Was Hitler objectively bad?

[Edwardo Piet]

It's not something that can be desired, it's just a description of the relationship between things that exist, desires and a state of affairs.

Exactly my point. Ultimately, it's descriptive, not prescriptive. It's prescriptive within itself and that's validated by its translating of descriptions into prescriptons. But... desirism has no way of saying that any opinion that goes against desirism is objectively 'wrong'. Because desirism can't show how it itself is objectively 'right', it can only assume it is right and then from that point it is internally consistent.

If you can name me a reason for action that actually exists other than desires then this notion is fucked, but until then it stands to reason that since morality judges our reasons for action, and the only reasons for action that exist are desires, all moral statements necessarily deal with desires.

Before any of this it has to be assumed that what we value is what we should value. It is all we can value, but that doesn't mean we should value it. While I am alive I must breathe, but this doesn't mean I should breathe while I'm alive. What would that even mean? It's just describing it isn't prescribing.

I hope I've answered the "desirism needs to be desired" objection sufficiently.

Desirism needs to be desired according to desirism. That's circular reasoning.

I've argued that Desirism is true for a number of reasons,

And it can't be true from the outset unless you assume it is correct in the first place. Since it is only internally true it all relies on the premise that it itself should be valued.

Sure, and if someone doesn't care about having beliefs that are the best representation of what we know to be true then i'm not concerned with what they think.

What we value does not=what we should value. It's a logical fallacy to say that. Desirism makes sense within itself as a prescriptive system. Outside of itself it is merely descriptive because it can't show itself to be true with its own logic because that's circular reasoning.

It's like someone saying "No, I don't like it" when talking about common ancestors, and the same answer applies, "so what?"

No it's nothing like that because that's an entirely descriptive matter both internally and outside of its own subject. Desirism can only say it is "prescriptive" within its own logic. Outside it is merely description. See above.

All of your objections about ought are invalid because you failed to account for the if. I ought to eat food if and only if I wish to eat, taste something etc.

I agree with all this. I never disagreed with it. I have already said that 'ought' implies 'can'.

eating food has no intrinsic value that leads to it being an ought, it is dependent on an if. If I wish to starve to death I ought not eat.

Yes it's dependent on an 'if'. But if the 'if' is there that doesn't objectively prove that it is a 'should' or 'shouldn't' outside of any moral framework. And no moral framework can support themselves without being circular.

This is rooted in the same false objection answered above. Even if you don't want to call it morality, you can be objectively wrong in thinking that desire x will be the one that brings about a state of affairs in which more and stronger desires are fulfilled.

Well you are redefining morality from 'what should be' to 'what should be according to desirism' then. We can only do what we desire so it makes no sense to say we 'ought' to do anything different. But there is still no proof that we 'ought' to do what we desire. That goes from describing to prescribing.

It may be that you think keeping slaves will bring about a better state of affairs, in which case you are objectively wrong.

That's only if you define 'better' as 'according to desirism'. So desirism is based on the assumption that its definition of 'better' is the right one.

I would argue that this is very much morality, but whether you want to call it that or not desires exist and are the only reasons for action that exist, and there is an objectively true or false standard by which we can judge desires by their tenancy to bring about a state of affairs in which more and stronger desires are promoted vs thwarted.

And you can't objectively say that we should agree with this without circular reasoning.

We can see that conduct is action, and desires are the only reason we act, and we can also see that we need a set of rules about right and wrong. I would argue that desirism provides the best framework we have for making sense of moral language, while achieving everything we want from a moral framework.

Desires are the reason we act, yes. So it makes no sense to say we should act other than what we desire, yes. But it also makes no sense to say that Desirism objectively shows that we should act according to X desire and not according to Y desire for whatever reasons, because desirism doesn't prove that desires are anything of objective value. It merely states the obvious fact that we do what we desire.

Another thing. Can you name me a good action that is one that thwarts more and stronger desires than it promotes?

You are merely defining "good action" as one that doesn't do that but instead promotes desires. So you are asking me to refute your circular reasoning. I can only do so by saying it is circular.

What about a wrong action that promotes more and stronger desires than it thwarts?

You are merely defining "wrong action" as one that doesn't do that but instead thwarts desires. So you are asking me to refute your circular reasoning. I can only do so by saying it is circular.

