Was Hitler objectively bad?

[theVOID]

It's not something that can be desired, it's just a description of the relationship between things that exist, desires and a state of affairs.

Exactly my point. Ultimately, it's descriptive, not prescriptive. It's prescriptive within itself and that's validated by its translating of descriptions into prescriptons. But... desirism has no way of saying that any opinion that goes against desirism is objectively 'wrong'. Because desirism can't show how it itself is objectively 'right', it can only assume it is right and then from that point it is internally consistent.

A prescription is dependent on IF and OUGHT.

IF I wish that P I OUGHT to do X. IF I wish that there exists a state of affairs in which more and stronger desires are fulfilled than thwarted then I ought to have the desires than tend to promote more and stronger desires than they thwart.

This is trivially true, the argument is whether or not this goal to achieve said state of affairs should be called morality. This is the real argument here and I argue that it should, for reasons you have already seemed to agree with, that being it's consistent with moral language, is the only reason for action that exists and morality is necessarily a standard by which we judge action.

Also, our moral intuitions also seem to have this relationship in mind subconsciously, that being the vast majority of moral Nihilists and subjectivists who say that morality is whatever the opinion of a relevant person or persons are (or that moral statements are colloquialisms) is in fact representative of the relationship between desires and a state of affairs. A falsifiability would be to name an action that is considered good by the majority of desires universally that does not have these features?

Desirism it's self is true in that it is objectively true or false that certain desires tend to promote more and other desires than they thwart and vice verse, and since desires are the only reasons for action that exist all action that we take is contingent upon the relationship between our desires and the state of affairs, thus if you want a world in which more of us are free to act as we chose without being hindered you are essentially a Desire Utilitarian regardless of whether or not you want to label it 'Morality'.

So in that sense there are no opinions that 'go against' desirism, you can chose to call something else morality but that has no impact on the truth of desirism in determining what desires tend to promote more and stronger desires than they thwart.

If you can name me a reason for action that actually exists other than desires then this notion is fucked, but until then it stands to reason that since morality judges our reasons for action, and the only reasons for action that exist are desires, all moral statements necessarily deal with desires.

Before any of this it has to be assumed that what we value is what we should value. It is all we can value, but that doesn't mean we should value it. While I am alive I must breathe, but this doesn't mean I should breathe while I'm alive. What would that even mean? It's just describing it isn't prescribing.

1. You have your conception of 'should' without IF once again, thus your objection is based on the same fundamental flaw. If you want to live you ought to breath and avoid trucks and eat food and drink water etc. If you don't value life you ought not to breath, avoid trucks etc.

You see what happens when you ignore the If? No Ought statements work by themselves, there is nothing you ought to do for the sake of it.

Any valid prescription is necessarily a valid description of what you ought to do should you value a state of affairs in which that P.

2. Any moral framework can only tell you what to do if you already value that outcome. If you value the outcome of X you ought to do Y because Y tends towards X, in Divine command theory, you ought to do X if you value that P, where P is the avoidance of eternal hell-fire and X is the action that tends towards P.

There is no such thing as a framework of any kind that enforces or necessitates behaviour in it's self. In Desirism, whether or not you want to label it morality, if you value universal freedom of action you a) Ought to have the desires than tend to promote more and stronger desires than they thwart b) Have reason for action to promote or condemn the desires that are contrary to this value, in doing so changing the malleable desires of others to be such that tend to promote more and stronger desires than they thwart.

Is that cleared up?

The only legitimate argument here is whether or not we should call desirism morality, and even if we chose not to that does not mean that Desirism is not objectively true in it's criteria of right and wrong relative to the goal.

I hope I've answered the "desirism needs to be desired" objection sufficiently.

Desirism needs to be desired according to desirism. That's circular reasoning.

This is false, desirism is not something that is valued, it is a framework. What needs to be valued for one to be a desire utilitarian is the desire for a state of affairs in which more and stronger desires are promoted vs the present. That is something I think we all generally value, and if we value that then we ought to have the desires that promote more and stronger desires than they thwart AND We have a reason for action in the form of our desires themselves.

