Was Hitler objectively bad?

[theVOID]

There is none. I keep making this distinction because every time you ask why I 'ought', I give you an 'if', and each time you say something nonsense like "that's not objectively prescribing it's self".

Can you name me something that objectively prescribes it's self?

I meant that it can't prove that it objectively should be followed. It's objectively descriptive but not objectively prescriptive.

Nothing at all can "objectively prescribe" it's self. That's assuming you're using the term like Makcey, which half the time you don't seem to be. Mackey considered "objective prescriptivity" to be the mechanism by which the intrinsic value theories of moral realism state their reason for action (like Bentham's pleasure utilitarianism), he does not consider it a necessity for a theory of moral realism, nor does it exist in his own moral realism. It's a completely arbitrary objection.

And any prescription is necessarily a relationship between a set of desires and a state of affairs, if you desire that P you ought to do x (where x is the action that tends to do bring about a state of affairs). Any prescription when drawn out ends up with a desire and a goal.

"If you want to get healthy, you ought to take this medicine." The desire is to be healthy, the validity of the prescription is objectively true for false in terms of it's ability to bring about the state of affairs in which "I am health" is true.

It is objectively true of false whether or not a prescription is valid (tends to being about a state of affairs in which that P). That is an objective prescription, it's the only kind of prescription that exists. A prescription is a reason for action, to say that you should do x is the same as saying you have a reason for action to make or keep x true. Desires are the only reasons for action that exist. You will not intentionally act unless you desire the thing you are acting towards.

Anyway, that's not the issue, WE have to value accurate descriptions of reality, you could demonstrate that a methodology is the best descriptor of a set of phenomenon and that still would not make that methodology "objectively prescriptive". I argue that desirism is the most accurate description of moral phenomenon, thus is the best framework for approaching moral claims.

I may have even come up with a proof, rather than the tentative truth, but that will be for another thread once I have properly examined the formal argument.

'Objective morality' simply requires that the moral propositions are objectively true or false.

So yes Desirism is objective in the sense its descriptive propositions are true.

And prescriptive. A moral prescription is one form of moral proposition, these too are objectively true or false.

Of course not, we have no IF in your example. It's the same fundamentally flawed objection you bring up time and time again, the necessity for intrinsic value. If scientists want to know about X they ought to do what they believe will best lead to knowledge about x.

And so science is based around objective ideas about nature and the universe and whatnot so in that sense it's objective. But it still can't objectively prove itself as true without tautology because there are only tentative truths like you say, so in that sense it's not objective.

That's not what objective means, it means "not grounded in the opinion of persons". In that sense all relational measurements in science, both the descriptions of relationships and the prescriptions dealing with what actions and methods tend to lead to certain results, are both objectively true or false.

The difference is science is descriptive only. It doesn't attempt to bridge the 'is' 'ought' gap.
It is true that if you can't value 'X' then it makes no sense to say you should value it. But if you can value 'X' there is nothing to say you 'ought to' value it.

Right, but you can prescribe actions relative to desired results. Just like in desirism you can prescribe action relative to your desires and a state of affairs in which the desires are true. These statements can be both descriptive and prescriptive at the same time.

And what we ought to do is a relationship between what we desire and what actions will get us to a state of affairs in which the desire is true.

You can't prove that, you can only assume it. The fact that we can desire 'X' doesn't objectively mean we should fulfil that desire even if it's to the fulfilment to all desires of everyone.. That's just your own judgement that 'better for everyone' is better, that goes past describing and into prescribing. You haven't bridged the 'is' 'ought' gap.

No, I can prove it. To say that you should do x is to say there is a reason for action for you to do x. Desires are the only reasons for action that exist, thus all real prescriptions are necessarily descriptions of what desires tend to lead to a state of affairs in which that P. These statements are both descriptive and prescriptive at the same time. There are no other logically valid forms of prescriptions, including Mackey's "Objective prescriptivity". To complain that Desirism doesn't account for prescriptions that don't exist is a completely invalid objection.

Anything of value also only exists as a relationship between desires and a state of affairs. If I value equality I desire a state of affairs in which the statement "Everyone is equal" is true. We will only ever act in a way that fulfils the strongest of our competing desires, and anything that fulfils the desire in question has a positive value in the 'good for me' or 'good for you' (common good) sense.

Another example. To say "I value this hammer" is the same as saying "I desire a state of affairs in which that P is true, and this hammer has instrumental value in making That P"

You can do this for any values.

All values are either 'good for me', 'good for you' or 'good for us'. Moral value is a subset of a theory of value that deals exclusively with 'good for us'. Our moral judgements are a standard by which we judge action, an action that brings about state of affairs in which more and stronger desires are fulfilled than thwarted (which is the same as saying has a general increase in value) is 'good for us' good. Thus, we can morally judge action based on it's tendency to promote or thwart other desires.

Therefore, A morally good desire is one that when applied generally to the community is one that tends to promote more and stronger desires than it thwarts. The desire to rape is a desire that if it existed generally in the community would thwart more and stronger desires than it promotes, thus we who have an aversion to having our desires thwarted have a reason for action why we ought to condemn the desire to rape. You can assess desires subjectively ('good for me') or objectively ('good for us').

The rest of this seems to be the same objection, so i'll just wait for your response to the above.