Is 10,000 people suffering identically equal bad as one of them?

[theVOID]

If what you believe is true it necessarily does imply that because it implies that sufferers can outweigh other sufferers through sheer quantity alone (because each of them suffer equally). So a great enough quantity sufferers suffering little can outweigh a smaller quantity of sufferers suffering more.

I don't care about impossible additional suffering. All suffering is equal if all sufferers suffer equally because only sufferers actually suffer.

Right, and all sufferers suffer equally was not the case in your pinprick example, in that you had one person suffering 10,000 times more than any other individual. In this instance the person suffering 10,000 times is 10,000 times more potent in affecting our aversion to suffering, thus we have reason to prevent that suffering more than the marginal group suffering.

Equal sufferers means equal suffering.

So by that right you must conclude that 10,000 people suffering 1x is literally equal to 1 person suffering 10,000x, because the amount of suffering quantitatively is identical between groups.

If you want to know how we would act, and not what the values are, you must look at value in the situation beyond the experience of the sufferer, the only thing that affects the judgement either way therefore is the value it has relative to the person assessing the situation, again it gets down to what desires we have, I have an aversion to the suffering of Me, You and Us, the more the suffering the greater the aversion, thus given the choice I will act to prevent the suffering for which I have the greatest aversion.

But when the values are confined to an assessment of group 1 and 2 they are equal.

John Rawls gives a critique of Utilitarianism in A Theory Of Justice that rejects the idea that the happiness of two distinct persons could be meaningfully counted together. He argues that this entails treating a group of many as if it were a single sentient entity, mistakenly ignoring the separation of consciousness.[17] Animal Rights advocate Richard Ryder calls this the 'boundary of the individual', through which neither pain nor pleasure may pass.[18] Thus the aggregation of utility becomes futile as both pain and happiness are intrinsic to and inseparable from the consciousness in which they are felt, rendering impossible the task of adding up the various pleasures of multiple individuals.[...]

In the example you gave though, even if we could meaningfully assess happiness and determine which situation would have the greatest amount (and assuming suffering is the antithesis of happiness) the two situations would still be of equal value.

That doesn't matter though, it's easy to make value claims without evaluating strange and mostly unworkable phenomenon like happiness, which in this case would have to have intrinsic value, in fact as far as I know nobody here used happiness as a response, there are much more concrete relationships to work with. Thus, Rawl's objection has no place amongst our objections to your reasoning.