I've argued that Desirism is true for a number of reasons,

And it can't be true from the outset unless you assume it is correct in the first place. Since it is only internally true it all relies on the premise that it itself should be valued.

This is all stemming from your mistake earlier, Desirism is trivially true. The only valid debate is whether or not we should call it morality.

Sure, and if someone doesn't care about having beliefs that are the best representation of what we know to be true then i'm not concerned with what they think.

What we value does not=what we should value. It's a logical fallacy to say that. Desirism makes sense within itself as a prescriptive system. Outside of itself it is merely descriptive because it can't show itself to be true with its own logic because that's circular reasoning.

There is NOTHING that we simply 'should' value, because no 'should' is independent of an IF. This is the last time I am going to point this out, if you continue to misuse the concept then I see no point in discussing it with you any further, it's like head-butting a wall (or talking with fr0d0).

It's like someone saying "No, I don't like it" when talking about common ancestors, and the same answer applies, "so what?"

No it's nothing like that because that's an entirely descriptive matter both internally and outside of its own subject. Desirism can only say it is "prescriptive" within its own logic. Outside it is merely description. See above.

The only valid prescription IS a description of the relationship between desires and a state of affairs. IF you wish/desire/want/value that P you OUGHT to do X. Name me one valid prescription that is not a description of the relationship between a set of desires and a state of affairs. You won't be able to, and since that is true and you seem to think that anything that needs an IF is only 'prescriptive within its own logic' then anything you think you should do becomes 'circular' in your view.

IF you wish not to get hit by a car, you ought to check both sides of the road before crossing.

There is simply no 'you ought to check both sides of the road before crossing', and if that makes it 'circular reasoning' then you're running in circles your whole life.

See above, and the post before that, and the one before that...

All of your objections about ought are invalid because you failed to account for the if. I ought to eat food if and only if I wish to eat, taste something etc.

I agree with all this. I never disagreed with it. I have already said that 'ought' implies 'can'.

And how is the statement "If you wish not to die, you ought to eat food and drink water" any less circular than "If you desire universal freedom of action you ought to have the desires than tend to promote more and stronger desires than they thwart"?

eating food has no intrinsic value that leads to it being an ought, it is dependent on an if. If I wish to starve to death I ought not eat.

Yes it's dependent on an 'if'. But if the 'if' is there that doesn't objectively prove that it is a 'should' or 'shouldn't' outside of any moral framework. And no moral framework can support themselves without being circular.

Of course not, it needs to be a VALID DESCRIPTION between what your wanting that P and what will realise a state of affairs in which the statement that P is true. Your objection is like saying "If I want to catch a fish I ought to brush my hair" which I totally agree is false, but a valid description between the desire and the state of affairs in which that desire is true IS a prescription. "If i want to catch a fish I ought to get a fishing rod and bait, then cast my rod into the ocean and be patient"

Your idea of circular is flawed, it makes any should statement regardless of it being a moral framework circular.

This is rooted in the same false objection answered above. Even if you don't want to call it morality, you can be objectively wrong in thinking that desire x will be the one that brings about a state of affairs in which more and stronger desires are fulfilled.

Well you are redefining morality from 'what should be' to 'what should be according to desirism' then. We can only do what we desire so it makes no sense to say we 'ought' to do anything different. But there is still no proof that we 'ought' to do what we desire. That goes from describing to prescribing.

Morality never has been defined as 'what should be' it's always been a standard by which we judge action, and in saying that any moral framework can be assigned like "If this framework is accepted as morality then the standards follow" This situation is no different and like I said earlier the only valid debate here is whether or not Desirism best fits moral criteria.

Also, you've got Ought wrong again, it's not a question of whether we ought to do what we desire as a desire is a future producing brain state, it's if we desire that P we ought to do x (what will bring about a state of affairs in which said desire is true). The fact that we desire something is the only reasons we have for acting as to fulfil that desire, provided that it is our strongest desire out of all possible relevant desires.

I'm out of time will get to the rest later.