Was Hitler objectively bad?

[theVOID]

That makes no sense. Do you want to clarify what you mean by "objectively prescribe itself"?

I mean that whilst Desirism is a normative or IOW prescriptive moral philosophy, it can't objectively prescribe itself because it can't evidence how it itself should be desired. If it is to use it's own logic from within its own framework to show why it is desired then that is a circular argument. Hence my point is that it can't prescribe itself as a truly objective moral system because the morality of it is only desirable if you assume it is correct in the first place. If you don't value desirism then it can't refute you.

It's not something that can be desired, it's just a description of the relationship between things that exist, desires and a state of affairs. Desires are the only reason for action that exist and because morality is a standard by which we judge action, morality is concerned with desires.

If you can name me a reason for action that actually exists other than desires then this notion is fucked, but until then it stands to reason that since morality judges our reasons for action, and the only reasons for action that exist are desires, all moral statements necessarily deal with desires.

We also know that desires are brain states downstream from dopamine and are 'future producing', they form a model of a state of affairs in which the desires are true, thus morality must necessarily deal not only with desires, but a state of affairs relating to those desire too.

The desires we have and the state of affairs in which these desires are true is a description and the only valid prescription is an accurate description of what actions to take to realise a state of affairs in which the desires are true.

In the sense of normal 'good', a good action x is one that fulfils the desires in question, the desire is the thing that gives a reason for action to do x. If I want to realise a state of affairs in which my desire that P is true I ought to do x.

We agree here I'm sure. But I think this shows that it's not really objective because it's a total matter of opinion whether desirism itself should be valued or not. The fact it is objective within itself is completely different to saying that it itself is objective in the sense of "better": better than an alternative. If someone doesn't value desirism you can't use desirism to refute them.

I hope I've answered the "desirism needs to be desired" objection sufficiently. We shouldn't believe some descriptive framework because it appeals to us, but because it is true or most likely to be true, whether or not we like it means nothing. You can't desire your beliefs, so a belief that desirism is the best description of morality isn't a desire that desirism be true.

I've argued that Desirism is true for a number of reasons, It fits our use of moral language, takes into account the only reasons for action that exists, establishes moral good and bad and measures the relationship between desires that we have and a state of affairs that will tend to result from these desires.

If I can demonstrate that Desirism is more coherent than other moral theories then it becomes the tentatively preferred framework for morality. That is all we ask of any of these frameworks.

It's only preferred if people actually prefer it. Obviously. People can just say "No, I don't like it" without any good reason or any reason at all, and Desirism can't refute them because Desirism can't show why we should value Desirism. Because that would be circular reasoning.

Sure, and if someone doesn't care about having beliefs that are the best representation of what we know to be true then i'm not concerned with what they think. It's like someone saying "No, I don't like it" when talking about common ancestors, and the same answer applies, "so what?"

You seem to have a poor conception of what ought's are for because you continually ignore the IF.

'Ought' is obvious. 'Ought' is what should be. But, additionally: That only makes sense if it can be of course. Because it makes no sense to say something 'should' or 'ought to' be a certain way if it can't be. What do you mean I continually ignore the 'if'?

Sure, your reasons for action are desires and a belief that action x will lead to a state of affairs where the desire is true. If you ought to do x to bring about a state of affairs where that P then you can possibly (not necessarily) do x to make that P.

You cannot have an ought without an If. All of your objections about ought are invalid because you failed to account for the if. I ought to eat food if and only if I wish to eat, taste something etc. eating food has no intrinsic value that leads to it being an ought, it is dependent on an if. If I wish to starve to death I ought not eat.

Sure, we aren't infallible, so what? We CAN be wrong.

On morality? Got any proof or even evidence for that statement? I think not. 'Wrong' within desirism is not the same as 'Wrong'. Desirism can't show itself to be right. Maybe it can even trump all other moral theories but that is still not the same as proving that it itself should be valued.

This is rooted in the same false objection answered above. Even if you don't want to call it morality, you can be objectively wrong in thinking that desire x will be the one that brings about a state of affairs in which more and stronger desires are fulfilled. It may be that you think keeping slaves will bring about a better state of affairs, in which case you are objectively wrong. You may think voting for party y will bring about a better state of affairs where it turns out to be wrong.

