Was Hitler objectively bad?

[theVOID]

That is completely off base, the Definition of a concept has nothing to say on whether or not the concept is to be adopted, it only means that morality, as defined in desirism, is a factually true relational measurement. Morality as defined in Subjectivism is also a factually true representational measurement.

That's what I was saying. Desirism is not objective because it can't objectively prescribe itself.

That makes no sense. Do you want to clarify what you mean by "objectively prescribe itself"?

That is all I meant, none of that can be used as an argument for Desirism or Subjectivism or anything else, they're just trivially true.

And that's what I see as the problem. They are trivial truths that can't be externally objective. Which is ultimately subjective in the bigger meta-ethical picture.

Objective means "not contingent upon the opinions of person(s)". In that sense of the word they are very much objective. All definitions are.

Whether or not the models based on these definitions are coherent, represent what we mean when we use moral language and match our intuitions is another matter entirely.

You can prove that it is is more coherent than other moral philosophies but not that it is actually moral.

If I can demonstrate that Desirism is more coherent than other moral theories then it becomes the tentatively preferred framework for morality. That is all we ask of any of these frameworks.

Desirism is not a subjective moral theory any more than the relational measurement between the sun and the earth is subjective, which it isn't.

Yes and in both cases all that is being evidenced is descriptive and not prescriptive. You can show the coherence of desirism but you can't show that it's moral just as how the relationship between the sun and the earth can be shown but it of course can't be shown that they "should" be that way.

You seem to have a poor conception of what ought's are for because you continually ignore the IF.

Also, the relationship between desires and a state of affairs is an objective measurement, but that is something that is established before we get to what ought to be done, and before we define what 'better' means and thus what becomes morally good and morally bad. I'm thinking this will be easier if we go from the very start.

http://atheistethicist.blogspot.com/2010...tions.html

1. Unlike the basis for other objective moral theories, Desires actually exist. Intrinsic values, Gods, impartial observers and social contracts don't.

And yet they can't be objectively shown to be moral. Showing what we value is not the same as saying what we should value.

2. Objective morality is more representational of our use of moral language than Subjectivism. When you say "rape is wrong" you don't intend to say "in my opinion rape is wrong".

And yet it is of course opinion in the sense that we either believe it is wrong or we don't. To say we knew it to be wrong would be false.

Sure, we aren't infallible, so what? We CAN be wrong. That doesn't mean there is no right answer.

Morality is a standard by which we judge action, and all action is informed by desire, thus all action we take, all of the goals we have, everything we want and need is based on desires.

A utilitarian 'better' is a state of affairs where something is maximised, in Desirism it's desire fulfilment. A state of affairs in which more and stronger desires are promoted than thwarted compared to the present is a better state of affairs.

IF you want to live in a better world, you ought to act like a moral person. What is a moral person? Someone who has the desires than tend to promote more and stronger desires than they thwart. We have reasons for action to promote good desires and condemn bad desires.

It can be objectively true or false that a certain desire is one that tends to promote more and stronger desires than it thwarts.

Any prescription (what you ought or should do) is a reason for action. Desires are the only reason for action that exists. Any time we act we do so to fulfil a desire. A desire that P is a motivational attitude that drives the agent to realise a state of affairs in which the statement "that p" is true.

A prescription is description between the desires and a state of affairs, namely what actions will lead to a state of affairs where "that P". is true. If you desire that P you ought to do X, where x is the action that tends to result in a state of affairs where "that P" is true.

Again i'm in agreement. Though I will point out that Ought = Should.

Of course.

I guess we agree but I see the meta ethical matter as more of a problem than you do. People can just disagree with desirism and it can't refute them.

I don't think there is a meta ethical (normative) problem, you've simply got your concept of ought wrong.