seems as though can be made sense of for everyone since that is all that can be desired.

Well no shit. This has nothing to do with whywe should prefer this definition. It's like saying if morality is defined as my pen then my pen is morality. It's a moot objection.

We can only value our own values otherwise they wouldn't be our values. Of course. But that's just plain obvious and nothing profound.

Again nothing to do with why we should accept the definition proposed.

Desirism is merely stating the obviousness that we can only really value what we value. The real point is that there's still nothing to say we should value anything at all. Only the mere obvious fact that we do value things.

All ought statements are necessarily qualified by an IF. IF you want to live in a better world, you ought to act morally. This again is all after the initial argument, it's a conclusion of the framework, not an argument for it so you're really barking up the wrong tree here.

"Ought" implies "can" but "no other option" doesn't imply "should".

Again i'm in agreement. Though I will point out that Ought = Should.