Was Hitler objectively bad?

[theVOID]

A prescription is dependent on IF and OUGHT.

??? What the fuck's the difference between prescribing and saying something 'ought' to be? At least in one's opinion?

Yes a prescription is dependent on an if, and so is an ought. But what's the fucking difference between the two?

There is none. I keep making this distinction because every time you ask why I 'ought', I give you an 'if', and each time you say something nonsense like "that's not objectively prescribing it's self".

Can you name me something that objectively prescribes it's self?

Who the fuck says you ought to simply because desirism says so? Until desirism can validate itself people can just tell it to go fuck itself.

For fuck's sake, there is nothing you ought to do because "Desirism says so", There only exists what you ought to do provided you value a specific state of affairs, and it's not the goal of desirism or anything else to tell you what you 'ought' to do for the sake of it (because 'for the sake of it' doesn't exist), what it tells you is what desires are good or bad based on their ability to fulfil or thwart other desires.

The argument is why we should give desirism the existing moral language.

Desirism has a valid (and fucking trivially so!) coherence. Valid in itself only though, and fucking trival it indeed is - because it can't show itself to be right. I've been through this fucking multiple times.

It can't show it's self to be right in what aspect?

Morality already has a definition! What is moral is what 'ought to be'.

That isn't the definition of morality at all, It's "conformity to the rules of right conduct; moral or virtuous conduct." Or essentially "A standard by which we judge action".

There is nothing there about what you ought to do, that comes based on what set of rules best reflect the various moral criteria, the use of moral language, moral intuition etc. That is what the only valid debate here is, whether or not Desirism best describes moral phenomenon, if that is the case then it is tentatively true that Desirism is the best theory for dealing with moral propositions.

If you're redefining morality to mean 'moral within the realm of desirism' then you're still not getting and fucking objectively morality! You're merely redefining 'morality' to suit your precious fucking desirism.

1) I'm not doing that at all, I am arguing that when you take all of the features of moral phenomenon, as currently defined, they are best described by Desirism, just like the features of evolutionary phenomenon are best described by 'the theory of evolution by means of natural selection'. Does natural selection 'Objectively prescribe it's self'?

2) 'Objective morality' simply requires that the moral propositions are objectively true or false. Divine attitude theory is false (god does not exist), and doesn't "objectively prescribe it's self" (whatever the fuck that actually means) but it still makes Objective moral claims; "If you desire not to burn in hell forever, you ought to act in a way consistent with the nature of God" Where what is consistent with God is objectively true or false. That is ALL ANYONE MEANS by "objective morality".

My fucking point is that desirism can't show what's objectively moral really, it can't show what 'ought to be' objectively, it can only show what ought to be within its own logic. How can any fucking moral system say that it is objectively right? It can't! And redefining morality completely is just fucking cheating and not actually getting to objective morality.

No moral system even attempts to show it's 'objectively right', all moral theories, like all theories period are tentatively true. If Desirism best describes moral phenomenon then using desirism as a moral framework makes the best and most perfect sense. If you want something more than that then you are out of luck, but you have to disregard every tentative truth out there, because none of them can show that they are 'objectively right" by definition.

You can't objectively show that what's moral is what desirism says is moral O - fucking - K? You can't magically transcend the meta-ethical issue by redefining morality to mean what you want it to mean... morality already has a definition and you can't prove any moral theory to objectively be better than any other.

I didn't redefine morality, I argue that desirism best describes all moral phenomenon and is thus tentatively true. You can't show that phyletic gradualism is "objectively better" than punctuated equilibrium in any sense other than you can say that Phyletic gradualism best describes the known phenomenon.

It's only by our moral intuitions that we can fucking say 'X is right' or "Y is wrong" at all, all prescribing is entirely subjective.

Not true, we can also make that distinction based on relationships, provided we can find positive and negative relationships between variables. In that instance our intuitions may be practically of use, but they can be objectively right or wrong based on the relationship in question.

