Proof Mind is Fundamental and Matter Doesn't Exist

[Rational AKD]

Been done to death...and I -did- already give you my thoughts...but, since you insist.

1. -useless, for your argument, but as I've said, I see nothing objectionable in the statement

2. -useless, for your argument, but as I've said, I see nothing objectionable in the statement

3. -I see no need for 2 or 3, since both are restatements of premise 1.  I would rephrase 1 through 3 as "If premise one were true, then premise one would be true".  In a metaphysically solipsist world, your premise 1, no argument need be given as all up to this point is contained within the parenthesis -in- that premise

well, at least you're ok with the first premises. it's a start. the reason I have premises 1 and 2 are because I anticipated the most common objection would be that I'm question begging by assuming solipsism is possible. I was correct, as even with those two premises it's still the most common objection. but they aren't the same statements. 1 is a statement of the epistemic possibility of solipsism. 2 is a claim that epistemic possibility of solipsism is evidence for its actual possibility and the belief that it is actually impossible is irrational given its epistemic possibility. perhaps I should have gone into detail on how the alternative of agnosticism is also irrational, but I didn't think of it at the time I made this thread. as for 3, it is important because it establishes there is something that is possible of mind but not matter which fits into the following premise.

4. -non sequitur, you -could- rephrase to make this statement follow, as I suggested, but since you haven't, tough shit.  Nothing in premise 1, restated however many times you like, makes any comment or implication regarding what either mind or matter are made of, specifically whether or not they are the "same stuff".

as I said, premise 3 is key to establishing this premise. given it is possible for mind to exist in a solipsist (immaterial) world but impossible for matter (by definition), then there is something that is true of mind but not matter. thus by Leibniz Law, they are not identical. since the difference is what is true of mind but not matter (or a property mind has that matter doesn't), that makes mind irreducible to matter.

so I guess your only problems then are with 4 and 5 since your only complaint about 6 is that there are problems with 4 and 5. at least now I have a good idea on what your objections are.

Mind and matter are indistinguishable in the context of physical reductivism.  All of your thoughts, all mind, -is- matter..not arising from matter, or emerging from matter.  That words have different meanings is no indication of the existence or accuracy -of- those meanings.

you may be using an alternate definition of matter, which you will have to define if that's the case. however, I wouldn't consider the apparent material constructs in our experience equivalent to mind. they are mental constructs. just because they aren't produced by your mind doesn't mean they aren't produced by any mind. my personal position is that they are produced by God's mind, though that is not the aim of the argument i'm presenting here.

Can you...go ahead, distinguish some for me then?  I'm eager to see what means you have available with which to do so.

you are not your imagination? you can come up with concepts in your mind, and those concepts are distinguishable from your own identity and mind. I mean, this is tautological stuff here...

Create as many divisions as you like, just understand that you're creating them as a matter of convenience in communication, they do not exist in this example.

then prove you're right and explain how my power plant analogy fails.

Programs that assess mudslide and avalanche risks do this all day every day

you can assess information without simulating a mountain... and those aren't the kinds of simulations i'm talking about. i'm talking about a simulation for an observer to experience. not an assessment program.

It's not really a mountain in -any- state...it's just a tiny little machine that exists, and persists.....on the board.

if it doesn't exhibit any qualities of a mountain, it isn't a mountain. I don't care if the code in the memory database means mountain, it's just an arbitrary code that is no more a mountain than the word itself I'm typing here.

sims aren;t required to actually -be- the thing they're simulating

no... that would be the 'simulator...' not the simulation... the circuit board would be the simulator while the game is the simulation.

The code...btw, not "just arbitrary code" - also little machines that exist and persist in-state.  There's nothing arbitrary about -any- of it.

all languages and codes are arbitrary... whether you're using binary, hex, or C++ it's all arbitrary.

-not at all, agreed.

at least the problem is isolated now... answer me this, do substances need to be tangible to tangibly interact? or do they not need to share that property?

Separate substances with a single shared property would seem to overcome your objection handily.

if they have a shared property, then there is a common substance between them. if they are fundamental, they cannot be broken down. if they are different, they have unique properties that make them different. if 2 substances share a property, that property is distinguished and taken from at least one of the substances. if they are both fundamental with fundamental properties, you wouldn't be able to take part of the substance's fundamental properties and distinguish it from that substance... or it wouldn't be its fundamental property now wouldn't it? it's like trying to distinguish materiality from matter. or mentality from mind. you simply can't because they're fundamental to it.