Using a methodology for evaluating desires we can be more accurate in determining which desires tend to lead to a better state of affairs.

I would argue that this is very much morality, but whether you want to call it that or not desires exist and are the only reasons for action that exist, and there is an objectively true or false standard by which we can judge desires by their tenancy to bring about a state of affairs in which more and stronger desires are promoted vs thwarted.

Using a standard definition of morality like "conformity to the rules of right conduct; moral or virtuous conduct." We can see that conduct is action, and desires are the only reason we act, and we can also see that we need a set of rules about right and wrong. I would argue that desirism provides the best framework we have for making sense of moral language, while achieving everything we want from a moral framework.

Another thing. Can you name me a good action that is one that thwarts more and stronger desires than it promotes? What about a wrong action that promotes more and stronger desires than it thwarts?

That doesn't mean there is no right answer.

No of course not. But what objectively means that there is?

The right answer is one that accurately describes the relationship between our desires and a state of affairs where that P. Relational properties ARE objective. I can't help but think you have a misconception of objectivity. Objective in moral language simply means 'not rooted in the opinions of person(s)' and as such it is objectively true that certain desires tend to bring about a state of affairs in which more and stronger desires are promoted or thwarted.

In morality what we want to know if an action is 'good' or 'bad', Desirism achieves that.

A utilitarian 'better' is a state of affairs where something is maximised, in Desirism it's desire fulfilment. A state of affairs in which more and stronger desires are promoted than thwarted compared to the present is a better state of affairs.

So desirism assumes a form of utilitarianism is moral. Has it got evidence to support that, objectively?

I'm not sure how to answer this, do you mean "why should we value a state of affairs in which more and stronger desires are promoted vs thwarted"?

Does desirism assume things like: 10 people with 1 good desire each being fulfilled is better or worse than 1 person with 10 good desires fulfilled? Or does it assume it as equal?

Well it's both more and stronger, so assuming all desires are equally strong it's equal.

What is a moral person? Someone who has the desires than tend to promote more and stronger desires than they thwart.

How is that a moral person? What if you have the right desires but accidentally do a lot of harm?

Then you don't have the desires that tend to promote more and stronger desires... Ignorance and intentional harm are both wrong if they thwart more and stronger desires than they promote. A person with good intentions, one who has a desire that they believe would bring about a state of affairs in which more and stronger desires are promoted can still be wrong, you can still accidentally do something morally wrong. If you believe that banning condoms will lead to a state of affairs where there are more and stronger desires promoted than thwarted you are objectively wrong, even though you believed that your desires were good desires.

Any prescription (what you ought or should do) is a reason for action. Desires are the only reason for action that exists. Any time we act we do so to fulfil a desire.

And we can end up doing completely different to what we desire. We could aim to do something that thwart other desires but accidentally end up fulfilling other desires, and vice-versa. All forms of rule utilitarianism reduce to act utilitarianism. And the same is true of consequentailism in fact.

It's not act utilitarianism, actions aren't evaluated. The desires (reasons for action) themselves are evaluated.

It's perfectly true that we can be wrong about what desires are good and bad, just like we can be wrong about distance from A to B. That does not mean that there is neither a right answer or that we can find out what it is. Taking desirism into account when making choices can aid in your ability to determine what desires do in fact lead to a state of affairs in which more and stronger desires are thwarted vs promoted.

I don't think there is a meta ethical (normative) problem, you've simply got your concept of ought wrong.

I, or anyone, could merely say "In my opinion desirism itself isn't desirable, I don't think it ought to be followed as a moral philosophy." and you can't refute them without a circular argument.

And in doing so they would be rejecting the moral theory based on the only reasons for action that actually exist and that best represents our use of moral language. And even if they don't want to call it morality the relationships between desires and a state of affairs in which more and stronger desires are promoted actually exists and it's objectively true or false whether or not an action promotes or thwarts more desires. That is all factually true, so at best they could say "I don't want to call that morality".