Proof Mind is Fundamental and Matter Doesn't Exist

[Pyrrho]

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This kind of argument is different from my usual because I tend to be weary of using the term proof. but this argument has my full confidence so I'm going ahead and presenting it as a proof. by proof, I mean that it cannot be reasonably refuted or bypassed. this is not an argument of my own, but it is a reiteration of the Introspective Argument created by Johanan Raatz.

Definitions:
Mind- simply that which produces consciousness. you can think of it as a product of material interactions or its own substance, but either way it cannot be denied mind exists.
Metaphysical Solipsism- belief that a mind (presumably the believer's mind) is the only thing that exists.
Substance Dualism- belief there exist two fundamental substances, mind and matter.
Monistic idealism- belief that mind is a fundamental substance, and the only one that exists.

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Argument:
1. a metaphysically solipsist world (a world where only a mind exists) cannot be proven false due to epistemic limitations.
2. it is unreasonable to presume solipsism is impossible given 1, therefore it must be reasonably granted solipsism is possible.
3. given 2, it is possible for mind to exist in a solipsist (immaterial) world while it is not for matter.
4. there is therefore something that it true of mind but not of matter. this means they cannot be the same thing and mind is not reducible to matter.
5. substance dualism has been proven false due to the interaction problem (substances can only interact via shared properties and substances cannot be fundamental and share properties).
6. therefore, all is mind and monistic idealism entails.

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Overview:
basically, I put together this argument to answer criticisms from the ground up rather than trying to explain separate from the argument. it uses external world skepticism to substantiate P1, thus already answering criticism of those who think I'm merely asserting solipsism is possible. from there, it goes on to debunk materialism and dualism leaving only monistic idealism.

Objections:
1. the argument doesn't debunk property dualism. it's possible mind is a property or process of matter and thus doesn't reduce to matter yet is still derived from material interaction-- it doesn't directly debunk it, but it can easily be shown false deriving from P2. if metaphysical solipsism is possible, mind cannot be a property or a process because you cannot have a world with properties or processes without anything to attribute them to. you can't have a world with only a run or a feed, therefore mind must be an entity rather than a property or process.

I'll also be willing to address any questions concerning monistic idealism as presented. my last thread was also an argument for idealism, but a much weaker one. feel free to critique, but either by challenging the premises or invalidating the logic. I listen to reasons, not emotional outbursts.

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I confess I have not bothered to read the entire thread.  But has anyone pointed out the fact that statement 2 does not follow from the previous claims?  If I cannot prove that something is false, that does not mean that it is actually possible.

It is confusing an epistemological idea with a metaphysical idea.  I may not be able to prove something, but that is about my knowledge.  Whether it is actually possible or not does not depend on my knowledge.

Furthermore, 3 is introducing more that does not follow from what was stated previously, because a mind might be a material thing.  Maybe your mind is all that exists, but your mind is a material object.  Thus, 3 would be false.

So you have at least a couple of ridiculous leaps in your argument, and even if there were only one ridiculous leap, it would fail.  Your argument is crap.