Anyone could say, "To me, a "right action" is one that leads to the deaths of millions and a "wrong action" is one that doesn't lead to the deaths of millions" and all you can say is "according to desirism this is wrong". It is objectively wrong within the framework of desirism but there is nothing to say that desirism is a 'good' framework. Desirism can only say it is a better framework according to its own logic, which is circular reasoning.

The right answer is one that accurately describes the relationship between our desires and a state of affairs where that P.

According to desirism. Desirism can't support itself though so it can't say it is objectively 'better' without circular reasoning.

Relational properties ARE objective. I can't help but think you have a misconception of objectivity. Objective in moral language simply means 'not rooted in the opinions of person(s)' and as such it is objectively true that certain desires tend to bring about a state of affairs in which more and stronger desires are promoted or thwarted.

But to assume that desirism is 'better' or 'worse' in the first place is completely rooted on opinion.

When you are describing the world that may or may not be objective. When desirism is objective it is being descriptive and not prescriptive. When it is actually being prescriptive it is based on its own logic and hence completely circular and not objectively 'better' unless you already assume it is.

In morality what we want to know if an action is 'good' or 'bad', Desirism achieves that.

No it doesn't because it doesn't prove that any action is 'good' or 'bad', or any desire, or any value. It just states obvious reasoning that we can only do what desire and it makes no sense we should do what we can't do. That is all descriptive, that is objective, that is trivial, that is not about what 'ought' to be. That is about what we can do and do do. It doesn't prove that we should value anything over anything else. It assumes all that.

I'm not sure how to answer this, do you mean "why should we value a state of affairs in which more and stronger desires are promoted vs thwarted"?

That's certainly a legitimate question that can't be proved right or wrong outside of assuming desirism's definitions of 'moral' is right in the first place. Redefining what 'morality' means doesn't mean we 'should' do it.

Well it's both more and stronger, so assuming all desires are equally strong it's equal.

And why should any of those things be valued? Why are any of them moral? Why are they 'good'. Can you give me an answer without assuming desirism's definitions of 'moral' or 'good' in the first place? I think not. Desirism states that we can only do what we desire, so it makes no sense to say we should do otherwise. Desires are the only reason for action, yes. Desires therefore can be the only things that we 'ought' to do or not do, yes. But no, that is not the same as saying we should do or value X and not do or value Y. That 'X' is moral and 'Y' is immoral is all based on the assumptions that desirism carries along with its descriptive obvious statements that are trivial, I don't object to, and merely describe and not prescribe by definition. Even "Everyone values X" and "X should be" mean completely different things. If everyone valued the same thing there would be no problem in the first place. By no logic can you say anyone else is objectively 'wrong' outside of your own assumptions when they desire or value differently to yourself.

So, objectively speaking, how is desirism not entirely descriptive? It is prescriptive within itself but any prescriptive view whatsoever can be prescriptive within itself. If we assume that the descriptions of the Bible are true then it's prescriptive according to the assumption that "one ought to do what God wants". How is "objective" after making a baseless assumption really "objective" in any meaningful way?

I don't think there is a meta ethical (normative) problem, you've simply got your concept of ought wrong.

I, or anyone, could merely say "In my opinion desirism itself isn't desirable, I don't think it ought to be followed as a moral philosophy." and you can't refute them without a circular argument.

And in doing so they would be rejecting the moral theory based on the only reasons for action that actually exist and that best represents our use of moral language.

So what? You can't prove that as 'wrong' without using the logic of desirism to validate desirism. Which is circular reasoning.

And even if they don't want to call it morality the relationships between desires and a state of affairs in which more and stronger desires are promoted actually exists and it's objectively true or false whether or not an action promotes or thwarts more desires. That is all factually true, so at best they could say "I don't want to call that morality".

No, they can also say "Why the hell should your version of morality be preferred? You can't tell me why without circular reasoning."

And now, on a side note. I find it strangely amusing that I found Sam Harris' talk about objective morality as very interesting and now I believe it to be horseshit. You seem to be no fan of Sam Harris and I am sure you dislike his moral ideas because his so-called 'objective' moral system is in no way as detailed or sophisticated as a proper moral theory like 'desirism'. However, I still find it amusing that you now nevertheless have started subscribing to an objective morality and I've went the other way. I've been getting more and more into it but recently changed my mind. I just find that funny, sorry if this isn't too relevant but I wanted to say it somewhere at some point.