(September 20, 2015 at 10:02 am)Rhythm Wrote: That they are "better represented as ideas" is, firstly...not a statement of their nature...but also a non-statement in every sense of the word. All things human beings experience are "represented by ideas".I believe the physicalist world view is one in which, because our experiences supervene on a "real" objective world with certain unambiguous rules, that underlying world is NOT considered an idea. Because if you are saying that physical or mechanical terms are just convenient labels for something NOT more than ideas, then we agree, and we can go play LoL.
Quote:Nevertheless, we find the notion that these ideas are referent to have explanatory power....as we find the notion that these ideas are referent to matter to have explanatory power.....and while I've been giving you answers to these questions you've asked me...as best I can, you've not yet begun to attempt an answer to the only question I asked of you. Not that this omission should be taken as any proof that my worldview is correct and yours is not - of course...but as above...I'm not sure that we're discussing something that -can be- proven unless our circumstances change. Until we can articulate how to go about proving either..I go with the one that explains.
There's no doubt that the physical world view has great utility. It explains how bridges can be built, and how drugs can change the nature of experience. It has caused us to discover much about the worlds of the very small and the very large, to create fantastical things like computers and flying machines, and to see opportunities for interest in everything we can observe.
But there's nothing about this degree of utility which is incompatible with an idealistic view. All the good you say about physicalism can be extended to an idealistic world view, with all our shared observations falling under the umbrella of a sub-set of ideas which we can call "physicalism," but as a category of idea rather than as an assertion about the foundation of reality.