Something beging objectively moral within a certain moral framework doesn't prove, and is no closer to proving, that X or Y is objectively moral or immoral whatsoever. Prescriptive within a certain moral framework is merely descriptive in the world we actually fucking live in.

Unless the framework in question is the best description of known phenomenon, then we have a tentative conclusion and thus you are fully justified in using said framework.

That proves nothing. Morality is a matter of subjective and relative opinion and there is no evidence of any objective morality outside of any entirely unproven moral framework that can't be objectively fucking substantiated is exactly where we still stand on the very valid meta-ethical issue. You can't say that any moral framework is objective because it can't use it's own logic to validate itself as being any 'better' then any other moral system.... you have to start with meta-ethics IF you actually want a fucking objective morality. And it seems impossible to me, indeed.

Reooow! Enjoy your hissy fit.

I've already pointed out that theories are tentative. It's not called "meta ethical proof" for a reason.

Science is an entirely descriptive issue. We wouldn't fucking say that we could objectively evice that scientists SHOULD research X, SHOULD experiment on Y. That would be prescribing and would be subjective and relative.

Of course not, we have no IF in your example. It's the same fundamentally flawed objection you bring up time and time again, the necessity for intrinsic value. If scientists want to know about X they ought to do what they believe will best lead to knowledge about x.

Science is completely fucking different to moral frameworks because moral frameworks are supposed to be prescriptive!! They can't objectively validate themseleves anymore than science can objectively say it should or shouldn't treat people like guinea pigs (And no, it can't.... that's a moral issue and a matter of opinion).

The only valid prescriptions that exist ARE descriptions of a relationship, they ARE NOT mutually exclusive. Name me one valid prescription that is not an accurate description of a relationship between a set of desires and a state of affairs.

Morality is entirely a matter of opinion because what we ought to do is entirely a matter of opinion.

And what we ought to do is a relationship between what we desire and what actions will get us to a state of affairs in which the desire is true.

Because outside of any moral framework what ought to be obviously can't be proven. And moral frameworks themselves can't be proven and the logic within them is fucking tautological to their owns reasoning (at best that is - at best it is merely coherent! Not objective in the real world).

I know all of this, It's simply not relevant. Theories are tentative, the best theory is the one that best describes the phenomenon in question.

Desirism it's self is true in that it is objectively true or false that certain desires tend to promote more and other desires than they thwart and vice verse,

So what that's descriptive and not actually a matter of moralitiy.

It's Descriptive in it describes a relationship between a set of desires and a state of affairs
It's Prescriptive in that it prescribes the action that tends towards said state of affairs.

and since desires are the only reasons for action that exist all action that we take is contingent upon the relationship between our desires and the state of affairs,

Still descriptive

Prescriptions are reasons for action, desires are the only reasons for action that exist. If you want to tell someone you ought to do x, you are saying they ought to have the desires give you reason for action to do x.

If you want a world that supports desirism them you will value it and say desirism ought to be subscribed to, yes. That's still descriptive!!! "People who desire desirism ought to support it within its own logic".... you have not bridged any 'Is' 'ought' gap.

I've covered this in the latest post.

Desirism is merely being descriptive though so fuck it. It's prescirptive within itself but then that means you should only listen to it if you already agree with it!

Right, and you should (prescription) only try to learn about life using techniques arrived at by the theory of evolution by means of natural selection if you already believe it's true. So what? It's got nothing to do with the reasons why we believe The theory of natural selection is accurate.

It once again comes down to tentative truths.

Desirism is entirely descriptive when it is correct. When it gets prescriptive and says anyone ought to desire X or ought not to desire Y it is completely fucking unsupported!

I've covered Prescription and Description and given you a challenge already.

I'm tired of repeating myself right now. Especially when I have trouble fucking explaining myself it seems

Cognitive dissonance.

Once we clear up why Desirism is tentatively true and how it IS prescriptive (And my challenge should solve that) you should come around